Acts of justice : risk and representation in contemporary American fiction by Polley, Jason S.
Acts of Justice 
Risk and Representation in Contemporary American Fiction 
Jason S. PoHey 
August 2006 
Department of English 
McGilI University, Montréal 
A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
© Jason S. Polley 2006 
1+1 Library and Archives Canada Bibliothèque et Archives Canada 
Published Heritage 
Branch 
Direction du 
Patrimoine de l'édition 
395 Wellington Street 
Ottawa ON K1A ON4 
Canada 
395, rue Wellington 
Ottawa ON K1A ON4 
Canada 
NOTICE: 
The author has granted a non-
exclusive license allowing Library 
and Archives Canada to reproduce, 
publish, archive, preserve, conserve, 
communicate to the public by 
telecommunication or on the Internet, 
loan, distribute and sell th es es 
worldwide, for commercial or non-
commercial purposes, in microform, 
paper, electronic and/or any other 
formats. 
The author retains copyright 
ownership and moral rights in 
this thesis. Neither the thesis 
nor substantial extracts from it 
may be printed or otherwise 
reproduced without the author's 
permission. 
ln compliance with the Canadian 
Privacy Act some supporting 
forms may have been removed 
from this thesis. 
While these forms may be included 
in the document page count, 
their removal does not represent 
any loss of content from the 
thesis. 
• •• 
Canada 
AVIS: 
Your file Votre référence 
ISBN: 978-0-494-32231-4 
Our file Notre référence 
ISBN: 978-0-494-32231-4 
L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive 
permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives 
Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, 
sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public 
par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, 
distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans 
le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, 
sur support microforme, papier, électronique 
et/ou autres formats. 
L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur 
et des droits moraux qui protège cette thèse. 
Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de 
celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement 
reproduits sans son autorisation. 
Conformément à la loi canadienne 
sur la protection de la vie privée, 
quelques formulaires secondaires 
ont été enlevés de cette thèse. 
Bien que ces formulaires 
aient inclus dans la pagination, 
il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. 
Acknowledgments 
Abstract 
Résumé 
Introduction: Ends and Odds 
Table of Contents 
Justifying Franzen's Fiction and Essays 
Chapter One: Defending Franzen, Defending The Corrections 
Chapter Two: Surveillance and Success in the Suburbs 
The Limits of Control in DeLiIlo's Drama 
Chapter Three: Stage-Managing the Individual 
Chapter Four: Lost in The Day Room, Locked into Valparaiso 
The Odds of Justice in Smiley's Fiction 
Chapter Five: The End of Legal Process in The Greenlanders 
Chapter Six: Big Stakes in Horse Heaven 
Conclusion: Risks and Starts 
Works Cited 
11 
IV 
VI 
1 
30 
75 
129 
169 
228 
278 
322 
328 
Acknowledgments 
The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without funding and 
the encouragement of colleagues and friends. During the course of my PhD, 1 received 
tinancial assistance in the form of the Slava Klima Award for Academic Excellence, a 
SSHRCC Doctoral Fellowship, the Hugh J. MacLennan Fellowship, a McGill Faculty of 
Arts and Science Award, and a McGill Faculty of Graduate Studies Entrance Award. 
From my cohort, 1 would especially like to thank Robin Feenstra for his 
recommendations about research and teaching. With his many questions, Seth Shugar 
helped me retine my thinking and theorizing. Thanks to Véronique Dorais for correcting 
my résumé. As always, 1 am deeply indebted to my parents, Trish McNulty and Joseph 
Polley, for a lifetime ofimmeasurable support. 1 thank my sister, Krista, for her 
consummate cool. Y gracias a Maria,Femanda Jaramillo, Santiago Jaramillo, Esteban 
Camargo, José Daniel Parra, Brian Lander, and Craig Williams for many refreshing 
meals and for keeping me informed about contemporary art, politics, media, and 
technology. 
1 also owe thanks to the University of Lethbridge, Universidad de los Andes, 
Bogotâ, and McGill for granting me sessional teaching positions. Like nothing else 
beyond the individuals on this page, teaching taught me that 1 do have something worth 
saying. 1 reserve my greatest thanks to the two individuals most instrumental to the 
completion of this project: my supervisor Allan Hepburn and my girlfriend Catalina 
Holguin Jaramillo. Always expedient, resourceful, and instructive, Prof essor Hepbum 
approached this study with more care, due diligence, expert commentary, and 
lU 
professional savoir-faire than 1 could have ever imagined, much less expected. 1 thank 
him for his time, ideas, dedication, and friendship. And Cata, this is as much for me as it 
is for you, my unofficial RA, mi paciencia infinita, my true muse. 
lV 
Abstract 
Spectacles of justice preoccupy contemporary American culture. Legal culture-
including the Watergate trials, the Lewinsky scandaI, and OJ Simpson's trial for alleged 
murder-assumes a central place in the American imaginary. Configurations of the law 
are not limited to media reportage and televised docudramas. Nor are arbitrations 
confined to law faculties and the spaces of formaI courts. Working through depictions of 
due process in different ways and in different zones, contemporary American writers 
point up the prevalence of legality in everyday life. Whether on college campuses, in TV 
studios and suburban homes, or at theatres and racetracks, justice mediates interpersonal 
relations. Personal narratives proliferate as modes of self-justification. Everyone has a 
right to represent her side of a story. As interpretations of reality, however, none ofthese 
stories can claim absolute justness. No one has a monopoly on the law or victimhood. 
This dissertation inspectshow Jonathan Franzen, Don DeLillo, and Jane Smiley 
present the inconsistencies of the law. These American novelists emplot global escapes 
into their work as a means to inform notions ofliberty and jurisprudence. For these 
writers, freedom requires the recognition of contradictory-and unanticipated-
narratives. "Justice Theory" emerges where media, gambling, performance, and suburban 
studies intersect with ethics, globalism, and narratology. In Franzen's novel The 
Corrections and essay collection How to Be Atone, self-validation requires the 
appreciation of the stories of others. In DeLillo's later works, particularly the plays The 
Day Room and Valparaiso, justice materializes in terms of isolation and the will to alter 
personal stories. For Smiley, as construed in her long novels The Greenlanders and 
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Horse Heaven, dynamic responsive actions attend risky, unpredictable encounters in 
competitive mi lieus like the racetrack. These authors reveal that executions of justice and 
the perpetration of injustice involve varied consequences. The law is not only about 
punishment and recompense. Rather, legality directs the consequences ofits applications 
toward the ideal of justice, which evolves alongside the subjects that it serves and the 
stories that they relate. 
VI 
Résumé 
La culture américaine contemporaine est préoccupée par des spectacles de justice. 
La culture légale--comprenant les procès Watergate, le scandale Lewinsky, et le procès 
d'OJ Simpson pour des allégations de meurtre-prend une importance globale dans 
l'imaginaire américain. Les configurations de la loi ne sont pas limitées au reportage des 
médias et aux documentaires dramatisés. Mêmes les arbitrages ne sont pas limités aux 
facultés de droit ou aux espaces des tribunaux judiciaires. Afin de représenter des 
procédures équitables de manières différentes et selon des zones différentes, les auteurs 
américains décrivent la prédominance du droit dans la vie quotidienne. Soit sur des 
campus universitaires, dans des studios télé et des maisons de banlieue, soit aux théâtres 
et aux champs de courses, la justice négocie toutes les relations interpersonnelles. Les 
récits personnels prolifèrent comme modes d'autojustification. Chacun détient le droit de 
représenter son côté d'une situation. Toutefois, comme les interprétations de la réalité, 
aucune de ces situations ne peuvent réclamer une justesse absolue. Personne n'a un 
monopole sur la loi ou la victimisation. 
Cette thèse examine les façons dont Jonathan Franzen, Don DeLillo, et Jane 
Smiley présentent les responsabilités de la loi. Ces auteurs américains incluent des 
évasions globales dans leurs œuvres afin de clarifier des notions de la liberté et de la loi. 
Pour eux, l'agence libre est démontrée par la juxtaposition de plusieurs récits uniques et 
plusieurs approches à la fiction. «La théorie de la justice» surgit des médias, du jeu, du 
théâtre, et des études urbaines qui s'entremêlent avec la narratologie. Dans le roman The 
Corrections de Franzen, et dans le recueil d'essais How to Be A/one de ce dernier, la 
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validation individuelle exige l'appréciation des histoires des autres. Dans ses oeuvres 
postérieures, particulièrement les pièces de théâtre The Day Room et Valparaiso, DeLillo 
localise la justice en termes d'isolement et de la volonté de changer son histoire 
personnelle. Pour Smiley, comme interprété dans l'ensemble de ses longs romans The 
Greenlanders et Horse Heaven, des réactions sensibles et dynamiques sont suivies par 
des rencontres risquées et imprévisibles. Les exécutions de la justice et la perpétration de 
l'injustice, comme ces écrivains décrivent, impliquent des conséquences diverses. La loi 
dirige ces conséquences vers l'idéal de la justice, qui évolue à côté des sujets et des 
histoires que ces individus partagent. Ceci n'est pas limité aux aspects de la punition et la 
récompense. 
Introduction 
Ends and Odds 
Performances of justice and narrative have a lot in common. As an ideal that 
necessarily evolves, justice requires narrative in order to be debated and implemented. 
Acting sometimes as arbiters of laws and legal apparatuses, narratives put justice into 
practice. Accordingly, narratives at once facilitate and problematize jurisprudence. They 
enact the processes that define the legal method. In textually inscribing legitimacy, 
however, they compromise the dynamic principle of justice by administering it in a 
particular way. Legality therefore exposes its pronouncements to supplementary 
intercession. In order to remain just, justice must risk conceding that its previous 
verdicts-its actions, its precedents-demand correction. As a matter of praxis, justice 
puts itself on trial through narrative acts. 
Complicating a fixation on justice in the United States, as illustrated through the 
cultural pervasiveness of what might be called "spectacles of justice," contemporary 
American writers repeatedly represent the liabilities of the law. Emplotting the legal 
method in different ways and in different spaces, novelists and dramatists reflect on 
conspicuous exhibitions of legality as they work through the repercussions of its domestic 
execution. American culture obsesses over public mediations of justice. In the aftermath 
of President Kennedy's assassination in 1963, an investigative commission published a 
contentious twenty-six-volume encyclopedia of evidence, accusation, and victimhood. 
Prosecutor Kenneth Starr's multiple cases against President Clinton sparked comparable 
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ci vic controversy; the Republican attorney took over the investigation into Clinton's 
involvement in the Whitewater ScandaI in the mid-1990s. Moving from real estate 
transactions to sexual indiscretions, Starr also gathered testimony essential to Clinton' s 
impeachment following the Lewinsky Affair. Whether captivated by the chronicle of an 
injured party or mesmerized by the perpetration of a moral assassination, American 
culture manifests an overwhelming yet unexamined concentration on justice as 
scrutinized through different modes oflegality. For contemporary American writers, acts 
of justice emerge in many zones or environments, not just in courtrooms. Dramatization 
of the legal process happens in such places as college campuses, closed courts, game 
milieus, TV talk shows, and theatres. These spaces also ironically allow for the 
suspension of due legal process. 
Although my assessment of justice focuses on novels and dramas rather than on 
critical dispositions to justice, this study involves the intersection of several theoretical 
approaches to narrative and culture. Investigating selected works by Jonathan Franzen, 
Don DeLillo, and Jane Smiley, this dissertation presents a narrative theory of justice. As l 
. constitute and lay claim to it, "justice theory" integrates the juncture-at times confluent, 
at other times divergent-of ethics, performance theory, gambling studies, urban and 
suburban theory, media analysis, narratology, spatiality, and globalization. The title of 
this study, "Acts of Justice: Risk and Representation in Contemporary American 
Fiction," also points towards my principal concerns with justice per se and its 
permutations within the field ofliterature. For aIl of its banal usage, or exactly because of 
these conventions, the word "justice" occupies a fundamental but uncultivated position in 
the public and individual imagination. As a case in point of the manifold intersections 
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that justice theory encapsulates, the root 'just" can denote prescribed philosophical 
adjectives like 'JuraI," grammatical commands like 'jussive," and legal terminology, 
such as the no uns jus cogens, jus gentium,justitiarius, and juste milieu. Less formally, 
"justice" connotes more decipherable nouns, like 'jurisdiction," ''jury,'' and ''judge,'' the 
familiar verb ''justify,'' along with its synonyms "validate," "defend," and "substantiate," 
in addition to the words normally interchangeable with the adjective "just," as in "fair," 
"unbiased," "proper," and "correct." 
In its simplest formulation, "justice" might be seen as the moral thermometer or 
collective register for a civil discourse. Notwithstanding the common recognition of the 
obligations of justice, literary analysts and contemporary cultural theorists have by and 
large ignored justice as a ground requiring extensive critical examination-not to 
mention the formulation of a comprehensive theory of justice. Reframing what Andrew 
Ross calls "the vastly disproportionate attention that broadcast TV devotes to legal 
culture" (48), 1 contend that legality, as a means for the application of justice, serves as 
the starting point for storytelling. Disturbances to justice initiate narrative. Independent of 
medium, as the consummate handbooks or mises en scène for the interrogation of free 
agency, fictional narratives are inherently embroiled in acts of justice. Representations of 
legality are by no means "disproportionate" to the interventions of justice in daily life. 1 
contest, rather, that attention to contemporary fictional applications of legality proves to 
be incommensurate with the predominance of legality in contemporary America. Despite 
its popularity in fiction, film, and television, "legal culture" remains understudied-or 
studied within unjust parameters. For example, while drafting multiple concordances 
between classic novels and legal texts in Law & Literature, Richard Posner, a trained 
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lawyer and economist, appropriates literature as a means to refine Iegality. Yet literature 
exists in its own representational terms. It is a symptom ofneither philosophy, nor theory, 
nor legality. 
, Justice is not only the prerogative of law faculties and the producers of television 
docudramas. Serious contemporary literature reconfigures justice in various modalities. 
Portraying justice in terms of women, outcasts, depressives, and other sociaIly 
marginalized figures, contemporary American literature appraises jurisprudence in 
substantive ways. Discounting clever jargon or specific name-hurling, as weIl as the 
modus operandi typical of formaI tribunal spaces, Franzen, DeLillo, and Smiley cross-
examine justice by means of reflection, verdict, punishment, spatiality, and the 
constellation of consequences that go hand-in-hand with the law. Whereas court 
documents and legal texts provide expert accounts and certified examples for the 
institution of new laws and the arbitration of existing laws, Franzen, DeLillo, and Smiley 
narrativize the manifold aftereffects ofthese dispensations of justice. Scrutinizing, for 
instance, the domino effect of victimhood (or how crimes may be caused by predecessive 
crimes) these authors elaborate upon illegality. Moving beyond the limits of the 
courtroom, these authors widen the scope for the articulation and interpretation of justice. 
Irrespective of my aim to explore justice substantively rather than generaIly, a 
word on terminology is required. My decision to use the designation "contemporary" for 
the major works and writers that 1 study in "Acts of Justice" derives from a reflection 
proportionate to the extensive consideration that justice obliges. Not impervious to the 
work of Linda Hutcheon, Fredric Jameson, and Brian McHale, 1 resist employing the "not 
'unproblematic' aspects of the term'Postmodemist'" (McHale 3) for a few key reasons. 
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Aware of Hutcheon's Derridean understanding of "postmodemism," which she defines as 
"a contradictory phenomenon, one that uses and abuses, installs and then subverts, the 
very concepts [that] it challenges" (3), and equally sensitive to Jameson's elaborate 
thinking on the subject of postmodernism, as manifested in his compilation The Cultural 
Turn and his tome Postmodernism, 1 adopt the catchword "contemporary" to steer clear 
ofthis debate about the meaning of"postmodemism." Despite my indebtedness to it, this 
deliberation would only sidetrack readers from my main concems. When the term 
postmodem arises in this investigation, as it seldom does, 1 defer to Allan Hepburn's 
unequivocal annotation in Intrigue, namely that postmodemism concems the ability to 
hold "conflicting opinions and values simultaneously" (197). 
Published between the mid-1970s and the present, the crucial "contemporary" 
novels, plays, and essays explored in "Acts of Justice" are released throughout a thirty-
year period that comprises responses to the Kennedy assassination, Vietnam, the Space 
Race, the fall ofthe Berlin Wall, and the close of the Cold War. This era encompasses the 
troubled administrations of Reagan, Clinton, and the Bushes, in addition to the post-9111 
epoch, which includes the War on Terror. Although 1 refrain from alluding to aIl ofthese 
incidents specificaIly, they provide background for what 1 portray as contemporary 
culture, an age that 1 variously describe as oriented towards images, media, markets, 
suburbs, technology, and information. Along with other less prevalent usages, 1 
incorporate phrases like "the image age" or "market culture"-almost interchangeably 
electing one or another as a more reliable indicator of the tendency that 1 am exposing. 
Synonyms, after all, provide for a modicum of slippage that fosters greater degrees of 
precision and nuance. As 1 move between different descriptors for contemporary culture, 
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1 pinpoint diverse facets of this current way of life. In the same way as legal 
argumentation and narrative demonstration can often draw their efficiency and persuasion 
from scrupulously elected terms and meticulously crafted expressions, literary analysis 
also exploits the specificities of this formalistic process. In contradistinction to a 
reductive or flippant mismanagement of language through unsophisticated formulations 
and appendages, the diligent micromanagement of language can educe the fine-tuning or 
descriptive elegance that discrete contemplations of justice compel. 
ln keeping with my focus on substantive issues instead of general ones, the three 
American authors whom 1 investigate do not write about justice and its costs exclusively 
or overtly. For example, in the fiction of Don DeLillo, who is one of the most studied 
writers in the US, there is a clear absence of legal drama or courtroom procedure. In 
White Noise, Libra, and Underworld, his most celebrated texts, DeLillo avoids staging 
recognized varieties of due process. A similar pronouncement can be made about Franzen 
and Smiley. Neither ofthese two authors fictionalizes justice in its courtroom form. 
Along with DeLillo, these writers inspect the underdetermined prevalence of justice, as 
weIl as its application by way of the limits of legality, in the lives of everyday Americans. 
By not writing about legality qua legalitas, but rather qua naturalis, they illustrate the 
commonness ofindividual concems withjustice. 
ln the estimation of novelist and essayist Jonathan Franzen, who evaluates 
narrative as contingent upon containment and manipulation, justice takes the form of self-
correction. In his work, especially the novel The Corrections, personal senses of freedom, 
sanity, and happiness work in conjunction with the personal will to change, not to . 
mention the will to accept the changes adopted by others. According to DeLillo, who is 
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both a novelist and playwright, justice also concerns the individual. Particularly in his 
dramas The Day Room and Valparaiso, characters turn inward to escape the constraints 
of culturaUy enforced codes and to reassert their respective daims to independence. In 
her two longest fictions, The Greenlanders and Horse Heaven, Jane Smiley contemplates 
justice in terms of neither self-correction nor self-rediscovery. Instead, she enlarges the 
compass of justice by configuring it in terms of random interpersonal relations. She 
represents free agents by means oftheir independent responses to unplanned social 
interactions, relations based upon the incalculable conditions that gambling and odds 
establish. AU three of these writers envision justice as part and parcel of the compromises 
that can redetermine individual fates. 
Developed through three two-chapter sections, this dissertation progresses from 
Franzen, through DeLillo, to Smiley for the sake of darity and coherence, not priority or 
import or other valuative resolves. None of these writers presents justice in a more just 
way than another. With their distinctive translations of narrative control (Franzen), spatial 
constraints (DeLillo), and haphazard circumstance (Smiley), all three writers illustrate 
that justice is about debate and execution rather than about being right. Justice entails 
prolonged narrative acts, not verdicts. Widening their considerations of justice as implicit 
to contemporary life, each of these authors assimilates a global understanding of the 
limits of representation while considering traditional concepts of justice. Taking into 
account the rights and viewpoints of other nations, Franzen, DeLillo, and Smiley work 
through and inform domestic versions of justice that implicate vigilantism, revenge, 
escape, precedence, creativity, and risk. Influenced by international events, they address 
and update local applications of the law. 
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As the form of my dissertation illustrates, Franzen, DeLillo, and Smiley revitalize 
their conceptions of justice in the course oftheir separate careers. Franzen reexamines 
The Corrections and the media event that followed its publication in his book of essays 
How to Be A/one. DeLillo reworks his novelistic depictions of agency by focusing on 
drama in the latter half ofhis career. In the course ofher oeuvre, Smiley increases the 
geographic range ofher narratives. She departs from American regional spaces to 
international settings. By incorporating two chapters into aIl three of my author-specific 
sections, 1 illustrate how each author reconstitutes his or her personal position toward 
justice and its spatial determinants. As prolongations, the second chapter of each section 
acts as an amendment, qualified resolution, or, 1 hope, persuasive finale to a lengthy 
survey of a performance of justice. Embodying the stipulations that "justice theory" 
promulgates, aIl three sections provide evidence for the rectifications that analyses of 
justice entail. A pluralistic and agonistic place as influenced by global perspectives as it 
is important to them, contemporary America must recognize that every enactment of 
justice can be reopened, reinvestigated, and corrected. Never definitive, always 
inconclusive, justice cannot be instituted unilaterally. Nor can it be used to any absolute 
end, save one that is categorically provisional. Upholding differentiations rather than 
universals, disputes in lieu of agreements, exceptions instead of constants, the law serves 
and protects on a case-by-case basis. 
Although legal precedents-or stories-initially determine the limits of due 
process, no case is exactly proportionate to another. For this reason, juridical procedure 
accommodates evolving understandings of criminality and punishment. These shifting 
conventions are performed in particular spaces of ceremony and mIe. Acts of justice 
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thereby occur in zones that resemble the spaces where games are played. Still, at first 
glance, the dynamism of jurisprudence contradicts the circurnscribed rules that normalize 
game spaces. Marking an unambiguous distinction between the set confines of play 
spaces and the open parameters of the everyday world, Roger Caillois describes the 
domain ofthe game as "a pure space," as "a restricted, closed, [and] protected universe" 
(7). "The confused and intricate laws of everyday life," Callois asserts, "are replaced, in 
this fixed [game] space and for this given time, by precise, arbitrary, unexceptional rules 
that must be accepted as such and that govem the correct playing of the game" (7). 
Precise rules aspire to direct game play in its different forms. Rule offenders, if 
caught in the act of taking advantage of another player or bending a set guideline, are 
immediately penalized. For instance, in End Zone Don DeLillo accentuates rule violation 
and punishment in college football. In the middle of End Zone, protagonist Gary 
Harkness, carrying the ball for the Logos squad, steps out of bounds because two 
opposing players have "the angle" on him (123). Notwithstanding his tactical departure 
from the zone of play, he gets "hit and dropped and hit again" (123). Impassioned by the 
illegal collisions, he retaliates. He cornes "up swinging" before being grabbed, pulled 
down, and kicked (123). As a result ofthese altercations, the Telcon team obtains a 
fifteen-yard penalty for "roughing" (123). Within the dictates of the game, a translation 
of justice plays out immediately. Dissimilar to the everyday world, where "trusting to 
autonomous and complete [and instantaneous] justice is futile" (Roos 157), the offenders 
receive their punishment, while Gary, the original victim, with his attempt at revenge 
clearly overlooked and forgotten, refocuses on the game. With these problematic 
depictions of discretion and judgment, End Zone presents a reflection upon strictly 
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regulated violence and the conditions of justice. The title refers to the two ends of the 
playing field, thereby signaling the sidelines and boundaries of the game. The narrative, 
however, questions these limits. Even though "play and life are constantly and 
universally antagonistic to each other" (Caillois 63), games are not completely separated 
from the everyday. Like player injuries, ofwhich End Zone contains an encyclopedia 
(145-7), the "ethical creativity oflimited and regulated conflict" (Caillois 169) cannot be 
restricted purely to play spaces. 
In terms of its title, as weIl as by means of its emphasis on motion, regulation, and 
spatiality, End Zone clearly alludes to Samuel Beckett's Endgame. Whereas Beckett 
refers to the micromovements, ponderings, and attacks of the final stages of a chess 
match, De Lillo repositions these militaristic orchestrations to the West Texas desert. 
Amalgamating the emptiness of the "Bare interior" and the stillness of the "Brie! 
tableau" that open Endgame (92), DeLillo transfers Beckett's characteristic anomie to the 
archetypal American zone of justice: the desert. DeLillo includes desertscapes in most of 
his fictions. In End Zone, the author condenses three different spatial determinants for the 
allocation of justice. He places the football field, where arbitrary mIes swiftly manage 
offenses, at the core of the college campus, where symbolic mIes sanction assorted social 
interactions. As a space of overlapping, complementary, and conflicting regulations, the 
campus sits at the center of the bare desert, where outlaw justice encodes mano a mano 
clashes. With these concentric demarcations of justice, DeLillo commemorates the 
institutionalization of empty space, as the underdetermined mIes and limits intrinsic to 
the names Endgame and End Zone imply. Like Ground Zero, which rests in the awful 
vacancy left in the absence of the Twin T owers, endgames and end zones are the spaces 
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where activity stops. Yet, in paradoxically inaugurating endings that compel epochal 
embellishment, DeLillo observes how serious play, in its multiple varieties, transcends its 
own prescribed limits. Though models for the lawful assignment of recompense, play 
zones incorporate the questionable arbitrations that define domestic distributions of 
justice. 
Even when allegedly irrefutable, as in the "arbitrary" precincts of play that 
Caillois emphasizes, performances of justice are never indisputable. In the same way as 
legal processes rely upon narrative, and specifically on dissimilar renditions of a joint 
story, courtroomjudgments corroborate the devices of narrative. Inextricable from 
storytelling, justice provides local applications, not universal answers. Combined with 
narrative portrayal, the law also integrates theories of ethics and literary analysis. 
Respectively, James Phelan, Martha Nussbaum, and Robert Eaglestone prop up Shirley's 
Heath's daim that good literature, like religion, proves "substantive" because it provides 
neither "answers" nor "dosure" (in Franzen, "Why Bother" 82). Implying a connection 
between active disagreement and disinterested consideration, between doubt and ethics, 
Phelan contends that "The activity of discussing the values of texts is ethically more 
important than getting it right" (95). In parallel fashion, Nussbaum encourages readers to 
"applaud and investigate" the different ethical judgments of a given text (71). Eaglestone 
makes a related intervention when he condudes, "criticism too must fail, must always be 
open to interruption. There can be no final reading, no last word" (179). Nonetheless, in 
contrast to the endless ethical elaborations that Phelan highlights, it is the job of justice to 
endorse its procedures by implementing absolute pronouncements. Though court cases 
can last for protracted periods of time, they must, like novels, come to an end-at least 
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temporarily. 
Debated, deliberated, and delivered by means of the legal method, just decisions 
leave themselves open to supplementary contention. Understood as signposts along the 
way to justice, rather than as definitive destinations for the would-be proper institution of 
justice, courtroom judgments--or findings--endorse dispute at the macro and the micro 
level. In the same way as a legal precedent can be overruled, ajudge's ruling can be 
appealed by the guilty party. The right to appeal prolongs the negotiations of due process. 
In a related form of aboye-board intervention, accusers and defendants can exercise the 
right to settle a case out of court. When faced with malpractice suits, hospitals and their 
affiliated physicians customarily opt for this alternative in order to safeguard against the 
establishment of precedents that would further increase liability. Appeal and settlement 
therefore redirect the courses of justice. The former pro longs formaI conclusion. 
Upholding the mandates of justice, appeals call for additional presentations of narrative. 
Dependent upon added detail, extended appraisal, and recalibrated assessment, appeals 
exaggerate the devices of justice. Aiming to cancel out an initial ruling, appeals call 
attention to reconsideration, to rereading. Though officially conclusive, legality applies 
its means to its end. Investigating and addressing acts of injustice, jurisprudence 
incorporates the reinvestigation of its own conclusions. 
In out-of-court settlements, justice sanctions a procedure that disallows the 
creation of new regulations and, by extension, new understandings of illegality. In 
prohibiting the institution of new legal precedents, justice paradoxically maintains its 
track. In order to be just, justice must prohibit its own abuse. Obstructing the overuse of 
just recourse, legality tempers its own control over the citizens that it governs and serves. 
l3 
In discouraging the creation of laws and bylaws, justice discourages unjust increases in 
personal accountability. As the starting points for the exacting of justice, precedents 
clearly encourage self-professed victims to resort to lawful or unlawful tactics for the 
redeployment of justice. In the contemporary repertory of American fiction, the rising 
status of the "victim"-whose specter is visible in the allegations of President Clinton's 
sexual misconduct with White House intem Monica Lewinsky-Iegitimates spectacles of 
justice. Precedents suggest constellations of events, much like the curious or discomfiting 
incidents that serve as the starting points for fictional narratives. Precedents permit so-
called "victims" of putative "crimes" to link themselves to comparable acts of justice. 
Novel applications of the law amplify interpretations ofvictirnhood and criminality. 
In checking the introduction of laws, the legal method restricts the limitations that 
a culture can place upon itself. Cultures certainly adapt and evolve on account of the 
realization of new laws and freedoms. Yet overiy regulated societies, like overiy 
permissive ones, impose limits on the freedoms of their citizens. Akin to too much 
legality, too much liberty can arrest personal agency. As contemporary American fiction 
by Franzen, DeLillo, and Smiley shows, surpluses oflegality, like shortages, alter the 
boundaries of everyday life. Justice, in other words, ought not to be the leitmotif of 
anyone's personal story. A crevice divides the ideal of justice and applications ofthe law. 
Narratives correspondingly emplot exclusive endorsements of justice. Disparate acts of 
justice surrender the ideal to local appraisals and usages. In or out of court, justice cannot 
be dispersed in one way. As it applies and revises itself, justice limits itself. 
Not fashioned in order to establish personallimitations, justice articulates and 
approves the appreciation of individuallimits. Regulating while it complies, justice also 
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orders as it answers. As one of its inbuilt ironies, justice manifests itselfby remaining 
half concealed. Too visible, it constrains the people that it guards. Invisible, it ignores the 
personal narratives of certain individuals by disrespecting the differences and 
complexities of US culture. In Way of the World, Franco Moretti argues that everyone has 
a right to a story, and these stories, as personal testimony, are implicated in systems of 
justice (205,213). Moretti's consideration of the Bildungsroman from Fielding to 
Dickens implies that all novels "back up an ideology of justice" (213). In order to clarify 
this "cooperation ofliterature and law" (212), Moretti emphasizes that fiction 
"introduces" and "strives to prove, in explicitly egalitarian fashion, that everyone-
bastard chi Id, woman, drunk, fugitive, pauper-has the right to tell her/his side of the 
story, to be listened to, and to receive justice" (213). In Moretti's estimation, these 
representative subaltems have been "deprived of the right to have rights [and] restoring it 
to them is nothing more than an act of justice" (205). Therefore, the history of the novel 
from its inception is, in sorne ways, a form of justice. 
Nonetheless, contemporary American narratives concem the le gal arbitration of 
justice. Modem European novels, as Moretti appreciates them, do not support the meting 
out of legal or financial rewards. Rather than dwell on heavenly rewards, the works of 
Smiley, Franzen, and DeLillo, among others, concentrate on the apparatus that attributes 
justice on earth. Unlike Fielding's hero Tom Jones, who receives a socially arbitrated 
reward (he marries the squire's daughter after his urban experiences), in the US justice 
gets mediated through the processes of legality. In Joyce Carol Oates's campus novel 
Nemesis, published in 1990, a composer-in-residence accused of abusing a male student, 
who does not file criminal charges, receives a buyout from the conservatory as a result of 
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his alleged crime. Narrative adjudicates the situation not as a dispensation ofright and 
wrong, nor even as a compensation for being a decent person. The ethical implications 
faU on the apprehension of legal rightness as determined by a particular tribunal, 
notwithstanding a person's evasions of the law. Though canonized occidental novels and 
recent American narratives configure the distribution of justice in divergent ways, both 
make a virtue ofhow justice revolves around storytelling. 
American fiction has a long history of representing injustices in order to redress 
them. In Melville' s masterwork, Moby-Dick (1851), the narrator, who invites readers into 
the text with the opening request "CalI me Ishmael" (3), delivers his self-justifying story 
alongside accounts of the actions and gestures of the almost impenetrable yet eminently 
admirable and "affectionate" Queequeg (28), a heavily tattooed black man of unclear 
origin. At once a human symbol of the unvanquished sea, an individual without equal, 
Ishmael's lifesaver, and Ishmael's proxy audience, Queequeg plays multiple parts in 
Ishmael' s narrative. These roles indicate that free agency requires the sharing of personal 
stories. Marking a movement from divine justice to the grim justice of naturalism, Frank 
Norris likewise emphasizes individual narratives. Published in 1899, McTeague, a 
landmark of naturalistic fiction, features an eponymous dentist whose mounting passions 
overwhelm his small refinements, eventually leaving him destitute in a de sert fighting a 
friend-tumed-foe to the death. In the vast expanse of Death Valley, McTeague finds 
himself as entrapped and doomed as the "half-dead canary" that he carries around in "its 
Httle gilt prison" (324). Though McTeague escapes his cramped apartment in 
overcrowded San Francisco, his fate is sealed when his former friend, in a last-ditch 
effort to orchestrate McTeague's fate, handcuffs himselfto his murderer as he expires. 
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Contemporary writers engage in acts of justice by complicating relations between 
identity, performance, and freedom. In light of the trajectory ofindividual stories as 
depicted in the Arnerican literary tradition, Frederick and Steven Barthelme demonstrate 
the flexibility of justice systems in their memoir Double Dawn. Like sorne of their 
contemporaries, the brothers work within notions ofvictimization, theatricality, and risk 
as they extend representations of the problems of justice and independence. For recent 
Arnerican authors, characters access freedom by endangering their conceptions of this 
lack of restriction. Like the legal method, self -justification by necessity remains open to 
risky questions, actions, and decisions. 
Double Dawn documents the two-year gambling addiction ofthe Barthelme 
brothers. Their splurge, which is funded by an inheritance, ends when they are prosecuted 
for complicity in cheating a casino. Remarking that the law is "awkward" and 
"remarkably unsupple" (169), Frederick and Steven style Double Dawn as an appeal that 
pro longs the deliberations of due process. They evoke connections between narrative and 
liberty as they cross-examine justice in its courtroom form. In their estimation, "The law 
wasn't about finding the truth. It wasn't about guilt or innocence. It was about telling the 
jury a story. And whoever told the best story won" (172). Fashioning their book as a 
delayed legal testimony, the Barthelmes insist that prevailing legal narratives cannot 
reflect the ambiguities and complexities of the everyday world: "[The court] did not want 
reality. [It] wanted a picture you could draw with a child's marker" (176). They put 
forward that justice-as protocol-materializes as both a game of reduction and a high-
stakes gamble. Storytelling in a courtroom, as a modeling of truth for the purposes of 
approaching a just verdict, entails serious play with serious consequences. 
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As an extension of the tribunal that scrutinizes the justness of the Barthelmes 
approach to gambling, Double Down puts the justness of justice on trial. In doing so, the 
narrative acts as an alibi for the brothers, who present themselves as thrifty academics in 
the everyday world and high-rolling gamblers in the play space. "At home," they plea, 
"you might drive across town to save a buck on a box of Tide, but at the [blackjack] table 
you tip a cocktail waitress five dollars for bringing you a free Coke. You do both of these 
things on the same day" (25). Entreating readers to identify with them by using the 
pronoun "you," Frederick and Steven argue that they are guilty only insofar as the law 
needs to be reconsidered. Narrative thereby restores a balance of justice-an impartiality 
executed through legal acts, not through merit or providence. After all, the brothers are 
"hooked on risk," not luck (102). Furthering the formallimits of justice and freedom, 
narrative invites justice to risk re-justification. 
American literature contains the prevailing sentiment that the law is a set of 
stories. Since this is the case, any interpretive construct can be correct, or at least 
arguable. In contemporary American fiction, the dimensions of this ethical problem 
increase because felony always cornes in concatenated stories. Illustrating the raison 
d'être for laws, which supersede vengeance withjustice or vigilantism with stories, the 
consequences of criminal acts canjustify, cancel, extend, or duplicate the so-called 
"original" crime. Acts of justice and injustice alike take into account prior provocations 
and actions. Notwithstanding its multiple formulations, justice is never enacted in a 
vacuum. Commensurately, novelists and dramatists construct specific zones for the 
circulation of justice. 
Whereas the Barthelmes engage in awkward acts of justice in American casinos 
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and courtrooms, Joyce Carol Oates represents justice in regional milieus. Perhaps the 
most productive serious writer in the US, Joyce Carol Oates has published over eighty 
books. Principally a realist, like Smiley and Franzen, Oates positions herself in the 
naturalist tradition by frequently incorporating revenge motifs and the emplotment of 
retribution in her novels. In her roman à cleftitled Nemesis, which she writes under the 
assumed name Rosamond Smith, a name change that protects any "potentially libelous 
author" (Mc Hale 206), the simple expression or so-called demonstration of the will-to-
revenge transforms victims into suspects. Set at the Forest Park Conservatory of Music, 
which is a fictional substitute for Princeton, where a sex scandalled to the discharge of a 
tenured prof essor in the late 1980s (see Rabinowitz [1989]), Nemesis concems events 
surrounding the alleged rape and beating of gauche and creepy student Brendan Bauer by 
Composer-in-Residence Rolfe Christensen. Judged by a campus tribunal made up ofhis 
colleagues, Rolfe, who is known more for his rap-sheet of sexual indiscretions than for 
his musical scores, receives a counterintuitive sentence: relief from his teaching duties 
with full pay. Maintaining his eminent title and proportionate salary, albeit with the 
perquisite of additional spare time, Rolfe appears to be rewarded for his dubious actions, 
a recompense that implicitly renders Brendan's claims questionable, even defamatory. 
After Rolfe's death by chocolate (he receives a mysterious gift-box delivered 
through campus mail), Brendan becomes the prime suspect in the police case. Brendan's 
putative rape, never proven in a legitimate court, not least on account ofhis refusaI to 
press formaI charges and to submit to a medical exam, therefore alters from an 
underinvestigated heinous crime perpetrated upon an unsuspecting young man to the 
same young man's motive for committing murder. A crime can tum a victim into a 
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suspect, particularly when a graver crime follows the initial one. In this case, victim 
equals victimizer once victimizer equals victim. More than ever, when an initial offense 
appears to be dealt with unjustly, cri minai acts compound criminality. 
The recollective narrative style of Nemesis further complicates the reader's 
appraisal of Brendan as both a suspected victim and a suspected murderer. Oates 
consistently refers to terrible events only to delay elaborating on them. Such is the case, 
for instance, after she reveals a third felony, the bloody murder of young professor 
Nicholas Reickmann, Rolfe's substitute literary executor. Instead ofpresenting a 
description and analysis of this episode and its pressing implications, Oates turns to 
different narrative events. As a backdrop to each murder, she presents a constellation of 
mysteries and details that may or may not be directly pertinent to the cases at hand. She 
thereby compels her readership to integrate legal investigation with narrative 
representation. Rather than immediately describe criminal acts through the eyes of an 
impartial, third-person witness, she depicts these activities through testimony and hearsay 
founded in a series of interwoven, disordered stories. Playing off the mythological term 
designating divine punishment for misconduct or presupposition, Nemesis explores how 
unjust actions affect the lifestyles and the futures not only of those involved in a case, but 
also of those peripherally involved in a crime. Because of professional or personal or 
regional ties to extenuating circumstance, acts of injustice and their prosecutions have 
unpredictable and irrevocable aftermaths. As manifested through the legal method, Oates 
shows that it is the job of justice to allocate impartial reconciliation, not only punishment. 
Mere penalties, themselves always open to debate and presumption, cannot fulfill the 
demands of justice. 
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Oates investigates the same ends and odds of justice in her most famous work, We 
Were the Mulvaneys, an Oprah-approved regional epic about the dissolution of an all-
American family. In this traumatic 1996 novel, Zachary Lundt rapes his popular, virginal, 
cheerleading classmate Marianne Mulvaney. FoUowing the deferred exposure ofher 
exploitation, Marianne's model-citizen father, aptly named Michael, takes it upon himself 
to confront the assumed abuser at his father's home. VengefuUy, he bloodies the boy's 
face and manhandles his father. Legally obstructed by a deal that would embroil him in a 
counter-suit for assault should his daughter press charges against her persecutor, Michael 
tums to drinking, his long-abandoned habit, in order to suppress his alignment with 
Marianne's victimization. Complicating and widening the compass ofthese feelings of 
oppression, Marianne, who was drunk for the first time when allegedly violated, betrays 
her family by refusing to cast any blame upon Zak. Moreover, she does not even 
acknowledge his abusive actions. Notwithstanding her inescapable focus on his self-
incriminating command "Don 't play games with me" (71), a behest that recalls Rolfe' s 
flagrant "JUST DON'T PLA y GAMES: 1 WARN YOU" in Nemesis (46), Marianne, to the 
agony of her father, devotedly reiterates versions of "1 was drinking. It 's so hard to 
remember. 1 can 't swear. 1 can 't be certain. 1 can 't bear false witness" (Mulvaneys 142, 
143, 145, et seqq.). Since she feels disinclined to embroil herselfin a legal trial that 
would expose her to the inspection of the public, her father's compensatory actions 
cannot openly be justified. Because Michael's illegal maneuvers are verifiable-they 
were witnessed-he, also a victim, assumes the municipal burden of Zak' s guilt. By 
association, aU six members of Michael's family likewise assume culpability to various 
degrees. 
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Within a year, the family is no longer the well-respected Mulvaneys of "High 
Point Fann." Incapable ofbearing the circumlocutory fonn of injustice that his daughter 
perpetrates upon him and his family, Michael, a dipsomaniac in dedine, sends Marianne 
to live with a distant relative. In response to Michael's growing impertinence, Michael, 
Jr, the oldest son, quits roofing for his father and moves away. Patrick, the family brain, 
departs for Comell University on a scholarship. With only Michael'sîong-suffering wife 
Corinne and their preadolescent son Judd left to manage the farm, the property falls into 
disrepair as the malingering Michael progressively loses roofing contracts. Squandering 
the family savings on abandoned legal cases filed against a rising number of so-called 
victimizers, the justice-obsessed Michael finally declares bankruptcy. 
Purposely disassociated from the locus of the Mulvaney's irredeemable loss of the 
American Dream, Patrick thrives at college, amassing awards and praise. Yet an 
unpredictable event disrupts his academic accomplishment. One evening while 
uncharacteristically attending a rock concert, he encounters a young man he mistakenly 
identifies as Zak. The misrecognition prompts Patrick to develop a Michael-like fixation 
on "executingjustice" upon the real Zak (253, 255, 257, 267, 272, et seqq). Compelled to 
restore a long-overdue balance of justice to his banished sister and to his wounded family 
members, Patrick devises an intricate plan of retribution over several months. Initially 
typified as incurably unhappy, Patrick daims an unprecedented sense of extra-academic 
purpose from his detailed recourse to the emplotment of reprisaI. 
Although he does not leave Zak to die at the culmination ofhis carefully 
orchestrated and perfectly perfonned plot, Patrick's actions reestablish a sense of justice. 
As a matter of fact, he works out the problems of and his personal preoccupations with 
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justice because he ultimately identifies with Zak's vulnerability. As a result ofhis 
alignment with his victim, Patrick rescues the repentant Zak from a sluggish drowning in 
an isolated swamp. Patrick reclaims personhood and contentment--or the principle ends 
of justice-through the contemplation of a risky revenge, not the complete execution of a 
plan that, against expectation, proves to be less than risky. In We Were the Mulvaneys, 
Oates iIlustrates how fashioning, rather than completing, payback corrects a previous 
injustice. When Zak candidly admits to his perpetration of an unlawful act, he upholds a 
fundamental process of just reconciliation. Necessarily ironie, justice in this novel takes 
the form of emplotment (an unjust kidnapping), admission (a confession of guilt), and 
identification (an empathetic susceptibility). Acts of justice do not require reciprocal 
counterbalancing. In Oates, as in Smiley and Franzen, justice concems plot making--or 
narrative-not an impetuous settling of scores. 
Configuringjustice in different ways than Oates, Toni Morrison, who is also an 
Oprah-approved author, interrogates social relations instead of interpersonal ones. In her 
criticism and fiction, victimization manifests itself in terms of race and concatenated 
stories. In her celebrated novels, aIl of which embrace the spiritual realm of magic 
realism, as weIl as in her introductions to the collections Birth of a Nation' hood and 
Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power, Morrison excavates storytelling as both a mode 
and a theme. Merging technique and subject, she works out self-justification in terms of 
narrative, which combines communal stories and their literary interpretation. As she says 
in her essay on Clarence Thomas, "To know what took place surnmary is enough. To 
leam what happened requires multiple points of address and analysis" (Race-ing Justice 
xii). Incorporating back stories and stories-within-stories into her discursive and fictional 
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work, she makes a virtue out of problematicaUy legitimating the outwardly inexcusable 
actions ofher "characters." Extracting OJ from his iconic media image, a public exposure 
that swiftly altered from "affable athlete" to "wild dog" (Birth of Nation' hood vii), 
Morrisonjustly redistributes a roundness to Orenthal J. Simpson in her consideration of 
his "breaking story" (xiii). As she interrogates the openly contrived nature of legality in 
his less than private trial for multiple homicide, she provides Mr. Simpson (as DeLillo 
does Lee Harvey Oswald) with a justness that the "shotgun wedding of the commodified, 
marketplace story and the official story" (xv) did not administer: the integrity ofthree-
dimensionality. 
In The Bluest Eye, Morrison's first novel, ChoUy Breedlove rapes and 
impregnates his daughter Pecola. The novelist forewarns her readers ofthis delayed 
narrative event in the second prelude to the novel, a brief account of the explicit plot of 
The Bluest Eye with a chilling close: "ChoUy Breedlove is dead; our innocence too. The 
[gardenj seeds shriveled and died; [Pecola 'sj baby too. Il There is reaUy nothing more 
to say-except why? But since why is difficult to handle, one must take refuge in how" 
(9). Earmarking the devices of narrative, the précis ofPecola's horrible destiny 
reconfirms the confounded nature of the first prologue, a Dick and Jane story rendered 
increasingly impractical by means of Morrison's accelerated narrative reruns. Originally, 
she presents the one-hundred-and-fifty-word textbook primer in simple declarative 
sentences: "Here is the house. It is green and white. It has a red door" (7). Morrison twice 
replays it, first removing the patriarchal punctuation, then the spacing altogether. Her 
focus on representation and re-representation mns through The Bluest Eye, which is 
narrated by a preadolescent named Claudia who does not entirelyunderstand the events 
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that she reports. Alongside her incomplete accounts of the stories that surround Pecola, 
several descriptions of and letters from the past likewise eradicate any easy assessment of 
Cholly's actions and their outcomes. 
Quite late in the novel, another narrator, this one third-person and gossipy, relates 
a horrifying and unshakeable event that overrules the awfulness ofPecola's rape, not to 
mention ChoUy's double abandonment by his father. As immobilized witnesses, readers 
are treated to a scene wherein two white men, one holding a "spirit lamp," the other 
aiming a "flashlight" (116), convert ChoUy's first erotic act, consensual sex with a 
teenager of his own age in an empty field, into a horrifying episode of spectacular 
consumption. Guns cradled, aimed beams "racing" aU over the couple, the gleeful 
huntsmen coerce the "nigger" to "Get on wid it," "get on wid it," transforming Cholly's 
love into "hate," his tendemess into "violence," and Darlene's "sweet taste" into "rotten 
fetid bile," her soft hands into "baby claws" (117). ChoUy's eventual rape ofhis daughter 
tums around the hostility and voyeurism ofhis formative sexual experience. The father's 
appalling maltreatment of Pecola neither materializes itself as an enactment of revulsion, 
nor objectification, nor racism. Though performing an incestuous and a manifestly 
abusive, not to say illegal, action, the drunken ChoUy gives Pecola a version of the 
formerly unfeasible friendship and recognition that she desires. Forever the circumvented 
ugly duckling of the small town of Lorain, Ohio, Pecola finally becomes a figure of 
admiration, in her own estimation anyway. Interpreting public disapproval ofher 
pregnancy as a form of covetousness, Pecola determines that the new attention being 
lavished upon her is the effect of her "successful" request for a pair of blue eyes from the 
strange mulatto medium Soaphead Church (also a child molester). As a consequence of 
her father's exploitation, Pecola notionally gains the perlect blue eyes that grace Barbie 
doUs, popular schoolgirls, motion picture starIets, and other objects of longing. 
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Morrison's spotlight on stories furthermore occupies a telling place in the novels 
Jazz and Beloved. In Jazz, where she examines justice as implemented by a nation-
within-a-nation (a black community in New York City, caUed "The City" in order to 
intimate a world-center ofurbanity, culture, and justice), fifty-something Joe Trace 
shoots his eighteen-year-old paramour Dorcas out of jealousy. She dies. In order to 
avenge herself on the young lady who turned her husband inward, thus changing him 
from a loquacious man into a reticent one, Joe's wife Violet, thereafter known as 
"Violent," disfigures Dorcas' corpse with a pocketknife. Having no recourse to local 
authorities, on account of an inherent distrust of certified lawmakers and preservers of 
justice, the black community exposes the implications of these acts of vigilantism by their 
own devices. Using what Maxine Hong Kingston describes repeatedly in The Woman 
Warrior and China Men as the "talk-cure" of "talk-story," the involved members of the 
neighborhood work out their problems through conversation. In the transitional spaces of 
stoops and doorways, everyone talks about Joe's grief and Violent's attack. Working 
through the upshot ofher actions, Violent visits Dorcas' legal guardian. Although Joe 
maintains what readers identify as an aberrant silence, his personal plight gets revealed 
through sustained flashbacks. An abandoned figure, like most of Morrison's protagonists, 
and the son of a woman nicknamed Wild, Joe spends much ofhis youth seeking his 
elusive, homeless mother. 
Crafting a narrative of smaller narratives, each of which positions its central 
figure both as prey and as predator, Morrison investigates the disparate yet interrelated 
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stories of Dorcas, her aunt, her lover, his mother, and his wife, among a growing 
assemblage of side-line characters. Escalating the complications of unjust acts, 
Morrison's audience finally leams (along with Joe and Violet) that Dorcas did not die 
strictly because of Joe's gunshot. Rather, she bleeds to death. This slow demi se is the 
product of Dorcas' unwillingness to visit a white hospital and also the result of the 
ambulance drivers who refuse to respond to the emergency caU with urgency. This 
terrible fate substantiates African-Americans' distrust of white people who exercise 
control and influence. The actions of Dorcas' best friend, Felice, whose name connotes 
praise or happiness, also mollify Joe's guilt and responsibility. As the close of Jazz 
suggests, Felice acts as the vehicle ofreconciliation for the husband and wife by spending 
time with them, thus graduaUy reintroducing the emotionally estranged couple. In Jazz, 
narrative restores the balance of justice without recourse to tribunals or juries. 
Morrison presents a comparable assessment of justice through acts of telling and 
recounting in her most popular novel, if not the most popular work of fiction in America, 
Beloved. As much a gravemarker, as a dead baby, an invasive ghost, a bizarre visitor, a 
repository for the legacy of slavery, and an indicator of an odyssey towards liberation, the 
name and title "Beloved" encodes an incomparable human sacrifice on the part of 
Morrison's protagonist Sethe, a runaway slave from "Sweet Home" in the Deep South. 
Sometime after her getaway from Kentucky, and her reunion with her family in Ohio, 
Sethe batlers her newborn baby Beloved to death in order to protect her from the "four 
horseman" recently arrived to reclaim their human property (149). Despite the fact that 
Morrison's free indirect narrator delays relating this unthinkable event, she attunes 
readers to the impending episode from the very beginning of the nove!. Though Sethe 
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knows that an outside force renders her house "spiteful" (4), she never blames or accuses 
or reprimands the interloper. As a variant to the narratives that in due course 
problematize Joe' s alleged vigilantism in Jazz, Morrison similarly tempers and justifies 
Sethe's martyrdom of Beloved with early events presented in chronological disorder. 
Morrison's deliberations on justice vis-à-vis acts of the imagination and stories-within-
stories on the home front, and particularly within the black community, incorporate the 
same issues that 1 investigate at the internationallevel in works by Franzen, DeLillo, and 
Smiley. Narrative maintains the central role in my analysis of justice in recent US fiction. 
"Acts of Justice" looks at the ways in which contemporary American writers 
articulate the predominance of justice in the everyday lives of US citizens. Incorporating 
global perspectives, which neither Oates nor Morrison uses, Franzen, DeLillo, and 
Smiley work through alternative models of justice and assess why and how individuals 
enact, question, and correct these proposaIs. Justice, as this project illustrates in a number 
of distinct yet commensurate ways, materializes as an end that can never be reached nor 
attained. Exploring the ramifications of unjust acts, Franzen, DeLillo, and Smiley present 
mandates about the directions in which justice ought to move. Justice concerns debatable 
directions, not one direction; justice allocates contentious results, never a result. The 
implications of justice and injustice alike are changeable. To daim thatjustice can be 
instituted in only one way is to discount the active developments of social and cultural 
interchange and evolution. To allege that any dispensation of justice is itself wholly or 
universally just--{)rcorrect-is to enact an injustice upon justice. Justice theory proposes 
that eachjust decision occupies an instrumental position in an unrelenting activity that 
stipulates argument, recollection, and projection, not to mention an obligatory acceptance 
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of counter-argument. If anything, justice materializes as a de facto argument that, by 
definition, allows its provisional conclusions to be challenged de jure. Justice, therefore, 
never ends. It starts in the middle ofthings. Never starting ex nihilo, never employed ex 
parte, never considered conclusio, legality insists on continuation through successive acts 
of justice. 
Justifying Franzen's Fiction and Essays 
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Chapter One 
Defending Franzen, Defending The Corrections 
Jonathan Franzen writes about walls, laws, failure, and correction. The walls or 
borders that he inc1udes in his three novels are permeable, fracture d, and even toxic. The 
laws he represents are on occasion mainly decorous and at other times officially 
prescribed. Falling into the province of decorum or manners are the routines observed 
between individual family members, the codes adopted between particular coworkers, and 
the arbitration that encourages conformity in the suburbs. Instances of formallaw in 
Franzen's fiction consist of the specific legal restrictions that sanction or disallow certain 
corporate strategies, stock-market manipulations, terroristic acts, counterterroristic 
operations, revenge plots, and social upheavals and advancements, not to mention 
faculty-student relations. As a predominant theme in Franzen, failure tends to be sudden 
and surprising rather than inevitable and reasonable. In the novelist and essayist' s most 
recent and most recognized novel, the 2001 bestseller and National Book Award-winner 
The Corrections, each ofhis feature characters takes personal risks and fails in one way 
or another. Though unique, each ofthese personal mistakes, letdowns, or disintegrations 
can be evaluated as a perpetuation of an initial injustice. In The Corrections, Franzen 
thereby implements multiple meanings of correction in order to illustrate how unjust acts 
can compound other injustices, despite specifie attempts at correcting wrongs. Yet 
corrections, of course, do not solely uphold unjust processes. As Franzen demonstrates, 
correction can take the form of a market amendment when the marketplace lowers so as 
31 
to correct inflated priees. Though the will of capitalism cannot be corrected, a last child 
off ers parents the opportunity !o make corrections to the others. Additionally elucidating 
intergenerational association or mentoring, prof essors also correct the academic papers 
and theoretical articulations of their students. Always attentive to representation itself, 
Franzen furthermore correlates correction to surveillance, pharmacotherapy, 
imprisonment, capital punishment, illness, and retirement, as weIl as vis-à-vis writing and 
reading. 
Indicating his concern with literary and non-literary forms of production and 
consumption, Franzen routinely configures various versions of information transmission 
in his fictions and essays. His work integrates maps, graphs, transcripts, corporate logos, 
handwritten notes, daily clippings, radio spots, TV news, and emails. As manifestations 
of the detritus of culture, these mediated and usually impersonal sources of intelligence 
and communication are often the only links connecting the five estranged Lambert family 
members in The Corrections. Extending the distinctly urban-American parameters ofhis 
first two novels to an international setting, The Corrections depicts order, fraud, collapse, 
and escape, aIl at the end-of-the-millennium, as the ,narrative moves back and forth 
through Philadelphia, New York City, Western Europe, and Vilnius, Lithuania, en route 
to the well-veiled Midwestern suburban somewhere of St. Jude. Home to the eIder 
Lamberts, St. Jude tums out to be a fictional adaptation of the St. Louis satellite where 
Franzen spent his boyhood. Though merely insinuated in his prize-winning novel, this 
impression figures prominently in his next book, a collection of essays titled How to Be 
A/one, and promises also to feature in his forthcoming memoir, The Discomfort Zone. In 
returning to St. Louis, which is likewise the setting ofhis first novel, The Twenty-Seventh 
City, Franzen can thus be seen to trace or demarcate the evolution of his views on 
representation. Especially in the wake of How to Be A/one, a non-fictional postscript to 
the near six-hundred-page work, Franzen's The Corrections corrects certain 
understandings of cities and shake-ups depicted in ms first two novels. 
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In each ofhis early books, Franzen introduces a particular family and focuses on 
actions within a select city that occur in the space of less than a year. Published in 1988, 
The Twenty-Seventh City, which considers corruption and success in America's most 
decentralized city, concems the Probst family in St. Louis. Published four years later, 
Strong Motion, a fiction about an earthquake-threatened yet ever-listless Boston, presents 
the Holland family. In The Twenty-Seventh City and in Strong Motion, as in The 
Corrections, Franzen's main family invariably drifts apart only to reunite by the end, 
albeit incompletely. From fiction to fiction, he insinuates this family disconnection in two 
ways. His families get bigger by exactly one member and older by about a decade. 
Barbara and Martin Probst, in their early forties, have a seventeen-year old daughter 
named Luisa. Eileen and Louis, children ofthe late-fifty-something Hollands, are twenty-
seven and twenty-four, respectively. Septuagenarians Enid and Alfred Lambert, from The 
Corrections, have two sons, Gary and Chip, and a daughter, Denise. In order, these 
youngish adults are forty-three, thirty-nine, and thirty-two. With number as with time, 
Franzen' s oeuvre indicates, the threat to the stability of the family unit increases. As 
individual family members age, they develop their own personal narratives, unique 
storylines that frequently counteract the cohesiveness or shared narrative of the traditional 
family. 
Franzen's fictional rendering of cities likewise presents an unambiguous trajectory 
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towards the unstable. He always ruptures cities. He includes a map of St. Louis at the 
onset of The Twenty-Seventh City, the twenty-seventh largest city in the US in terms of 
population. This number and title poetically downplay the escalating tally of "small 
municipalities" and "fragmented neighborhoods" which make up St. Louis, the most 
atomized city in America (Sandweiss 7). As map lines get more and more complex, like 
the branches of a family tree, bisecting and connecting segments and contours split up 
rather than unite. Acting as borders or walls, map lines make clear distinctions between 
localities. The plot of The Twenty-Seventh City, which begins in late 1984, stresses this 
separation and divisiveness. An ironic version of Big Brother, the new police chief from 
Bombay, India, who aims to capitalize on the blighted real estate of the downtown core, 
fails in her bid to unite the two defining factions of St. Louis: Municipal Growth and 
Urban Hope. 
With Strong Motion, which is a seismological term designating the stress release 
of tremors and temblors, Franzen moves to subterranean markers. Integrating a number of 
geological maps, Strong Motion shakes up and ravages Boston by way of unnatural 
earthquakes. These induced plate slips are the result of a corporation's illicit disposaI of 
toxic chemicals into concealed injection wells. The final city-shattering tectonic-slide 
takes aIl but three or four of Franzen's Bostonians by surprise, largely because dominant 
media players and powerbrokers thwart and redirect the attempted admonitions of a vocal 
seismologist modeled on Henry James's Verena Tarrant, an avant-garde feminist in The 
Bostonians. A pro-choice activist, Dr. Renée Seitchek defends the rights of women. 
Similarly in conflict with contemporary forces corresponding to the social conditions that 
the progressive Verena initial1y challenges in 1870s Boston, Renée also frankly points out 
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that Boston's "twisted crime," "overt racism," "elevated cancer rates," and "harbor full of 
sewage" counteract the public notion that the city is "a center of culture and education" 
(120). 
Notwithstanding Franzen's sustained focus on families and cities, The 
Corrections, in which there are no maps, reconsiders these motifs. In The Twenty-Seventh 
City and Strong Motion, the individual constituents of the two main families play roles, 
but not exclusive ones, within essential plots. Both of these five-hundred-plus page 
novels incorporate extra-familial characters, such as police chief Jammu and seismologist 
Renée, among others, who are of vital importance to the development of these city-
specifie stories. As social novels about cities, both books incorporate urban histories, are 
"highly plotted," "extensively researched," and "markedly political" (Green 91). The 
Corrections, by contrast, is "emotionally charged" (Ribbat 562). In this novel, each 
member of the Lambert family is central to his or her own very personal and 
fundamentally unique narrative. Enacting narrative in traditional arcs, every individual 
Lambert has his or her distinct big high and bigger low. Demonstrably, save for frequent 
tlashbacks, sorne reaching back an entire generation to the 1960s, these stories rarely 
intersect. An explicit partition, age separates characters in The Corrections. Further 
exemplifying that age signifies severance and independence, even old-timers Enid and 
Alfred, who inhabit the same suburban home, live widely dissimilar lives. 
The disconnection of the Lamberts, in fact, almost resists novelistic 
representation. Characterizing the manifest individuality of all Lamberts, The Corrections 
splices back and forth through time in two brief framing chapters and five principal 
chapters of equallength, respectively devoted to Chip, Gary, Denise, Enid and Alfred, 
35 
and the Christmas vacation. These divergent stories, and their international interludes, to 
places like Québec, the Baltic States, and Bavaria, pull the narrative apart. Franzen ties 
these disjointed plots and places together, however, when the Lamberts reunite for the 
holiday season in St. Jude, a final family Christmas that refashions the conclusion of 
Frank Capra's classic, the seminally suburban 1946 film It's a Wonderful Life. As weIl, 
the long-anticipated Lambert get-together recalls the Angstrom Christmas that begins 
Rabbit at Rest, the last book of John Updike's Rabbit quartet, a series mostly positioned 
in a suburb of Brewer, modeled on Reading, Pennsylvania. 
Capra situates his weird post-World War II picture in a small-town location, 
where Savings and Loan manager and principled good-guy George Bailey unselfishly 
supports his clients' upstart-housing purchases in the nascent suburbs, all while the old 
and devilish town-villain, Mr. Potter, compels his ill-fated customers to rent degenerating 
property closer to an emerging downtown area. Almost predictably, It 's A Wonderful Life 
ends with a Christmas celebration after George misplaces his money, attempts to commit 
suicide, and is physically saved by a guardian angel named Clarence, before a group of 
generous friends and patrons tallies up the total required to keep George' s altruistic 
cooperative afloat. Satirizing the facile conclusion to this unsubtly ideological anti-urban 
Christmas film, the final full-Iength chapter of The Corrections is ominously titled "One 
Last Christmas." Equally discomfiting, this extended holiday scene takes place in a 
neighborhood named after "St. Jude." Franzen therefore supplants Capra's timely deus ex 
machina Clarence with the patron saint of hopeless causes. Perhaps similarly taking a 
page from Updike, who starts Rabbit at Rest with a sad and representationally 
unseasonable Christmas episode in Fort Myers, Florida, Franzen sardonically remarks on 
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the enforcement of family togethemess and happiness under the banner of Christmas by 
calling the epilogue ofhis novel "The Corrections." Christmas in no way closes or 
resolves the divergent narratives of The Corrections. Seemingly as standardized as the 
formulaic suburban sUITounding, even Christmas can be corrected. 
Although landscapes and cultural trends are no doubt intricately related, aesthetic 
consistency need not be a prima facie indicator of CUITent, or a harbinger of eventual, 
behavioral conformity. As in any suburb, an inactive army of identical zombies cannot 
convincingly inhabit St. Jude, over Christmas or any time. Foregrounding the altering 
land and architecture around his characters, in The Corrections Franzen illustrates that 
suburban figures can change for the better, even after decades of relative changelessness. 
This is a welcome demonstration of correction, given that by "1990 there were more 
suburbanites than city and rural dwellers combined" in America, an "alarming" statistical 
ri se when one considers that "in 1920 the census had revealed that the United States was 
officially an urban nation" (Jurca 160). As he refines the suburban environment, Franzen 
addresses the conventions of suburban fiction. In terms of American literature about the 
suburbs, a genre inaugurated by William Dean Howells' 1871 novel Suburban Sketches, 
and sustained by Sinclair Lewis' Babbit in 1922, as well as James N. Cain's Mildred 
Pierce in 1941, suburban characters tend to be as unvarying as their living spaces are 
negatively coded .. 
Nonetheless, Franzen refreshes this American literary heritage. One of the 
manifold meanings ofhis indefinite title is that correction can lead to improvement. Not 
only showing up failure, correction can be supportive and affirmative. Irrespective of the 
all-consuming onward walling-up of suburbanization, Franzen ultimately invests The 
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Corrections and its characters with a modicum of hope, progress, and even success that 
has so far been largely ignored by his literary critics. Nor has he been recognized as a 
suburban writer, much less as a revitalizer ofthis realist genre. As a matter offact, 
Susanne Rohr is the sole critic to remark persuasively on the suburban qualities of The 
Corrections. Yet she fails to note that above and beyond the "stereotypical" suburban 
"ingredients" he depicts, such as "conforrnity, conservatism, [and] narrowness" (103), 
Franzen likewise representsa sympathetic depiction ofboth the suburb and the city. In so 
doing, the novelist moves away from earlier practitioners of the suburban fiction legacy. 
Departing from definitive motifs in F. Scott Fitzgerald, John Cheever, and Gloria 
Naylor, for instance, Franzen's suburbs are not mainly "symbolic spaces" undercut by 
"forces of insecurity, disintegration, and loss of familiar structures of experience" (Rohr 
103). As an inheritor ofthis American genre of fiction, Franzen also refuses to dismiss 
the city. Diverging from his literary forbears, neither does he treat urban areas as dirty, 
dangerous, dreamlike, incredible, or mysteriously absent. In other words, he does not 
reserve his realism exclusively for the suburbs. Franzen's suburbanites do not merely 
escape to the suburbs or simply long to flee from them; they are not restricted to these 
places physically and novelistically. Every Lambert, CUITent suburbanite or not, however, 
has immutable ties to the suburbs. Franzen declares as much in the essay "Meet Me in St. 
Louis" from How to Be A/one. Summarizing the plot of The Corrections, which he often 
does, and always differently, he describes it in this piece as "a family novel about three 
East Coast urban sophisticates who alternately long for and reject the heartland suburbs 
where their aged parents live" (289). But these city cats invariably come back. And these 
returns, no matter how brief, illuminate the inevitable positively charged modifications 
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and corrections Franzen makes to the typical American suburb. As he exemplifies in The 
Corrections, a suburban center can be a risky, evolving, and interpersonal setting. Thus 
staged or represented, the suburbs Can be read as places that emplot their own systems of 
justice, systems that, like aIl just implementations oflegality, forever move toward 
dynamic redress and reconciliation. 
While paying particular attention to Franzen's sophisticated techniques of 
representation and his underexamined methods of narration, 1 will explore the 
conventions and tropes Franzen manipulates in order to locate him in the American 
suburban literary tradition, as weIl as the innately legalistic literary field of academic 
fiction. A strange version of the unsafe suburb, the sexually scandalous campus raises the 
problem of a parajustice system (in colleges) at loggerheads with a public justice system 
(formalized in laws by governments), as my first chapter, "Defending Franzen, Defending 
The Corrections," illustrates. In my second chapter, called "Surveillance and Success in 
the Suburbs," 1 clarify how Franzen, in an act without fictional precedent, depicts what 
canjustly be called a cosmopolitan upgrading ofthe archetypal satellite community. 
Though 1 will make reference to his complete body of work, in both of my Franzen 
subdivisions my main focus will be The Corrections-ms most important, rewarding, and 
misread text. Ifl may cite Oprah Winfrey, whom Bonnie Greer, among others, describes 
as the woman who "control [ s] the publishing world" ("Magnum Oprah" 31), The 
Corrections is "Funny, familiar, insightful, and disturbingly real aIl throughout. Not a 
false note in aIl 568 pages of the book. When critics refer to 'The Great American Novel,' 
this is it, people" (qtd. in Epstein 33). 
Although 1 have so far resisted bringing up Oprah and her frequently restructured 
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book club, any serious discussion of Franzen and his work requires a preliminary look at 
the cultural event that followed hard upon the publication of The Corrections. As a few 
critics have noticed, the affairs surrounding Franzen's overt ambivalence toward and 
eventual exclusion from the Oprah Book Club are decidedly germane to "the subject of 
The Corrections itself' (Lehmann 40). As my first chapter introduces and my second 
develops, Franzen hails readers into his big novel. He intentionally fragments his text in a 
number of ways so as to invite readers to engage with his work ethically, socially, and, 
above all' critically. Franzen sets up these always corrective, always compelling 
engagements by way of "The Failure," an opening section devoted to his narrator's 
experiences as a cultural critic at a college in Connecticut. Albeit, in spite of Franzen's 
democratic style of representation, as an arbiter of justice Oprah has induced many 
reviewers and readers away from the cultural critique and assessment that his narrator 
encourages. Undermining what should be conceived as a democracy ofreading, Oprah's 
institutional correction of The Corrections and its author provides an undeniable case in 
point ofhow the celebrity's book club-and the media age that it concurrently supports 
and symbolizes--contributes to unjust, not to mention anti-novelistic, reading practices. 
In correspondence to the processes ofjust recourse, however, Jonathan Franzen 
appears to take action against Oprah Winfrey in his coda to The Corrections, How to Be 
A/one. The title of the book may be an ironic allusion to Oprah's curiously confidential 
yet divulged life story, a widely published personal "literacy narrative of progress" (Hall 
649) that always begins with an endorsement of reading as cure to "being alone" (qtd. in 
Hall 649). Complicating the simple paralegalistic terms of the Oprah Book Club, sorne of 
the essays in Franzen's nonfiction book recoup the array of ethical conditions, difficulties, 
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and engagements essential not only to The Corrections but also to literature. In light of 
Oprah's televised evaluation ofhim, an appraisal that perpetrates the author against his 
own work, Franzen reasserts his original repudiation of the promotion of a biographical 
and therapeutic model of reading, a model in turn sponsored by pharmaceutical and 
corporate interests. As my opening chapter elucidates, Franzen reclaims The Corrections 
as a critical judgment of capitalism in How to Be A/one. Though we cannot correct free 
enterprise, we must critique it, for we are not all capitalist subjects to the same extent. 
Despite the fact that individual American citizens are govemed by similar officiallegal 
structures, not everyone has the same economic leverage as, say, Oprah. 
Beginnings 
In the midst of the media' s sustained focus on fear and trembling and loathing and 
war after the terrible attacks in New York City and Washington, DC, in the late summer 
of 200 l, Franzen "entered the history of literature and publicity simultaneously" 
(Edwards 75). Within the same month he at once took home the National Book Award 
and an invitation to the Oprah Book Club. The extensive enthusiasm surrounding the 
author just over forty was short lived. In a move without precedent, the woman who 
fights difficulty officially withdrew her invitation: "Jonathan Franzen will not be on the 
Oprah Winfrey Show because he is seemingly uncomfortable and conflicted about being 
chosen as a book club selection" (qtd. in Lehmann 40). Franzen's attempts to explain his 
disinvitation from the self-made billionaire's popular show (even though book club 
segments are her least popular) only made matters worse. Visibly flustered by his 
newfangled role as ovemight icon, and exhausted by the countless interviews attending 
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his book tour, he made the mistake, as he himselfputs it, of "conflat[ing] 'high modem' 
and 'art fiction' and user d] the term 'high art'" in order to explain his literary influences 
("Meet Me in St. Louis" 300). Describing this incident, critic Joseph Epstein points out 
that "An artist can say almost anything he wants as long as he manages not to commit the 
cultural sin of elitism" (34). In the image age an elitist is a paper tiger indeed. 
Unsurprisingly, the popular media aimed their reviews and stories at the author 
himself. Franzen the man became the dominant narrative, in lieu of his actual work. His 
fame as a fiction maker was soon replaced by his infamous "cultural arrogance" (Ribbat 
558). Generally disparaged for his distrust of corporate emblems-i.e., the Book Club 
logo-and his undiplomatic, honest, aH-too-honest estimation of Oprah-endorsed 
selections-i.e., sorne good books, enough one-dimensional, schmaltzy ones-Franzen 
was hailed as, among many other things, "The Snob Who Dissed Oprah" (Freund 59). No 
friend to the author, Freund go es on to patronize America's latest villain for his 
unrehearsed statements: "Poor Franzen, that's as close to the role of Judas as the culture 
offers" (59). Fittingly, what gives birth to this biblical mark is a retum to "St. Jude." In 
other words, Franzen's fast fall from repute to ill repute has its source at the real source of 
the fictional St. Jude, where The Corrections begins and ends. 
In "Meet Me in St. Louis," Franzen recounts his experience with Oprah's B-roll 
footage personnel in St. Louis after his nomination into the book club. In spite of his 
avowal that St. Louis has nothing to do with his present life, he was informed by one of 
Oprah's producers that these preplanned B-roll fiHer-shots (as what he dubs a "dumb but 
necessary object," a "passive supplier of image" [288]) were to be spliced with A-roll 
footage of him speaking. As the essay begins, Franzen finds himself 100 king west over 
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the Mississippi River from rundown East St. Louis where he and the Oprah team are 
seemingly "plotting by the side of a road" but actually "doing nothing more dubious 
morally than making television" (287). Their goal, Franzen clarifies, is to capture the 
former St. Louisian driving to his boyhood home of decades ago in Webster Groves via 
the Poplar Street Bridge, with stops at the Old Courthouse and the Arch along the way. 
Franzen's role is to appear "what? writeriy? curious? nostalgic?" (288), while he dutifully 
"pretend[ s]" to "reexamine his roots" (287). Adhering to a script and coached by B-roll 
producer Gregg, Franzen only half succeeds at looking "contemplative" (297; 298; 299) 
in a number of locations in his old suburban neighborhood, including under the Oak tree 
commemorating his father. Unable to emote justiy beneath his father's tree, he at last 
informs the crew that this sentimental TV moment is "fundamentally bogus" (298). Y et, 
unable to go on, the difficult author goes on. For the next hour he is captured 
contemplating trains at the Museum of Transportation, his first visit to the place. 
Franzen's unresolved impromptu remarks about the Oprah Book Club followed not long 
after this stylized day. 
In his book Late Postmodernism, Jeremy Green offers an extensive scrutiny of 
Franzen's run-in with Oprah. He starts offhis analysis ofthis media exhibition by 
pointing out that there is "something almost Franzenesque in the comic desperation of 
this drama" (79). "[ A] brilliant success," Green continues, "gives way to disaster because 
of a few ill-chosen words, and the mess grows more intractable with every attempt the 
protagonist makes to extricate himself' (79). Green is not alone in this detection. Chris 
Lehmann and Christoph Ribbat likewise provide variants on the connections between the 
fictional makeup of The Corrections and its non-fictional fate in the media market. 
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Lehmann sees Franzen as the victim of a "pathetic spectacle" by "a newly apprehensive, 
war-tom nation [that] was repairing to the bracing, morale-boosting tonic of cultural 
warfare" (40). Going on to speak more generally about literature, Lehmann laments that 
the "somewhat complicated response to his Oprahfication that Franzen tried to voice was 
not a permissible attitude; never mind that this very sort of ambivalent self-questioning is 
among the signal qualities that define good literature (popular, 'high art,' and anything in 
between)" (40). Ribbat, for his part, likens what he caUs Franzen's "programmatic 
statements," that is, his "self-positioning in the American literary tradition" through 
"essays, interviews, and public statements" (561), as a non-fictional illustration of the 
character-centered un-ironie modemist realism that drives what has variously been caUed 
new conventional or late postmodem or post-postmodem fiction. Ribbat makes clear that 
the author of the "post-postmodem" novel The Corrections (558) plainly "places the 
'protagonist first'-i.e., Jonathan Franzen" (561). The aftereffects of the Franzen-Oprah 
breakup are at once comedie, misfortunate, and telling. 
Whether he caUs it a desperate drama, a pathetic spectacle, or an example of self-
placement, each of these three defenders of Franzen focuses on the staginess at the heart 
of the Franzen-Oprah entanglement. The set-up nature ofhis appointment to the club, so 
Franzen later implies, was apparent from the beginning. If the essay title "Meet Me in St. 
Louis" is not indication enough, the author's twice-expressed des ire to be filmed in New 
York instead of St. Louis (where he hadn't lived for twenty-four years) should be. That 
the unremarkable Midwest milieu of St. Jude featured in The Corrections cornes to be 
equated with a particular area in suburb-beset St. Louis intimates what can be 
characterized as the autobiographical-confessional, redemptive-therapeutic aim of the 
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Oprah Book Club. After aIl, in terms of Franzen's fiction, the sole evidence suggesting 
that St. Jude may be situated in St. Louis is tenuous at best. The Meisners, who live next 
door to the Lamberts in The Corrections, initially show up as minor characters in his first 
novel, The Twenty-Seventh City. They are Franzen's lone intertextual figures. 
Complicating matters, though, is the fact that Chuck and Bea Meisner are exceptional 
only insofar as the location oftheir home in The Twenty-Seventh City is conspicuously 
left unrevealed, a fact that works against the tendency in this novel for characters to be 
presented in respect to where they live exactly. In terms of their lack of explicit setting, 
the Meisner couple stands alone-with the exception of the Lamberts, of course. That is, 
until Oprah's patently naïve reading, anyway. 
Ominously staging the "we" of the club against the "you" of the author, the Oprah 
people, when they first contacted him, told Franzen that his novel was "a difficult book 
for us" ("Meet Me in St. Louis" 289). Still, right after this admission, and probably even 
before it, and perhaps even before reading the book, the Oprah team as usual removed the 
"difficulty" from the nove1. Given the sorting classification that heads the first edition of 
The Corrections, this may have been a simple open and shut case. According to the 
Library ofCongress logging data, The Corrections is about married women, Parkinson's 
disease, parents and children, and the Middle West. Such a "cataloguing note," Thomas 
R. Edwards remarks, "sounds just right for Oprah' s club" (78). Appropriately, the 
directions in which Franzen was stage-managed, both to St. Louis and in St. Louis, all as 
part of what he was advised were the "responsibilities of being an Oprah author" ("Meet 
Me in St. Louis" 289), also play right into "the talk show's therapeutic vocation" (Green 
88). The author and his work, to put it plainly, are systematically co-opted into the 
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ideological contrivance of the Oprah show. Marketing carnpaigns led by Oprah's book 
club correct the satirical author and harness him to the will of capitalism. No matter what 
he says, no matter how he resists "branding" in the marketing sense of the term, he is 
recast in particular media roles after Oprah corrects his market value as a novelist. 
Irrespective of Franzen's fictional and personal efforts, capitalism cannot be corrected, 
much less criticized, it appears. Once drafted into the club, a club that unjustly brands or 
positions the novel, the author, and the audience as aligned subjects of a curative market 
culture, Franzen is roundly reprimanded (even by usually savvy critics) for exerting 
artistic individuality and difficulty as his ownjustice-in addition to his own 
justification. A badge ofhonor, the self-autonomy he willfully exerts counteracts the 
group-reliance Oprah's show deliberately venerates. 
Green spells out the plain link between book club picks and talk show topics. He 
explains how the "sentimental and melodrarnatic works of fiction" that Oprah typically 
chooses are "novels that tum around the kinds of problems de ait with on a regular basis 
on her show-spousalabuse, racism, overeating, bereavement. The narrative focus of 
these texts informed the content of the discussions featured on the show, wherein the 
sufferings of characters were likened to the sufferings of Book Club participants" (82). 
The ethos of the show, of course, focuses on the connection between confession and 
identification. Adarnant about the biographical nature of fiction, Oprah sets up sappy pans 
and zooms of authors ostensibly emoting under oak trees. These shots aim to encourage 
the situating of book clubbers within selected books in the sarne way that they position 
respective authors within their own books. As Green recounts, Oprah pushes her viewing 
and reading public either into "confirming the shape of experience ('my life is just like 
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that') or [into acceptrng] a model to emulate ('my life should be more like that')" (84). 
With her "para-social" strategy of "imagined or constructed intimacy" (Hall 650), Oprah 
in effect pathologizes identification, therefore ensuring the continued popularity, not to 
say success, ofher series. On the talk show scene personal problems are played out on a 
public stage. Actors spell out their tribulations knowing that the audience is prepped to 
commiserate as they spectacularly consume. The problem then enters the public domain, 
no longer shouldered by one single Sisyphus. Always jostling, actors and audiences 
forever return, knowing they will identify to no end and hoping they will be emulated 
against aIl odds-just like Oprah. 
As he was being filmed over and over under his father's tree, a tree bordered by 
his mother's ashes (he was wise to "make [him]selfforget" ["Meet Me in St. Louis" 
297]), Franzen may also have envisioned himself and his latest novel being bandied into 
an even greater would-be plan ofOprah's. Tactically promoted as a novel about illness 
and homecoming, about healing and redemption, The Corrections could very weIl be 
packaged into a predictable agenda of post-91l1 therapy. Incongruously espousing 
providence, Oprah could simply brand and dismiss The Corrections as "the great 
American novel arriving just in time to heal our troubled nation," or something like that. 
This style of one-dimensional purpose-directed reading epitomizes the Oprah approach to 
fiction, an anti-novelistic method that "promote[s] [Oprah] herself' (Hall 652) while at 
the same time overlooking or disallowing "other ways ofreading" (Hall 661). An extract 
from a transcript of Toni Morrison's fourth appearance on the show illustrates how Oprah 
reduces refinement and range into a take-home recipe. Aiso disquieting, a contemporary 
iconoclast could theorize that the television transmission featuring Paradise concludes 
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with the jaded joviality of a cynical autocrat. Effectively disregarding the last remarks of 
her notable visitor, who was awarded the Pulitzer Prize in 1987 and the Nobel Prize for 
Literature in 1993, among a ho st of other literary distinctions, Oprah endorses her own 
personal celebrity as the standard of literary authority. She does not only inform her 
viewers about what to read. As a TV icon, Oprah also tells them, as well as her guest in 
this instance, how to read: 
Ms. Morrison: Vou have to be open to this-yeah, it's notjust black or 
white, living, dead, up, down, in, out. It's being open to all 
these paths and connections and ... (unintelligible) between. 
Winfrey: And that is paradise! 
Ms. Morrison: That is paradise. 
Winfrey: And that is paradise. Marvelous. That's great. Paradise is 
being open to all the places in between. (in Green 86) 
Taking the full installment of this book club show into account, Green 
summarizes what he sees as "the problem [Oprah's] medium has in dealing with such 
intricate [literary] matters": "Morrison's speculative comments are translated into a 
slogan, rather as if the discussion must close with a pithy formula that the viewer might 
take away from the show, without regard for the preceding difficulties and elaborations" 
(86). Green finishes with the declaration that the Oprah project eschews "cultural 
dialogue" in favor of a purported optimism that solicits the personalization of the "textual 
encounter" (89). In spite ofFranzen's obvious effort to correct his would-be host, and 
Morrison's delicate attempts to correct her actual host, Oprah's gullible therapeutic 
reading model confuses the distinction between the curative and paying lip service to the 
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curative. Whether chastising Franzen or abridging Morrison, Oprah shuts down any 
semblance of productive critique or discourse. Without aspiring to "correct" capitalism or 
racism or chauvinism or egotism, the "teacherly" and "preacherly" book club (Hall 658-9) 
makes life simpler and easier, an improvement arguably acquired by way of merely 
buying into Oprah's commercial telecasts, both emotionally and monetarily. 
Considering Franzen's most popular work before the publication of The 
Corrections, a long 1996 Harper 's essay first titled "Perchance to Dream," later edited 
and mordantly renamed "Why Bother?," the author's candor with Oprah's B-roU 
producer after he was obliged to gesture like afaux-Beckettian mime under a tree almost 
seems like the stuff of an overwrought narrative. Before the orchestrations of the Oprah 
team, the figure makes public his strong motion against what he sees as "the therapeutic 
optimism raging in English literature departments," an indictment that probably includes 
the debate-free salve of a televised book club ("Why Bother?" 78). In the same essay, he 
discloses his personal anxiety over what he as a novelist sees as the "hyperkinesis of 
modern life" (63). According to him, this almost time-Iapsed Zeitgeist integrates "mass 
suburbanization," "at-home entertainment," "virtual communities," and "Zoloft" (70-71), 
aU ofwhich compromise the place oftraditional "linear reading" (63). A champion of the 
low-tech, the figure also looks back to the technological prints that signal his overt 
malaise with modernity: "Just as the camera drove a stake through the heart of serious 
portraiture, television has killed the novel of social reportage" (67). 80 when this same 
figure gets a chance truly to engage with popular culture (and, aU the better, with the 
"average" wife or husband, the bachelorette or bachelor "whose life is increasingly 
structured to avoid the kinds of conflicts on which fiction, preoccupied with manners, has 
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always thrived" [70]), he accepts in good faith. 
Jonathan Franzen, however, soon found himselfbeing drafted into the very 
"technological consumerism" he satirized (68). After a day ofbeing bullied around a 
setting that was no longer his, he came to dread the end product of the theatricalized 
images the TV camera attributed to him personally. Sensing that his engineered image 
was undergoing a process of "extraction, reduction, and recombination," as Michael 
Sorkin might describe these media machinations (393), Franzen realized that he was 
unexpectedly sponsoring the cultural conditions he aimed to challenge. As an Oprah 
author or un-ironic citizen-subject, he was recruited to relaya "tight connection between 
self-realization and pure consumerism," to appropriate David Harvey's phrase (The 
Urban Experience 254). Yet when Franzen made these discomfiting concems public, for 
the second time as it were, he was met with scom by the media, by past Oprah authors, 
and even by sorne literary critics. Such was the case after he voiced his uneasiness with 
the Oprah emblem, never mind that a major trope in The Corrections details the 
pervasiveness of the Mid-Pac logo, an abbreviation for the restructured Midland Pacific 
Railway, a subsidiary of W- Corp, owned by the invisible Wroth brothers, who appear 
to have actual and imagined vested-interests in everything from pharmaceutical 
production and distribution, to high tech -industries, to university endowments, to prison 
building, to hallucinogenic drug culture, to the video gaming of children's literature. This 
novel-Iength critique ofthe unchecked sway of a corporation, a control that can trickle 
down and out to every strata of culture through a popular logo alone, ought to be word 
enough to readers that the author might himself distrust the motives behind a 
corporation's sponsorship-especially for those readers and critics who prove incapable 
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of distinguishing the divide between a narrator and his creator. 
In "Surfing the Novel," essayist Joseph Epstein levies what can be seen as one of 
the more customary attacks upon Franzen following the author's "mn-in with Oprah 
Winfrey," a woman Epstein describes as "the nation's most powerfulliterary critic" (33). 
Though he admits that Franzen is a "talented writer" (35), Epstein takes him to task for 
two principal reasons. First, he looks back at the Harper 's article and dismisses it as a 
"great clown's baggy pants of an es say, [where] Franzen pulls out every rubber chicken, 
toy trumpet, and whoopee cushion ofliterary snobbery of the past fort Y years" (34). 
Afterward, Epstein moves through a few of the elements in The Corrections that he finds 
unappealing-the "grotesque family" (34), the "flimsy clothesline" of a plot (35), and 
"the depth of [Franzen's] disdain" for his characters (36)-before he settles on what he 
labels the vital "element that is entirely missing from The Corrections: a moral center" 
(36). Although Epstein begins by charging Franzen with literary snobbery, a cursory look 
through sorne of the critic's own essays, found in Life Sentences, Partial Payments, and 
Plausible Prejudices, for instance, reveals that he too appears to be a literary elitist. Not 
even one of the authors who shared the bestseller list with Franzen appears in Epstein's 
discursive work. No Robert Ludlum nor Danielle Steele; no Mary Higgins Clark nor John 
Grisham. Moreover, a perusal ofEpstein's recent book Snobbery (2002) indicates the 
same trend. While Epstein accommodates noteworthy figures from Henry Adams to 
Philip Ziegler, inc1udes celebrities between Rodney Dangerfield and Andy Warhol, and 
also mentions Walter Cronkite, Dan Rather, and other media personalities, not once does 
he refer to a writer oftypical bestseller status. To be sure, popular authors manifest a 
modicum of social discernment as weIl, whether in their work or in person. 
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After close inspection, furthermore, Epstein's reading of Franzen closely 
resembles the undemocratic and perfunctory readings of many post-Oprah Franzen critics. 
Like reviews by Nicholas Blincoe, Bonnie Greer, and James Wolcott, not to mention the 
first half of an appraisal by Valerie Sayers, the ex-girlfriend to whom Strong Motion 
remains dedicated, Epstein' s estimation of The Corrections reads more like a j udgment of 
its author. Like everyone, he wants to correct Franzen. A markedly candid arbitrator, 
Epstein admits to having "ceased reading The Corrections" halfway through, "before [he] 
knew [he] was going to write about it" (35). This sincere gesture, however, incriminates 
the judge himself. With his apparently impromptu confession, Epstein sheds more light 
on his own reading practices than he does on Franzen's actual novel. Paired with the 
complaint that The Corrections lacks a moral center, Epstein's approach to literature 
begins to convert into a weird variant of the Oprah approach. Outwardly unable to locate 
a succinct statement that might sum up the message of the text, he quits it. Subsequently, 
he rereads the novel in its entirety in order to dismiss it in a few words. 
Additionally, aside from his proclamations against the Harper 's essay, which 
clearly suggest that he has read it, Epstein overlooks how Franzen counteracts Oprah-
style therapeutic optimism with what he describes as "tragic realism" ("Why Bother?" 
91). Near the end ofhis well-known essay Franzen writes, "1 hope it's clear that by 
'tragic' 1 meanjust about any fiction that raises more questions than it answers: anything 
in which conflict doesn't resolve into cant. (Indeed, the most reliable indicator of a tragic 
perspective in a work of fiction is comedy)" (91). Perhaps exposing Oprah's approach to 
fiction as dictatorial, the serially corrected novelist and essayist continues, "The point of 
calling serious fiction tragic is to highlight its distance from the rhetoric of optimism that 
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so pervades our culture. The necessary lie of every successful regime, including the 
upbeat techno-corporatism under which we now live, is that the regime has made the 
world a better place" (91). When Epstein attacks The Corrections for what it lacks, he 
reaHy seems to be demonstrating what his understanding of The Corrections lacks. The 
Corrections has no moral center because its author decries resolving novelistic conflict by 
means ofa humbug dictum. Franzen, to put it differently, refuses to incorporate markers 
by which a character' s correctness can be caIculated. What The Corrections does not 
lack, but Epstein's vision ofthis particular novel does, is an embedded awareness that the 
tragic can be viewed through a comedic lens, a view that makes ambivalence and 
difficulty and conflict aH the more sophisticated and stirring. Epstein's overstated disdain 
for what he highlights as Franzen's disdain for his characters, blinds the critic from one of 
the more refined representational constructs ofthis novel: its mode of narration. Even 
though The Corrections is Jonathan Franzen's novel, it is not his individual story. The 
complicated fictional sequence of events belongs to Chip Lambert: Franzen's narrator. 
Difficulty 
In an essay from How to Be Alone titled "Mr. Difficult," Franzen scrutinizes the 
increasingly difficult and angry fiction of William Gaddis as a means to articulate the 
distinction between what he himself terms the "Status model" and the "Contract model" 
of how literature relates to its audiences. According to Franzen, the former model 
designates "great works of art" (239). The latter, by contrast, specifies "a sense of 
connectedness" (240). Whereas status novels exist "independent" of "enjoy[ ment]," 
contract novels "entertai[n]" as they uphold a "compact between the writer and the 
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reader" (240). Though this acknowledged discrepancy can be made tenuous or even be 
seen to disappear altogether from one text to the next and from one reader to another, 
Franzen clarifies that the status model "invites a discourse of genius and art-historical 
importance" while the contract model encourages an engagement epitomized by "pleasure 
and connection" (240). With Gaddis in mind, Franzen insists that the difference between 
the two proposaIs emerges most palpably when readers judge a work to be "difficult" 
(240). 
The significance of Gaddis and his evident "status," nevertheless, is not the major 
focus of"Mr. Difficult." Instead, in this discursive piece Franzen sets up subtle indices 
for the reading of The Corrections, a strategy that helps solidify How to Be A/one as a 
defense of and justification for his commonly misinterpreted novel. In the same way that 
"Why BotherT' problematizes a plain link between his first two novels and his third one, 
and "Meet Me in St. Louis" complicates the easy association of St. Jude with a suburb in 
St. Louis, "Mr. Difficult" troubles the simple identification of Franzen with the narrator 
of The Corrections. In other words, with each ofthese essays Franzen urges readers away 
from the professed assurances and substantial entrapments of autobiography. The 
Corrections is not motivated by the same theory-minded social critique evident in both 
The Twenty-Seventh City and Strong Motion. St. Jude is not definitively set somewhere in 
or around St. Louis. The Corrections is not Franzen's halffictional, halfpersonal 
memoir. With or without the publication of How to Be A/one, The Corrections exists as 
an autonomous fictional narrative. 
"Mr. Difficult" begins with a retrospective look at one of the more delicate 
difficulties faced by Franzen a short period oftime after the publication ofhis award-
54 
winning novel. As he describes, he received a number of angry letters from perfect 
strangers, strangers most certainly affronted by the media exposure attendant to the Oprah 
affair: 
For a while last winter, after my third novel came out, 1 was getting a lot of 
angry mail from strangers. What upset them was not the novel-a comedy 
about a family in cri sis-but sorne impolitic remarks l' d made in the press, 
and 1 knew that it was a mistake to send more than bland one-sentence· 
notes in reply. But 1 couldn't help fighting back a little. Taking a page 
from an old literary hero of mine, William Gaddis, who had long deplored 
the reading public's confusion of the writer's work and the writer's private 
self, 1 suggested that the letter writers look at my fiction rather than listen 
to distorted news reports about its author. (238) 
At first, Franzen does not take these very personal assaults to heart. Still, in contrast to 
Oprah's inaugural disinvitation policy, he refuses to ignore the women and men behind 
these confrontational missives. Deflecting his detractors from the smooth-rolling 
machinery of the media, he encourages them to aim their criticism at The Corrections 
itself. Notwithstanding his self-placement in the media, and the way the media controls 
this positioning, Franzen indicates that he wants readers to evaluate his work, if nothing 
else. In this manner, he essentially distances his public self from his published work. 
Wanting The Corrections to be approached independently rather than resentfully, he 
requests a democratic reading of his novel, ajuster appraisal that privileges neither the 
status model nor the contract model. 
A few months after redirecting a number of angry letter writers to a reading ofhis 
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novel, Franzen received a second correspondence from "one of the original senders" 
(238). In her riposte to his recommendation, the woman he identifies as "a Mrs. M- in 
Maryland" begins taking him to task by including a list of "thirty fancy words and phrases 
from [his] novel, words like 'diurnality' and 'antipodes,' phrases like 'electro-pointillist 
Santa Claus faces'" (238). The woman's detailed catalogue, so she doubtlessly calculated, 
introduces what Franzen calls her "dreadful question": "Who is it you are writing for? It 
surely could not be the average person who just enjoys a good read" (239). Though the 
surprised author mostly discounts her consequent accusation that he is an immoral "elite 
of New York" and therefore "a pompous snob and a real ass-hole," he admits to finding 
himself "paralyzed" in face of the "hostility" accompanying her uncomplicated yet 
incisive inquiry (239). Addressing the awful query, Franzen then acknowledges that he 
subscribes to both the status model and the contract model of a reader's rapport with 
fiction, before he obliquely answers the Marylander three pages later. 
In the same way that Mrs. M- initiates her second personal assault on Franzen 
with a critique of his coinages, Franzen frames his roundabout response to Mrs. M- as a 
set-up to his study of Gaddis. Intimating that he disliked the creative processes behind 
and the overall results ofhis first two status-oriented novels, Franzen's indirect reply 
appears to stage The Corrections as a corrective to his early work: 
1 read The Recognitions as a kind of penance, back in the early nineties. 
During the previous year, while my father, in a different time zone, was 
losing his mind, l' d written two treatments and four full drafts of an 
"original" screenplay. In lieu of actual dollar payments, 1 had the 
enthusiastic support of a Hollywood agent who, out of pit y or negligence, 
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never mentioned that my story bore a fatal resemblance to Fun with Dick 
and Jane, which 1 hadn't seen. My story had double and triple crosses and 
characters who used prosthetic makeup to impersonate other characters. 1 
lived in that state of rage that cornes of doing sustained work that you 
know to be shoddy and dishonest. (242) 
As an honest rejoinder to Mrs. M- in Maryland, Franzen insinuates that he enjoyed 
writing The Corrections because it was neither motivated by an elitist agenda nor directed 
to any select audience. After these biographical specifications and implications, "Mr. 
Difficult" explicitly considers the developing rage that eventually dominates the life and 
work of William Gaddis. For Franzen, who titles The Corrections "partly in homage to 
it," The Recognitions confirms a personal faith in literature (248). Though Gaddis' 
encyclopedic novel is "quintessentially difficult" (242), it is uniquely gratifying (268). 
Franzen deems The Recognitions rewarding, that is, testing, moving, and memorable, on 
account of the enormous travail its reading entails. The novels released after Gaddis' first 
publication, on the other hand, grow increasingly embittered and difficult and status-
minded in Franzen's estimation. Much to his disappointment, he surmises that these 
subsequent six texts require more work to "decipher" than they did to "assemble" (267). 
ln a review of How to Be A/one called "Advertisements for Himself," James 
Wolcott assesses "Mr. Difficult" as "a prop to measure the progress of Franzen's own 
development" (36). As the commentator's title advises, Wolcott indicts Franzen as a 
"pious opportunist" whose work reflects an incorrigible self-centeredness: "It's always 
about him" (36). With respect to How To Be A/one in its entirety, and possibly "Mr. 
Difficult" specifically, Wolcott's judgment may be warranted, as far as it goes anyway. 
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Franzen's essays, always in first-person, always confessional, invariably work toward 
placing their outspoken author within the culture that he writes about. This practice of 
self-positioning, however, is standard for Harper 's, The New Yorker, and the other 
American publications to which Franzen contributes. First-person belletristic essays, 
moreover, offer cultural specificity and situadness. As a defense against charges of 
universalizing, which is now thought to falsify any position, the "1" functions as a 
recognition of individuallimitations. Like Joseph Epstein, who consistently writes in the 
first-person singular, Franzen utilizes the "1" as a rhetorical strategy for personal integrity. 
Naturally checked and balanced by editors and their associates, the personal tone ofhis 
nonfictions proves to be less than idiosyncratic. True to the form of most critiques of 
Franzen, Wolcott's resolve to correct the author of The Corrections, ifnot to correct The 
Corrections as weIl, distracts his reading of Franzen. Though "Mr. Difficult," as a case in 
point, is clearly about its writer, it is also about making a distinction between this 
particular writer and his fictional narrators. 
In his answer to Mrs. M-, Franzen establishes a discussion of Gaddis in terms of 
the rage that previously delineated his own personallife. On the surface, he outlines that 
his overruling temper was in most part due to his labors on an uninspired film script. He 
reveals that Gaddis' initial work rescues him from his yearlong mental agitation. Franzen 
recognizes the relation between phoniness and unhappiness, a relation that informs his 
differentiation of literature and life. When he finishes "Mr. Difficult" with the testimony 
that "Something went haywire" with Gaddis, that the man stopped trying to connect with 
the world after it ignored him, that the man never let go ofhis anger, that the man's sad 
life story is the stuff of fiction, Franzen suggests that Gaddis lived his literature, that 
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Gaddis was his literature (268-9). In making this claim, Franzen indicates that he aspires 
toward an altemate fate. Dramatizing neither life as clue to fiction nor fiction as clue to 
life, Franzen proposes that what makes the break between life and the bits and pieces of 
literature possible is the ability for an author to feel that she appeals to an audience, an 
audience that in tum feels free, if not in fact compelled, to engage with the work on its 
own terms. As a reader and a writer, feeling good about a textual encounter, despite its 
level of difficulty, legitimates the time and effort that an individual can devote to 
conventionallinear reading. 
Franzen's appraisal ofliterary production do es not preclude the implementation of 
biography into fiction. Unmistakably, the events that contour a life likewise shape the 
literature affiliated with this life. Still, Franzen cautions authors and readers to evaluate 
bona jide facts only in terms of the representational parameters in which they are 
depicted. Although this counsel may appear self-evident, given that picking up a novel is 
one and the same as adopting a fictional stance, and that disceming the partially made-up 
from the wholly made-up tends to be unfeasible for a reader, this has not been the chief 
response to Franzen's most recent fiction. Nearly every consideration of The Corrections 
is colored by the impressions of an author made popular by the media because of his 
resistance to being made popular by Oprah. Franzen's edifying advice, however, is self-
directed too. As Wolcott reveals, Franzen measures his development as an author against 
Gaddis' progress. Whereas Gaddis falls apart, Franzen seems to say, he cornes together. 
Self-hype aside, this admission highlights the author's newfangled approach to narrative 
in terms of The Corrections. His third novel contains neither the ironic anger that drives 
the plot of The Twenty-Seventh City nor the obvious anger that forces the action of Strong 
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Motion. Franzen furthermore elects not to incorporate a significant character clearly 
modeled on himselfinto The Corrections, a selfthat he describes in the introduction to 
How to Be Alone as "very angry and theory-minded" in the past ("A Word About this 
Book" 4). Discarding rage and frustrated cultural rebuke, he learns to prefer writing "for 
the fun and entertainment of it" over writing for the reason that it satisfies his "sense of 
social responsibility" (4). 
With this discovery, Franzen makes the transition from what might be called the 
realm of creative social critique to the realm of fictional entertainment. This measurement 
of Franzen's evolution as an author, though, does not insist nor imply that social and 
cultural theorists are angry. Notwithstanding the reactions of Mrs. M-, Franzen's 
development illustrates that he now aims to delight his readers in lieu of instructing them. 
Although fiction can be as informative as theory (or more so) and theory can be as 
entertaining as fiction (or more so), writers and readers have different reasons for 
investing themselves in each ofthese enterprises. Much like his creator, character Chip 
Lambert also cornes to this realization in The Corrections. Originally characterized by 
anger, Chip openly resembles his author in a number of ways. Yet in spite ofbeing 
theory-minded and manifestly difficult, as a fictional figure Chip can be appraised wholly 
in terms of the narrative in which he features. Akin to his maker but not a mere 
translation of him, Chip tells his own distinctive story. 
Representation 
The first chapter of The Corrections details Chip's final months as a tenure-track 
culture critic at D- College, in small-town Connecticut. Titled "The Failure," Chip's 
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section follows a briefprologue called "St. Jude." As a framing device, and a telling 
diversion to Chip's early career, the novel begins and ends in the suburban setting that 
Chip's elected occupation criticizes and corrects. In "St. Jude," the narrator introduces 
readers to an old woman named Enid and her ailing husband Alfred. Enid can no longer 
keep house; even her issues of House Beautiful and Good Housekeeping are in disorder 
(6). In an effort to conceal the fact that he can no longer follow full sentences, Al spends 
most of his time "underground" in the basement (10). Following the epigrammatic 
suburban opener, Chip's narrative commences outside New York City at LaGuardia 
airport, where the cynical son stands "just beyond the security checkpoint" watching the 
couple he considers "killers" amble very slowly towards him (15). Enid and Alfred are set 
to depart on an autumn cruise to see the colors of Québec later in the day, as the Nordic 
Pleasurelines bags they shoulder indicate, and Chip, who until recently deconstructed 
corporate ads professionally, is there to collect the couple, feed them, and deliver them to 
the pier. 
At this stage of Chip' s life, only his pain and suffering are important to him. His 
original gesture in the narrative is to grab and pull the wrought-iron rivet in his ear. He 
does this to buck himself up for the lunchtime visit. Conscious that he must remain 
composed as he longs to swallow a "hoarded Xanax" (20), Chip's self-punishment 
momentarily repels his attention from the other four major pains he seems unable to 
correct. These established throbbings, readers soon learn, are the result of (i) the 10ss of 
his post as an associate prof essor in "Textual Artifacts," because of a misdemeanor 
involving an undergraduate girl that fell "just short ofthe legally actionable" (17); (ii) the 
more than twenty-thousand dollars he borrowed from his younger sister, for the purpose 
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ofwriting a screenplay beginning with a turgid, academic, six-page opener that not even 
eighteen months of correction has made readable; (iii) the free articles he writes for the 
Warren Street Journal, an arts monthly that subverts the ideals that his mother praises, 
illusions she thinks he also supports, since he has not corrected her half mistaken belief 
that he works for the Wall Street Journal; and, (vi) the status ofhis affair with an 
undivorced woman whom he has neither seen nor heard from in nearly a week despite his 
many voice mails and emails. 
Chip's want of confidence only heightens his growing catalogue of failures. He 
understands, for instance, that just as he lacked the verve to resign from his position when 
he was given the chance, a step which would have made college tenure somewhere else 
possible, he also lacked the nerve to amend his screenplay when he knew he had to, a 
move which could have made his present post-submission mind-frame less insufferable. 
Chip is likewise aIl too aware that his inability to disabuse his mother of her 
misconceptions, not to mention his incapacity to inform his girlfriend of his 
pennilessness, simultaneously corroborates and exacerbates a two-year period clearly 
defined by his lack of courage. Rather than actually confronting his personal weakness of 
the will, he takes the less difficult course of disguising it. At the age ofthirty-nine, he has 
a quarter-inch rivet hammered onto his ear. In addition, he takes to wearing leather "like a 
second skin" (18). Predictably, Chip's midwestem parents comment on his physical 
modifications not long after the threesome's preliminary hellos. 
Chip's introduction recalls the opening of John Updike's 1990 novel Rabbi! at 
Rest. The last novel of the Rabbit quartet begins in the waiting area of an airport, where 
middle-age parents Harry and Janice collect their thirtyish son, his wife, and their two 
62 
children. Just after they meet on Boxing Day, Harry "Rahhit" Angstrom notes that his 
badly dressed son's earlobe "bears a tiny white earring" (13). Barely controlling his 
signature irritation, Harry's frustration swells when he then realizes that Nelson's recent 
haircut involves "one ofthose tails, like a rat's tail, uncut and hanging down over the 
boy's collar" (15). With this beginning, Updike initiates the two adjacent themes that run 
through his narrative. Like its three precursors, Rabbit, Run (1960), Rabbi! Redux (1971), 
and Rabbi! is Rich (1981), Rabbit at Rest draws attention to aloneness and independence. 
Yet for the first time in his thirty-year tenure as a suhurhan character, Harry winds up 
living alone, an isolation that foreshadows ~is death. Throughout the succession of 
novels, he at one time or another lives with his wife, with a prostitute, with a rich teenage 
hippie and an ex-con, and with his wife and her mother. In spite ofhis many movements, 
however, Harry never remains alone. Furthermore, save for the young father's short term 
with the prostitute Ruth in Rabbit, Run, Harry keeps the suitahly insecure Nelson by his 
side. 
Significantly, in Rabbit at Rest the grownup Nelson at last seems capable of living 
independently, despite several unsteady (to say the least) starts. Following his discharge 
from a treatment center for drug dependency, Nelson has his own business plans, plans 
that exclude his father. Similarly, Harry's wife Janice also desires independence. With 
little warning, she unexpectedly embarks on a year-round career as a realtor, leaving her 
inflexible hushand to winter by himself in their Fort Myers condo, or so it would seem. 
Largely unprecedented in the quartet, these extra-Harry stories suggest a generational 
shift. By including ample narrative on grandma Janice and father-of-two-with-one-on-the-
way Nelson, the prolific Updike restructures the character focus of the Rabbit novels, 
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thereby setting up a credible prolongation of the series. Even following grandpa Harry's 
death near the end of Rabbit at Rest, a renamed "Angstrom" compilation proves 
conceivable. Intentionally suspect from the start, the original name of the suburban series 
craves correction, after aIl. Ever since Rabbit, Run, only the narrator consistently calls 
Harry "Rabbit." Illustrating the ironic nostalgia typical to the genre of suburban fiction, 
"Rabbit" was Harry's nickname when he was a high school B-Ieague basketball star, six 
years before the events that begin the earliest "Rabbit" novel. 
While Harry gravitates toward his expected final rest in the fourth novel, Updike's 
third-person narrator drafts a relation between independence and narrative. Akin to his 
mother, Nelson attains a measure of individuality when his unique narrative warrants 
supplementary attention and development. Perhaps influenced by Updike, whom he 
mentions once in How to Be Alone (62), and de scribes as a "reliable thunderhead" of 
"commercially viable literary fiction," along with American novelists Stone, Roth, 
Morrison, Smiley, and Oates, in an angry 1996 article (''l'Il Be Doing More of Same" 36), 
Franzen likewise forges a link between autonomy and personality in The Corrections. 
With Chip as protagonist and narrator, albeit a narrator whose identity remains 
undisclosed untillate in the novel, Franzen demonstrates how acts of narratological 
separation reinforce individual identity. 
Although The Corrections starts with a focus on the half estranged Enid and Al, 
the spotlight shifts when Chip enters the narrative. After the taxi ride to his prewar 
building, the elevator ride to his apartment floor, and the short walk to his door, the 
family-visit ends abruptly. Chip's girlfriend materializes at his door with the personal 
belongings that she has just reclaimed from his apartment. In the same way that she 
64 
clandestinely left her Lithuanian husband, a dissident-turned-politician named Gitanis, 
she tries to discard Chip in secret, not least because the final edit of his original 
screenplay, an ill-masked cinematic roman à clefwith figures named Bill, Mona, and 
Hillaire, brings up "breasts" an offensive number oftimes (26). Julia dodges Chip's pleas 
for her to stay and talk by slipping into the elevator. As he fumbles at the lift door, she 
descends. Without a word to his parents, he follows. Once he reaches the rain-drenched 
street below, he notices Julia escaping in a cab as a beautiful, well-dressed woman 
descends from another. The attractive woman happens to be his sister, arriving from 
Philadelphia in order to lunch with her brother and parents. He informs her that he needs 
to get to his producer's office and make sorne last corrections to his film script. Unable to 
convince him to stay, Denise advises him to hurry, since "Dad is sick" (32). Chip looks at 
a cab. A quick decoder, Denise straightaway says, "1 can't give you any more money," 
before she rhetorically asks, "Because where does it end?" (32). In answer, Chip turns and 
stomps away in the downpour, "smiling with rage" (32). 
Subsequent to this additional tense encounter, the chapter splices back and forth 
between his journey to producer Eden Procuro's office and the back story describing the 
failures that began at D- College, with short looks at the Lambert lunch occurring in 
Chip's absence. We learn that the ex-professor's offenses at the small campus in 
Connecticut involved sleeping with, taking club drugs alongside, plagiarizing a paper for, 
and eventually stalking his former student Melissa. When Chip, who was very lonely that 
term, first resists the undergraduate's overt sexual advances, he gives "himself an A for 
correctness" (51); after aIl he "co-chaired the committee that drafted the college's 
stringent new policy on faculty-student contacts" (37). 
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Chip's ironic resolve fails after his greatest supporter, the college provost, suffers 
a stroke and his archenemy, a competing colleague, publishes a book. With his pending 
tenureship now at risk, he can no longer repress his rising despair and loneliness, a 
depression intensified by ms spontaneous summer trip to Scotland. Consequently, he 
spends most of the weeklong Thanksgiving holiday in a gmngy motel with Melissa before 
the psychotropic "Mexican A" that she provides mns out and Chip's shame grows 
unbearable (60-61). Unwilling to deal with his ressentiment and conflictedness, she 
leaves him all alone. When the semester resumes, Chip fails to duplicate her unequivocal 
actions. He caUs her. He follows her. As a result, she makes the entire affair public. The 
accused prof essor then refuses to resign, a decision that goes against the lone counsel of 
the acting provo st of the college. After the obligatory college hearing, Chip gets fired. 
His unwillingness to resign from his faculty post seems to be based on principle. 
Chip, however, downplays this position when he pretends that he has no real justifiable 
reason to discount the advice of his colleagues, not to mention take legal action against 
his former employer: "He borrowed ten thousand doUars from Denise and hired a lawyer 
to threaten to sue D- College for wrongful termination of his contract. This was a waste 
ofmoney, but it felt good" (87). The act oflawful revenge on the part of the indicted calls 
attention to the maneuvers of two other contemporary fictional figures who are similarly 
prosecuted by university paralegal systems. In J.M. Coetzee's novel Disgrace, which won 
the Booker Prize in 1999, the Technical University of Cape Town, South Africa, 
adjudicates an official complaint against David Lurie, a Romantics professor allegedly 
guilty of sleeping with a student and doctoring her marks. Without reading his former 
student's plea, David informs the committee ofinquiry that he is guilty. When a colleague 
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formally inquires "Guilty ofwhat?," the accused resolutely counters with "Of everything 
Ms. Isaacs avers, and of keeping false records" (49). Following further statements, the 
board of review requires David to issue a statement wherein he repents his unlawful 
actions. The Romantics scholar refuses this public show of contrition on philosophical 
grounds. The appeal for repentance, he summarizes, is beyond the compass of legality: "1 
won't do it. 1 appeared before an officially constituted tribunal, before a branch of the 
law. Before that secular tribunal 1 pleaded guilty, a secular plea. The plea should suffice. 
Repentance is neither here nor there. Repentance belongs to another world" (58). 
Referring to Josef von Sternberg' s 1930 film Der Blaue Engel, which features a 
disgraced professor nicknamed "Dnrat" (garbage or rubbish), Francine Prose's recent 
novel Blue Angel features an instructor named Ted Swenson who also faces charges of 
sexual harassment. But whereas David Lurie objects to his lay tribunal on theoretical 
grounds, Ted Swenson disapproves ofhis entire indictment on the bases ofveracity. In 
Blue Angel, student-accuser Angela cunningly frames the writer-in-residence. Though the 
plaintiff and the defendant did have proscribed yet consensual contact, the gifted 
undergraduate novelist reformulates the purported facts of the certified proceedings for 
the purpose of marketing her forthcoming novel, which obsessively integrates tailored 
aspects from both Ted's personallife and his lone novel. An exasperated objector, Ted 
crudely and unwisely attests, "1 didn't make this girl sleep with me in exchange for 
pimping her novel" (245). For obvious reasons, however, Ted's counterclaims are legally 
indefensible. In spite of any details that might support his acquittaI, the beginning of 
Prose's narrative establishes that Ted will be guilty as charged. In the second chapter of 
Blue Angel, faculty and staff of Euston College, isolated an hour away from Montpelier, 
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Vermont, in the "Northeast Kingdom" (13), attend a compulsory meeting on sexual 
harassment policy. As host, the dean's "Sermon" accentuates "the current zeitgeist" of 
Puritan "warfare" indicative of latter-day "witch-hunt[ing]" on American campuses (21-
3). 
As with Chip and David, Ted's inadequate consolation results from the fact that 
his bold contrariety will play up the theatricality affiliated to his unjust hearing. While 
Chip hires an attorney for the sole purpose of playing a phony legal game, neither David 
nor Ted considers legal representation because neither wants to promote participation in a 
pseudo-courtroom drama. While at the mandatory meeting, for instance, Ted meditates 
upon the fact that given Euston's "alarmingly tiny endowment," the college cannot risk 
litigation (22). In these campus scandaI novels, each "guilty" prof essor recognizes his 
involvement in an un-winnable open and shut case. In aIl three instances, what is reaIly 
laid bare is the review board's plan to make a distinction between the institution and the 
accused. Orchestrating its own blamelessness, each university engineers its own defense 
against indemnification. Like sorne twisted Athenian democracy, the academics who sit 
injudgment oftheir colleagues merely pretend to gesture towards the just implementation 
of legality. Rather than impartially review the positions oftheir respective defendants, 
intramural tribunal boards avoid the potential r~ifications of justice and legality. 
Faculty-student contact hearings are not staged in courts of law. The indicted party 
therefore receives neither the assurance of due process nor the guarantee of Miranda 
rights, both ofwhich are constitutionalliberties mandated by US law. Whether within 
America or not, other issues complicate the manufactured minimalism of these self-styled 
trials. David Lurie, for one, reveals a discordance between sexual mores and natural 
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inclinations when he mentions "intimacy across the generations" (Disgrace 52). 
Cogitating the inapplicability of clear culpability in milieus characterized by inequities of 
power, Ted Swenson contemplates "desire" and "Mutual seduction" (Blue Angel 245). 
Correlating sexual desire, authority, and transgression, Chip finds false relief in the fact 
that "There's a code" offaculty-student conduct in the first place (The Corrections 51). In 
an essay that examines particular American academic novels published or planned in the 
Clinton-era, Jesse Kavadlo investigates what he poetically configures as the "parasitic 
relationship that exposes the camaI heart of darkness beating beneath supposedly cerebral 
pursuits" (11). In his discursive piece, Kavadlo elaborates on how each fictional 
representation of a campus scandaI "reiterates the boilerplate of sexual conduct codes that 
demonstrates how even consensual relationships betray imbalances ofpower, authority, 
age, and frequently, gender" (15). 
Kavadlo continues by identifying that for the indicted fictional figures in Prose's 
Blue Angel, Franzen's The Corrections, Edward Allen's Mustang Sally, and Philip Roth's 
The Dying Animal (all ofwhom are sympathetic men teaching in English departments 
typicaIly located in the New England area) "academic freedom contradicts, rather than 
corresponds with, the terror and mortification vital to eroticism; they find, and exploit, 
one of the only ways in which a tenured prof essor may be fired. And it should be clear 
that these formulations of power, eroticism, and taboo apply to Bill Clinton, who 
apparently discovered one of the only ways a sitting President could be impeached" (16). 
As the literary theorist intimates, these novelistic depictions of the accrued tensions 
between Puritanism and predation, prudery and power, and publicness and privacy (aH of 
which are largely unique to the decade or so between the Cold War and the War on 
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Terror) "provide psychological insight into both academic and political crises in ways that 
nonfiction has not, and perhaps Can not [sic]. They attempt to include yet transcend their 
immediate subject matter to provide the ambiguous character and narrative 
determinations and ambivalent morality that has eluded partisan politics and mainstream 
journalism" (13). 
Notwithstanding his focus on American fiction, a focus that could include Joyce 
Carol Oates's Nemesis as a counterpoint, given that in Oates's 1990 novel a male 
composer-in-residence, whom the review board eventually acquits, allegedly rapes a male 
music student, Kavadlo's insights bear a strong resemblance to those of David in 
Coetzee's Disgrace. Though living and working in South Africa, David exposes his 
entrenchment in an academic climate of ambivalent morality. As a male prof essor, he 
instantly recognizes his de facto guilt, the guilt that Coetzee problematizes by 
characterizing the student-victim as at once disinclined towards and disposed to her 
recurring physical engagements with the teacher-perpetrator. The illicit liaison, however 
undefined, never precludes Melanie's free agency. Always-already liable on account of 
his profession, David has no reason to verify the plaintiffs testimony. Mere allegation, in 
other words, entails criminality. From the beginning of the scheduled proceedings, David 
therefore plainly acknowledges the affair with his student Melanie, an affair that he 
refuses to mitigate by means of a plea proclaiming a simulated "spirit of repentance" (58). 
Though a mock trial may offer illusions about justly delineating the complexity 
and the correctness of an entire affair, David makes plain that a review board cannot in 
the same false spirit determine and thereby reduce the suitability of the putative remorse 
he ought to feel at the end of the affair. As the Romantics scholar asserts, "Repentance 
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belongs to another world, to another universe of discourse" (58). This extra-le gal 
discourse belongs to the universe of fiction. Whereas the numerous formalities of the 
quasi-courtroom and the actual courtroom are put in place to ensure that the legal process 
paints a clear picture of reality, novelists are free to represent "reality" in all of its 
ambiguity, complexity, and even indecipherability. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, David, Ted, and Chip turn to writing fiction once 
theyare dismissed from their academic positions. After a "few years" of "playing with the 
idea of a work on Byron" (4), David finally approaches his opera to be titled Byron in 
Italy in earnest. Eventually, he abandons the project because ofhis lack of "musical 
resources" (214). At the conclusion of Blue Angel, Ted finds relief in the fact that he no 
longer has to teach. This reprieve hints that the once-published novelist will retum to 
writing his unoriginal The Black and the Black following a two-year hiatus. Irrespective 
ofthis respite, Ted's future success looks doubtful. He has the makings of a one-novel 
man. Comparatively, Chip works on his Lewinsky-inspired film-script after his dismissal. 
This equally dubious writing project plays up what Kavadlo calls the "tragic 
irrevocability" fundamental to the predictable plots of academic novels (18), as weIl as 
the sacrifices to privacy that accompany any position of authority open to the scrutiny of 
the public. 
Additionally, Chip's commitment to his movie script emphasizes the rudimentary 
connection between reprisaI and legality. When Chip looks back, he admits that he 
conceived his screenplay as a "form" of "revenge" "that would expose the narcissism and 
treachery of Melissa Paquette and the hypocrisy of his colleagues; he wanted the people 
that hurt him to see the movie, recognize themselves, and suffer" (87). In correspondence 
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to other narratives about "the sexual misadventures" of morally ambiguous prof essors, a 
group of academic novels that also includes Roth's The Human Stain (2003), which 
features the Clinton-Lewinsky scandaI as both subtext and context, Chip's failed writing 
project restricts him from the logic of "redemptive possibility" (Kavadlo 18). WeIl, at 
least in the Oprah sense of novelistic salvation, anyway. Her corrective reading likely 
concludes that Chip could never write effectively. For Oprah and the Oprah reading team, 
Chip might emblematize the stupid smart-person, the delinquent male prof essor perfectly 
suited to spectacular consumption. 
Kavadlo and every other published "critic" of The Corrections likewise overlook 
Chip's key function in Franzen's novel. Because Kavadlo tailors The Corrections to fit 
into his attentive reading ofrecent campus fiction, he intentionally disregards Chip's 
ongoing presence in the work. Purposely finishing prematurely, his analysis of The 
Corrections ends with an annotation of what happens "after the academic section" (18). 
In his succinct estimation, Chip merely "finds his life deteriorating further, from petty 
shoplifting to international monetary fraud" (18). Kavadlo therefore deduces that Chip 
cannot correct the despondent conditions that define him in "The Failure." In order to 
appear at Eden's office in timely fashion, Chip certainly steals petty cash from the tip jar 
of a waitress. Shortly following his arrivaI, Chip definitely consents to defraud stupid 
American investors via an Internet scam based in Lithuania. Before the chapter closes, 
furthermore, Chip boards a plane headed for Vilnius with his new colleague-in-crime, 
Gitanis MiseviCius, the free-party politician he has been cuckolding, in theory at least, for 
almost two years. This second trip to an airport in the space of a less than a day, however, 
does not signal the figure offailure's departure from the narrative. Conversely, Chip's 
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primary role in Franzen's third novel commences where the academic section concludes. 
At once marking and missing Chip's intricate responsibility in The Corrections, 
critics who comment on the method of narration in the novel customarily exhibit clear 
frustration. Robert L. McLaughlin, for example, disapproves of the uneven "narrative 
voice" throughout the fiction: "the narrative voice continually shifts-and asks its readers 
to shift along with it-its attitude toward the social world [that] it's representing and its 
attitude toward the process of representing that world. This could be interesting if one had 
the impression it was being done intentionally, but here it seems the result of an author in 
flux, unsure ofhow he relates to the world and his art form" (63). Along the same lines, 
Brian Phillips questions the effectiveness of narratorial awareness in The Corrections. In 
his' essay on the representation and development of character in contemporary fiction, he 
integrates part of a scene in which Enid acquires the hallucinogenic Aslan Cruiser (a.k.a. 
Mexican A) from a quack doctor peddling illicit pharmaceuticals aboard the Québec-
bound cruiseliner. Phillips elaborates on this doctor-patient transaction as a case in point 
for unintentional and confusing narration. He wonders, "Whose thoughts are these? They 
are certainly not Enid's. When Franzen gives us a look at her consciousness, we see her 
sniffing at the doctor for mistaking her name: 'Her name was Enid. E-NI-D' [sic]. This is 
not someone who would consider, in the given language, 'the givens of the self,' or 'a 
newly scored drug.'" (641). Phillips goes on to say that "the confusion is complicated by 
the fact that another character in the book, Enid's son Chip, does think in terms of scoring 
drugs and the givens of the self, so that one has the bizarre and surely unintended sense 
that Chip is narrating this passage. In reality, of course, the irruption is Franzen's own, 
and there is no mediating narratorial consciousness" (641). 
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In their respective analyses of narration, both McLaughlin and Phillips talk about 
the notion of intention, whether in the form of a lack of intention or in the shape of a 
sense of un-intention. Tellingly, each scholar also alludes to Chip, albeit to different 
degrees. McLaughlin appears to reference the former cultural critic when he bemoans the 
flux and uncertainty of the voice behind Franzen's narrative. After aU, despite Chip's 
banal assertion that "the structure of the entire culture is flawed" (The Corrections 31), 
"he is just as messed up," as Peter Filkins observes (231). Time and again in his chapter 
"The Failure," Chip illustrates his trademark instability and indecision. Following his last 
full semester of lecturing, for one, the diehard Foucaultian doubts "even the most abstract 
utility [of] his criticism" (45). Vacillating over a pair of costly avocadoes at a trendy 
market, Chip simply cannot "pull the trigger" (93). Chip's hesitant yet pervasive 
influence, an adroit control extending the length of The Corrections, appears to be the 
voice that so aggravates McLaughlin, even if the cri tic fails to distinguish this narratorial 
tactic. Phillips, by contrast, recognizes Chip's frequent novelistic incursions. Though 
Phillips second-gues ses his own impressions, he realizes that Chip narrates certain 
passages of the novel. With this detection, he approaches an understànding ofChip's 
sophisticated part in The Corrections. 
An aspiring screenwriter, Chip Lambert does not merely invade and momentarily 
take over the narration of the novel. While en route to yet another airport, only on this 
occasion in hopes of retuming to Christmas in suburban St. Jude for the first time in 
nearly a decade, he finally reveals that he narrates The Corrections. Exerting his own 
justice, an act of justice he initially envisages as "revenge" in the "form" of an imminent 
"movie" designed in order to oblige his treacherous and hypocritical tormentors to 
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"suffer" (87), he illustrates how justice likewise necessarily concems itself with the 
correction of victims. Not only about the trial, sentencing, surveillance, and correction of 
the criminal, just compensation likewise involves the reparation of the victim, a 
recompense that Chip discovers in the telling of his narrative, a unique narrative that 
redeploys his awareness from his perpetrators to himself. This shift in focus elucidates 
that individual victims and criminals alike have their own personal reproofs and daims 
and judgments, aIl of which can contribute to the ongoing development of justice-an 
evolving process always moving towards restitution rather than retaliation. 
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Chapter Two 
Surveillance and Success in the Suburbs 
Walls 
Inspected as a whole, Franzen's fiction advances from the categorical map (the 
increased divisiveness of St. Louis), through the erased map (the crumbled Boston area 
atop its seismological survey), to the literally unmapped (the fictional St. Jude). Formerly 
a Midwestemer, the author incorporates several actuallocations in The Corrections. The 
plot of Franzen's third novel progresses through known or mapped places while 
advancing toward the Christmas holiday in St. Jude, the suburb situated somewhere in the 
vast Midwest where The Corrections begins. Setting up the purported placelessness of St. 
Jude, Franzen includes a focus on foreign spaces in The Corrections, a move that adds the 
world outside of the US to his depictions of American cities and their peripheral 
communities. In contradistinction to the recognized cities that Franzen normally 
represents in his work, "St. Jude" could be almost anywhere. The "Midwest" designation 
accentuates this anyplaceness ironically. Typed as paragons of similarity, America' s 
Heartlanders are routinely perceived as hardworking, honest, devoted, and, of course, 
bored and boring. Franzen thereby intimates that in terms of the limits of the suburbs, the 
home state, never mind the home city, may be of little consequence. Just as "individual" 
houses in these bedroom communities lack distinction, so too do "singular" suburbs lack 
differentiation. 
In her book White Diaspora, Catherine Jurca examines the unsettling 
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repercussions of the suburban phenomenon. Underscoring what she calls "the 
unprecedented homogeneity associated with the paths of suburbanization since W orld 
War II,'' Jurca quotes Richard Rodriguez for the purpose oftranslating the innocent 
inquiry "Where am I?" (13). Appropriating Rodriguez, she wonders, "How to tell if one is 
in suburban Atlanta or Denver or Houston?" (13). Before she poses this clearly 
discomfiting question, the urban theorist appraises the escalating mass-production of 
houses and neighborhoods, of families and lifestyles, as a development "associated with 
homelessness" (12). In order to clarify her introductory assertion, Jurca relates the 
impression of homelessness to a feeling of unoriginality, arguing that the "association 
cornes through the undesirable multiplication of such houses and furnishings, interiors 
and exteriors, that look exactly alike" (12). Discussing the postwar "expansion" or 
"explosion" of suburbia in similar ways, Robert Beuka contends that the "proliferating 
sense ofplacelessness and in turn the perceived homogenization of American life ... 
immeasurably alter [ s] the ways Americans think about place and their individual and 
collective relationships to it" (2). 
Mike Davis, however, reveals a quantifiable consequence ofthis alteration in a 
certain segment of the American population. While elaborating on the rising number of 
insular "residential enclave [ s] or restricted suburb[ s]" in the US, he cites a documented 
example of how the "white middle-class imagination," a suburban imagination usually 
"absent from any first-hand knowledge ofinner-city conditions," amplifies alleged "threat 
through a demonologicallens" (224). Intimating a correspondence between suburban 
living, broad ignorance, media embellishment, inculcated paranoia, security mobilization, 
and social control, Davis confirms, "Surveys show that Milwaukee suburbanites are just 
as worried about violent crime as inner-city Washingtonians, despite a twenty-fold 
difference in relative levels of mayhem" (224-5). 
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Throughout his fiction, Franzen concems himself with the representation of the se 
modem tensions and anxieties between individuality and place. In The Twenty-Seventh 
City, for instance, the Probsts lose their Webster Groves suburban home to fire, which is 
an instantiation of Martin's loss of cachet as a real-estate developer, his unproductive 
political maneuverings, and multiple personal failures. In Strong Motion, Melanie 
HoUand inherits a suburban estate outside Ipswich, near Boston. This legal acquisition 
acts as the touchstone that actualizes the breakup of her marriage, while likewise 
eradicating the near-lifelong estrangement of the two Holland children, at least 
momentarily. With aU oftheir losses and mergers, properties and politics, departures and 
intersections, separations and reconnections, these narratives are tied to specific places on 
the edges of particular cities. Fixated on unequivocal suburban settings, Franzen propels 
his first two novels in the direction of tricky delineations of real estate, capitalism, 
politics, and individualism. As a critic of contemporary culture who stages his pre-
millennial fictional works within presumably safe, secure, and banal middle-class 
communities, Franzen implicates the suburbs in the systems of justice that classify urban 
centers. Neither as zones ofsentimentality, nor as precincts oftraditional family values, 
his suburban milieus are supplied with the inner-city difficulties and predicaments that 
they were originally designed to correct. Almost as cities-in-small, these spaces are 
replete with crime, accusation, retaliation, reproach, physical danger, personal 
surveillance, and uncommitted compromise, none of which credibly brings his families 
members any closer to candor and justice. 
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In his first two novels, Franzen adjudges the suburbs as finally incorrigible. Like 
the majority ofhis contemporaries and predecessors; in the fields ofboth urban theory 
and novelistic depiction, Franzen finds little to commemorate or leave uncorrected from 
these particular yet placeless environments. Nevertheless, he departs from this general 
assessment when he modifies his previous spotlight on precise suburban sites by 
integrating a mythic, unspecific place into The Corrections. Even in its literary 
beginnings, the Lambert home is given no real, precise, findable setting. "Chez Lambert," 
a short story published in 1996, and a draft of the prologue to The Corrections, opens 
with "St. Jude: that prosperous midwestem gerontocracy, that patron saint of the really 
desperate" (29). Actually the patron saint of lost causes, St. Jude the suburb is nearly 
anonymous. Its inhabitants define it, not its location. By observably parodying the 
resemblance of aU St. Judeans, a semblance that normalizes their so-called uniform 
wealth, age, and mental health, Franzen problematizes the portrayal of this place. 
Most places, ifnot aU ofthem, Franzen's understated amendment to suburban 
representation seems to advocate, cannot help but be home to sorne degree of diversity. 
Despite the poignant findings, apt projections, and valid fears of urban theorists (the 
critical voices of a fashionable interdisciplinary field moving more and more towards 
suburban theory, as works by Soja [1989], Harvey [1990], Marshall [2001], and Spigel 
[2001], among many others, illustrate to varying degrees), where one lives does not 
necessarily shape how one lives or how one wishes to live. As Chip Lambert ascertains 
over the course of his visit to Midwestem St. Jude, a temporary homecoming effectively 
preceded or introduced by his twenty-year critique of mass culture, as well as his two 
months of felony and lei sure in the capital of Lithuania, the suburban neighborhoods and 
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communities of the US need not be understood as irredeemable hubs of placelessness, 
supervision, conformity, and fear. Like the urban centers that these suburban peripheries 
have been replacing all through the American Century, these still-developing spaces can 
be evaluated as distinctive, vibrant, and cosmopolitan. 
After a half season of lucrative wire fraud for a sham corporation based in so-
called "Free-Market Vilnius" (438), a job that ensures "the more patently satirical the 
promises, the lustier the influx of American capital" (439), and a life that includes a twice 
weekly "therapeutic (trans)act(ion) on the massage mat" at Club Metropol (441), Chip 
must flee the Lithuanian capital due to sudden civil urnest. Mere days before the Lambert 
family's "One Last Christmas," as the novel's final chapter title forebodes, Chip awakes 
to the sounds of a noisy crowd. The growing group gathers just outside the "U.S.-
embassy-quality fence" surrounding the ex-Soviet stronghold that the expatriate shares 
with Gitanis and a handful ofbodyguards (440). Chip promptly learns that because of 
sorne well-timed political hatemongering the general population of Lithuania holds 
Gitanis fully answerable for the country' s current wireless "communication silence of 
nineteenth-century proportions" (451). The American soon discovers that aIl ofthe 
bodyguards, save Gitanis' two cousins Aidaris and Jonas, recently absconded. 
Exacerbating their delicate state of affairs, the four fenced-in men only have one 
means of escape, the Ford Stomper, regrettably a clear symbol of Gitanis' unfair 
affluence. The former official advises his partner and friend to leave the Baltics without 
delay. After little hesitation, Chip prepares his lone travel bag. The two men agree to 
reunite one day. Equipped to return home, Chip climbs into the seat alongside Jonas, the 
sentry at the helm of the SUV. Without incident, Jonas delivers Chip to the small, 
understandably busy airport. Chip gets in line. Impatient, he changes queues. Using his 
pack to secure his place, he telephones his mother with a credit card on a landline. He 
tells her he will be in St. Jude for Christmas. Elated, Enid replies, "Oh, wonderful! 
Wonderful! Wonderful! (458), an enthusiastic reaction that recalls the final sardonic 
words of John Cheever's single suburban novel: "wonderful, wonderful, wonderful, 
wonderful" (Bullet Park 245). Following his phone caU, Chip retums to his lineup. A 
tank then roUs onto the airport runway. As expected, incoming and outgoing flights are 
cancelled. DramaticaUy, the lights go out. 
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After hearing about the airport's closure over the radio, Gitanis, Aidaris, and 
Jonas, who were halfway to safety in Ignalina, near the Belarus border, retum to Vilnius 
determined to "rescue the pathetic American" (533). Jonas navigates the Stomper on 
back-roads toward Poland. As they near the frontier, Gitanis calls the disorder and 
posturing and calamity in his country "A tragedy rewritten as a farce" (534). Seemingly 
on cue, they pass a jeep fleet headed the opposite way. The convoy tums around. Jonas 
speeds up. Mishandling an elbow curve on the uneven road, he loses control. The SUV 
"trie[s] out several versions of the vertical" and crashes (534). Though unhurt, the four 
escapees are stripped of cigarettes, greenbacks, electronics, and American leather at 
machinegun-point. Mission accomplished, the masked muggers, who are sporting 
"police" uniforms, abandon the scene (536). Aidaris observes, "Truckfucked up" (536). 
Chip openly blames himselffor his friends' losses. Shrugging, Gitanis quickly attempts to 
assuage the American: "We might have got shot on the road to Ignalina. Maybe you saved 
our life" (536). Smiling, Aidaris repeats, "Truck fucked up" (536). Chip decides to hike 
the fifteen kilometers to the checkpoint by himself, thereby enabling the amicable trio to 
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make their way home without further delay. Alone, he walks away at ease, partly because 
a sweater, jeans, and sneakers have replaced his neck-to-toe leather. Equally comforting, 
he still holds his un-stolen passport and an unfound two thousand dollars. Hours later, he 
recollects Gitanis' curious appraisal of the chaotic climate in Lithuania: "[a] tragedy 
rewritten as afarce" (537). A flash ofinsight in the predawn dark, Chip applies this 
reading to his film script. He suddenly realizes how to correct the multiple scenes he 
knows memoria ad verba. Almost running to the barely visible border-hamlet ahead, a 
hamlet that designates the safe proximity of the Warsaw airport, he reiterates aloud 
"Make it ridicu/ous. Make it ridicu/ous" (538). 
Separated by one hundred pages, the Chip-centered scene occurs over two 
singular episodes in The Corrections. The running sequence of events and details 
therefore interrupts two different chapters in the novel. Chip's great escape not only 
disrupts the section devoted to Denise Lambert, "The Generator," but also suspends the 
section devoted to the Lambert family, "One Last Christmas." In the same way as Chip's 
personal voice often takes over the narrative, his individual story at times takes over the 
narrative. Notwithstanding his plain placement outside of the mainly discrete stories of 
distinctive Lamberts, Chip makes regular inroads into these stories, narratological inroads 
that surpass his infrequent calls to Enid and his irregular emails to Denise. These 
narrative interventions are neither purely invasive nor merely unintentional. As Chip's 
breakthrough revelation on the road to the protective lights of Poland illuminates, just as 
the screenplay about Bill and Mona transforms the story of Chip and Melissa, so too does 
The Corrections modify Chip's initial screenplay. When Chip grasps that his "tragic" 
hero is a "comic fool" (537), he reveals his own role within The Corrections. With The 
Corrections as a comical or farcical translation of ms affair with his former student, 
academic-cum-author Chip counterbalances ms story of failure with other concurrent 
narratives offailure, all ofwhich are fictional adaptations ofhis theoretical interests. 
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Demonstrably, Chip's iterations ofthe terms "tragic," "comic," and "ridiculous" 
recall the sketch oftragic realism outlined by Franzen in his Harper 's es say, a piece that 
undercuts present-day Westem-world myths of therapeutic and corporate optimism. As 
Franzen forewams his readers, and Chip reminds them, the comic and the ridiculous 
provide a means of articulating the difficulties undemeath the alleged ease of current 
pharmaceutical cures and technological escapes. In terms ofrepresentation, comedy and 
ridicule likewise illustrate the difficulties inherent in any critique of contemporary 
American life. Making reference to David Foster Wallace's "E Pluribus Unum," which 
discursively examines the climate of irony in postmodem USA, McLaughlin emphasizes 
that "In a culture of irony and ridicule no assertion goes unmocked, and if no assertion 
can be sincerely utlered and heard, nothing positive can be built" (65). McLaughlin go es 
on to reword Wallace when he dubs this strained and unproductive modem-day 
atmosphere as "essentially conservative," for the reason that it "negate[ s] the possibility 
of change at the same time as it despairs of the status quo" (65). 
McLaughlin then examines recent appraisals of the modem social world with a 
half covert allusion to both the drug and play themes in Foster's Infinite Jest and the drug 
and travel themes in Franzen's The Corrections. The literary critic finishes his article by 
stressing "the role language plays in constructing" and mediating these recent novels: 
"Post-postmodemism seeks not to reifY the cynicism, the disconnect, the atomized 
privacy of our society nor to escape or mask it (as much as art, serious and pop, does), 
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but, by engaging the language-based nature of its operations, to make us newly aware of 
the reality that has been made for us and to remind us-because we live in a culture 
where we're encouraged to forget-that other realities are possible" (67). Restrictive 
clauses and awkward syntax aside, McLaughlin once again touches upon yet fails to grasp 
the narrative voice that Franzen utilizes in The Corrections. Ever the instructor (he 
teaches primary school as the novel ends), Chip makes his own reality available to us in 
The Corrections. In doing so, narrator Chip reminds his readers continually to revise and 
to correct their estimations of the characters in the novel in the same way that he himself 
constantly revises and corrects his evaluations of the characters in his sereenplay (he 
continues revising it as the novel ends). In this manner, Chip highlights a brand of the 
comedie that does not simply dismiss, and a brand of the ridiculous that does not solely 
disdain. Just as his D- College students seeond-guess his critical analysis of the 
corporate advertisement campaign "Y ou Go, Girl" (39), a reader can second-guess or 
complicate the comedie aspects and the tragic value of his fictional depiction of the 
Lamberts. Inviting others to join him, but not necessarily to concur with him, Chip 
enables readers to engage democratically and correctively with an evolving narrative 
about late-twentieth-century American culture. 
Poignantly, the Lithuanian scene wherein Chip finally experiences his revelation, 
a revelation prompting him to reformulate his script, a reformulation indicating a 
corresponding reappraisal ofthe disjointed stories ofhis American family members, a 
reappraisal that undoubtedly required his exit from the US, hearkens back to his original 
departure from The Corrections. As a matter offact, Chip'sjourney from the walled 
garrison in Vilnius, Lithuania, to the "unfenced world" of St. Jude, USA (540), 
, 
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unmistakably refashions his earlier getaway from the main setting of the narrative. Sitting 
on a plane on the other side of US customs, Chip closed "The Failure" with the line 
"Different kind of prison" (135). Shamefaced, he utters the halfpitiable phrase in reply to 
Gitanis, who has just labeled him a "pathetic American" on account of his single, self-
administered cigarette bum (135). At the end ofChip's academic chapter, this topic of 
conversation arises after Gitanis explains that Julia left him because she was sick ofhis 
cigarette bums, bums he acquired as a dissident under torture in a Red Army barracks in 
1990, the same quarters he and Chip eventually share in newly sovereign Lithuania. The 
Julia topic, in tum, arises because Gitanis wants to clear the undercurrent of tension 
between himself and his new coworker while they are in still in the Americas. He has on 
the handy laptop before him, surveillance data from the bedroom of the New York 
apartment he still owns. Secured on his lap are digital images from the bedroom his wife 
often shared with someone other than himself. Remembering the "strangely complicated 
smoke detector" above Julia's bed, Chip has reason enough, inexpressible reason enough, 
not to want Gitanis to view these shots contemptuously styled as maybe "interesting," 
maybe "hot" (134). 
Bitter, awkward, funny, and forgiving at the same time, the chapter that concludes 
somewhere over the North Atlantic introduces the narrative technique employed 
throughout the four remaining mostly Chip-exclusive sections of The Corrections. When 
Gitanis confronts Chip about the extra-marital affair with Julia in sideways fashion, the 
scene inverts the weird pleasure Chip takes from his prior performance of this adulterous 
relationship. Earlier in "The Failure," Chip admits that he adores Julia's status as an 
undivorced woman, a status he unreservedly publicizes. An illustration of complication 
and incongruence, the ex-prof essor reveals how the marital standing he embellishes 
advertises his modem tolerance while confirming his traditional prejudices: 
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Down at the offices ofthe Warren Street Journal, where he sometimes felt 
insufficiently transgressive, as ifhis innermost selfwere still a nice 
midwestem boy, he took pleasure in alluding to the European statesman he 
was 'cuckolding.' In his doctoral thesis ("Doubtful It Stood: Anxieties of 
the Phallus in Tudor Drama") he'd written extensively about cuckolds, and 
under the cloak ofhis reproving modem scholarship he'd been excited by 
the idea of marriage as a property right, of adultery as theft. (90) 
These manifold transitions from the theoretical to the actual include interrelated transfers 
and exchanges of performance, power, and visibility. At once doing and pretending, 
Chip's tangible excitement contradicts his notional detachment. A victimizer and a 
victim, Chip "steals" as Gitanis spies on him. Up-to-date and old-fashioned, Chip 
authorizes the affairs he considers criminal. 
In "The Failure," Chip essentially foregrounds the personal incentives behind, as 
weIl as the theoretical motivations within, his PhD dissertation by way of his focus on the 
aftermath ofhis disastrous liaison with a former student. The repercussions ofthese 
unsanctioned relations incorporate the triangulation that occurs between Julia, Gitanis, 
and himself. After aIl, the first chapter ofthe novel begins with Julia leaving Chip, and 
ends with Chip leaving with Gitanis. Moreover, in the same way that Chip appears to 
reconfigure his understanding of his doctoral thesis in light of his actual (or real) situation 
with a woman tellingly named Julia Vrais, Chip translates aIl ofhis activities with 
Melissa Paquette, activities that include instructing her, dropping hallucinogens with her, 
86 
sleeping with her, and drafting a bitter screenplay about her, to the proceeding sections of 
The Corrections. 
The exclusive variant to this narratorial technique concems the article "Let Us 
Now Praise Scuzzy Motels," which Chip writes for the Warren Street Journal (17). By 
title alone, this piece makes reference to the rundown place with the obese clerk where 
his short-term affair with Melissa ripens and expires, namely, the "Comfort Inn that had 
lost its franchise and now called itselfthe Comfort Valley Lodge" (56). Nevertheless, 
"Let Us Now Praise Scuzzy Motels" likewise addresses the budget motels where Alfred 
sleeps on his business trips two generations earlier. As disclosed in a back story of the 
chapter "At Sea," which relates events surrounding Enid and Al, the regimented 
Schopenhauerian patriarch aptly displaces his clear sexual frustration into barely 
restrained rage when he habitually hears women "ululating" and couples "osculating" 
through the thin walls of his inexpensive rooms (246-7). Beyond this multileveled 
example, however, Chip articulates the immodest baggage ofhis own proscribed 
relationships vis-à-vis the diverse stories ofhis family members. As the narrator, he sets 
up these assorted yet connected storylines not so much as a persuasive case for the 
ordinariness of sorne of his own actions, but rather as a sympathetic critique of sorne of 
the commonplaces in American culture. 
Utilizing a narrative intervention that ratifies the banality ofhis Melissa affair by 
downplaying its severity, Chip's other Warren Street Journal contribution, simply titled 
"Creative Adultery" (17), prefigures the section of The Corrections devoted to Denise. In 
"The Generator," Chip's sister has a series ofaffairs, affairs that can be labeled as 
increasingly exceptional or incomparable. Over the course of her sexual development, in 
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other words, her adulteries become progressively more creative. From the start of her 
sexuallife, Denise sleeps exclusively with married men, the tirst of whom is a Vietnam 
veteran employed by her father's subordinate's subordinate. Following her early 
withdrawal from college, the young woman marries her workplace mentor, a short, 
middle-aged French-speaking chef from Montréal. She then leaves him for a woman with 
whom she argues and tights nonstop. Not long after this unhealthy romantic rapport 
predictably concludes, a nouveau-riche entrepreneur retains her, with an inflated salary, to 
run the kitchen of an ambitious new restaurant to be situated in the tower of a 
decommissioned power plant. The chic eatery is called The Generator. Succeeding one 
year of concentrated preparation, which includes two months of paid food and wine 
reconnoitering i'n Europe, a near affair with her cool boss Brian, and a nascent affair with 
his un-hip wife Robin, Denise creates a menu with "twenty winners on it" (413). The 
delectable "three-way conversation between Paris and Bologna and Vienna" generates 
fame for both the unique restaurant and its young chef (413). While The Generator, as the 
Philadelphia Inquirer describes it, "single-handedly" puts Philadelphia "on the map of 
cool" (415), Denise makes the front page of The New York Times, among other stamps of 
gastronomical repute (422). 
Her personal stardom, nonetheless, is short-lived. Subsequent to a wordless 
breakup with Robin, whom she truly loves, Denise sleeps with Brian, whom she purely 
likes. The next day, Brian discovers her double duplicity, as it were. Before he fairly 
judges the drives and upshots of these three deceits in an effort to understand them, if not 
somehow to correct them, he holds the principal generator of his restaurant' s notoriety 
entirely responsible. Consequently, he tires head chef Denise. Like Chip before her, 
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Denise gets implicated in a succession of events that lead to her discharge from a 
successful occupation. Instead of addressing or correcting an assortment of questionable 
motivations and actions, however, both of these dismissals perpetuate a string of unjust 
recriminations and conclusions. Just as Chip's expulsion from D- College fails to 
address sexual indiscretion on the college campus, Denise' s firing from The Generator 
fails to correct the problematical characteristics of Robin and Brian's marriage. 
The multiple senses of generator in "The Generator" correspond to the many 
meanings of correction in The Corrections. In the same wayas The Corrections presentS 
a picture of America, complete with an ironic manipulation of unfair foreign investment, 
"The Generator" presents a picture ofthe Northeastem US, and Philadelphia in particular. 
A cultural critic, Chip undeniably appreciates the historical-contextual resonance of The 
City of Brotherly Love. As a case in point, Chip proves to be as keen on Foucault's theses 
on power and prison as his young father was on Schopenhauer's ethics of will and 
pessimism. When Chip trades aH of his texts at the Strand in order scarcely to fund his 
bourgeois relationship with Julia, his Foucault books are among the last that he exchanges 
(92-3). Discemibly, Chip introduces and sustains an allusion to the ties between 
Philadelphia, prison, and Foucault, not to mention Schopenhauer, with a skillful narrative 
maneuver unique to the section he reserves for his brother, Gary. 
Rooms 
In distinction to the other four subsections leading to the family reunion in "One 
Last Christmas," the chapter titled "The More He Thought About It, The Angrier He Got" 
integrates a lengthy sequence wherein the dissimilar narratives of two independent 
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Lambert members intersect. In the midst of Gary's suburban segment, he and Denise meet 
in Central Philadelphia for the purpose of attending the promotional proceedings of the 
Axon Corporation, a biotech company reportedly on the way to correcting progressive 
brain and nervous system degenerations like Alzheimer's and Parkinson's. Al Lambert 
suffers from both of these illnesses. The septuagenarian likewise suffers from clinical 
depression. Albeit, in keeping with its comprehensive agenda and title, the Axon 
Corporation alleges that the Corecktall Process will prompt the auto-correction of clinical 
depression as well. In another observable coincidence, it tums out that Al, who may be an 
ideal preliminary client for Corecktall, contributed his own original research to the 
formulation ofthis innovative process. Before he retired from aU varieties ofwork 
altogether, Al committed himselfto being a railroad superintendent, a practicing 
pessimist, and an amateur scientist. As a chemistry hobbyist, the five-thousand-dollar 
patent that he obtains from his basement experiments with "eIectrical anisotropy" and 
"ferro-organic gels" place his work at the "center" ofAxon's projected $200 million 
jackpot process, according to Gary the opportunist (192). Unlike Denise, who reasons that 
her father's health may well ameliorate, Gary merely attends Axon's public showcase 
under the co ver of concem for his father' s debilitated physical condition, a bill of health 
which he judges incorrigible. A banker, Gary takes in the corporate endorsement session 
in order to assess his own investment opportunities. In terms ofmoney, the first-bom 
child plans to capitalize where his father failed. 
As the venture-campaign-promoted-as-medical-forurn continues, the CEO reveals 
the strangely Ludovican nature ofher company's groundbreaking procedure. Recalling 
the ghastly "Reclamation Treatment" first outlined and then executed in Anthony 
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Burgess' utopian satire A Clockwork Orange (94), Merilee Finch casually notes that 
Axon's technique not only treats bodily ailments but also corrects social diseases. 
Without irony, she insists, "I1's Corecktall or prison" (208). In her speedy rejoinder to the 
obvious cry for the Eighth Amendment by a very small group in the audience (this 
meeting is for investors after aIl), the CEO mentions the Eastern State Penitentiary, which 
happens to be only three blocks away from the unrestricted convention. "World's first 
modern prison," she pointedly emphasizes, "opened in 1829, solitary confinement for up 
to twenty years, astonishing suicide rate, zero corrective benefit, and, just to keep this in 
mind, still the basic model for corrections in the United States today" (209). 
Triumphantly, she concludes her unconcealed sales pitch by defining Axon's Corecktall 
Process as the reverse of "cruel" and "unusual": "This is the liberal vision: genuine, 
permanent, voluntary self-melioration" (209). 
By including a patent reference to the Eastern State Penitentiary, the "mode!" 
penal complex situated in the heart of Philadelphia, narrator Chip indicates the ultimate 
carceral place for adults surveyed by Michel Foucault in Discipline and Punish. As the 
cultural historian's equally catchy subtitle makes clear, his seminal study scrutinizes "The 
Birth of the Prison." Speaking of the "absolute isolation" first administered in the 
Philadelphia security unit, Foucault clarifies that "the only operations of correction were 
the conscience and the silent architecture that confronted it" (239). This punishing 
method of intemment wherein the secluded prisoner faces his conscience alone, 
institutionalizes the form of introspection wherein the subject faces his will alone, an 
ethic of asceticism advocated by Arthur Schopenhauer. Within the same historical period 
that saw the first modem prison conceived and opened, the nihilist ran counter to the 
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rationalism ofhis colleague Hegel and developed a metaphysic privileging will over 
reason and sensation. As Chip shows the reader by way of his father' s much-read copy of 
the German' s work, Schopenhauer saw "this world as a penifentiary, a sort of penal 
colony" (256). According to the philosopher, one of the principal "evils of a penal 
colony," the young AI's disciplined underscoring illustrates, "is the company ofthose 
imprisoned in if" (258). Chip, however, contests the iconoclastic viewpoints that his 
father fervently supports and observes. Taking a page from his preferred cultural analyst, 
Chip makes a case for the personal and social benefits of bad company over those of true 
isolation. As Abel BIouet sums up in his 1843 work on cellular seclusion, "walls are 
terrible and man is good" (qtd. in Foucault 239). 
Throughout The Corrections, Chip returns to the Blouet conclusion that Foucault 
defers to in the middle of his analysis of the Pennsylvanian prison. Without fail, Chip 
represents how the individual and collective advantages of difficult relations outstrip the 
so-called personal improvements attending an absence of relations. Lonely, doubting his 
possible tenureship, cognizant that an illicit affair will further risk his job security, Chip 
succumbs to Melissa's physical advances. Irrespective ofpotential disadvantageous 
consequences, Denise forever flees to riskier liaisons in lieu of facing aloneness. 
Analogous to the risks taken by her two youngest children, Enid compromises her prized 
probity by tuming to a quack doctor when AI's dementia overwhelms her at sea. In The 
Corrections, Chip faIls into affairs, Denise relies on affairs, and Enid flirts with drugs. As 
Chip insinuates, both his father and his brother suffer from dementia because they 
categorically refuse to engage in similarly risky social activities. Unlike the other three 
immediate members of the Lambert family, neither Al nor Gary elects to break away from 
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rus private instantiation of steadfast solitude. Whereas Enid, Denise, and Chip find escape 
hatches from the various walls or social precincts that surround them, the determined Al 
(abetted by his reading of Schopenhauer) and the principled Gary (abetted by the 
demands ofhis wife) avoid any form offlirtation with risk, and by extension, its 
concomitant corollaries of interpersonal exchange and the feasible amelioration of 
personal circumstance. Rather than attempt to correct their individual feelings of 
entrapment and anomie, the Lambert father and his oldest child essentially build more 
walls or barri ers around themselves. 
Notwithstanding their respective allegiances to forms of seclusion, Al and Gary 
are never really alone. Both have families. As such, each husband and father finds himself 
doubly confined within "the prison ofhis [own] angry thoughts," a phrase Franzen uses to 
describe the effects of his mid-nineties theory-mindedness and writer' s block in How to 
Be A/one ("A Word About This Book" 5). Al and Gary also appear to situate themselves 
within the "Hell [that] is-other people," a line that demarcates the leitmotif of Jean-Paul 
Sartre's Schopenhauer-inspired dramatization of anguish (No Exit 45). In keeping with 
Chip's sustained interrelation between risks, affairs, walls, sickness, and the heritable, 
just as a restriction to certain rooms (motels, the basement, bathrooms, the bedroom, a 
hospital) de fines AI's character, a constraint to particular spaces (a darkroom, the kitchen, 
an elevator, the bedroom, a closet) delimits Gary's character. In point offact, given the 
unpromising events depicted in "The More He Thought About it, The Angrier He Got," 
Chip intimates that his brother will suffer from the same fate as his father before him, 
should Gary prove so lucky, that is. (His wife Caroline tums out to be less than half an 
Enid: though a bossy warden, Caroline is no loving caregiver). With anger as his only 
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muse, suburbanite Gary moves from a position of professional success towards a 
condition of household surveillance. With work as his only refuge, he eventually develops 
into a detainee in his own safe neighborhood. His residence in Philadelphia's trendy 
Chestnut Hill transforms from a house of security into a "house of certainty," to 
appropriate a Foucault expression in Discipline and Punish (202). Over the course of The 
Corrections, Gary's personal space, his Big House, becomes its colloquial equivalent: Da 
Big House. 
IfChip's chapter exemplifies academic fiction, then Gary's instantiates suburban 
fiction. Correspondingly, the last full section of The Corrections likewise provides a case 
in point of realist fiction situated in the suburbs. Not exclusive to "The More He Thought 
About It, The Angrier He Got" and "One Last Christmas," Chip's emphasis on satellite 
communities occurs all through The Corrections. In his two brief framing sections and his 
five long chapters, Chip demonstrates his overriding concem with America's principal 
family setting. Even when he finds himself physically farthest from the culture that he 
critically assesses, he cannot help but remind his readers of the leading lifestyle in the 
USA. For one, Chip's intrusive Vilnius segment originally interrupts and eventually 
replaces the Denise section, which is the only section in The Corrections that 
conspicuously resists suburban portrayal. By way of the emails from 
Denise3@cheapnet.com that exprof@gaddisfly.com first answers and then ignores (431-
6), the seemingly random report of the wireless communication failure in Lithuania acts 
as a substitute for the unfinished account in "The Generator." Furthermore, the last half of 
the Lithuania disruption tears readers away from St. Jude only to build up Chip's long-
avoided retum to this place. Identifying with Chip, the individual reader suddenly and 
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unexpectedly longs to revisit the suburbs. 
ln an earlier narrative orchestration that functions as a harbinger to Chip's 
continuing focus on different suburban lifestyles, his academic critique of corporate 
America in "The Failure" sets the stage for the subsequent section devoted to his investor 
brother. In yet another compelling, as weIl as corrective, representative narrative move, 
the main features of Chip's Baltic work-holiday (431-458; 533-539) recast the leading 
themes originaIly portrayed in Gary's Chestnut Hill chapter (137-238). In fact, when Chip 
glosses what he sees as "the main difference between America and Lithuania" (444), he -
includes a précis of the second chapter of The Corrections. He speIls out that "in America 
the wealthy few subdued the unwealthy many by means of mind-numbing and soul-
kiUing entertainments and gadgetry and pharmaceuticals, whereas in Lithuania the 
powerful few subdued the unpowerful many by threatening violence" (444). Half 
facetiously, Chip then concedes, "It warmed his Foucaultian heart, in a way, to live in a 
land where property ownership and the control of public discourse were so obviously a 
matter of who had guns" (444). 
On account of these theoretical and practical overviews of order and power, Chip 
likewise caUs to mind the last class of his last complete term as a prof essor, a final 
meeting that catalyses the sequence of events prompting his ultimate dismissal from D-
CoUege eight months later. With aIl ofthese associated admissions, recoIlections, and 
revisions, Chip highlights "The More He Thought About It, The Angrier He Got" as a 
fictional rendition of his theoretical breakdown of the corporate ad campaign "You Go, 
Girl." As he does throughout The Corrections, Chip turns to narrative as a means of self-
justification, a mode of self-justification that also propels him toward self-correction. In 
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reconceptualizing his story, a personal story that extends to the stories of the people 
closest to him, he engages in ongoing acts of justice, just acts that compel him to review 
rather than to dismiss, to refonnulate rather than to forget. 
In order to conclude his two-semester-long theory course called "Consuming 
Narratives," Chip unsurprisingly chooses "to test his students' mastery of the critical 
perspectives to which he'd introduced them" (39). To this end, he screens a six-part ad-
campaign wherein four women in a" small office struggle with the news that one of 
them-Chelsea-has breast cancer. Within the series, which the Times and The Wall 
Street Journal style as "revolutionary," not least because after many "tear-jerking" scenes 
Chelsea actually dies in spite of the fact that her beneficent boss pays for aU her 
treatment, the once "technophobic" ladies use the W- Corporation's new Global 
Desktop Version 5.0 so as to "hook Chelsea into support networks and the very best local 
health care providers" (39). Predictably, after a final "rapid montage [in which] women of 
all ages and races are smiling and dabbing away tears at the image of Chelsea on their 
own Global Desktops," the series ends with the W- Corp's "sober" testimony that they 
have donated over "$10,000,000.00 to the American Cancer Society to help it Fight for 
the Cure" (40). Although Chip doubts whether his class as a whole will be capable to 
stand finn against the seductiveness of the slick campaign, he feels certain that Melissa 
Paquette, far and away his best young student, possesses the correct "critical tools of 
resistance and analysis" to evaluate this over-the-top example of mass culture (40). AIl 
the same, in a classroom gesture without precedent, Melissa sides with the peers she 
habitually derides. Instead of bluntly taking any one of the students in her cohort to task, 
she openly chides her prof essor. 
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Foregoing her customary classroom deportment as an active cultural critic, 
complete with an erect posture, a seat in the front, and always-cogent, always-concise 
commentaries, she simply utters "Yes" from her slumped position at the back when Chip 
inquires whether she concurs with the class's consensus that these wholesale 
advertisements "are good for the culture and good for the country" (41-2). When he caUs 
on her to qualify her unusual accord, she second-guesses his claim to care about the 
opinions ofhis students. Similarly out of character, she proceeds to question his 
established method of instruction. In answer to her remarkable contrariety, he plays off a 
stock reply about critical distance: "This is about learning to apply critical methods to 
textual artifacts. Which is what l'm here to teach you" (42). Still intractably indicting her 
prof essor in a way that augurs Oprah's denunciation of Franzen, Melissa avers, "1 think 
you're here to teach us to hate the same things you hate" (42). In Melissa's callous 
estimation, Chip thereby relies on the same representational techniques that he professes 
to challenge, specifically, repetition over receptivity, and agenda over argument. 
Moreover, just before the semester-ending bell rings, his star student concludes 
her unparalleled professional and personal assailment by implying that his course syllabus 
and seminar tutelage lack originality and clarity: "It' sone cri tic after another wringing 
their hands about the state of criticism. Nobody can ever say what's wrong exactly. But 
they aU know it's evil. They aU know 'corporate' is a dirty word" (44). Surprised, stifled, 
and shown up, Chip's minimal motions designate that "Consuming Narratives" is over 
and done with. He does not lay eyes upon his once-prized pupil again until the following 
autumn, whereupon she enters his office in D- College's Wroth Hall and swiftly begins 
to redefine the parameters of their affiliation with untimely and initially unwelcome 
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apologetic advances. Less than a week later, after leaming about the provost's 
inconvenient stroke and his colleague's inopportune book, a dejected Chip makes dinner 
for the student he once described as "jailbait" (37). He then pursues sexual congress with 
Melissa on the chaise longue in his staff housing, a condominium located in a cinderblock 
complex across the creek from a derelict property owned by the Connecticut State 
Department of Corrections. 
Because of Melissa's classroom immobilizations, while in his professorial role 
Chip loses the opportunity to argue why American audiences ought to interrogate the 
motivations behind "You Go, Girl" and other less-than-sincere consuming narratives. 
Certainly, he explains how corporate machinations engineered the presumably brave 
campaign as "a surefire publicity coup," a media blitz made all-the-more-successful by 
virtue of its Nielsen weekly rating, the Internet rumor that Chelsea is a real person, and 
Beat Psychology's timely posting ofChelsea's phony personal and medical histories 
online (41). Describing the W- Corporation's ongoing involvements in damning 
litigation, Chip points out that the main backer of the campaign "is currently defending 
three separate lawsuits for antitrust violations" (42). In addition, he declares that the W-
Corp's "revenues last year exceeded" the GDP ofItaly, that W-'s ad "exploits a 
woman's fear ofbreast cancer," and that W- patently conceived of"You Go, Girl" for 
the purpose of selling merchandise, exercising stock options, and promoting a certain 
lifestyle (42-3). According to Chip, W-'s marketing ofmass culture and celebration of 
conspicuous consumption aims to cultivate a general desire for bigger and bigger houses 
and bigger and bigger SUVs (43). He plainly reproves the emblematic corporate 
campaign for the reason that it endorses an optimism founded on an infantilized craving 
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for the superlative. Chip, however, rebukes this brand of material culture for a personal 
reason too. In condemning the lifestyle that W- encourages, he likewise denounces his 
brother's lifestyle. Although he utilizes "You Go, Girl" as a means to critique mass 
culture, he could just as well have presented Gary as his case in point. Inspite of 
everything, when Chip underscores the material artifacts that W- shareholders prize, he 
forces himself not to reveal that Gary and Caroline own "a great deal of W- stock" (41). 
Likely signifying that he cannot disassociate the pair from the consuming narratives he 
professionally deconstructs, this is the first time he alludes to his insufferable brother and 
his even more insufferable sister-in-Iaw in The Corrections. 
Foregrounding his affiliation of passive spectatorship to conspicuous 
consumption, the last words ofChip's academic culture section encapsulate the primary 
theme of Gary' s market culture section. At once recalling his trials in Connecticut and 
New York City, anticipating his difficulties in Vilnius and the Lithuanian countryside, 
and delineating Gary's torments in Philadelphia's Chestnut Hill, Chip closes the curtain 
on the first chapter of The Corrections with the phrase "Different kind of prison" (135). 
As the second chapter of the novel begins, Gary sits alone stewing in what readers soon 
learn is his characteristic resentment and insecurity. In the opening scene, while Caroline 
plays soccer with the couple's two oldest boys, Caleb and Aaron, Gary prints photos, a 
task he submits to twice weekly for his wife's sake, in his personal darkroom, which was 
a pricey, unwanted, hobby-making birthday gift. He arrives in this secluded space by 
leaving his "big schist-sheathed house on Seminole Street and cross[ing] his big back 
yard and climb[ing] the outside stairs ofhis big garage" (139). Again confined to this 
place, again performing an unsought, disliked pastime, Gary doubts his mental health, 
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decries his father's financial incaution, on top of the old man's neurochemical aloofness, 
and suspects his own wife and eider sons of perpetually mocking him. What cornes to be 
his top rancor on this day, and for months thereafter, however, results from a 
photographic image he fails to capture. As Jonah, the youngest of his biblically named 
sons, and his only solace, visits him, he peers out a windowpane through a lens. Training 
the zoom on his wife, he catches her pinched brow and limped run, only to tum away 
without snapping a picture in the name of aesthetics. This aborted shot tums out to be a 
big mistake for Gary's soundness ofmind, his fatherly authority, and his husbandly 
presence, or what little of these he ever actually had. 
Just after he stops focusing his camera on Caroline, the telephone rings and she 
hobbIes toward the house. When out of Gary's sight, she trips and screams. Naturally, she 
has injured her back again. She then maintains that her bad back (an old college injury 
allegedly "reactivated" by her slip on the un-shoveled lane in St. Jude nine Christmases 
before [148]) and coincident limp result from this phone calI, a calI for Gary from Enid. 
Gary knows, and repeatedly maintains, otherwise. He fixates on his only proof: the lost 
photo. His mantra-like iteration of correctness ("1 am right") soon disintegrates his home 
life, for Caroline, a pop-psychology buff, "ex-lawyer, eavesdropper, and truly awful 
domestic tyrant" (Edwards 81), reacts by systematically sabotaging her husband. Her 
blatant betrayals begin when she tells the kids that their dad suffers from depression, just 
like their grandpa. In another curiously significant correspondence between St. Jude and 
Chestnut Hill, in the same way as the officious former-patron of a Lambert house in a 
white suburb of a black city in the Midwest was always right, the moneyed matron of this 
big Lambert house in a white suburb of a black city in the Northeast is never wrong. 
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Caroline's remedial books, Caroline's spoiled boys, and Caroline's affluence authorize 
Caroline' s judgments. As Gary weU feared, her clinical D verdict straightaway overrides 
his already restricted daim to household control (The Corrections 161). 
Likewise connecting events in Chestnut Hill to other incidents in the narrative, 
Caroline's weird bond with her boys modifies Melissa's strange preoccupation with her 
parents. In "The Failure," the spoiled Melissa speaks to her mother and father on the 
phone for hours every day. She caUs them her "best friends" (59). In "The More He 
Thought About It, The Angrier He Got," Caroline plays pre-adolescent games with her 
spoiled sons for hours a day. She caUs them her "best friends" (141). In an equaUy bizarre 
modification of particular narrative details to the Chestnut Hill setting, two of Caroline 
and Gary' s boys appear to be named after the two faithful bodyguards in Vilnius. In the 
chronology of The Corrections, however, brothers Aaron and Jonah appear as precursors 
to cousins Aidaris and Jonas, given that the suburb-specific chapter antecedes the broken-
up Lithuania-specific segment. Yet when a reader confronts the secure villa in Vilnius, 
she recaUs and reconsiders her understandings of events in the safe suburb of 
Philadelphia. With this procedure of revis ion, and other similar strategies that employa 
combination of analogy, disruption, and recoUection, Chip reinforces a corrective reading 
of The Corrections. 
Perhaps Chip implements a counteractive narratorial modus operandi as a result 
of his commitment to Shakespeare, the sole writer whom he refuses to remove from his 
bookshelves and exchange for petty cash at the Strand (93). As war breaks out in Eisinore 
at the end of Ham/et, for example, Horatio discloses that with his "wounded name," that 
is to say, his title of oratio, of orator, of auctor, of author, he has already done justice to 
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the dead prince by"tell[ing] [his] story" (5.2.326-331). In the developing action ofplay, 
Prince Hamlet likewise does justice to his mentor, the dead King Hamlet, by telling his 
story. Chip appropriates a similar technique when he departs civil war-tom Lithuania. As 
he realizes that he must reformulate the conceptualization ofhis screenplay, he tells 
readers to reassess their earlier conclusions about The Corrections. By informing his 
readership that he himself must necessarily refashion his "tragedy" into a problem play by 
making it "comic" and "ridiculous" (537), he insinuates that readers must necessarily 
reevaluate their initial impressions ofhis already comic and already tragic narrative. Just 
like Chip, readers therefore look back to Chestnut Hill, among other places, while they 
look forward to St. Jude. 
Chip also borrows his incorporation of the backward-Iooking glance from the 
genre ofsuburban fiction. From Howells' Suburban Sketches, through Fitzgerald's The 
Great Gatsby, Capra's It's a Wonder/ul Life, Cheever's Bullet Park, Oates's Expensive 
People, DeLillo's White Noise, and Coppola's The Virgin Suicides, to Mendes' American 
" 
Beauty and Smiley's Good Faith, fictions and films chiefly concemed with suburbia tend 
to be framed as self-reflective, recollective narratives. As Eleanor Perry makes obvious 
with her screenplay adaptation ofCheever's "The Swimmer," suburbanites cannot help 
but reminisce. Reflecting the nostalgia of Ulyssean hero Ned Merrill, who is "swimming 
home" by means of the backyard pools in his prosperous neighborhood, director Frank 
Perry frequently intercuts The Swimmer with long, outlandish, soft-focus montages of 
wild animaIs, green trees, and noisy creeks. Illustrating the conflicted longings of 
archetypal suburbanites, suburban figures altemately crave urban life and rurallife, while 
their amalgamated recourses to nostalgia complicate their realizations that by living in 
suburban environments they threaten the survival of the sophisticated city while they 
concurrently crush the pastoral idyll. 
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Demarcating his brother as an ironic suburban figure from the start, Chip 
commences Gary' s chapter with an obvious recoUection. Gary' s role in The Corrections 
begins "three weeks earlier," as the first clause in the first sentence of "The More He 
Thought About lt, The Angrier He Got" accentuates (139). With a move that evokes the 
clearly satirical tone throughout Cheever's Bullet Park, Gary describes the suburban 
setting he eventuaUy dubs an "enchanted arboreality" (226) as "The Land That Time 
Forgot" (143). As sardonic as Sinclair Lewis' "vaguely frightened" suburbanite Babbitt in 
the eponymous 1922 novel (Babbitt 317), Gary clarifies these sober labels to himself 
while he walks across his yard to answer Enid's telephone caU: "Century-old maples and 
ginkgos and sycamores, many of them mutilated to accommodate power Hnes, grew in 
giant rot over patched and repatched city streets bearing the names of decimated tribes. 
Seminole and Cherokee, Navajo and Shawnee" (The Corrections 143). Appropriately, 
the se are the community lanes Caroline's oversized Ford Stomper erodes en route to her 
quarter-time pro bono-work for the Children's Defense Fund; the very commuter roads 
Gary's luxury Swedish sedan bumps over on the way to his fuU-time job as vice president 
of CenTrust Bank. Furthermore, in an incongruence that delineates the tragedy, comedy, 
resentment, and ridiculousness of Gary's suburban story, he wishes that his agreeable 
downtown job was triple-time because of his increasingly less tolerable home life, the 
very home life he cannot curtail, on the basis that "his entire life was set up as a 
correction ofhis [overworked] father's" (181). 
In lieu of correcting his father's lifestyle, nonetheless, the eldest Lambert child 
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replicates it. Gary reproduces AI's failures too. In fact, early in the Chestnut Hill chapter 
Gary appears to concede that his personal failures as a father will emerge as even greater 
than Al' S own fatherly failures. At the onset of what cornes to be a protracted mêlée 
against his wife and her "allies in the house," the paranoid Gary outlines his ineffective 
parenting abilities (160). His thoughts converging on his wife, his father, his mother, his 
present self, and his childhood self, he reveals that Caroline's "sons would protect her 
from her husband. Her husband who was a shouter. Like his father before him. His father 
before him who was now depressed. But who, in his prime, as a shouter, had so 
frightened young Gary that it never occurred to him to intercede on his mother's behalf' 
(160). With his transgenerational breakdown offatherhood and collapse, ofmotherhood 
and collaboration, Gary likewise anticipates the fates of his sons. Although a classically 
co Id and stem authoritarian, AI's example worked to instill signature midwestem 
qualities, like diligence, hard work, and integrity, into his children. In spite of everything, 
Chip and Denise appear quite successful before they are both fired unjustly. On the other 
hand, Gary' s considerations and assessments insinuate that the Caroline paradigm of 
unconcealed permissiveness portends a less than successful future for his spoiled sons, an 
estimation bolstered by later events in the chapter and the novel. 
By virtue of these recollected failures and fears, as well as these projections of 
forthcoming troubles and trials, Chip represents fathers Al and Gary as sympathetic 
figures. Though disregarded by all critics of The Corrections, Chip's ability to 
commiserate with his father and his brother proves to be at once noteworthy and 
commendable, especially given the Foucaultian's avowed lifelong disaffection for his 
male Lambert counterparts. Chip tactfully encourages this corrective reading when he 
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admits that with but a modicum of revision, refocus, and overstatement his "tragic BILL 
QUAINTANCE" can transform into a "comic fool" (537). With this eye-opening disclosure, 
Chip refers not only to hisBILL, but also to his GARY, and to his AL, in addition to his 
CHIP. The Lambert women, by contrast, are al ways likeable in The Corrections. Despite 
their similar penchants for nagging and bossiness, Chip identifies with ENID and the 
nearly anagrammatic DENISE from the start of his narrative. As he turns away from stories 
, 
in which he attacks Gary and Al in order to turn toward stories wherein he shows concem 
for them, he makes his diplomatie or ambassadorial responsibilities as a storyteller quite 
apparent. When he reestablishes his plot-driven "thriller" as a character-driven "farce" 
(537), Chip redistributes the initial aspirations ofhis fiction. In making these revelatory 
concessions and corrections, he stops writing for the select audience comprised of 
individuals whom he endeavored to attack and thereby avenge, and begins writing for a 
general audience whom he endeavors to apprise of typical American impediments and 
failures. With his demonstratively self-corrective writing process, Chip replaces an act of 
vengeance with an act of justice, an intrinsically legalistic act that implements a cautious 
form of deliberate contemplation rather than an all-too-easy reversion to rudimentary 
accusation. 
Stories 
On account ofhis corrective revelation near the sanctuary of the Polish border, 
purposeful Chip counteracts a story based on revenge with a series of interconnected 
stories founded upon reflection, in an the senses ofthis activity. In terms ofjust or 
nonpartisan narratives, any act of reflection requires an integrated understanding of 
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similarity, deliberation, and recoUection. Coupled with its narrativization, this 
multileveled act of consideration, a weighing up that prompts the adjudicator to look back 
as weU as forward, outlines the legal process. Earrnarking the neutrality or nonalignrnent 
obligatory to the official performance of legality, Chip can only reflect upon the justness 
of his cultural critique once he removes himself from the irn.rnediate setting of this 
selfsame critique. Indicatively, the most pointed revisions to Chip's original estimations 
of American mass-culture arise in respect to the representation of Gary, and by 
association Al. After aU, these clinicaUy depressed fathers epitomize the culture that Chip 
evaluates and corrects. Perhaps likewise illustrating their less than progressive or dynamic 
lifestyles, Gary and Al are the two members of the Lambert family who do not leave the 
USA over the course of The Corrections. At the behest of Enid, Al does embark upon the 
cruiseliner destined for Québec City. Al does distinguish what he incorrectly describes as 
the Gaspé Peninsula. Following his mistaken map reading, Al falls from the ship in a 
perilous attempt to pee over the edge of the top deck. Though he incredibly survives this 
unpredictable plunge into the icy Atlantic, the voyage-ending micturation emphasizes his 
confinement to small rooms. Whether in the cellar ofhis suburban home or in the 
cubbyhole of a floating retirement cornrnunity, as Al progressively deteriorates he spends 
more and more time detained in washrooms. In a skillful redistribution of similar topics, 
the unhappy Gary feels increasingly entrapped or incarcerated while things fall apart for 
him in Chestnut Hill. 
Likewise associating corrective narrative representation to the precedents that 
informjust courtroom deliberation, the two getaways that bracket Chip's cross-Atlantic 
excursion, combined, of course, with the events that occur during Chip's stay in this 
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strangely familiar place, condense the major themes of The Corrections in general, and 
Gary's chapter in particular. Beyond the indicators that compare Chip's online defrauding 
to Gary's investment banking, Gitanis' Ford SUV to Caroline's Ford SUV, and cousins 
Aidaris and Jonas to sons Aaron and Jonah, Chip integrates inbuilt ties between the ex-
Soviet barracks in Vilnius and the schist-sheathed house in Chestnut Hill. Versions of 
each other, the garrison and the home collectively compre~s motifs of power, violence, 
prison, and correction. Turning around the progression of Gitanis' story, Gary's residence 
essentially transforms into his personal prison. As the depression of the failing patriarch 
deepens, and his family life degenerates, his big, Big House gets smaller and smaller. In 
other words, just as Gitanis' former torture chamber eventually converts into his living 
quarters, Gary's current household eventually changes into his prison chamber. 
The evolution of Gary's dwelling from a secure house into a house of security 
commences on the traumatic day that he neglects to photograph Caroline with her 
unbecoming grimace and prominent hobble. That same afternoon, Gary's middle child, 
Caleb, informs his father that he has yet another new hobby. With the addition of a 
camera, a microphone, and sorne controls, the eleven-year-old boy wants to convert aIl of 
his unused photo, video, and CPU equipment into a surveillance system to be installed in 
the kitchen. Before the dubious Gary cynically notes that the disused accumulation of 
techno-gear in Caleb's room has "an aggregate retail value possibly exceeding the annual 
salary of [his] secretary" (158), he instantly seeks to maintain the privacy ofhis own 
preferred "hobby." Quick to protect his clandestine form of daily escape from Caroline's 
household tyranny, he reminds himselfthat the "The liquor cabinet is in the kitchen" 
(156). Though he delays his ironic fatherly disallowance of the supervision project, after 
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first vainly debating the issue with Caroline, who dotes on the principles of a book titled 
The Technological Imagination: What Today's Children Have ta Teach Their Parents, by 
Nancy Claymore, PhD (158), and then secretly swigging two ounces of Bombay Sapphire 
gin, Gary vetoes the invasive scheme. "Hate to break it to you," he annOUnces while 
bearing his now-modest drink aloft as a symbol ofhis temperance, "but surveillance is 
out. It's not appropriate as a hobby" (163). Rather expectedly, however, Caroline 
summarily overrules her husband in front oftheir assembled children. "Gary, it doesn't 
matter," she theatrically broadcasts, "he's got his own money. He can spend it however he 
wants. Right, Caleb?" (164). Subsequently, the conspiring mother and son trade hand 
signaIs and glances, the colluding codes of intra-familial alliance that Gary cannot quite 
follow as a result ofhis stealthy drunkenness, which is his post-five pm ritual. 
By way ofhis free indirect narrator, Chip demonstrates the customary nature of 
puerile conflict chez Gary Lambert. The original gang-up on Gary establishes the tone for 
the remainder of Gary's gradually more upsetting story. In the aftermath of Enid's early 
chapter telephone caU, Gary sets himself three interrelated missions of reciprocal 
consequence. For one, he endeavors to get his wife and kids to the Midwest for a final 
Lambert family Christmas, a delicate task given his pledge nine years earlier that he 
would never again request that Caroline visit St. Jude during the busiest holiday season. 
Once Enid apprizes him of AI's smaU patent remuneration, Gary likewise covets the 
opportunity to collect what he sees as the patent's actual market value. As the oldest 
child, as the individual de facto accountable for his parents' welfare, he owns the rights to 
the exclusive megabucks. At any rate, he convinces himself of this personal entitlement to 
multiple Axon stock options. Furthermore, given that he discovers the incorrigible 
Caroline listening-in to his private conferences both with Enid (i49) and with Caleb 
(157), not to mention the fact that he catches her exaggerating ifnot concocting her 
professed back injury more than once, Gary wants her to acknowledge her repeat 
offences. 
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Notwithstanding the casuist advantages of Gary's self-appointed market 
privileges, he finds himself unjustifiably embroiled in an infuriating dilemma. He cannot 
exercise his stock options without ample financial backing from his wealthy wife, the 
"Unfuckingbelievable" wife who eavesdrops on his personal conversations (149), the 
unalterable wife who derides him if he challenges her (166), the unforgiving wife who 
calculatingly labels him a "depressed old man" (184), the antagonistic wife who 
childishlydisregards him for the disobliging reason that he caUs a travel agent instead of 
a psychologist the moming after Enid's ill-timed caU (185). As an infantile yet tactical 
figure who represents "even more punishment" than the "professionaUy and personally 
dishonest" Gary "deserves" (Edwards 81), wife Caroline can be read as an ironie 
replication of the American "symbol ofthe new domesticity" (Beuka 152). Elaborating on 
"a formula that marked the new suburbs as a prescriptive ['child-centered'] environment" 
(151), Beuka describes what he calls "the double bind of the suburban housewife in the 
1950s": "Positioned amid the interlocking discourses of entertainment and consumer-
product marketing, the married woman of suburbia was at once a highly visible, even 
'targeted' social phenomenon, while at the same time being conditioned to accept a role 
characterized by confinement and estrangement from the world outside the home" (153). 
With her unjust strategies of ridicule, indignity, permissiveness, and household coalition, 
as weIl as a number of other premeditated persecutions and prosecutions, Caroline 
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deliberately displaces an embelli shed translation of conventional suburban "confinement 
and estrangement" upon her victimized husband. 
The terms of the suburbanite's unhealthy and unreasonable home life alter the 
moming after Caroline records five voice mails on his machine in the space of his lunch-
hour, her first sympathetic contact with Gary in over a month. His secretary apprizes him 
of these multiple messages while he continues to recuperate from a particularly 
unpleasant elevator ride. Moments before, Gary "bounded out of the elevator ... taking 
big coollungfuls of centrally processed air" in order to counter the jam-packed and germ-
laden attributes of the tiny space (223). Troubling the characteristically ill-at-ease father 
and husband, the claustrophobic lift included the young, redheaded estate-planner who 
has been smiling at him suggestively for months, like the "do zen" of other "secretaries 
and female pedestrians and sales clerks who in any given week took note of his height 
and his schist-gray hair" (221). Since Gary fears "add[ing] yet another disapproving 
woman to his life" (221), a life where he already feels "surrounded, imprisoned, by 
disapproving women" (221), he persuades himself that his principled loyalty to Caroline 
provides him with an "erotic kick" (223). Because ofhis less-than-enviable predicament, 
Gary "pump[s] his fist in triumph" when he determines that Caroline's unplanned 
communications indicate "desperation" (223). Collecting himself, he coolly rings her: 
"What's up?" (223). A big, old, manned station wagon, she shakily cries, has been parked 
in front of the house for an hour. The SECURITY BY NEVEREST placard, moreover, has 
been stolen "again" (224). Correlating his quickened sexual zest to Caroline's need ofhis 
physical safeguarding (224), as weIl as the "Vital signs of the rambunctious American 
economy" flashing across the office monitors (225), he leaves the bank prematurely, 
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calling to mind his first unchaste date with Caroline. 
Arriving home, he notes the nonexistence of an additional Neverest sign, the fifth 
this year. Following his first-time Alfred-like urge to sleep in his parked sedan, he gaily 
bangs on the interior garage door, which is "locked andchained" (227), as he 
unproductively seethes over his "flooding [of] the market with worthless signage," his 
"diluting [of] the value of SECURITY BY NEVEREST as a burglary deterrent" (226). 
Gainsaying his mid-aftemoon anticipations, a cold yet unquivering Caroline barely 
registers his presence from her usual station before the TV with Caleb. Without looking 
at Gary, much less thanking him for his early retum home, she tells him to nail the next 
home-security sign to a tree. Caleb then drowns out his father' s advisory observation on 
projected "c1assiness and subtlety" by tuming up the television (228). Overridden by the 
volume of the "galactic rerun" (227), Gary grabs another placard from the basement. In 
his thirty-second absence, Caroline re-bolts the door, refastens the chain, and resets the 
alarm. Incredulous, grumbling Gary goes through the necessary disarmament, leaving the 
front door wide open. A minute later he retums to the bolted, armed, and chained 
entrance. Before Caroline finally appears, he almost bashes the door off its hinges. 
"Gary," she infuriatingly condescends, "just knock" (228). So progresses Gary's 
particular performance of No Exit. Exacerbating home-front matters, when he opens the 
liquor cabinet for the fourth time that evening, after making dinner, washing the dishes, 
and trying to trim the hedge, he detects Caleb' s proxy eye inspecting him from the 
kitchen ceiling. Surveillance takes the dignity, not to mention the victory, out of Gary' s 
gin. Even Jonah, his solitary house-of-certainty consolation, comments on his drinking. 
The next morning, after one more sleepless, neverestful Chestnut Hill-night, he 
surrenders. Only a coalition of the willing need visit St. Jude for Christmas, Gary 
concedes to his wife. 
The intemecine conflict and counterfeit reconciliation within Gary' s secure 
suburban home satirically reposition the supposed insecure sociopathic wheelings and 
dealings of inner-city life. Commenting on what he caUs the "security-driven logic of 
urban enclavization," otherwise known as the massive movement toward gated and 
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pas sport communities in Los Angeles, and the rest of America by extension, Mike Davis 
asserts that a "loss offreedom" acts as the true payment ofthis fêted '"security''' (244). In 
the book City of Quartz, which ironically establishes LA as a perfect place, an unpleasant 
place, and a no-place aIl at the same time, Davis investigates what he sees as the 
balkanization and militarization of American life. He elucidates that just as the "Berlin 
Wall was being spontaneously dismantled, the LAPD extended [its] barricades" (277). 
The Orwellian tenor of Davis' cultural appraisal of LA-and the USA-as "a Gobi of 
suburbs" (47) similarly finds its way into Chip's interconnected narratives. 
As Filkins remarks, The Corrections incorporates "meditations on OrweIlian 
social controls over huge chunks of the citizenry fostered by the big drug companies" 
(231). Still, Chipper' s creator does not limit his narrator' s Orwellian allusions to 
American implementations of pharmaco-culture and -control. Nor does Franzen restrict 
his allegiance to Orwell's cultural critique to his third novel. He depicts insidious 
supervision and invasive forms of power in aU ofhis fiction. As his oeuvre develops, the 
sustained threats to personal privacy and agency that Franzen represents grow 
increasingly local. In The Twenty-Seventh City, for instance, "Safety's cheap" (284). 
Privacy, on the other hand, is not. Gary-Lambert-precursor Martin Probst finds bugs 
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planted by police chief Jammu in the walls ofmost of the suburban homes ofhis 
Municipal Growth colleagues. Unconstitutional infringements upon personal privacy 
develop into substantive threats to personal safety in Franzen's next work. In Strong 
Motion, tacitum CEO David Stoorhuys, who attempts to murder young seismologist 
Renée before she can expose that his corporation induces a cycle of Boston-razing 
quakes, lives on an ordinary suburban street. Not coincidentally, David invests heavily in 
earthquake insurance, a veritable rarity in metropolitan Boston. In addition, he supplies 
gas masks, detailed instructions, and food preserves, along with other disaster-relief 
devices, in the "carton of emergency equipment" conveniently stored in his kitchen (458-
60). Though he endangers his family as he provides for them, he imperils Renée, his 
neighbors, every Bostonian, and the environment. In respect to The Corrections, Chip's 
examinations of social order lay emphasis upon Gary's home almost exclusively. 
Once Gary discovers the Caroline-endorsed undercover work of his three sons, his 
Chestnut Hill bastion transmutes into an adaptation of Orwell' s Victory Mansions in 
Nineteen Eighty-Four. As a weird variation ofprotagonist Winston's neighbor and 
coworker, Gary's initial enthusiasm about family life rivaIs Parsons' dedication to 
informer life. Emblematically faithful to Big Brother's bylaws, Parsons heartily 
encourages his wee nipper of a daughter to spy. Truly dedicated to the Party, Parson's 
organizes the Hate Week bonanza in his building with gusto. Driven by equally charged 
social mores, Gary loyally coordinates aIl of his family meals. Aiso aiming to secure a 
model family life, Gary optimistically envisions the entire Lambert clan living as 
neighbors in Philadelphia. In their respective ardent attempts to ascribe to a particular 
social condition, though, each ofthese characters loses his small claim to "individualism 
113 
and eccentricity" (Orwell 74). Recasting Parsons' denouncement at the hands ofhis 
heedful seven-year old, a vigilant brotherhood made up of Aaron, Caleb, Jonas, and 
Caroline frustrates Gary's liberty. Instead ofbeing promptly relocated to and imprisoned 
in the Ministry of Love, like Parsons and Winston and others in Orwell'sabject cast, the 
admittedly "depressed" Gary finds himself forced to forfeit his fatherly and husbandly 
judgment, a "surrender" he seals by making "euphoric" love to Caroline, their first union 
in more than a month (237-8). 
Upon reevaluation, Gary's undeserved emasculation at the hands of Caroline 
similarly redeploys the premises of Gitanis' atrocious stage-management by a Belorussian 
"puppet government" (445). One year after his birth, "new Communist administrators" 
displace Gitanis and fifteen thousand comrades from several scattered border towns to a 
small, modem, cinderblock city, "for reasons of safety" (445). Within ten years of this 
mass relocation, a transfer ironically devised as an asylum from two looming nuclear 
power plants, "everybody's" mom or dad contracts cancer as a consequence of the 
radioactive pitchblende pooling radon in the breezeblocks of the people's "brand-new, 
fully modem" refuge (445-6). Gary' s particular life-altering trauma, of course, results 
from a different form of institutional maneuvering and direction. As a boy, Gitanis 
endures an emotional trauma because of the "deliberate strategy of recycling low-grade 
nuclear waste in building materials" (446). Recontextualizing a local variety of severe 
Soviet incompetence to a general paradigm of pemicious suburban culture, Chip presents 
Gary as the exaggerated dupe of an American ideology founded on merchandise and 
commerce. 
As Michael Moore insinuates all through his popular feature-film length 
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documentary Bowling For Columbine, and Franzen underlines near the end of Strong 
Motion, "In a decadent society people can slowly drift or slowly be drawn by the culture 
of commerce into yeaming for violence" (470). In The Corrections, Caroline and her sons 
essentially consume Gary in the same way as they spectacularly consume television. 
Tellingly influenced by the fear and gadgetry that sponsor TV prograrnming, these four 
"children" of a "child-centered" uni verse focus their acquired fears and gadgets directly 
upon Gary. As a handy at-home translation of the urban hostility the suburban home 
apparently guards its potential victims against, Gary tums into a repository of infantile 
and unjust revenge. Just as the dictatorial Caroline trains her "best friends" to fear old 
cars on city streets, she drives them to shame their old-fashioned father. Surveyed rather 
than respected, Gary feels confined in a house of unproductive correction. 
Given his midlife capitulation to the consuming narratives in his Chestnut Hill 
home, Gary flies solo to the last Lambert family Christmas in St. Jude. Conceivably less 
than surprising as well, when the eldest son arrives to his boyhood home he immediately 
draws attention to two protracted contemplations of fear and violence. In the weeks 
leading to the long-awaited holiday, both senior Lamberts relive their respective 
premature exits from the oceanliner in unique ways. Enid cannot escape the shame that 
descends upon her after she exhausts her supply of Aslan. Endlessly retuming to the 
multiple apprehensions that the hallucinogen superseded, Enid fears that her fellow 
passengers aboard the Scandinavian-based Gunnar Myrdal felt communally infringed-
upon by her and AI's eccentricities, AI's voyage-rerouting fall, and her irresponsible drug 
abuse. Enid's utmost paranoia, however, develops from her inescapable recollection that 
prior to leaving the ship she failed to sa~ an affable word to her new confidante Sylvia 
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Roth, a secretly distressed Delawarean whose daughter was first tortured then murdered 
by a gun-Iess black man to be executed in Pennsylvania over the course of the cruise. 
Sylvia admits to embarking upon the Gunnar Myrdal for the purpose of avoiding 
media reportage of the convict's lawful death. While at sea, Sylvia also confesses that 
after being apprized of the facts of Khellye Whithers' bestial crime she became a 
clandestine gun artist. A Penelope who obliterates her labors, Sylvia paints guns by day 
and destroys them by night. Notwithstanding this compulsive activity, or perhaps as a 
corollary of this cyclical undoing, Silvia fails to "escape" her "crazy thirst for revenge" 
(310). Despite her "M.D.I Ph.D.," her confidence in the "randomness of the tragedy," and 
her conviction that capital punishment pleases the conservatives who covet "permission 
to ignore social injustice," Silvia "want[ s] [Whithers] dead" (306-7). Neither strictly 
about personal edification nor individual beliefnor political allegiance, Silvia's dilemma 
illustrates the inimitability of unjust acts, not to mention the sustained deliberation and 
innovation that acts of justice obligate. Yet incapable of comprehending, much less 
accepting, Whithers' criminal motivations and actions, Silvia craves the closure that she 
refuses to condone on ethical grounds: a murderer's state-sanctioned execution. Bereft, 
embittered, and injured, she desires the revenge that she cannot sanction. Just and unjust 
actions alike promulgate a succession of consequences, consequences that expand beyond 
the individual case involving the original "victim" and the original "victimizer." To be 
dealt withjustly, an injustice must instantiate an attempted evolution towardsjustice, not 
a professed resolution of justice. Any claim to the contrary, any claim to the exactness or 
perfection of just legal procedure, obstructs the due diligence justice must always 
endeavor to deliver on a case-by-case basis. 
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Foreshadowed by Silvia and the complicated resolution to the Whithers case, in 
the aftermaths of their discontinued cruise Enid and Al both chronically relive past events 
in hopes of appreciating the impending Christmas visit. Whereas Enid regrets her 
interpersonalfaux pas, Al rebukes himselffor "instinctively" grasping "the orange 
flotation device" (465). In other words, he "reconsider[ s] the wisdom of surviving" (465). 
Irrespective of his many maladies, he rebuffs the picture of himself as "an idiot, a lad, a 
demented person" worthy of a "nursing-home future" defined by "phony solicitude" and 
"thiilly veiled contempt" (465). At once a poignant indicator of his chagrin, his poise, and 
his hardship, when he monitors the unfired shotgun tipped against his old workbench, he 
condemns the pain and profound breach of privacy his violent act of self-murder would 
bring upon his family members. Knowing he could have drowned with dignity, Al 
bewails not surrendering to the sea's unfeeling and unseeing undertow. 
Chip integrates numerous versions of hostile activity into The Corrections. 
Without fail, he fragments his representations of violence. In the article "Oprah's 
Choice," Thomas R. Edwards appears to accuse Franzen's narrator for these calculated 
fragmentations: "In The Corrections people and stories and intimations of meaning can 
irritatingly vanish without a trace" (83). Although the critic neglects to mention this 
curtailed depiction of violence specifically, Edwards intimates as much when he makes 
reference to Sylvia Roth, to Billy Passafaro, and later to Lithuania for the purpose of 
proving his reported frustration. Edwards, however, overlooks the underlying pattern to 
these compelling vanishings. In The Corrections, every immediate Lambert experiences a 
form of violence, whether the violence manifests itself as local or general, actual or 
imagined, autonomous or dependent, just or unjust. Revealed but not refined, introduced 
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but not concluded, none ofChip's accounts of violence receives a modicum of narrative 
roundness or resolution. 
Reflecting the violent undertone of the glossy commercials that subsidize a TV 
show and the giant billboards that finance astate highway, as well as the patent violence 
of the bad news that marks the top of every hour, Chip presents a series of incomplete 
stories, incomplete jumbles of products, facts, events, and newsworthy features. He 
thereby insists that his readership not consume these details passively. In the same way as 
he refashions his personal understandings of his family members while building their 
individual cases, he encourages his readers to reconsider and to narrativize the 
consequences of conspicuously disjointed forms of violence. Democratically hailed into 
The Corrections as a literary detective, the active reader can make connections between 
the violent acts that Chip fragments and their repercussions upon the characters that he 
develops fully. With an emblematical narrative technique, the increasingly sympathetic 
Chip associates every Lambert to a variety of violence. Once he empathizes with Gitanis' 
torture chronicle in the midst of his Lithuanian escape, he reviews how Gary might 
endure surveillance, how Al might regard his gun, how Enid might remember Sylvia, and 
how Denise might face Billy's story. 
The adoptive brother of Denise's lover Robin, Billy receives a twelve-to-eighteen-
year prison sentence for utilizing a two-by-four to bash in the face of a young PR 
representative for the W- Corporation. While at a "ribbon-cutting ceremony for a 
Community Computing Center," the guilty party commits this premeditated crime in the 
name of his indictment that the bourgeois mayor of Philadelphia and the imperialistic 
W- Corp are methodically merging "American business and American government" in 
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order to make possible the cooptation of urban children into "technoslavery" (344-5). 
Given the viciousness of Billy's vigilantism, his recriminatory act fails to correct, or even 
address, the injustice perpetrated by the iniquitous coupling of the mayor and W-. 
Because Billy so blatantly disregards the tenets of legal formulae, rather than expose and 
police the alleged injustice perpetrated upon the children of Philadelphia, his two-by-four 
attack proves se1f-incriminatory. Naturally, acts of justice often incorporate irony, a 
telling example being the "kidnap[ping]" ofaccused Nazi leader Adolf Eichmann in 
Argentina and his ensuing transport to Jerusalem for the purpose of "stand[ing] trial for 
his role in the 'final solution ofthe Jewish question'" (Arendt 4-5). Given the visceral 
nature of Billy's approach to justice, however, he ultimately distracts the public and those 
closest to him from the injustice that he aims to correct. While the media concentrates on 
Billy's brutal actions, and his committed-socialist father Nick (who similarly agrees that 
W- sells "phony violence to children") falls ill after he peruses pictures of the PR man's 
indented face, Billy's sister Robin pays extended visits to the hospitalized victim and his 
devastated parents (346). Illustrating the unpredictable developments that just and unjust 
acts perpetuate, Brian sells an invention to the W- Corporation for twenty million 
dollars, a business deal that destabilizes the couple's marriage, thus facilitating the 
husband's and the wife's separate liaisons with Denise. 
Chip's deliberately abbreviated instances of violence indicate that no 
representation can do justice to the enduring aftereffects of criminal actions. The unkind 
and depressing events surrounding Gary's unaccompanied arrivaI in St. Jude likewise 
reveal sorne untold consequences of injustice. To her great disappointment, when Enid 
fervently opens her front door eager to see her least favorite child with her favorite 
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grandchild (no other Chestnut Hillians are expected) Gary stands alone on the front step. 
Prepared to face Enid's anticipated displeasure, Gary promptly enlists his "courtroom 
kind ofvoice" and informs his mother that a "disappointed" Jonah could not embark on 
the two-day trip because of a high fever (476). In spite of Gary' s rehearsed declaration, 
his eight-year old son is not unwell. Moreover, Jonah himself"freely" elects not to visit 
his grandparents, ostensibly "in accordance with the terms of Gary's surrender to Caroline 
in October" (486). 
Notwithstanding the would-be diplomacy ofhis justification for Jonah's absence, 
Gary clearly realizes that the boy has no real choice but to circumvent the Christmas 
stopover in St. Jude. For one, Caroline baits him by buying tickets to see both a magician 
and a stage-show on the days that he may be in the Midwest with his father. As weIl, she 
"more and more openly encourage [ s] the older boys to laugh at their grandparents and to 
tell stories about Alfred's cluelessness ('He called it Intendo!') and Enid's puritanism 
('She asked what the show was rated! ') and Enid's parsimony ('There were two green 
beans and she wrapped them up in foil!')" (486-7). By virtue ofher cruel contrivances 
and her relentless machinations, Caroline also places her husband in a similar position to 
Jonah. Following the mid-autumn capitulation, Gary feels obligated to participate in his 
wife' s juvenile lambasting of the Lamberts too. In an attempt to correct his increasing 
sense ofalienation, Gary haltheartedly admits, "Grandma is funny, isn't she?" (487). As 
the pièce de résistance in her methodical anti-Lambert-Christmas scheme, Caroline 
purchases a fashionable videogame, which she insists that Jonah playon the eve ofhis 
scheduled departure. A young version of the susceptible Gary, Jonah decides to forego 
traveling with his father, not least because God Projeet II "entrance[ s]" him (487). Jonah 
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finaHy succumbs to what Chip labels "the tyranny of Cool" (487), the tyranny that the 
conniving Caroline orchestrates in her avid and uncritical support of market culture. Just 
as she unjustly disallows her husband's dissenting views on family life, she unreasonably 
rejects Jonah's compassionate vision ofhis grandparents, an impartial project she 
arguably instigates when she introduces him to online videogame translations ofC.S. 
Lewis' Narnia novels (203). In order to correct Jonah's fondness for outdated linear 
reading, she initiates him to the hip tyranny oftelevision, gadgetry, gaming, and the 
Internet. 
Despite the alarming nature of Jonah's speedy consumer-culture makeover, 
Gary's midlife transformations at the hands of Caroline emerge as equally disconcerting. 
Certainly, at the opening of "The More He Thought About lt, The Angrier He Got" Gary 
already sponsors corporate culture and already celebrates many of the cultural artifacts 
that Chip devotedly critiques. In these early stages of the novel, Gary furthermore proves 
to be less than sufferable on a number of other material and personallevels. Still, at this 
juncture Gary does not exhibit the idiotic and childish tendencies that eventuaHy 
characterize him and his role in The Corrections. After aH, Gary holds a Wharton School 
MBA, occupies an elevated position at a bank, persuasively supports his convictions, and 
sardonicaHy appreciates "the crisis of moral duty in a culture of consumer choice" (488). 
Superficial or not, these markers of mainstream American success disintegrate once Gary 
surrenders to the punishing conditions stalwartly enforced by his wife. On the morning 
before the Whithers execution, the morning his father plummets from the Gunnar 
Myrdal, the moming he and Caroline engage in conciliatory conjugal activity, the 
morning he regains the capital to invest in Axon stock, Gary does more than relent to 
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Caroline's autocratic stipulations (235-8). With his pivotaI concession at a pivotaI time, 
he endorses a standardized form of violence, a domestic violence wherein he will be 
surrounded and imprisoned by a disapproving brotherhood, a brotherhood that will 
include his son Jonah once the brotherhood in turn surrounds and imprisons him. In 
conjunction with his personal submission, Gary likewise relinquishes his self-styled 
function as "Federal Reserve Board Chairman Gary R. Lambert" (162), as suggested by 
his refusaI to go to work on this fateful day. 
Chip indicates Gary's adjustment from self-appointed Chairman to representative 
fool in the last two sections of the narrative. In the interim between the early-October in 
Chestnut Hill and the late-December in St. Jude, Gary seems to assume his ''l'm-a-jerk'' 
face habitually, a face formerly reserved solely for tricky business transactions (195, 211). 
When used sparingly, the self-conscious gesture designates humanity, humility, and 
apology. When utilized regularly and reflexively, though, the delicate gesture converts 
into a standard of insecurity, humiliation, and confusion. Recasting his pathetic and 
telltale "Grandma is funny, isn't she" (487), Gary twice employs the grimace within his 
forty-eight St. Judean hours (493, 541). Demonstrably, on neither occasion does he have a 
real, discemible reason to do so. The tirst time he fashions the foolish leer he has no 
audience, no subordinate or coworker to whom he owes a show of contrition or a simple 
excuse. Even the abject, angry, ailing, and attacked Gary ofthree months previous would 
denigrate the ridiculous idea of routinely adopting this imbecilic front. Albeit, by 
incorporating this transformative depiction of Gary, a progression that implies a 
regrettable decline in his mental titness, Chip at once corrects and complicates his 
critique of the American "middle class," a dominant "sociological" group Franzen 
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himself identifies as "suburban" ("Pirst City" 192). 
Over the holiday sequence and the brief epilogue, Chip illustrates Gary's 
increasing inability to manage difference and difficulty. In distinction to the aged Enid 
and Al, the comparatively young Gary rebuffs divergent opinions and unforeseen 
occurrences. When articulating that Gary regards St. Jude's shopping "poor people" as a 
"dumber, sadder, fatter" and "Diseased underclass that he really, really liked to keep away 
from" (484), Chip recalls Gary's previous evaluations of the same people in the same 
place. In his everestless chapter, an aggravated Gary elucidates his angoisse in respect to 
the sudden sophistication of the Midwest: "all the restaurants in St. Jude were suddenly 
coming up to European speed (suddenly cleaning ladies knew from sun-dried tomatoes, 
suddenly hog farmers knew from crème brûlée), and shoppers at the malI near his 
parent' s house had an air of entitlement offputtingly similar to his own, and the electronic 
consumer goods for sale in St. Jude were every bit as powerful and cool as those in 
Chestnut Hill" (198). The ex-Midwesterner's growing opposition to adjustment likewise 
manifests itself after he collects Denise from the airport somewhere beyond his parent' s 
suburb. In little time, Gary exhibits frustration over the fact that "people could so easily 
drop out of the world of conventional expectations" (491). With an altered Denise in the 
seat next to him, Gary feels "especially galled that the latest defector to the 'alternative' 
was not sorne flaky Other from a family of Others or a class of Others but his own stylish 
and talented sister, who as recently as September had excelled in conventional ways that 
his friends could read about in the New York Times" (491). Rather than reflect upon the 
reasons that prompt these modifications, Gary sees what he fails to anticipate as a 
personal attack. According to him, unpredictable developments "undercut the pleasure he 
t[akes] in his home and job and family" (491). In Gary's apprehensive estimation, 
irregular alternatives "fe[el] like a unilateral rewriting, to his own disadvantage, of the 
rules of life" (491). 
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Incorrectly connecting the general "rules of life" to the recent requisites ofhis 
controlled home life, Gary arrives in St. Jude armed with his courtroom voice, a staged 
legalistic tool engineered to lend authority to his preplanned defense and accusation. 
Given his victimization in Chestnut Hill, he prepares to be acknowledged as the "villain 
in St. Jude" (485). Repositioned at the other end of the law, the desperado of St. Jude 
strategically adopts ex-lawyer Caroline's decisive last-word say-so. When Gary assumes 
this performed variety of elementary legality, he ratifies his resistance to unexpected 
versions of progress as he confirms his tendency towards a lamentable personal regress. 
Bossy and incorrigible, he behaves like a spoiled child as he becomes increasingly 
childlike. While readying himself for sleep in his boyhood bedroom, his strange, powerful 
longings insinuate the onset of psychological malady: "he was gripped by an ancient 
excitement at the prospect of running trains through mountains of papier-machée, across 
high Popsicle-stick trestles" (498). The next day, after Denise alerts him to the model 
railroad supplies stored in a basement box, Gary basically echoes his youngest son's 
amazement at the "cool" Prince Cas pian CD-ROM "stuff' he was "very much looking 
forward" to "order[ing]" and "playing with" (203). ''l'm having a great time with this 
railroad stuff," Gary later declares, "There are sorne truly neat things that you can buy" 
(523). Stressing his brother's imbalanced neurochemical defenses, Chip reformulates 
Jonah's acquired admiration for the technological as Gary's nostalgie approbation for the 
mechanical. 
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When the last Christmas scene materializes, Chip additionally fashions Gary's 
unique reversion to childhood as a peculiar allegory of suburban America. Once Chip 
eventually assumes his long-awaited chair at the Lambert dinner table following his train 
of truck rides and airline flights, Gary symbolizes a bankrupt version of suburban USA. A 
degraded, mismanaged, or abused suburbanite, Gary cornes complete with a model 
railroad, a replication that signifies the daily commuting necessary to suburban fiction, as 
Howells envisions the genre in his cIassic Suburban Sketches. Nevertheless, Chip inspires 
a sympathetic view of Gary and the popular culture that he ironically epitomizes. Now 
stateside, Chip restyles the deleterious indicators of Gary' s suburban lifestyle as 
degenerative symptoms of a psychosomatic syndrome. After Gary holds court at table, a 
Christmas moming trial in which he indicts his siblings for irresponsibility, his mother of 
misapprehension, and his father of incompetence, a trial wherein Alfred crashes to the 
floor and Enid weeps, a trial that reveals Gary's actual motivation forvisiting St. Jude, a 
trial after which Gary quickly leaves the Midwest while his formaI, hollow words still 
hum in the air, Chip notices that "his brother was afraid" (542-7). With this cIear 
judgment, a ruling presumably sustained by his half-private fireside chat with Denise 
(549-550), Chip reminds readers that Gary's case can be read as distinctive rather than 
representative. Combined with his juvenile actions, his frustrated parenting, his 
compulsory capitulation, and his domestic custody, Gary's thwarted aspirations are not 
necessarily the products of a decadent culture. Neither Gary nor America can daim 
solitary culpability for the terrible events that demarcate the Chestnut Hillian's awful 
existence. Though the violence that Gary encounters and endures must be put on trial, a 
trial that Chip arbitrates aIl through The Corrections, the mitigating circumstances of 
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Gary's case appear to overrule correction, on the surface at least. 
Adding to his signature disappointment, the increasingly distressed, disobliging, 
intimidated, and contrarian Gary deplorably distinguishes that the inhabitants of 
suburban-nowhere St. Jude eventually can obtain the indispensable cultural capital that 
he, a not uneducated urban sophisticate, considers indicative of refinement and 
cosmopolitanism. As a means of emphasizing the potential citification, if not the 
uncultivated new-wave modishness, of satellite communities, Chip punctuates Gary's 
stop in St. Jude with details that correlate his evolving apprehensions to the improvement 
of suburban spaces. Just as Gary deems as discomfiting the newfangled privilege, savoir-
faire, and ultra-modem merchandise of the St. Judeans (198), the big brother also 
remarkably finds silence and aloneness disconcerting. As readers encounter the mock 
medical term Garyitis (512), a less facetious than admonitory neologism Denise quietly 
coins the moming after a terrified Gary secretly hides in his old closet (498), Chip 
encourages a reconsideration of the "little parkinsonian" shake that besets Gary's hands in 
the midst ofhis solo Intemet-surfing a season earlier (171). Perhaps more tellingly, Chip 
introduces Gary's emerging mental infirmity at the beginning of "The More He Thought 
About it, The Angrier He Got." The second chapter of The Corrections starts with Gary, 
"(a vice president at CenTrust bank, not a shrink, let's remember)," stationed in a 
darkroom while he mentally measures his levels ofNeurofactor 3, Factor 2, Factor 7, and 
Factor 1, in addition to his serotonin (139). With the subtle details and reminders 
included in "One Last Christmas," Chip insists upon a revised evaluation of Gary, as weIl 
as his Chestnut Hill home. Neither strictly incapacitated by the embellished limits ofhis 
panopticon house, nor exclusively determined by the equally overstated specifications of 
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his despotic wife, Gary suffers from the same neurological dysfunctions as his father. A 
tragic fool, DNA disables him, as do CPUs. 
By implementing these emendations into The Corrections, Chip sadly insinuates 
that whereas a buoyant Enid, at seventy-five, finally determines to "makesome changes 
in her life" (568), and a nursing-home confined Al, after two years, finally regains his 
dignity by killing himself in a steadfast refusaI to eat (568), Gary may be incapable of 
making similar voluntary decisions or ameliorations. Despite his wife's financial backing, 
he still may not survive the post-millennial market collapse in the lifestyle he endorses. 
Unlike Enid and Al, whose assets remained "locked" in ordinary "annuities and T -Bills," 
Gary takes a "nasty little bath on [the Axon] biotech IPO" (564). Regardless of the two-
year interval between "One Last Christmas" and the finale "The Corrections," Gary 
illustrates no mentionable improvement to his individual temperament or constitution. On 
the other hand, Denise, now working at a new restaurant in Brooklyn, "look[ s] so much 
happier" in Enid's estimation (564). By the same token, Chip, a recent father and 
husband, "seem[s] almost miraculously transformed" (565). Even before her planned 
corrections, Enid likewise changes. In a secret show of solidarity with her daughter, Enid 
silently discontinues her protracted friendship with Bea Meisner after the unlikable 
woman labels a famous "'gay' actress" "immoral" and "evil" (564-5). 
Notwithstanding the physical and genetic traits that he shares with his father, Gary 
furthermore appearS unable to illustrate even a degree of AI's definitive altruism. Before 
Alloses his ability to communicate verbally, he reluctantly yet confidentially notifies his 
daughter that he took his very costly early retirement, much to the chagrin of Enid and 
Gary, in order to save her "privacy" from the defamations' of the blackmailing, blue-
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cheeked Vietnam "Fellow" (521-4). Likely influenced by her father's unselfish loyalty, 
Denise compels Chip to accept her "forgive[ness]" of the "principle torment ofhis life": 
his $20,500 "debt" (549-551). Before the close of The Corrections, Gary, by contrast, 
enacts a notable exception to Lambert fiscal munificence. Banking on thealleged 
"principle at stake," he continues harrying Enid on account of the $4.96 she "still 'owed' 
him" for an errand he performed during their last family Christmas (564). Out of 
"principle," Enid refuses to reimburse her resolute, grownup son (564). As a futile 
alternative to looking ahead, like the progressive Enid, Gary pro longs 100 king back. As a 
fruitless substitute to listening to the stories of others, like the attentive Denise and Chip, 
Gary persists complaining about his own story. As an unproductive replacement to 
appreciating the random and often agonistic relationships that cultivate the evolution of 
social equality, like the covert Al, Gary continues to condemn the desires, deviations, and 
decisions that he cannot understand. Yet ruling out Gary's eventual sense of self-
melioration perpetuates the multileveled injustices that he experiences. Merely to dismiss 
or discard his complex case, with eyes downcast and shoulders slumped, perpetrates yet 
another injustice upon this big brother-the injustice that disallows additional 
examination, recognition, and correction. 
The Limits of Control in DeLillo's Drama 
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Chapter Three 
Stage-Managing the Individual 
Don DeLillo writes about danger and dread insofar as they contribute to the 
refashioning of indi,:idual identity. For this American author and playwright, the self 
advantageously endures crucial adjustment or correction as it risks its known limits, 
independent limits that are evermore restricted and inactively ignored by virtue of 
contemporary American mass-market culture. In other words, in the media age the 
individual gains a greater sense of self-understanding when she actively elects to 
challenge the limits ofthis understanding. In DeLillo's always-political fiction, "a fiction 
that refuses the opposition of the personal and the public altogether" (Lentricchia 4), 
when a character endangers her self-awareness, she likewise exposes the dominant 
narratives of justice of her culture. Self-questioning, then, is not only a feature of 
personal autonomy but also an aspect ofideological critique. Accordingly, when 
someone tests her limits, she also tests the laws and restrictions of her immediate milieu. 
For DeLillo, self-change perpetuates collective change-a personal, social, and legal 
motif that plays out most predominantly in his disregarded dramatic works. In his plays, 
which director Peter Brook might describe as "truer" because they center on "doubting," 
"unease," "trouble," and "alarm" instead of sorne "noble aim" (50), DeLillo positions 
women, madmen, the alienated, the inert, the quasi-dead, and audience members alike in 
strange, controlled, and dangerous settings in order to instantiate the unique payoffs of 
sustained discomfort. 
130 
DeLillo confronts the submissive structures of both marginality and spectatorship 
in his drarna. Modeling his plays on the theatrical tradition that integrates the absurdity 
and avant-gardism of Pirandello, Beckett, and Pinter, DeLillo sets up his theatrical spaces 
as carceral, punitive, and liberating. Counterbalancing his celebrated portrayals of 
novelistic containment, DeLillo' s overlooked drarnas circle around issues of the body, 
stillness, identity, and creativity. As in Franzen's The Corrections, DeLillo's novelistic 
figures cannot avoid representation, notwithstanding their global movements and 
relocations. In DeLillo's plays, on the other hand, disrupted and broken dialogue, 
palpable haphazardness and improvisation, prone and broken bodies, as well as 
existential emptiness, accentuate a crucial distinction between drarna and narrative. For 
DeLillo, drarnatic figures can escape depiction. By evading the spatial constraints of 
performance, an avoidance foregrounded with several characters who appear capable of 
simply leaving the stage, actors enable DeLillo to reconsider specific problems 
conceming identity and control. 
Because they concem the progression from one space to another, inertia and 
departure invite questions of space and justice. In the theatre, the dictates of the play 
space forbid-ür restrict-movement away from the stage. When a player absconds from 
this circumscribed locus, she no longer abides by the rules of the game of drarna. The 
sarne does not necessarily hold true for novelistic narrative. An expansive scrutiny of 
DeLillo's plays, therefore, will enable further excavations ofhis novels. A detailed 
inspection of DeLillo's theatrical work, which consists of four full-Iength plays, The 
Engineer of Moonlight, The Day Room, Valparaiso, and Love-Lies-Bleeding, in addition 
to two mini-plays, The Rapture of the Athlete Assumed into Heaven and The Mystery at 
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the Middle of Ordinary Life, begins to administer critical justice where justice is long 
overdue. Not exclusively a novelist, DeLillo has devoted more than half of his literary 
career tothe medium of drama-ifnot his entire career. As the goal of the legal method, 
justice demands reparations for particular actions or dis services or crimes. In order to 
begin to enact the deliberations that direct arbiters towards the fair implementation of 
justice, adjudicators must avail themselves of as much germane information, as much 
relevant narrative, as possible. Correlatively, to do justice to DeLillo and his work, not to 
mention his persistent representations of spatiality and its complex interrelations with 
control, free agency, and justice, an evaluation ofhis plays will carry a great deal of 
consequence, the imperative corollaries that this section of my thesis discovers. 
In his substantial canon-his fictional oeuvre currently numbers fourteen novels, 
including one written under the pseudonym Cleo Birdwell, and one feature-film 
screenplay-DeLillo constantly situates his lead characters in opposition to their cultural 
narratives. His protagonists, in fact, are always outsiders. A theorist who utilizes the 
forums of novelistic and dialogic discourse, DeLillo should be evaluated as an 
anthropologist and as a social critic. His oppositional characters also can be seen as 
reflections of DeLillo himself. From the beginning ofhis career, he has maintained a 
modicum of protected privacy and controlled distance from the American literary and 
media establishments. As Thomas LeClair says in his breakthrough 1979 interview with 
the writer, an interview that took place eight years after DeLillo's first novel, Americana, 
was published, "DeLillo has not joined the literary auxiliary: he does not sit on panels, 
appear on television, judge contests, review books, or teach creative writing. He travels 
and writes" (3). In the meantime, DeLillo has budged, albeit, given his great success, not 
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by much. Vince Passaro, after a 1991 meeting with the author, gently remarks, "DeLillo 
is a star now, no longer the shrouded, elusive figure he had been when he was first 
interviewed by LeClair. He does readings from time to time; on rare occasions, he speaks 
to the press" (76). 
In a marked contrast to DeLillo's personal self-positioning outside the spotlight of 
the popular culture he critiques, his publications have been received with tloodlights of 
critical acclaim and evaluation. He has won numerous literary awards, including the 
National Book Award and the Jerusalem Prize. Accordingly, assessment of DeLillo's 
fiction features in tens of books and hundreds of critical articles. Distinct from the 
comparative dearth of scholarly response to the work of the very public Franzen, DeLillo 
criticism is an industry. Animated responses to DeLillo' s prose, by supporters and 
detractors, originated after the release ofhis 1985 novel White Noise. Following the 
popular eminence ofhis two encyclopedic epics, Libra (1988), a conspiratorial skeleton 
key to the Warren Report starring JFK-assassin Lee Harvey Oswald, and Underworld 
(1997), a Virgilian underground history of Cold War America, interest in DeLillo 
continues to escalate. This wide reaction makes him mandatory reading for any student or 
aficionado of the contemporary literary scene. Irrespective of the expansiveness ofthis 
criticism, though, it proves to be less than exhaustive. 
Missing from this considerable critical analysis is a comprehensive look at 
DeLillo's work as a dramatist. Though DeLillo habitually highlights his predilection for 
the theatrical-he includes dramatic conventions in his novels, he engineers the 
movements of his limited public life, he has written plays-Iess than five percent of 
DeLillo criticism takes his drama, not to mention his penchant for the performative, into 
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account. As Klaus Benesch points out in a 2003 article, "DeLillo' s dramatic texts are still 
conspicuously absent from academic criticism ofhis work" (133). Moreover, no single 
article within this limited body considers the evident connections between his different 
plays. Each of his theatrical pieces makes up a part of what could be called his dramatic 
project, a project that culminates with rus most recent work, the play Love-Lies-Bleeding. 
DeLillo' s dialogic works limit his novelistic considerations to personal 
impositions and constraints. In White Noise, he locates suburban USA as the pop-culture 
and commercial capital ofthe American (or Consumerist) Century. Libra and 
Underworld respectively move outward to the world-scene so as to reconfigure 
problematic understandings of consumption, correction, and justice in America. In 
DeLillo's drama, by contrast, players devise games withjustice. As checks and balances, 
these games refocus attention inward. They have consequences only for the players 
themselves-at first anyway. In The Engineer of Moonlight, The Day Room, Valparaiso, 
and Love-Lies-Bleeding, unique interchanges bespeak a tradeoff that surpasses the stage 
setting. Just as an actor plays her part on the stage, adjusts to the umehearsed shifts that 
occur onstage, and performs different parts on different stages, so too does she reposition 
herselfin terms of the evolving limits ofher culture. Acting, ifnothing else, teaches its 
adepts to contend with and to aestheticize change. After aU, as Antonin Artaud implies, 
no two performances of the same drama are alike: "the theater is the only place in the 
world where a gesture, once made, can never be made the same way twice" (75). 
According to Artaud, successful theatrical gesturing eschews routine. Unlike the 
untheatrical, the performative obliges its adepts to evolve, to develop their roles during 
the course of a play and over a series of productions of a play. Though counterintuitive 
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because scripts demarcate the parameters of staged characters, the performed celebrates 
the transformation that the everyday can suffocate. As with justice, revision and 
correction distinguish theatre. 
The Body Artist, DeLillo's shortest novel, emphasizes an exchange between the 
staged and the stages ofthe everyday. Though not a play per se, The Body Artist is set in 
a Big House, incorporates but a few characters, and centers on protagonist Lauren 
Hartke's stage performance, one of only three or four events that takes place beyond the 
walls ofher home. Lauren's physically exacting and visibly tiring slow act of contortion, 
of practiced resistance, of personal conversion, speaks to DeLillo' s persistent theatrical 
focus on the linkages between the private and the public. Her progress from home to 
stage also draws attention to DeLillo's ongoing movements from the privacy ofhis 
writing desk to the publicness of the theatre. After stressing the delicacy of independence, 
he acknowledges that the role ofthe playwright offsets that ofthe novelist: "1 think ifs 
precisely because a novelist lives in a world of fragile autonomy that 1 welcome the 
chance to work with other people. Ifs certainly not something 1 would want to do 
. exclusively, and for me there is an element in which each form is an antidote to the other" 
(in Feeney 170-1). 
Aiso embedded in DeLillo's privileging of the group work associated with the 
production ofhis plays is his admiration of audience reactions to the performances ofhis 
plays. In the same way that rehearsal compels him to "los[ e] a sense of the customary 
reference points" (in Rothstein 21), "the presence of an audience" obliges him to 
appreciate "A sense of the play's strangeness" (in McAuliffe 175). As Mervyn 
Rothstein's and Jody McAuliffe's separate interviews with the playwright illustrate, 
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whether DeLillo aligns himself with individual actors or with a collective audience, he 
appreciatively reconsiders the limits ofhis work. These fresh gazes extend to directors as 
weIl. Akin to the dramatist who rethinks his conceptions of a play, and the actor who 
reacts to the changing nature of a play, a director likewise alters his outlook of a play 
when surrounded by actors and audiences. Brook explains, "any director will agree that 
his own view of his own work changes completely when he is sitting surrounded by 
people" (142). As an extension of acting, spectatorship entails a form of misplacement, 
repositioning, and revision. 
In her short article "A Novelist Finds the Bare Bones of a Play," Joyce Carol 
Oates likewise accentuates the logic of lostness associated with dramatic performance. 
Oates avers that "To experience the play, the playwright must become part of the 
audience, and this can only happen when there is an actual stage, living actors, voices 
other than one's own" (3). DeLillo effectively elaborates on Oates's appraisal of dramatic 
stimulation in his talk with Marc Chenétier and François Happe. Underscoring ambiguity, 
and maybe the centuries-long text-versus-performance debate among certain Shakespeare 
scholars, DeLillo closes his 1999 interview by confirming the lack of narrative closure in 
drama: 
There is such a delicate balance necessary between text, performance, 
direction and even eventually lighting and sound that at sorne point in the 
process you realize that you've come full-circle and that the novel is going 
to be the antidote to the play, and aU you want to do is go back in your 
lonely room and experience the classic solitude of the novelist. This is the 
cycle for me of plays and novels. The excitement of theatre is palpable but 
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the frustrations, and the complete absence of a definitive evening-the 
play as text means nothing in a way-, there' s no particular performance 
that is definitive in the way a novel is a solid object you hold in your 
hands and here it is. You can't say that about a play. If the novel gives us a 
sense ofthrobbing consciousness, theat[re] is pure soul, beautiful and 
elusive. (111) 
Though DeLillo purposely reconfirms that he initially sees theatre as a remedy to 
the novel, and once again substantiates his pressing need for the traditional seclusion of 
novel writing, in the latter half of his literary career dramatic discourse appears to be his 
top priority, as his writing history since the mid-eighties intimates. Shortly following the 
publication of Valparaiso, for instance, DeLillo joked, "It seems 1 do a play every 
decade" (in Feeney 169). Taken at face value, his observation pinpoints the plain fact that 
The Engineer of Moonlight was published in 1979, The Day Room in 1986, and 
Valparaiso in 1999. Nevertheless, later on in the interview Feeney clarifies that DeLillo's 
third play first took root not long after the release of Libra in 1988: "DeLillo began work 
on what is now Valparaiso in 1991. Dissatisfied with the results, he soon abandoned it 
for what would turn out to be Underworld. The novel took five years to write, and when 
he was done DeLillo found himselflooking at what he'd done on the play" (170). 
Mark Feeney goes on to remark that DeLillo directly "went to work and had a 
fini shed version within five months" (170). DeLillo's post-Valparaiso publications, if 
anything, emphasize his preoccupation with drama over two decades. Although The Body 
Artist (2001) is not a play, it develops by virtue of the events prompting Lauren to 
prepare and present her piece "Body Time," a performance virtually ignored in DeLillo 
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criticism. Subsequent to Lauren's incorporated stage-performance, DeLillo publishes two 
more short works, both ofwhich buttress his fascination with theatre. Released in 2003, 
but occurring over a single day in April 2000, the novel Cosmopolis acts as a coda to both 
Underworld and Valparaiso. As it observes the unities oftime, space, and action, 
Cosmopolis at once problematizes the epilogue of Underworld, called "Das Kapital," and 
supports the finale of Valparaiso. Whereas Underworld concludes with the word "Peace" 
(827), as though the author condescends to tolerate if not to bolster the international 
cyberworld (or network economy) that closes his modem rendering of Karl Marx, 
Cosmopolis ends with less prevarication. Reformulating the televised murder that finishes 
Valparaiso, DeLillo terminates Cosmopolis with an underground assassination that 
compresses the main threat of the technoworld (or media economy): the end of 
individuality. In DeLillo's three-act play Love-Lies-Bleeding, first performed in 2005, 
and published in 2006, he caps offhis prolonged dramatic analysis of the body and 
identity with a focus on stillness, isolation, and autonomy. Slotted into this twenty-year 
period is his novel Mao II (1991), which best embodies DeLillo's career-Iong fascination 
with creative men confined to "lonely rooms," the theatrically coded spaces that DeLillo 
associates with escape, seclusion, creativity, and independence. Similarly instrumental to 
the second half of DeLillo's career are the two two-minute plays The Rapture of the 
Athlete Assumed into Heaven (1990) and The Mystery at the Middle of Ordinary Lift 
(2000). 
Yet Don DeLillo's complicated fixation on the aesthetics of drama, as 1 start this 
section of my dissertation by showing, also reaches back to the very foundation of his 
literary vocation. "The Limits of Control in Don DeLillo's Drama" proceeds in two 
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chapters: "Stage-Managing the Individual" and "Lost in The Day Room, Locked into 
Valparaiso." ln the first chapter, 1 will investigate his major themes as 1 navigate through 
sorne of the principal responses to his work. No study of the celebrated writer can be 
complete without a consideration of DeLillo' s place in the culture that he appraises. In 
addition, this chapter explores the theatrical nature of DeLillo's strategie move into a 
limited public life while it likewise scrutinizes the filmic and theatrical dimensions that 
he features in his earliest fictions, fictions that establish the dramatic emphasis that cornes 
to govem his literary production. 
ln the final half of my DeLillo investigation, 1 endeavor to do critical justice to 
DeLillo' s dramatic proj ect. Paying particular attention to his two most famous plays, The 
Day Room and Valparaiso, this analysis considers the constellation ofthemes developed 
throughout DeLillo's dramatic canon, a canon increasingly devoted to the fate of the 
spectator in the media age. Taking the work of Brook and Artaud into account, as weIl as 
sorne pieces by DeLillo's main cinematic, novelistic, and dramatic influences, "Lost in 
The Day Room, Locked into Valparaiso" closes with a look at DeLillo' s capacity to 
manipulate his audience members into his dramas. DeLillo thereby shows the affinity 
between plotting, writing, directing, acting, and witnessing, aIl of which call upon the 
individual to orchestrate her own sense of identity and freedom-a liberty that 
reconstructs the limits of social control, that is, the structures of representation, identity, 
freedom, and justice. 
Film 
One decade into a writing career that currently spans over thirty-five years, Don 
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DeLillo stealthily outlined his literary objectives in a feature story for Rolling Stone 
magazine. In the 1982 article "American Blood" the reclus ive author discussed what he 
saw as a shift in American consciousness, a shift activated not by the Kennedy 
assassination itself, but rather by the collected minutiae on the murder-an epic of detail 
DeLillo sees as the novel that James Joyce could have written (DeCurtis 62). Popularly 
known as the Warren Report, and officially titled Hearings before the President's 
Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, the twenty-six volume 
encyclopedia cornes to challenge the "sense of coherent reality most [Americans] shared" 
(22), according to DeLillo. He underlines the literary nature of post-Kennedy, or post-
Oswald, America: "We seem from that moment [22 November 1963] to have entered a 
world ofrandomness and ambiguity, a world totally modem in the way it shades into the 
century's 'emptiest' literature, the study ofwhat is uncertain and unresolved in our lives, 
the literature of estrangement and silence. A European body ofwork, largely" (22). In the 
wake of the JFK assassination, and particularly the catalogue of doubt that this unjust 
incident prompts, "America" adopts the expansiveness and alienation ofhigh modemism. 
The fact that DeLillo forsakes sorne of his secrecy and separation in order to 
detail these same topics is nothing short of deliberately dramatic. After aIl, the New 
Yorker's confidentiality in the early stages ofhis career rivaIs that of J. D. Salinger and 
Thomas Pynchon. Even by 1982, "after having already published six novels to great 
critical acclaim" (DePietro viii), DeLillo had only granted two interviews, and these 
reluctantly. He does not submit to another one for five more years, after which he agreed 
to participate in a relatively small number of interviews, given the magnitude of his 
novelistic success. Yet his audience address upon the reception of the American Book 
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Award for White Noise in 1985 proves even more telling than his adopted silence. 
DeLillo arrived at the podium armed with but a brief apology: ''l'm sorry 1 couldn't be 
here tonight," after which he quickly yet coolly returned to his seat (qtd. in DePietro viii). 
Instead of either showing up or not showing up at the New York Public Library, DeLillo 
manages to coordinate both maneuvers. Deadpan and shielded like the inscrutable rocker 
Bucky Wunderlick in his 1973 novel Great Jones Street, DeLillo public1y protects his 
privacy. At the same time, he public1y vacates his public life. In like manner to the writer 
Bill Gray of Mao II, who is a later version of Wunderlick, DeLillo exposes himself to 
scrutiny only to maintain his privacy. He reveals his character with actions, not words. 
As the prolitic novelist and playwright divulges in his tirst interview, "It's my 
nature to keep quiet about most things. Even the ideas in my work. When you try to 
unravel something you've written, you belittle it in a way. It was created as a mystery, in 
part" (in LeClair 4). In answer to LeClair' s opening inquiry about the dearth of 
information about himself in reference books (these are limited to book titles and 
publication dates), DeLillo deflects the question. Resisting autobiography, he discusses 
the difficulties of elaborating on his own work, the difticulties of restructuring his own 
restructuring, and the difficulties of matching the vocabulary of the author with the 
vocabulary ofthe author as self-critic, before he halffacetiously, halfwearily conc1udes, 
"But here 1 am, talking" (4). This DeLillo performance, stage-managed as at once candid 
and tactical, follows the tirst phrase of his tirst answer as an author offering himself to 
the depictions of the academic and the public arenas. In the beginning, DeLillo sets up his 
media image or civic self by citing the cerebral Stephen Dedalus: "Silence, exile, 
cunning, and so on" (4). Expanding upon Dedalus' memorable phrase, DeLillo adds the 
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equivocal "and so on," which pertains to his avant-gardism. He aims to lead, not follow. 
By adding "and so on," DeLillo likewise moves towards the sense of quiet alarm or 
distraction that characterizes the drama of Samuel Beckett. Whereas Joyce endeavored to 
say everything, Beckett labored over saying anything at aIl. 
Though perhaps cryptic, DeLillo's stylized entry into public life should not be 
interpreted as exaggeratedly surprising. He highlights A Portrait of the Artist out of a 
sense of straightforwardness and frankness, rather than in an attempt at elusiveness or 
evasiveness. By invoking James Joyce and his intertextual writer manqué, a would-be 
artist who conspicuously does not appear in Finnegans Wake, DeLillo discloses a 
cautious measure of personal information, while simultaneously hearkening back to his 
earlier work. As he draws attention to Dedalus and Joyce, DeLillo points to his own main 
literary influence. He also directs attention towards his first novel, the Warren 
Commission Report, and his approval of difficult fictional discourse. DeLillo refers to 
Joyce in later interviews with Passaro, Begley, Howard, and Remnick as weIl. These 
references suggest that DeLillo models himself as a theorist of contemporary culture, as 
the writer configuring the details that Joyce would have collected. 
DeLillo' s earliest novel features commercial-, TV -, and film-making, and a 
prolonged road trip. Deliberately titled in order to distinguish DeLillo as an American 
and not as a second-generation Italian-American, Americana (1971) evokes two late-
fifties classics: Franco-American Jack Kerouac's first successful novel, On the Road, and 
Russian-American Vladimir Nabokov's first American novel, Lolita. As Nabokov 
stresses in his afterward to Lolita, he invested the work with "suburban lawn[ s]" and 
"mountain meadow[ s]" and "American motels" because he was "trying to be an 
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American writer and claim only the same rights that other American writers enjoy" (281). 
During his cross-country drive in Americana, first-person narrator David Bell makes 
frequent allusions to Ulysses, the one-day epic wherein Dedalus is ironically consumed 
by the night, instead ofbeing smoldered by the sun, like his Greek predecessor. From 
what turns out to be his final day as a TV executive in New York, where David learns 
that his college friend will be marrying his third wife in "old Dub [so he can] pretend 
she's Molly Bloom" (95), through the recounting ofhis days as a film-studies student at a 
liberal arts school in the Southwest US, where he wanted to be called "Kinch. The knife 
blade" (145), to one ofhis final car rides, where the talk-radio jockey goes off on the 
jocoseriousness of "Buckmulliganism" (368), David's US tour recasts Dedalus' day in 
Dublin. In Americana, as in Ulysses, each complex protagonist leaves a particular tower, 
be it a gleaming skyscraper or the rundown Martello. Both obsess over media forms. Just 
as Dedalus intones theological tracts, David reiterates for-profit slogans. A contemporary 
adaptation of Dedalus, David furthermore meanders in the sand, although he drifts in an 
Antonioni-inspired empty desert rather than upon a St. Augustine-textured dirty beach. 
Unlike Dedalus, however, David does not strangely withdraw from his respective 
narrative. Neither overshadowed by a half-father figure, nor forgotten in the predawn 
dark, David does not more or less disappear by the middle of Americana. Certainly, the 
primafacie argument for David's sustruned presence in Americana derives from his role 
as narrator. In Ulysses, by contrast, Dedalus is one ofthree or four key figures. In this 
encyclopedic text, which could have been titled lrlandia, the stories of the Jewish 
Leopold and the Spanish Molly satirically overrule Dedalus' personal narrative. 
Compellingly, David successfully resists disappearance because he reclaims artistic 
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individuality, a self-recovery that Dedalus' specific sort ofresistance appears to disallow. 
Fixated on the language and culture ofhis English oppressors, in addition to rus penury, 
Dedalus cannot escape his immediate circumstances in order to actualize his artistic 
ambitions. Distinct from the exiled Bloom and Molly, as well as Joyce himself, Dedalus 
cannot tell his story. Confronted with different sorts of equally stifling contemporary 
dilemmas, David, on the other hand, fulfills this aspiration. In asserting his personal 
freedom, which works in tandem with his art making, he avoids being consumed by the 
corporate culture of the USA. 
Notwithstanding his problematic understanding of the type of art that he fashions, 
David's artistic creation affirms his renewed sense of personal identity. In Americana, the 
twenty-eight-year-old David (the son of a marketplace tycoon who "move[s] the merch" 
with consummate proficiency as he "collect[s] reels [and reels] of TV commercials" [84]) 
initially sees himself as a television wunderkind. "Dave Bell's my name; TV's my 
game," he industriously proclaims into his ringing office telephone (96). He later changes 
this occupational qualifier after he finally informs his three road companions (who are 
accompanying him to the set of a TV -special on the Navahos) that he has abandoned his 
cushy job for the purpose of directing "a long unmanageable movie full of fragments of 
everything that' s part of my life, maybe ultimately taking two or three or more full days 
to screen and only a minutely small part of which l' d like to do out here" (205). Once 
David begins his cinéma vérité in a dingy hotel room situated somewhere in the Midwest, 
he alters his telephone theatrics: "Dave Bell's my name; cinematography's my game" 
(222). In spite ofthe fact that he ultimately completes a book and not a movie, however, 
he never alters this revised career descriptor. At the close of the novel, David describes 
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himself as a wordsmith, ostensibly crafting his American narrative on an unnamed isle. 
Taking this final narrative turn into account, Stuart Hutchinson argues, "the proposition 
that the whole book is a movie or movies remains as notional as his eventual existence on 
an island. Americana, after aIl, exists in prose, and we cannot see any movie David 
makes" (120). 
With this transition from film to fiction, David can be understood as a version of 
the young DeLillo. They are both first-time novelists. David's age reflects DeLillo's 
when he originally conceived Americana. Moreover, like David, who sees himself as a 
"child of Godard and Coca-Cola" (269), DeLillo acknowledges that "the movies of Jean-
Luc Godard had a more immediate effect on [his] early work than anything [he]' d ever 
read" (in LeClair 9). Moreover, just as David's cinematic and literary allusions solely 
relate to innovative men (Eisenstein, Bergman, Hitchcock, Antonioni, Kafka, Kerouac, 
and Beckett), so too are the novelistic forbears that DeLillo eventually highlights in his 
first interview exclusively male creators. "The books 1 came back to," DeLillo offers, 
"seem to be the ones that demonstrate the possibilities of fiction. Pale Fire, Ulysses, The 
Death of Virgil, Under the Volcano, The Sound and the Fury--these come to mind" (10). 
In the same decisive talk with LeClair, DeLillo also demonstrates that he 
privileges the old spirit of print over the new vigor of the image. Indicating an affinity 
between earlier forms of cinematic representation and the enduring nature of novelistic 
depiction, a kinship that contemporary film-makers and -audiences apparently distort or 
neglect, DeLillo stresses that "It's movies in part that seduced people into thinking the 
novel was dead. The power of the film iniage seemed to be overwhelming our little world 
of print. Film could do so much. Print could only trot across the page. But movies and 
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novels are too closely related to work according to shifting proportions. If the novel dies, 
movies will die with it" (9). DeLillo asserts the primacy of the written. Like his first 
protagonist, David, he places fiction before film. Though film indeed sways fiction, as 
David's artistic development embiematically suggests, in DeLillo's personal estimation 
films cannot supersede literature. With his first novel, DeLillo styles himself as above aIl 
an American writer-"I'm a novelist, period. An American novelist," he later 
reemphasizes in an interview with Nadotti (115). As weH, in Americana he sets himself 
up as a novelist who will not be overwhelmed by the increasing force of the image, a 
captivation and capitulation that David's business-mogul father typifies. Though 
interested in, ifnot mesmerized by, film, TV, and the product placements that finance 
these rapidly shuffled stiIls, DeLillo implies even in ms first major work that he will write 
against the "Multinational corporations," as he describes them thirty-years later, that 
"have come to seem more vital and influential than governments" ("In the Ruins of the 
Future" 33). 
As DeLillo illustrates aIl through his novelistic and dramatic work, he sees 
creation as individuating. A manifestation of self-creation, plastic or literary creation 
differentiates the individual from the mass-mentality typically targeted, not to say 
generated, by consumer culture. As a preliminary case in point of DeLillo's career-Iong 
association of human distinctiveness with artistic conception, in Americana the learned 
David manages to create. His hero Dedalus never accomplishes this creative act, this self-
fashioning of identity. DeLillo vests his understanding of the individual qua individual in 
artistic design, whether in the form of film, fiction, theatre, visual art, or body artistry. As 
DeLillo consistently theorizes in his fiction, and maybe most movingly in his drama, in a 
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contemporary world wherein "we're aIl," so he posits in his interview with Begley, "one 
beat away from becoming elevator music" (97), original creation enables a person to 
actualize herself as distinct, as an inimitable, evolving self. To be an individual, namely a 
self fully aware of personalliabilities and private freedoms (especially in an age wherein 
DeLillo sees even lone TV viewers as silent members ofthe crowd, as a "crowd broken 
down into millions of small rooms" [in Begley 101], as what Guy Debord calls "the 
lonely crowd" [22]), agents must controversially lead rather than half-consciously pursue. 
In the same manner as the risks duly assumed by novelists, terrorists, actors, and actors' 
audiences constitute the developing facets of production, novelty, and critique, 
individuals must take an active stake in self-construction and -correction. 
In a 1996 letter to Franzen, whom at the time was suffering from a depression 
commensurate with his inability to reconcile the competing demands of writing a big 
social novel that is at once poignant and popular (i.e. a novel enjoyed by the culture that 
it criticizes), DeLillo comforts the distressed New Yorker by outlining what he sees as 
the historical and contemporary role of the novelist. DeLillo writes, "The writer leads, he 
doesn't follow. The dynamic lives in the writer's mind, not in the size ofthe audience. 
And ifthe social novellives, but only barely, surviving in the cracks and ruts of the 
culture, maybe it will be taken more seriously, as an endangered spectacle. A reduced 
context but a more intense one" (in "Why Bother?" 95). DeLillo then outlines a 
connection between autonomy and writing,· and, by extension, any form of artistic 
formation: "Writing is a form ofpersonal freedom. It frees us from the mass identity we 
see in the making aIl around us. In the end, writers will write not to be outlaw heroes of 
sorne underculture but mainly to save themselves, to survive as individuals" (95-6). 
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Although the postcript to this letter fills Franzen with a "strange" "surge ofhope" (96), it 
first appears to convey a sense of imminent danger, ifnot doom. Almost nostalgic for a 
phenomenological sensitivity to identity, DeLillo ends ms epistle with an off-putting 
paean to criticism and individuality: "If serious reading dwindles to near nothingness, it 
will probably mean that the thing we're talking about when we use the word 'identity' 
has reached an end" (96). 
The edge of expectation that Franzen finds here, in spite ofhis concems over the 
decline of "serious reading" and Silicon Valley's would-be potential to "plant a virtual-
reality helmet in every American household" ("Why Bother?" 96), rises out ofhis newly 
professed appreciation of "human limitation" (96). With DeLillo's help, the younger 
author realizes that difficulty signaIs a "fixture of life" (96), a condition of constraint that 
can inculcate the will to discover mystery in the commonplace and to create comedy out 
ofthe tragic. To close his most popular essay, Franzen draws attention to the fact that the 
world, just as a generation before, is "ending still" (97). Accentuating the oddly 
comforting nature ofthis putatively discomfiting actuality, Franzen ends "Why Bother?" 
with unanticipated sanguinity: ''l'm happy to belong to [the world] again" (97). Just as 
the tragic realism of The Corrections expresses a comedic and therefore human or 
compassionate perspective, so too can a unique sense of individuality be located in its 
alleged opposite-a threat to this same individuality. The difficulties attached to this 
imminent danger justify distinctive identity. Recognizing novel intimidation implies an 
awareness of difference, a difference that the endangered agent wishes not only to protect 
but also to substantiate. While justifying individuality, the self engages in acts of 
irreproducible rejuvenation, which entail unpredictable transformations. Personality 
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adapts as it reestablishes itself through creative acts. 
Fiction 
In his fiction, DeLillo excavates the connections between danger, difficulty, 
mystery, comedy, performance, and identity. As he says in a 1988 interview with 
Anthony DeCurtis, this thematic inspiration results primarily from what he "consider[ s] 
the great era of European films: Godard, Antonioni, Fellini, Bergman" (67). DeLillo 
makes a point ofhighlighting that these directors "seem to fracture reality. They find 
mystery in commonplace moments. They find humor in even the greatest political acts. 
They seem to find an art and a seriousness which [he] thinks[ s] was completely 
unexpected and which had once been the province of literature alone. So that a popular 
art was suddenly se en as a serious art" (67). Speaking for DeLillo, David Firestone 
proposes why DeLillo's fiction unwaveringly commemorates the mystery and 
seriousness that define the continental films of the 1950s and 1960s. Also suggesting how 
television, gadgetry, and the media usurp the strange and the weighty from the public 
imaginary, Firestone writes, "It is mystery that feeds the imagination, and it is mystery, 
[DeLillo] believes, that is being drained from the public arena, with its multiple camera 
shots, instant replays and snap moraljudgments" (153). 
DeLillo's focus on the mass cultural backing of certainty over mystery and 
repetition over reflection recalls his estimation of television as put forth in a 1993 talk 
with Adam Begley. DeLillo clarifies that-as he illustrates in rus early novels Americana, 
Running Dog, and The Names-in contradistinction to film, "TV has a sort ofpanting 
lust for bad news and calamity as long as it is visual. We've reached the point where 
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things exist so they can be filmed and played and replayed" (105). In another 
interrogation four years later, DeLillo refines his understanding ofthe relation between 
the general focus in the popular media on "bad news, sensationalistic news, 
overwhelming news" and a loss of creative critical dialogue between individual 
Americans: "It seems to be that news is a narrative of our time. It has almost replaced the 
novel, replaced discourse between people. It replaced families. It replaced a slower, more 
carefully assembled way of communicating, a more personal way of communicating" (in 
Remnick 143). 
As a consequence of the image age, an impersonal, collective identity 
appropriates familial and individual identities. Instead of cautiously reading isolated 
violent acts and their attendant sources and costs, the TV viewer "consume[ s] these acts 
of violence" until they are eventually replaced by equally violent, equally mass-marketed, 
equally overplayed images (in Remnick 144). Rather than discem difference, the 
manipulated viewer witnesses a narrative wherein divergence receives inadequate 
attention. On account of this negligence, "the display of violated bodies gives an 
imaginary body to the noncorporal crowd of television watchers and newspaper readers, 
while at the same time vouchsafing the reassurance that the suffering physical body is 
elsewhere" (Green 167). Just as distinct acts get replicated as one endless stream of 
images forging a "palpable link" between the lone perpetrator and the faceless consumer 
(167), so too is the independent viewer treated as one accumulated viewership that is 
systematically prohibited from any clear sense ofindividual peculiarity. In the same way 
as the corporate sponsors of this ongoing violent narrative endorse a "cultural fixation on 
female thinness [that] is not an obsession on female beauty but an obsession about female 
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obedience" (Wolf 187), the body of indistinct viewers can never personaUy identify with 
what it submits to devour spectacularly. As Debord, who defines "The spectacle" as 
"capital accumulated to the point where it becomes image" (24), theorizes, "Spectators 
are linked only by a one-way relationship to the very center that maintains their isolation 
from one another. The spectacle thus unites what is separate, but it unites it only in its 
separateness" (22). In accordance with the female body, a dynamic body reduced to a 
specific undifferentiated image, the viewing body entertains a paraUel treatment. The 
lone spectator gets condensed into a particular, indistinguishable crowd, a crowd 
passively obsessing over a stream of like images. Comprised of endless spectacle as 
commercial consumption, the media age therefore complicates affiliation. Viewers are aU 
united in their sense of aloneness. Viewers consume as a weirdly congruous one, each 
lonely one convinced that she is not the lonely one that she is watching. 
LeClair opens the first DeLillo interview by describing the novelist's work as a 
"precise and thorough anthropology of the present, an account of our kinship in myths, 
media, and conspiracies" (3). In retrospect, LeClair might also have indicated that 
DeLillo similarly appears to be an accurate anthropologist of the future-had he 
DeLillo's tested predilection for prognostication, that is. As Jesse Kavadlo says in the 
first sentence ofhis book on the popular writer, "We live in DeLillo-esque times" (1). 
(Consider for instance the front cover of Underworld, which may, or may not, have been 
selected by the author. Published in 1997, the face of the tome encompasses the twin 
towers of the World Trade Center obscured by mist-or noxious smoke-from two thirds 
up, with a giant bird, presumably a symbol for a second aircraft, swooping into the haze, 
aU fronted by the crucifix of St. Michael's Church, which resembles both a tombstone 
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and a set of crosshairs). After he describes the telling toxic spills detailed in White Noise, 
the conspiracy and bureaucratie incompetence of Libra, and the Middle-Eastern terrorist 
activities in Mao II, Kavadlo lists other members ofthe literati who likewise comment on 
the author's eerie prescience: "Pizarro suggests that [in the wake of9/11] DeLillo's 
insight, long noted as one of his most striking features by book critic Michiko Kakutani, 
novelist David Foster Wallace, and scholars Frank Lentricchia, Charles Molesworth, and 
Mark Osteen, now bordered on the uncanny" (2). 
y et the poignancy of these allegations of foresight has nothing to do with the 
most telling elements in the DeLillo canon, as Kavadlo swiftly attests. In the end, judging 
an author in terms ofhis prescience or "street cred," a standard under which one 
"imagines DeLillo would do quite well," proves "absurd" in Kavadlo's estimation (3). 
Though DeLillo certainly maps present trends, and often anticipates future ones (a 
forethought that develops part and parcel with his avant-gardism), the successful 
forecasting of future events does little to validate the vitality of literature. Nor does 
correct conjecturing authenticate the social work or justice and imaginative interchange 
that important literature encourages and executes. Rather, for DeLillo and his 
combination of contemporary archeology and anthropology, cultural appraisal, personal 
discomfort, and individual correction demarcate the cultural resonance of fiction. 
In his meeting with LeClair, he sketches what turns out to be a career-Iong fidelity 
to difficulty. Evoking mystery and marginality, DeLillo pinpoints the differences between 
the media and the novel, the glib and the serious, and the crowd and the individual: 
You want to dare readers to make a commitment you know they 
can't make. That's part ofit. There's also the sense of drowning in 
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information and the mass awareness of things. Everybody seems to know 
everything. Subjects surface and are totally exhausted in a matter of days 
or weeks, totally played out by the publishing industry and the broadcast 
industry. Nothing is too arcane for the treatment, the process. Making 
things difficult for the reader is less an attack on the reader than it is on the 
age and the facile knowledge-market. The writer is driven by this 
conviction that sorne truths aren't arrived at so easily, that life is still full 
ofmystery, that it might be better for you, Dear Reader, ifyou went back 
to the Living section of your newspaper because this is the dying section 
and you don't really want to be here. The writer is working against the age 
and so he feels sorne satisfaction at not being widely read. He is 
diminished by an audience. (12-3) 
DeLillo connects difficulty to difference, and difference to individuality. For him, 
apartness is a prerequisite for creativity and critique. Just as the writer can lead via her 
interest in inscrutable communication, the reader can lead by way of her unremitting 
assessment of these mysteries. A solo exercise, the act of reading ensures a variety of 
cultural refuse. Like the writer, the reader frees herselffrom the mass identity in the 
making all around her by engaging in a complex interpretive act that counteracts the 
flight from self-awareness perpetrated by what DeLillo labels the "mass anésthesia" of 
consumerism ("American Blood" 24). 
Several critics comment on DeLillo' s emphasis on the tie between mass culture 
and mass identity. Observing "DeLillo's people," and particularly his depiction of Libra 
hero Lee Harvey Oswald, Ann Arensberg remarks that "sanity and integrity appear to 
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depend on each one's remaining outside the mainstream of a society that is clearly 
dangerous, even fatal, to the individual" (41). Aiso underscoring Libra, as well as 
DeLillo' s membership among writers who "yok[ e] together [the] terror and wildhumor" 
of CUITent America, Frank Lentricchia highlights DeLillo's "des ire to move readers to the 
view that the shape and fate of their culture dictates the shape and fate of the self' (2). In 
the same vein, David Cowart refers to Underworld, wherein protagonist Nick Shay (a 
"murderer, thief, sexual predator, waste executive, survivor)," proves to be "sufficiently 
aware to hold his own against social, biological and historical determinism" (202). 
Redeploying his assessment towards the dangers and the dispensations of the media age, 
Cowart cites John N. Duvall: "An awareness of one's alienation is the last best hope to 
construct an opposition to the forces of consumer culture" (202). 
These claims, and others like them, have a dual purpose. Though they evidently 
explore how DeLillo construes the individuality of his male protagonists and of his 
readers, they also act as overt defenses of DeLillo and his work. Ever since the 
publication of White Noise, which lambastes white-American suburban-culture, while 
featuring an idiotic yet appealing prof essor of Hitler Studies, and increasingly after the 
publication of Libra-a noveJ that his Rolling Stone article predicts-DeLillo has been 
under siege by the right in the American media. Going against what eventually tums out 
to be the communal view ofjournalists Bruce Bawer, Gary Will, James Wood, Jonathan 
Yardley, and B.R. Meyers, in "American Blood" DeLillo glosses a shift in consciousness 
essentially subsidized by the Warren Report. Exposing the commission's researchers as 
conspiracy-minded or Oswald-like, DeLillo states that "We have been educated in 
skepticism, Europeanized, by reports of official mistakes, half-hearted investigations, 
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willful omissions. The valuable work of the theorists has shown us the dark possibilities, 
prodded us to admit to ourselves the difficult truths of the matter. No simple solution, no 
respite from mystery and chronic suspicion. Conspiracy is now the true faith" (28). 
In "American Blood," DeLillo then dues his readership into what he aims to 
accomplish with the book that he eventually titles Libra. Tipping off conscientious 
interpreters of detail, he delineates the ways in which he will manipulate the possibility, 
mystery, and difficulty of the Warren Report: "Give good minds an opening and they will 
create a conceptual masterwork, a gleaming four-faced idol much more beautiful, fearful 
and intriguing than the facts as we know them could conceivably yield" (28). Libra, as its 
title implies, endeavors to delivera balance of justice, at least representationally, to 
unlikely protagonist and perennial outcast Lee Harvey Oswald. Allan Hepbum explains 
this pioneering move from the traditionally iconic (public Kennedy; JFK's Dallas 
motorcade) to the essentially legalistic (private Oswald; Lee's criminal defense): "In 
Libra, DeLillo innovates on literary representation as a form of legal representation. The 
novel neither gives voice to the president nor directlY depicts him. In this regard, DeLillo 
defies the iconic tendencies in American fiction. He effectively shifts emphasis away 
from the indeterminacy of an iconic event and towards the princip les that underlie 
justice" (285). 
Given DeLillo's impartial depictions of outsiders and his razor-sharp critiques of 
the media establishment, the fact that old boy members of this joumalistic guild 
surnmarily paint him as un-American proves less than startling. An alien to irony, a 
stranger to satire, Bawer dismisses DeLillo's fiction: "It's better DeLillo seems to say in 
one novel after another, to be a marauding, murderous maniac-and therefore a human-
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than to sit still for America as it is, with its air-conditioners, assembly lines, television 
sets, supermarkets, synthetic fabrics, and credit cards. At least when you're living a life 
of primitive violence, you're closer to the mystery at the heart ofit aIl" (qtd. in Remnick 
141). Predictably, Will's condemnations are quite comparable to those ofBawer. Where 
Bawer labels White Noise as "Philosophy McNuggets" (in Remnick 141), Will hails 
Libra as "sandbox existentialism" (in Remnick 141). Still, Will takes his easy variety of 
rational objectivism much further than his likeminded associate. Aiso misconstruing 
DeLillo's iterated equation of the writer to an outsider, while likewise overlooking the 
novelist' s repeated depictions of individuals tracking other individuals, Will typifies 
DeLillo as a perilous madman, and indicts him and his "sophomoric self-dramatization" 
with "literary vandalism and bad citizenship" (141-2). Incapable of appreciating 
DeLillo's cultural criticism, legalistic deliberation, and configuring of justice, not to 
mention his justifications of fictional discourse as an investigation and a reevaluation of 
both policing and criminality, these defenders of American princip le easily dismiss his 
literary production by attacking his presupposed intentions. Their accusations of De Lillo 
the man are doubtlessly defamatory. DeLillo, however, openly welcomes these facile 
denunciations and others like them. 
His response to these charges manifests itself as at once wonderfully emblematic 
of DeLiIlo himself, historically telling about writers in themselves, and, most of aIl, 
evocatively discomfiting for the individual readers ofthis literary delinquent. In his 
interview with Remnick, DeLillo accepts Will's allegations as a tribute to the 
considerable influence ofnovelists: "We ought to be bad citizens. We ought to in the 
sense that we're writing against what power represents, and often what the government 
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represents, and what the corporation dictates, and what consumer consciousness has 
come to mean. In that sense ifwe're bad citizens, we're doing our job" (142). Unsmiling, 
as his tone indicates; he continues to address Will's incriminations, "Will also said 1 
blarned America for Lee Harvey Oswald. But 1 don't blarne America for Lee Harvey 
Oswald, 1 blarne America for George [sic] Will" (142). Lentricchia, the adherent whom, 
with his work on White Noise, chiefly introduced DeLillo to scholarly study, appraises 
the stem "censorious reflections" of Will et al as a "backhanded testimony" in support of 
the cultural clout of fiction. Incorporating DeLillo's trademark pokerfaced humor, he 
states, "Not wanting to say so, the media right has nevertheless said in so many words, 
against its Will, that fiction does not have a private address and that DeLillo does to 
Oswald what we, for good or for ill, do every day to our friends, loyers, and enemies: he 
interprets him, he creates a character" (5). 
Lentricchia's review of DeLillo's bad citizenship, an evaluation that bonds the 
author to "canonical American writers," writers who were always "adversarial critics" of 
US culture, writers who were always "antinomian, suspicious, even 'paranoid'" (5-6), 
furthermore calls to mind sorne of DeLillo's earlier comments on the role ofthe author as 
notorious arbiter of dominant mores and trends. Privileging both the determined apartness 
and the willful resistance of the contemporary writer as cultural cri tic, DeLillo tells Ann 
Arensberg that 
The writer is the person who stands outside society, independent of 
affiliation and influence. The writer is the man or woman who 
automatically takes a stance against his or her government. There are so 
many temptations for American writers to become part of the system and 
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part of the structure that now, more than ever, we have to resist. American 
writers ought to stand and live in the margins, and be more dangerous. 
Writers in repressive societies are considered dangerous. That's why so 
many of them are in jail. (45-6) 
Since he voices these views on the traditional dangers of fiction in 1988, DeLillo's timing 
could not be more appropriate. Shortly thereafter, on Valentine's Day in 1989, the 
Ayatollah issued his fatwa or death sentence on writer Salman Rushdie in the months 
following the publication of The Satanic Verses, an East-meets-West blend of 
"documentary realism, literary allusion, and magic" (Scanlan 230). 
Taking the unsubtle nuances of Rushdie's media image into account, Margaret 
Scanlan describes the Rushdie Affair as an "enormous political and media event that 
threate[ ned] to swallow" up the author and his work (230). Instead of summarily 
executing the difficult author, the Ayatollah advertises his will-to-execute. He therefore 
issues a general public threat rather than a particular personal threat. In other words, the 
Ayatollah does not merely mark Rushdie as an iconoclast. In her article, Scanlan goes on 
to connect this vast political and media event to DeLillo's next novel, Mao II, which stars 
an author who discards his twenty-year self-exile in order to offer himselffor human 
hostage-trade in Bosnia. Scanlan argues, "the questions the Affair raises about the 
enmeshrnent of contemporary writers with electronic journalism, fundamentalism, and 
terrorism provide DeLillo' s novel with its most pressing themes" (231 ). For aIl intents 
and purposes, DeLillo underlined these affinities just before the publication of Mao II. In 
his discussion with Passaro, De Lillo describes Rushdie (who, like himself, once worked 
as an advertising copywriter for Oglivy and Mather) as "a hostage" (84). 
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Drama 
While holed up in the Washington, DC, apartment of self-styled savant 
Christopher Hitchens, Rushdie played the part of a jailed writer. Considered dangerous 
and marginal and terroristic, he found himself confined as a result of oppressive 
ideological forces. Taking the limits impressed uponjailed and hostaged writers into 
account, DeLillo drafts a linkage between fiction-makers and terrorists: "In a repressive 
society, a writer can be deeply influential, but in a society that's filled with glut and 
repetition and endless consumption, the act ofterror may be the only meaningful act" (in 
Passaro 84). Earmarking the force or power of performance, DeLillo prolongs his 
elucidation of creativity and cultural manipulation: "People who are powerless make an 
open theater of violence. True terror is a language and a vision. There is a deep narrative 
structure to terrorist acts, and they infiltrate and alter consciousness in ways that writers 
used to aspire to" (84). 
The theme of terrorism is not new to DeLillo in the early 1990s. As theatricalized 
manifestations of character completion, terror and conspiracy enter DeLillo's discourse 
as early as the mid- to late-seventies. Published in 1977, Players, which is DeLillo's fifth 
novel, features husband and wife protagonists Pammy and Lyle. Set up as counterparts 
(their increasingly divergent stories are narrated in altemating chapters), each engages in 
a secret, second existence for the purpose of establishing a sense of self-fulfillment in an 
otherwise desperate and predictable life wherein marital sex materializes as a business 
transaction involving "perfor[mance]," "service," and "satisqaction]" (35), and television 
manifests itself as "intimate, able to cause embarrassment" (40). Corresponding to these 
bizarre inversions, in Players the couple becomes estranged on account oftheir startling 
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familiarity with one another. Demonstrably, they watch the same TV shows from 
separate rooms. Just as they both independently fight lunchtime crowds (14), they both 
singly struggle with the privacy oftelevision (40). Moreover, they both autonomously 
reclaim themselves by eliminating the inevitable from their everyday lives in different 
ways. 
In this meticulously crafted and compact novel consisting of a prologue, an 
epilogue, two main sections of like length, and seven principal players, Pammy leaves 
New York, where autoerotic voyeurs roam in cars (25), to have an affair, eventually, with 
the suicidaI member of the homosexual couple with whom she stays on the coast of 
Maine. Instead of simply "performing" sex, she re-codifies its so-called restrictions. Lyle 
likewise refashions limits. He alters his lifestyle when he involves himself with the 
terrorist group that kills one of his coworkers on the floor of the Stock Exchange. He 
thereby makes the adjustment from passive spectatorship to active conspirator. In his 
interview with Begley, DeLillo comments on the double-lives he portrays in Players 
while he elaborates on a continuum between structure, estrangement, terror, and 
narrative: "The second life is not only the secret life. It's the more structured life. People 
need rules and boundaries, and if society doesn't provide them in sufficient measure, the 
estranged individual may drift into something deeper and more dangerous. Terrorism is 
built on structure. A terrorist act is a structured narrative played out over days or weeks 
or even years ifthere are hostages involved" (96). To put it as Diane Johnson does in her 
critical estimation of Players, "Terrorist action is not so much an example of lawlessness 
as a comment on the rules, an aspect of the structure itself' (109). 
Not purely a novel about terrorism, Players constructs a relation between legality, 
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narrative, perfonuance, and the self-aIl of which feature strongly in DeLillo' s 
continuing project as a dramatist. As he suggests in Players, his slimmest novel until The 
Body Artist, any sincere query of legality requires a repositioning of oneself in tenus of 
the limits of the law, limits that invariably evolve because ofthis same questioning. In 
correlation to this questioning and necessary relocation, when an individual disputes an 
aspect of the prevailing cultural narrative, she correspondingly reconfigures and 
reinstates her placement and function within this organic narrative. Like an actor, she 
steps from the wings into the action of a play, thereby forever altering its already 
transformative course. The enquirer might also be seen as an audience member who 
successfully manages to insinuate herself into the action of an ongoing theatrical 
performance. An above-board or lawful terrorist, the disputer or insinuator or spectator-
tumed-actor can redefine herself as she alters the structures of her immediate 
surroundings. 
Anticipating the theatrical project that extends to DeLillo's drama, Players 
concludes where David BeIl's amateur film begins in Americana: in a small room. 
Suggesting a curiously symmetrical condition to that ofLyle's wife Pammy, whose story 
ends as she confusedly computes the "functional value" of a "flophouse marquee" 
reading ''TRANSIENTS'' (207), Lyle's narrative stops just after he finds himself in a dark 
space puzzled by "the tendency of motels to tum things inward" (209). Like Lyle and like 
most De Lillo heroes, the reader also finds herself situated in a similar zone of discomfort. 
Suddenly and subtly hailed into the text, individual readers are invited to meditate on the 
motel room as "peculiar invention," as "powerfully abstract," as "the idea of something, 
still waiting to be expressed fully in concrete form" (209). Solidifying this strange, 
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deferred summoning of the reader into the text, DeLillo twice incorporates plural 
personal pronouns in the final three pages of Players. In "The Motel," DeLillo transforms 
his gathering of individual readers into a collection of dynamic spectators. Occupied by a 
"We" (210) or an "us" (212), the textual space turns into a theatrical arena wherein 
readers are left to determine their own roles as audience members. 
The active involvement that DeLillo calls for in the epilogue to Players undercuts 
the passive spectatorship in his prologue. In contrast to the events in "The Motel," "The 
Movie" renders characters and readers alike into positions of passivity or doubly 
constrained pas si vit y . Confined to the piano-equipped cabin of a jumbo jet, the 
anonymous reader and the seven unnamed characters view a film in which a gang 
wielding machineguns and machetes swiftly massacres an apparently innocent party of 
golfers. Complicating what David Cowart describes as this "Godardesque depiction of 
suburban terror" (44), DeLillo's cinematic scenes simultaneously appear as loosely 
laughable-for the airline passengers at least. By accompanying or even overshadowing 
the sudden "terror" with live, histrionic show-tunes, DeLillo distorts the overall 
impression of these unprovoked acts of violence. As his narrator clarifies, "Despite the 
camera's fascination for the lush slaughter of the se clearly expendable men, the scene 
becomes confused, due to the melodramatic piano. We're steeped in gruesomely 
humorous ambiguity" (9). In "The Movie," the reading "we" negotiates a fictional 
regression that slides through a narrative that details awful images, comical notes, and the 
vague joint-reaction to this unsettling mix. As invasive spectators, readers appear to have 
little choice but to identify with the fictional "we" of the novel. In this scene, complicity 
evokes not the availahle openness of a three-dimensional theatrical space, but rather the 
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enforced restrictiveness of a two-dimensional visual frame. 
Speaking to the form and content of Players, Bill Mullen expounds upon the 
representationallimitations ofthe image. Wrapping up his assessment of Players, he 
insists that "DeLillo's framing self-consciously refers us only to another series of 
frames-movies, pictures, television, which are for us as for Lyle the vehicles of cultural 
'discipline': the prisonhouse of images" (127). Nonetheless, in his reading of the novel 
Mullen seems incapable of disassociating the imagistic incarceration typified in the 
prologue from the theatrical possibility illustrated in the epilogue. Mullen theorizes that 
continued transference and eventual disappearance logically indicate "the end of 
representation." He states, "The end of the novel is the end of 'representation.' The space 
of the text itself, this frame which contains the story proper, empties ofmeaning for 'we' 
the reader just as Lyle evaporates in the last lines of the text" (126). In order to come to 
this conclusion, he cites the finallines of "The Motel." These lines run as follows: 
"Spaces and what they contain no longer account for, mean, serve as examples of, or 
represent. Il The propped figure, for instance, is barely recognizable as male. Shedding 
capabilities and traits by the second, he can still be described (but quickly) as well-
formed, sentient and fair. We know nothing else about him" (212). 
DeLillo explicitly elaborates on the end of exemplary representation. He clarifies 
how the "propped" figure, though "well-formed," grows increasingly unrecognizable. 
Furthermore, the fictional narrative literally stops after DeLillo elaborates on the strange 
and the indefinite. Nevertheless, Mullen fails to note the telling theatrical dimensions of 
this closing scene. Taken on their own, these lines read much like the stage directions that 
introduce the opening of a play. DeLillo introduces an inert three-dimensional figure, a 
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shadowy figure situated in an indistinct or Beckettian space, an uncharacteristic figure of 
whom we know nothing besides his unc1ear setting, an individual figure of whom we 
need to know something. Nowas stand-in audience members, readers await the words 
and gestures that Lyle will enact in order to reposition himself. Mutually rid of past 
capacities and characteristics, of former limitations and discriminations, the ambiguous 
actor and his ready audience prepare for forthcoming representation-the imminent 
drama set to redefine Lyle, the not yet named, not yet circumscribed player. 
When Mullen misses this sudden alteration towards the theatrical, a change that 
refashions the discomfiting consequences of the unforeseen arrivaI of the golf course 
terrorists in "The Movie," he adopts a form of the languor that the original Lyle 
admittedly espouses when he attends dramatic performances. At the center of Players, 
Lyle dismisses an active commitment with the performative in favor of a lazy surrender 
to the imagistic. He confesses that "he found himselfbored, often, at the theater (although 
never at movies), even when he knew, could see and hear, that the play was exceptional, 
deserving of total attention. This kind of torpor was generated by three-dimensional 
bodies, real space as opposed to the manipulated depth of film" (100). In comparable 
fashion to Lyle, Mullen privileges "manipulated depth" over stage-managed depth. 
Mullen might also be said to favor a c1assically enc10sed space bordered by cinematic or 
novelistic strategies that invariably begin and end when printed images or words do, over 
the awkward framing devices of drama. As Brook says, the stage can have "a lightness 
and range far beyond [that of] film and television" (98). On account of the open-ended 
limits of stage performance (which develops in a zone without the self-evident spatial and 
dimensional distinctions that separate viewers and readers from movies and books), plays 
164 
commence, continue, and conclude under unsettling circumstances. 
In the theatrical space, defined by Brook as "any empty space" that a "man walks 
across" while "someone el se is watching" (lI), audience members and actors awkwardly 
share the same venue. At first, the individuals within this zone are differentiated by title. 
Albeit, these initial markers become more and more tenuous. Given that in every 
instantiation of theatre "the audience is always the challenge without which a 
performance would be a sham" (Artaud 70), and that in some types of theatre the stage is 
designed "without partition or barrier of any kind," so that "A direct communication will 
be re-established between the spectator and the spectacle" (96), pre-performance 
distinctions between actors and onlookers can dissolve over the course of a play. Even 
with an evident division between the locus of the play space and the locus of the 
audience, performers and spectators can move back and forth through the plalea, the in-
between space at the nebulous limits of the proscenium arch that enframes the play space. 
Whether elucidated as "the theater of action" (Artaud 96) or "the rough theatre" (Brook 
73), this liminality, actualized by interchanges between actors and audiences, defines the 
principal condition of the theatre. One cannot help, for instance, but remember Hamlet's 
frequent, secretive, audience-directed asides, Rosalind's restated behests to the shocked 
audience in the epilogue of As You Like Il, or Prospero's insistent entreaties upon the 
audience-as-jury at the end of The Tempesl. Theatre always makes demands upon its live 
spectators, demands that likewise present themselves in theatrical settings wherein a 
manifest, uncrossed perimeter between stage and seats exists. Play audiences negotiate 
violent considerations of time and place, especially at the opening and at the close of 
staged dramas. 
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As a spectator initially engages herself with the developing action of play only to 
be forced eventually to extricate herself from this cooperative experience, she traverses 
performance-inspired borders. Like the orchestra member who reconsiders her actual 
state of affairs in the pit as she directs the fictional circumstances of the drama 
progressing above her, the individual audience member moves back and forth between 
two overlapping worlds. Though she watches from a padded seat in a repertory theatre 
situated somewhere in hectic Manhattan, she may be compelled to transport herse1f to the 
sitting room of a provincial backwater in late-nineteenth century Russia. Simultaneously 
a resolute weekend theatregoer and an armchair confidante ofChekhov's three restless 
sisters, the urban sophisticate tenderly longs for her retum to busy Moscow. In this case, 
the playgoer, whether or not she suspends her disbelief to the point of standing up and 
speaking out to Olga, Masha, and Irina, willfuIly submits to a form of stage-management. 
Allied to actors that may movingly look directly to her, momentarily brush up against 
her, or even imploringly whisper to her, she partakes in an evolving exchange of gesture 
and sound that can never be reproduced or relived. These profound possibilities, made aIl 
the more poignant by virtue oftheir unpredictability and irreproducibility, combine with 
the equally discomfiting form of violence that attends the unstylized adjustments that 
actors and spectators make when performances end. The post-performative act of 
reintegration into the modem world can be jarring and inimitable, disorienting and 
transformative. 
De Lillo introduces his interest in the unplanned contingencies of performance in 
Players. Evenly enthralled with cinematic and theatrical presentation at this early stage of 
his career, he carries this fascination into his next nove1, Running Dog. Published in 
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1978, the year before the release ofhis first drama, Running Dog should be read as the 
forerunner to DeLillo's unremitting theatrical focus on what Mark Osteen in time caUs 
"the nature of identity and the permeable membrane between behavior and performance" 
(64). Osteen remarks on how "DeLillo suggests that the ubiquity of cameras has 
transformed us aIl into actors under constant observation, even by ourselves" (64). In 
Running Dog, Lightborne, who collects eccentric art and alternative cinema, outwardly 
worries about the fact that ''the whole world [is] on film" (150). Naturally, as a trusted 
broker of the strange and the costly, Lightborne actually celebrates the twentieth-century 
phenomenon wherein "Spy satellites, weather balloons, [and] U-2 aircraft," among other 
insidious operations, "Tak[e] pictures" without end (150). As Lightbome cannot fail but 
to appreciate, the impetus towards unauthorized types of duplicitous footage results in 
supplementary forms of recorded self-preservation. Unjust invasions of privacy provoke 
the technological prospects as weIl as the human aspirations to manufacture local filmic 
documents. This newfangled representational drive culminates in a new artistic genre, a 
genre distinct from the specialization of cinema: the home movie. These personal 
narratives merge the theatrical and the nontheatrical. 
In Running Dog, Lightborne's story revolves around his approaching acquisition 
ofwhat he considers to be an invaluable filmic piece ofhistorical and personal narrative: 
"the people in the bunker under the Reich Chancellery in April 1945" (150). An early 
version of Gladney from White Noise, the professor who teaches an "Advanced Nazism" 
course centered on "parades, rallies, and uniforms" (25), Lightborne recognizes that the 
"Nazis had a thing for the movies. They put everything on film. Executions, even, at 
[Hitler's] request. Film was essential to the Nazi era. Myth, dreams, memory" (Running 
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Dog 52). Nonetheless, Lightbome's true interest angles not toward the exegetical analysis 
of culture and appropriation, but rather towards the spectacular consumption of fetishism 
and eroticism. "Ifit's Nazis," Lightbome insists to a client, "it's automatically erotic. The 
violence, the rituals, the leather, the jackboots. The whole thing for uniforms and 
paraphemalia" (52). Still, irrespective ofLightbome's mordant hopes, the fully intact 
document that he at last procures at the cost of severallives decidedly features dramatic 
performance in place of its sexual counterpart. 
Instead of acquiring a cinematic document in which Hitler is sexualized, he 
obtains a cinematic case in point of "Hitler humanized" (237). The unedited movie begins 
as a stationary camera unselectively records and erratically skips through a cast of adults 
and children setting up chairs as if for a stage performance. They sit before the camera. 
The camera captures another room where a woman sits at a desk. Static. Ignoring the 
gaze of the camera, the woman deliberately shuffles through a magazine. Seemingly 
interrupted or summoned, she gestures toward the door. Another woman enters the room. 
More static. Back in the original room, eleven people sit, filling the screen. Someone 
picks up the camera. It peers through a doorway. The doorway of another room frames 
Hitler, not in Nazi costume. Unlike the camera's eye, his live spectators, waiting, cannot 
see him. He acknowledges the camera. He steps into the empty space as the camera 
moves to the wings. He performs. Weirdly, yet aptly, the dictator mimics his mimicker, 
Charlie Chaplin. A woman smiles along with the children. Distortion. 
Appalled that this moving picture has "historical value," and not the speculated 
"madness at the end. The perversions and the sex" (237), Lightbome only watches the 
first oftwo reels. This opening roll stops not long after what DeLillo's narrator describes 
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as the "the sole attempt at 'art'" in this Führerbunker film (237). Under a new setup, 
"The camera faces the audience head-on. Th~ members of the audience are attempting to 
pretend that the Chaplinesque figure is still performing at a point directly behind the 
camera" (237). A few lines later, the narrator demonstrates that the spectators are now 
the actors: "There is a general shifting of eyes. The members of the audience are clearly 
being prompted by someone off camera" (238). Seconds later, the spool ends. Here, 
DeLillo sets up the central emphasis of his extended dramatic project. He stage-manages 
his readership, as he williater his theatrical audiences, into a position where spectatorship 
corresponds to performance. The presentation of the underground film, as Lightbome's 
mid-movie stoppage intimates, concems the actions of its viewers, not the actions of its 
on-screen actors. As readers watch Lightbome's small audience watch a film wherein a 
small audience retums a lost and inquiring gaze, they reconsider their roles as audience 
members. The individual reader can identify only with versions of herself. Lost, she 
examines herself looking. Self-regarding, she transforms into the locus of the 
performance. She relies only upon herself for interpretation and self-justification, a 
justification with consequences that surpass the limits of the art- or play-house-just as 
the implications of justice transcend distinct applications of legality. 
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Chapter Four 
Lost in The Day Room, Locked into Valparaiso 
Spectatorship 
Don DeLillo's first produced play, titled The Day Room, develops from the logic 
of dramatic potential that concludes Players and the sense of discomfiting lostness at the 
end of Running Dog. If nothing else, The Day Room stages an ineluctable link between 
madness, mystery, playing, and survival. Published in 1986, this two-act drama likewise 
recalls DeLillo's earliest play, The Engineer of Moonlight. DeLillo's first formaI move 
into the theatre in 1979, however, remains unproduced. Unperformed, as a piece of 
theatre it awaits theatrical adoption, correction, and transformation. In terms of 
performance, DeLillo' s first dialogic work occupies a transitional space between the 
theatrical possibility that finally complicates the novelistic discourse in both Players and 
Running Dog, as well as the evolving performances of The Day Room. Indicatively, this 
incompletion and prospect are manifest in the fact that the book-jackets ofhis three 
subsequent plays omit any mention of The Engineer of Moonlight. Nor does this first play 
tend to be included in the numerous catalogues of DeLillo's fictions. Widely understood 
as his first dramatic work, The Day Room supplants The Engineer ofMoonlight's claim 
to primacy. Lingering like a ready actor in the wings or an attuned spectator in the 
audience, the theatrical potentiality of The Engineer of Moonlight eventually 
emblematizes its thematic focus on playing as a means for endurance and patience. 
Eliciting self-directed forms of fortitude and justice, these themes receive further 
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examination and execution in The Day Room. 
Predicting the form of its dramatic successor, The Engineer of Moonlight features 
a version of a play-within-a-play in its second and final act. In both The Engineer of 
Moonlight and The Day Room, an embedded, representative play works as a mode of 
disorientation-and reorientation. On the face of it, DeLillo' s first dràma has two distinct 
settings. Act One takes place outside, the action occurring on the top and bottom 
sundecks of a beachfront house owned by a mathematician named Eric. The piece opens 
as the visiting Diana, Eric's third ex-wife, and James, Eric's assistant, enact a typical 
sunbathing routine (shirts off, sunscreen, sprawl, sit up, sunscreen, shift, shirts on) as they 
converse, while Maya, Eric' s fourth wife, and Eric, a once-celebrated mathematician, 
now and then show up and shuffle around, books and drinks in hand. Nearly invisible and 
almost inert, Eric tends to remain hidden indoors. 
The long, single scene in Act One hinges on Diana's shocked discovery of Eric's 
seven-week stay in a mental institution, a place Eric later de scribes as a "c1assic theater" 
(39), where nurses and ward officers cart around the frail and sedate, just like in "the 
better parts oftown" (39). At once anticipating Eric's obscure linking of madness to 
cultural privilege, and elaborating on Eric's cryptic idea that the "True future is the open 
space" (29), James simplifies the reasons for the theoretical preponderance of madness: 
"Little by little, the argument goes, the insane are being returned to the streets. This is 
because we're so preoccupied with violence we no longer see the insane" (29). Intimating 
a timewom social preoccupation with exclusion, Eric subsequently situates legislated 
detainment historically: "When leprosy diminished back whenever, it occurred to people 
to lock up the madmen. Streets were full of madmen. Suddenly they stood out" (29). 
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Today, since "Only the violent threaten," James and Eric agree, "They stand out" (29). 
Just as the sanatorium replaces the leprosarium by the end of the seventeenth century in 
Europe (leprosy withdraws as a result of "segregation" and a "break with Eastern sources 
of infection" after the Crusades, as Foucault clarifies in Madness and Civilization [6]), so 
too does the threat of violence eventually take over from the threat of the insane. A social 
fixation on imprisonment succeeds the comparable communal anxiety over 
institutionalization. 
Released, as it were, the mad are integrated, and often imperceptibly, into the 
dominant cultural narrative. In aIl of their facetious distinctions, "Lunatics of every 
stripe," or those whom James and Eric half-jokingly tag as "Maniacs," "Depressives," 
"Compulsives," and "Hysteries" (29), contribute to an everyday sense of the ordinary. 
We "leam their language" (29) in the same way that we learn to play the parts we are 
educated to sponsor collectively. The contemporary individual appropriates putative 
madness as one of the many aspects of cultural convention. To appropriate Eric, in turn, 
the "true future" consists of that "open theatrical space" wherein fresh idioms and 
varying roles are leamed and performed. The future likewise involves a diminishing 
space, an increasingly restrictive space, in which violence receives greater and greater 
embellishment. As violence gains in prominence by way of media reportage, if not in 
actual perpetration, its limits lengthen, and its definitions grow. The "better parts of 
town" that Eric alludes to in his likening of the madhouse to the theatre not only 
accentuates a link between success and performance, but also underscores a connection 
between fear and control. Consumed by the inculcated fear of an "epidemic of violence" 
(29), people in the better parts oftown, whether they reside in heavily secured urban 
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skyscrapers or gated suburban communities, end up confining themselves within their 
own heavily coded spaces. Success therefore cornes to connote isolation, itself a version 
of internment, of self-internment. Because of a conditioned fear of threat, which 
manifests itself as a fear of adjustment and readjustment, modem adaptations of the 
theatricalized Big House segregate select people within particular zones just as lazar 
houses and mental asylums did in the past. Restricted to these spaces, "inmates" have 
little choice but to replicate their gestures. Increased security measures effectively limit 
risk and its attendant insistence on innovation and alteration. 
Act Two of The Engineer of Moonlight is set in the main space of the oceanfront 
house. Nevertheless, the borders ofthis play space shift dynamically. During the closing 
act, the locus of the drama transfers from the plain frame or proscenium arch signified by 
the cathedral ceiling in the house to the unclear boundaries of an eccentric board game. 
The four personal narratives integrated into the drama involve revision, relocation, and 
mystery as weIl. In The Engineer of Moonlight, Eric's elected career openly changes. His 
ex-wife Diana Ieams that he has abandoned the exactitude ofmathematics in order to 
amass "notes on madness" (33,37). James and Maya, for their parts, record and 
transcribe these unsystematic notes, which they want Diana to compile with them. In The 
Engineer of Moonlight, DeLillo originally aligns his audience with the vacationing 
Diana. At first unaware of absent Eric's institutionalization, spectators shift in their seats 
while settling into the events of the drama, much like Diana in her reclining deckchair. 
Later in the same day, though, Diana engages in a confusing board game that the 
audience cannot see. As a resuIt, the progressively underprivileged viewers can only 
associate with her feeling of lostness, which dissolves for her as she acquires the tools 
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necessary for interactive gameplay. Symbolizing this focus on preliminary connection 
and ultimate disconnection, when Diana leams something new, such as the name of the 
game, the ongoing action gets harder to distinguish: the "Lights go dimmer" (40). 
Diana' s early questioning in Act Two-"Is this the game still?" (40)-also 
emphasizes DeLillo' s preoccupation with lostness. Akin to Diana, who cannot help but 
mix up the design of the game ("This is more than inner structure. We approach 
something utterly strange" [40]) with incidents developing beyond the game ("You can 
sense when a house yields up its mysteries to the right people" [40]), the audience of The 
Engineer of Moonlight perplexingly conflates the drama with the eponymous game 
featured within it. Unlike adept Eric, who "doesn't need the board in front ofhim" (38), 
the playhouse spectator requires a visual picture of this play space. Without this 
traditional theatrical framing device, spectators are lost. 
Diana can play, but the audience cannot. Because she immerses herself in the 
"Engineer of Moonlight," she concurrently appears to accept the invitation to remain in 
the house and labor alongside the bizarre, sexually charged 1970s threesome. By means 
ofthe game, she reappraises her developing identity. Taking an active stake in risk, 
intimated by her seeming acceptance of confusion and her resolution to embrace this 
apparent disorder (a turmoil exaggerated by the presence of an older man, his very young 
wife, and his young male assistant), Diana deliberately modifies the structures ofher life. 
DeLillo concludes the LeClair talk with an account of the united roles of the game and of 
Diana in The Engineer of Moonlight. In the same elucidation, he also counteracts Diana's 
varying attachments in the play with the audience's imposed disengagements from the 
play. With his penchant for sentence fragments and a lack of dialogic adomment, he 
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summarizes, "A game using words and logic used in unfamiliar ways. Ifwe take this 
game as a play within the play, what we see is that Diana, who has never played before, 
gradually cornes to understand the strange and complex nature of the game-an 
understanding the audience doesn't share. Toward the end she is elated; she is saying it 
aU begins to fit, the colors, the shapes, the names. She wants to play" (15). Laying 
emphasis upon comprehension and estrangement, DeLillo clarifies the division he 
orchestrates between Diana and his audience. In opposition to the newfound delight that 
he offers to Diana, he disallows his spectators to fall into similar zones of emergent-and 
sustainable--comprehension. Lost, the individual audience member has no quantifiable 
arithmetic, no visible pattern, to subscribe to or evaluate. Though he affords his viewers a 
delicious set of tense circumstances, they fade away as the invisible game becomes the 
center of attention. 
In his article on The Engineer of Moonlight and The Day Room, Toby Silverman 
Zinman takes DeLillo to task for his infidelity to dramatic convention in his first play. 
Zinman remarks that The Engineer of Moonlight incorporates verbal instead of visual 
images, which contribute to a "static, second-hand quality [that] diminishes the play's 
theatricality" (78). Inadvertently recalling the end of the played reel of Lightborne's 
Führerbunker film in Running Dog, Zinman continues by describing the sense of 
audience alienation that results from the arcane game in The Engineer of Moonlight: "it 
is, after aH, just a board game, so the audience is left looking at four people looking at 
something the audience cannot see, agame they cannot follow" (79). 
DeLillo, however, sees a marked potential, a potential illustrative of drama itself, 
in what Zinman evaluates as his betrayal oftheatre (79). Reminiscent of the close ofhis 
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first interview, he ends one ofhis recent talks by hearkening back to The Engineer of 
Moonlight. In his 2001 discussion with McAuliffe, DeLillo explains that his first play, 
were he to "to go back" and rework it, has the latent possibility of being "more 
rewarding" than his ensuing dramas (178). When his interviewer wonders why, he charts 
a relation between mystery, theatricality, and identity: "at least potentially [my tirst play 
seems] more deeply rooted in real people and real things. At least that's the way 1 would 
have to gear it if 1 were to work on it again. But the curious thing about my plays is that 
they are not nearly as established in the world around me as my novels are. And that, in 
my own limited sort of outlook on the theater, is an aspect oftheater itself. It's not about 
the force ofreality so much as the mysteries ofidentity and existence" (179). Although 
he remains elusive as to how he would refashion The Engineer of Moonlight into a ri cher 
drama, the interview ends with this vague spotlight on "the mysteries of identity and 
existence," DeLillo speculates on his undeveloped excavation of "real people" and "real 
things." Perhaps because the play has received so little critical treatment and analysis, 
because it still exists in the precinct of the unexplained and the unreproduced, its future 
possibilities have yet to be determined and thereby shut down. In DeLillo's estimation, 
The Engineer of Moonlight still occupies a zone that combines the refreshment and 
strangeness ofnovelty and memory. The play is precisely more real, more tangible, on 
account of its unexplored representational intersections of character, difficulty, 
responsiveness, and correction. 
DeLillo also includes an intriguing degree of improvisationalliveliness in his first 
drama. He encloses this unexploited prospect in the cycle of movements and entrances of 
Act One, in the underexposed sexual tensions in Act Two, and in his avant-gardism. The 
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Engineer of Moonlight anticipates the plays, novels, and films about math and 
mathematicians that flooded culture in the late 1980s and the 1990s. These include, The 
Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time, A Beautiful Mind, Good Will Hunting, 
The Revolutions Tetralogy, Arcadia, and Proo/, arnong others. For DeLillo, the players in 
his first drarna are more "real," and by extension more human or credible, precisely 
because they give up a calculated search for abstraction (signified by Eric's abandoned 
mathematical career) in favor of an inexact scrutiny ofuncertainty (illustrated by Diana's 
decision to assist compiling the notes on madness). DeLillo suggests that the "force of 
reality" proves to be its conspicuous incongruity, the manifest strangeness he obliges his 
audience to experience by virtue of the garne "Engineer of Moonlight." Forced to turn 
inward as the theatrical space darkens and diminishes in size, the individual spectator 
plays a garne with herself, a novel garne with unknown rules and limits. 
When lost, an individual restructures her relationship with the spaces around her. 
Given this self-reorientation, the lost individual also reconfigures these surrounding open 
spaces, as DeLillo illustrates in his second play. As the drarnatic successor to The 
Engineer of Moonlight, The Day Room reestablishes his leading concem with unsettling 
his actors and the members of his audience. This exigency extends to the common 
principles of drarna too. Mark Osteen explains the unusual demands that DeLillo makes 
upon his theatrical audiences. He writes, "The Day Room offers a dizzying array of 
masquerades-actors performing in a play-within-a-play that, we eventually le am, 
constitutes the play we have been watching-designed both to challenge theatrical 
conventions and to assess the nature ofrole-playing itself' (64). In order to test and 
trouble its actors, audiences, and the genre of drarna itself, The Day Room manipulates 
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the tie between immediate environment and individual identity. De Lillo positions his 
players and spectators in two particular places, which he evaluates as discombobulating 
due to their obvious forms of virtual indistinctness: a hospital room and a motel room. As 
DeLillo explains in his interview with Rothstein, these places, the latter of which 
customarily figures into his fiction, act as sites of spatial slippage and personal 
disorientation: "A motel is a peculiar reality-not exactly the same reality as a hospital, 
but it does represent a peculiar form of nowhere, particularly motels in undefined parts of 
the landscape. You don't know quite where you are, and for a brieftime- [sic] perhaps 
not quite who you are" (23). 
The Day Room opens by subtly discomfiting its audience members. As the 
spectator adjusts to a leisurely lighted, semiprivate hospital-room for two, where one 
figure performs "slow, stylized, continuous" motions oftai chi and another, sitting up, 
quietly leafs through a daily, she suddenly feels like an uninvited voyeur (5). After Budge 
"climbs" into bed, and "Wyatt stops reading," "There is a self-conscious moment," an 
instant wherein the audience likewise turns inward as it sits waiting, before Budge 
rhetorically ends the silence with the first line of the play. "In other words you're not a 
talker" (5). By virtue ofthis dialogue about dialogue starting in mid-conversation, as it 
were, the audience is made to feel as if it is insinuating itself into the drama, as if it has 
missed something, and as if it must play a vigilant game of covert catch-up. This theme 
of disruption and prying, delicately established straightaway, develops aIl through the 
single scene of Act One in The Day Room. 
Clearly playing up the conventions of performance, Budge sets up the scene by 
prepping Wyatt on how to act. He points out that they are "here, in a sense to talk" (6), 
178 
complete with "Loose-fitting clothes, so [that they] can gesture freely, relax, unwind, 
unburden [them]selves" (6). He emphasizes that they have "aIl the essentials" for an 
"arranged" tête-à-tête (6). As his counterpart, Wyatt agrees that the hospital "setting is 
favorable" to "casual talk" (6), much like the enclosed, formaI space of an airplane (7). 
Their dramatic conversation "mov[ es] right along" (8), that is, until Wyatt candidly 
admits that he finds himself in the hospital for a "[ s ]tandard series" of tests, an habituaI 
visit designed for the purpose of disturbance free "Rest. Reassurance" (9). Following 
Wyatt's adoption of the performative, the closed space punctually transforms into an 
open theatrical space. Once Wyatt, who is apparently a quick study, leams to deliver his 
lines, a succession of off-putting interlopers invades the retreat of their shared room. 
ln fact, Wyatt's pronouncement of "Rest. Reassurance" acts as the initial cue or 
prompt for a sequence of Pirandellian characters who, in their searches for individual 
roles rather than for an author, arbitrarily break into and break down the originallimits of 
this semiprivate setting. After Wyatt's outwardly offhand utterance ofrespite, Grass 
enters the room at an "exceedingly slow pace," dragging a bottle-filled "rnetal stand" 
laden with an incalculable number of "intravenous tubes" running to "different parts" of 
his body (9). Familiar to Budge, who claims that Grass "likes to pay visits. Maybe 
because nobody cornes to see him" (9), Grass explains that the cause of his medical 
condition and his related "dangling paraphemalia" (9) is "heavy water" (10). Immediately 
following this unexpected allusion to nuclear reactors, the formerly still Budge and Wyatt 
sally back and forth with neologisms from the nuclear age-"Alkaline rain," "Sulfate 
emissions," "Thermal inversions," "Benzene intoxications" (10). 
This eerie repartee recalls the jousting that makes up the four-word list of mental 
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infirmities in The Engineer of Moonlight (29). The exchange also brings to mind the four-
part inventory ofphysical infirmities in Harold Pinter's The Birthday Party. In this 1959 
play, McCann and Goldberg (who are for sorne unclear reason tracking Stanley, who 
seems to be hiding-out in a seaside rooming-house) engage in a brief game ofwordplay. 
Playing off one another, they banter: "anaemic"; "Rheumatic"; "Myopie"; "Epileptic" 
(82). Likewise instrumental to numerous interactions in Beckett and Pirandello, among 
other twentieth-century playwrights, this sort of inventorying draws attention to the 
impression of spontaneity as a distinguishing attribute of dramatic performance. 
Certainly, this form of verbal transaction also exists in novelistic representation, maybe 
most memorably in the six-page, tit-for-tat, bilingual banter in John Barth's The Sot-
Weed Factor (477-82). Nevertheless, these sorts ofinterchanges manifest themselves as 
inherently dramatic. As brief scenes, they detail the signal irreproducibility of theatrical 
performance. When properly played, they come off as spontaneous, not preplanned or 
contrived. Remarking on the bizarre exchange that DeLillo includes in The Day Room, a 
strange mockery that substitutes the dreaded nomenclature ofmedicine with Cold War 
taxonomy, Zinman notes that these Cold War neologisms "spea[k] our condition, and that 
language, like our condition, is both horrifying and hilarious. DeLillo has factored into 
his play, as he has factored into his fiction, the technological consciousness of our era and 
its accompanying paranoia" (82). 
DeLillo enhances this sense of mistrust, and what Judith Pastore sees as his focus 
on the encroaching "impact oftechnology on modem consciousness" (434), by 
problematizing the identities of his characters and the legitimacy of their locale. After the 
unexpected word-trade, Grass takes issue with the validity of Wyatt' s character, saying 
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that his name is but "A promising idea for a name" (11). To Wyatt's startled retort, "It's 
not an idea fol' a name, it is a name," Grass tells him that it "Could be improved with a 
little work" (11). Then he endeavors to expose Wyatt as an affected player rather than an 
actual person: "Who else have you tried?" (11). This distressing altercation sets off a 
string of outlandish events, all of which destabilize both the performers' and the 
spectators' understandings ofthis space. Shortly after Grass's odd inquiry, his words, like 
the earlier words of "Wyatt," act as stage directions. When Grass says, "The nurse walks 
in the door," Nurse Walker enters the room. She exposes Grass, the original detective, as 
an imposter (15). To Wyatt's ostensible horror, and Grass's feigned dismay, she 
summarily undoes his intravenous setup. With the help of the newly arrived Dr. Phelps, 
she alleges that Grass is a patient from the ho spital , s "Arno Klein Psychiatric Wing" 
(14). 
Soon, though, the audience suspects the authority ofWalker and Phelps too, for 
the former frankly "wonder[ s] about the narrow scope of the roles we have to play" (21). 
Sure enough, when Nurse Baker walks in Walker and Phelps get exposed as wandering 
"inmates" ofthe Arno Klein clinic (24). Baker, in turn, transforms into a suspicious 
character following her disclosure that the Klein Wing is "a place called the day room. 
Painted pure white, coat after coat after coat," wherein "Lonely monologues bounc[e] off 
the walls" as patients "watch daytime TV and throw food" (25). Baker admits that her 
odd acquaintance with these details results from having "snuck over once," "in disguise, 
not wearing [her] uniform, so [she] could mingle unannounced" (26). Consequently, 
Budge and Wyatt, along with the steadily surprised play audience, have little option but 
to doubt the clout, costume, and character of anyone who enters the room. 
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Incongruously predictable and unsettling, from this point on Act One of The Day 
Room carries on this dismantling of dramatic convention. In this Act, nothing, it seems, is 
what it seems. DeLillo reveals each figure in the infirmary to be an imposter, including 
Wyatt. From a cast incorporating three patients, two nurses, two doctors, and two 
orderlies, only Budge and the orderlies retain any degree of trustworthiness. These 
limited instantiations of purported genuineness, however, likewise prove suspicious. As 
emblems of unsound judgment, the sardonically titled "orderlies" emanate as potential 
trespassers because oftheir patent anonymity. Set up as nameless henchmen, they enter 
the scene but twice (47, 53). Limited to the brief gestures decreed by the stage directions, 
they say nothing. Though not in surgery, they wear surgical masks. In time, they 
manhandle Baker from the room, the nurse whom they initially escorted into the scene. 
For his part, Budge finally hails Grass from the wings (or the Klein Wing) to 
center stage. He offers the original pretender his own pillow and blanket, for Wyatt's 
were stripped away after his exposure. Playing the companion, Budge invites Grass to 
engage in evocative discourse: "Come. Sit Down. We'll talk" (56). Nevertheless, this 
tactful summons sounds more like the command of a director than the request of an 
acquaintance. At the end of the act, Budge appears to be stage-managing Grass in the 
same way that he stage-managed Wyatt. Given this reemphasis on Budge as director, 
individual audience members may want to be beckoned into the room before the stage 
area blackens. Lost like the clients of the psychiatrie clinic, the audience craves a center 
that will hold. With everything falling apart, the audience invests in Budge in order to be 
told what to do and how to do it, what to see and how to see it. Despite any evident 
distrust in this deputy director, the spectator needs him to reengineer her conception of 
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this theatrical space. 
This sense of distrust and lostness works on severallevels in The Day Room. Like 
his live players and play-audience, DeLillo experiences a feeling of disjuncture by the 
midpoint ofhis drama, as he confirms in the Rothstein interview. "Act Two," he 
confesses, "is an attempt to explain the first half ofthe play to myself; in a way it's the 
play about the play" (22). Unnerved, the playwright likewise feels placed in a similar 
position as a theatrical director, which he calls attention to by integrating a stand-in 
director into his drama. Analogous to Budge, DeLillo assumes a dual function: architect 
and imposter. Referring to the roles of stage directors, Brook explains an elaborate 
interchange: "In a sense, the director is always an imposter, a guide at night who does not 
know the territory, and yet has no choice-he must guide, leaming the territory as he 
goes" (44). Though DeLillo arranges the theatrics ofhis production, he cannot anticipate 
and control its organic advancement. To extricate himself from or take directorial 
advantage ofthis indirect impasse, he establishes an alliance between his proxy director 
and himself. Budge the actor and DeLillo the dramatist maneuver a cast of characters 
who insinuate themselves into a variety of improvised roles that play off one another. 
From the start of The Day Room, DeLillo's actors recognize that they are performing 
without the use of scripts. As Budge's promptings show, even their rehearsals remain 
indissociable from their performances. In this play, DeLillo discovers in Act Two, his 
players act continually, thereby confusing the differentiation between performativity and 
identity. 
Taking a page from Luigi Pirandello, whom DeLillo judges as his "theatrical 
guide," but not the only one (qtd. in Pastore 433), DeLillo begins Act Two of The Day 
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Room before the stage seems ready for a performance. Inverting the tranquil moming 
scene in Act One, Act Two opens with a literaI spotlight on disorder, damage, and 
distrust. After the time-Iapse indicator "Evening," spectators witness "A large white 
space flooded in harsh fluorescent light. White fumiture is arranged in a pile, chaotically. 
There is a stepladder. Crayons and drawing paper are scattered on the floor. Streaks of 
food and other suspicious matter coyer the back wall. There is a door at either end of the 
hall" (59). This appears to be the day room, as described by the animated Nurse Baker of 
Act One. Accordingly, a "motionless" male in a "straightjacket" sits staring "straight 
ahead" (59). As a means of stressing the inertia ofthis figure, the bright room appears 
distressingly quiet and still, given its messiness and the "lonely monologues bouncing off 
the walls" that Nurse Baker keenly described (25). The unorganized space calls to mind 
the atmosphere that opens Six Characters in Search of an Author. In Pirandello's 1922 
play, the stage directions indicate that "The spectators will find the curtain raised and the 
stage as if usually is during the day time. It will be half dark, and empty, so that !rom the 
beginning the public may have the impression of an impromptu performance" (211-2). 
With its coded deployment of disarray, Act Two of The Day Room commences by 
drawing attention to the psychological frustrations that conclude Act One. After aIl, the 
characters and the audience are assembled in a mental institution. Yet De Lillo at once 
sets two ofhis actors forth to rearrange the disaster and disorder. Returning the drama 
from a condition of motionlessness to movement, a desk clerk and a maid execute a 
cleanup of the room. While laboring, they discuss the clerk's forthcoming trip to 
"Califomia to help a friend commit suicide" (60), a prelude advising the audience that 
Act Two will be as unusual as Act One, despite the tidying up. Underlining this nuance, 
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the pair's dialogue starts in mid-discussion, reminiscent of Wyatt and Budge's opening 
conversation. Without warning, the desk clerk begins, "Because 1 won't be here. Now 
that you bring it up" (59). In little time, the maid and the clerk organize the furniture, 
beds, blinds, and phone. Before exiting the stage area, which "We see is a smallish hotel 
room" (62), the clerk mentions that his desperate friend is an actor. Playing the 
prevaricator, he adds, "Acting is dangerous" (62). He then diverts attention from the 
background only to restore interest in it. On his way out behind the maid, he blocks and 
lights the set by "adjust[ing] the position of the straitjacketedfigure, which is the room 
TV" (62), depositing the remote control on a table, and dimming the lights "way down" 
(63). 
The real danger here, as the clerk's gestures imply, is not the hazardous 
humanness of performance, but rather the passive menace of television, as embodied by 
the clerk's casual handling of the still figure as a minor electronic device. Zinman 
clarifies that this uncannily Frankensteinian configuration of man-as-gadget represents 
the greatest threat to the survival ofhuman beings as responsive agents (85). With 
unrestrained dedication, Zinman unconceals the underlying features of the inert man as 
"human TV," "of man as straitjacketed lunatic, of man as talking machine, of man as 
communication device govemed by remote control, of man as information system (the 
product ofhis own devising, Frankenstein's monster gone passive), of man as entertainer 
controlled by an audience entirely random and without any reliable attention span" (85). 
Nevertheless, throughout the remainder ofhis drama, which he describes as "form[ing] a 
kind ofunending circular structure" (in Rothstein 23), DeLillo recalibrates the perilous 
compliance evoked by the straitjacketed madman. 
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Expanding upon his iterated disregard for dramatic precedent and narrative 
anticipation in Act One, DeLillo methodicaUy counteracts the obedience and distraction 
characterized by his man-as-television by way of what Artaud would deem "a sense of 
life renewed by the theater" (13). Artaud elucidates this feeling ofrevitalization in terms 
of its relation to risk, creation, and, above aU, improvisation. "We must believe in a sense 
oflife renewed by the theater," Artaud intones, "a sense oflife in which man fearlessly 
makes himself master of what does not yet exist, and brings it into being. And everything 
that has not been born can still be brought to life if we are not satisfied to remain mere 
recording devices" (13). Instead of speaking to radio, TV, and other forms oftaped 
transmission, Artaud's c1ear dismissal ofrecording devices refers to the protean modality 
of performance. Whereas various forms of print and video media can but reiterate, the 
stage, by contrast, can rejuvenate. For Artaud, rejuvenation relates to improvisation, 
which presupposes an ability to defy the limits of control. Acts of de fiance provide the 
checks and balances that refresh legality. Without unplanned gestures of insubordination, 
everyday implementations of justice, rely on precedent in lieu of actuality. For justice to 
pursue its course justly, its very course must be challenged and changed. Theatricality 
and individuality develop by means of similar transitions and transformations. Just as a 
drama realizes itself on account of the ad hoc, not the repetitive, individuals evolve as 
they respond to unexpected circumstance, not routine situations. Whereas auto matons 
programmatically repeat the same actions, human beings act in response to the 
unfamiliar, namely the new and the unusual that drama represents-and that legality 
adjudicates for the protection and freedom of the culture that it answers to and directs at 
the same time. 
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Privileging the value of the unforeseen, Artaud adamantly spells out that any 
theatre limited to what "happens between cues" proves indistinct from the "performed 
text" (68). He determines the simple repetition of dialogue to be a mere manifestation of 
recording. He therefore configures a method by which to counter the "subordination" of 
awkward potentiality to a predictable transcript (41). Stressing the improvisational 
qualities that define the nature of performance, he envisions an entirely impromptu 
version of theatre: "The idea of a play made directly in terms of the stage, encountering 
obstacles ofboth production and performance, [that] compels the discovery of an active 
language, active and anarchic, a language in which the customary limits of feelings and 
words are transcended" (41). Artaud assesses performance in terms of its inherent 
complication. As he sees it, drama caUs for instantaneous reappraisals of its own limits. 
Theatre undermines itself at its source. Setting up conditions that it cannot stage-manage, 
theatre evokes would-be potential, not the certainty of a replayed succession of images 
and words. 
Although De Lillo does not compose The Day Room directly upon the stage, he 
takes Artaud's theoretical envisaging a crucial step further. In The Day Room, DeLillo 
illustrates what Artaud expresses. At its core, The Day Room presents an improvised play 
being produced on the stage, as the integrated mid-play stage-setup illustrates. Likewise 
demarcating the impromptu nature of Act Two, as well as the piece generally, the actor 
playing a human TV is the "same actor who is cast as Wyatt in Act One" (58). This 
conspicuous "NOTE," which revises the original roster of nine players, encourages the 
play-audience to connect the nine figures of Act One with those of Act Two. Following 
Wyatt, these characters all reenter the play under different guises. To put it more 
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precisely, in the latter half of The Day Room the players are always in the process of 
developing new roles that they never stop playing, improvisational roles that they cannot 
replay. These multiple evolutions of character draw particular attention to both the 
transformative nature of drama and the performative nature ofidentity. Significantly, in 
The Day Room players have no identities distinct from the parts they play. Evoking 
Jaques' celebrated lines in As You Li/œ It, "AU the world's a stage, / And aU the men and 
women merely players, / They have their exits and their entrances, / And one man in his 
time plays many parts" (2.7. 139-142), in DeLillo's drama the players are the many parts 
that they play. 
In so doing, DeLillo crafts his performers as variants of Pirandello' s actors on the 
hunt for a dramatist. In Six Characters in Search of an Author, Pirandello's self-styled 
"characters" (242) seek a stage upon which to perform those "roles which [they] are 
given in life" (235), roles that will amount to a performance that someone can take down 
"while [they] play it, scene by scene" (236). With these dramatic orchestrations, 
Pirandello refreshes the classic approach to theatre. He gives precedence to the show, not 
the text. DeLillo likewise invokes a form of theatre wherein the performance takes 
priority over the playbook. Still, DeLillo's characters are not looking for a place to 
perform. Rather, they seek a group ofperformers. 
In search not of an author but of a performance, DeLillo fashions his characters as 
distinctly less "true" and less "real" than Pirandello's, at least in the ironic version of 
character that Pirandello proposes in his fêted work. In Six Characters in Se arch of an 
Author, The Father, who unwittingly conflates the novelistic with the theatrical, insists 
that characters "are truer and more real" than non-characters because their reality 
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manifests itself as changeless (266). Unaware of the distinction between a written 
dialogue and a performed one, The Father holds that the immutable reality of the 
chara'cter stands against the shifting nature of actual reality, which invariably transforms 
into "illusion" by "tomorrow" (265). According to the patriarch, truth and reality grow 
increasingly less truthful and factual as they evaporate along with the misleading logic of 
the past. Influenced by Pirandello's concept of character, which distinguishes between 
actuality and memory, character and performer, and the written and the performed, 
DeLillo makes a virtue out of the shifts that define the everyday. These transitions 
compel his living performers and spectators to reconsider the realness and justness of 
yesterday. 
Once the maid (formerly an orderly) and the desk c1erk (also an orderly) exit the 
"motel room," a brief silence ensues, much like the self-directed suspension of action at 
the onset of Act One. Gary (Phe1ps), travel bag in hand, consequently enters and reverses 
the final gestures of the c1erk: he adjusts the lighting, picks up the remote, and switches 
on the television. He heads for the restroom "without waiting to see or hear what cornes 
on" the TV (63). As the creepy TV emits the sounds of a speech therapist encouraging 
her patient-"Ooooh," "Eeeee," "Eeeee," "Eeeee," "Aaaah," "Aaaah"-Lynette (Walker) 
enters, stations herself in a chair, and "gazes at the TV" until Gary cornes out, whereupon 
she "turns off the sef' (64). Akin to the suspension ofbelief confirmed by the maid and 
the clerk, neither Gary nor Lynette remarks on the faet that the TV resembles Wyatt in a 
straightjacket. Mimicking the actions of the televised therapist, the figures in the day-
room-as-motel-room encourage the audience to overlook the disjunctions from Act One 
already emergent in Act Two. The action takes place in a motel room, not in a hospital. 
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The man is Gary, not Phelps. Lynette is not Nurse Walker. A TV stands at center stage, 
not an immobilized Wyatt. Act One, it appears, ought to be forgotten along with the 
deceptive sense of yesterday. 
Notwithstanding these spatial, private, and temporal assurances, the audience 
cannot help but recall the rearrangement of the stage. Furthermore, the maid's most 
memorable and revealing question commands the interest of the conscientious: "Do we 
have names in this?" (61). Gary's first words in the scene give the impression oftaking 
this representative incongruence into account. He says, "1 was thinking the other day. 
Funny. You never see an old man named Gary" (64). Cued by Lynette, who disregards 
his meditations on age in order to elaborate upon her trouble with strange beds, Gary 
abruptly detlects audience-attention from a sustained focus on stable identity: "I1's not an 
old man's name. We don't last that long. But that's not the problem" (65). The immediate 
problem results from the couple's search for an "Elusive, mysterious, unsettling" 
theatrical group (67), an amateur performance group Lynette has been unable to observe 
despite over three years of aUeged globetrotting. She misses them in London, 
Amsterdam, Cairo, and Santa Fe. 
After establishing the actors' and the audience's investment in the validity ofthe 
motel room and the theatrical troupe, DeLillo caUs these assertions into question. 
Someone knocks on the door. Expecting Manville, Lynette and Gary's link to the evasive 
actors, the pair are surprised when an unfamiliar, "wild-haired, intense, rabbinicaf' 
figure "wearing a shabby dark suit, dark sneakers, [and] thick eyeglasses" steps into the 
room (70). Responding to Gary's inquiry, the interloper, whose entrance clearly recaUs 
the histrionics of Grass in Act One, avows, "Just Freddie, 1 guess, for now" (70). As his 
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opening line attests, "Freddie" is at once Freddie and not Freddie. By this means, his 
arrivaI re-inscribes the "elusive, mysterious, [and] unsettling" nature of the theatrical 
group to the cast of characters presently center-stage. Lynette bolsters this off-putting 
reappraisal of the whole scene when she asks Freddie, who is also a friend of Manville's, 
if their mutual contact knows the whereabouts of "the Arno Klein group" (71). 
From this point on, DeLillo executes a dismantling of the motel room as motel 
room. Like the hospital room, its limits are tenuous. Like the actors in both rooms, its 
uniqueness stems from its adaptability. Highlighting DeLillo's mysterious overlap of 
motel and madhouse, after Freddie concedes that he lives "Just along the hall," and Gary 
qualifies the statement with "In the motel," Freddie reiterates the mutability of names: "If 
that's what we've agreed to call it" (76). Freddie associates this unreliability to 
distinctions of place, as weIl as to a form of inertia: "One place is as good as another. 
How different can two places be ifwe use the word 'place' in both cases? We can change 
places without changing words. We don't even have to change places. We don't have to 
move from the room" (76). With this monologue, Freddie tums around the typical 
association between a person and her setting. As an actor, his theatricality proves to be as 
unmistakable as his routine references to playing. He tells the performers and spectators 
around him that this shared environment, this open space, derives from the people within 
it. He implies that self-awareness and self-understanding can work independently of 
locale. In challenging and changing oneself, one can alter the world around oneself. In 
Freddie's deceivingly subtle estimation, responsive agency originates in creative self-
inscribing, not in cultural allotment or social determination. 
Freddie's emphases on place, performance, and identity likewise jar the audience 
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into the insight that the actors onstage are active members of the Arno Klein group. As 
spectators grasp that they have been in the single, mutable day room all along, they 
recognize that have been engaged in an evolving Arno Klein performance. Manville's 
entrance solidifies this detection. He arrives as Lynette (now alone, for the men have left 
in search of food) performs what seems to be an endless series of unevenly spaced 
channel changes (78-80). Interrupting her apathetic TV session, which concerns her 
clicking instead ofher watching, as explicit in the fact that the audience sees her 
movements instead of any mediated image, Manville tells her that he "sent [Gary] on a 
mission with Freddie. To locate a contact of mine. A key figure in this whole affair" (80). 
Manville's reaction to her eager query about curtain time makes it quite clear that the 
who le, unscripted "affair" exists in a permanent state of production. In reply, he at once 
rhetorically and sincerely wonders, "Is there a starting time?" (80). Manville erases any 
unproblematic distinction between the formaI requirements of performance and the 
ongoing nature of performance. 
In the day room, as in The Day Room, characters and audience members 
consistently find themselves in the middle of a performance, an unsettling and unending 
performance that centers not on the passive and confining spectatorship typified by "the 
straitjacketed medium oftelevision" (Zinman 84) but rather on an active negotiation of 
the three-dimensionality of theatre. Marking difficulty and displacement, DeLillo 
counteracts any specialized compliance to the laws and limits of particular social settings. 
In The Day Room, as DeLillo divulges in stylized yet impromptu measures, the mental 
patients appear to survive precisely because they do not see themselves primarily as 
mental patients. In recreating themselves, they undermine the patent restrictions of their 
daily lives. Because they act, they are not merely locked into a room at the Arno Klein 
clinic. Because they actively take part in what amounts to a continuous psychodrama 
session, they regenerate themselves day after day. 
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In a related example of non-fictive theatrical rejuvenation, Brook explains the 
rationale of renewal in respect to actual psychodrama sessions. He insists that when 
participating mental patients leave the assigned, dramatic room, "they are not quite the 
same as when they entered. If what has happened has been shatteringly uncomfortable, 
they are invigorated to the same degree as if there have been great outbursts of laughter. 
Neither pessimism nor optimism apply: simply, sorne participants are temporarily, 
slightly, more alive" (149-50). Given this sense ofrebirth, Brook then likens drama 
sessions to oases (150), a comparison DeLillo effectively elaborates in The Day Room. 
The patients in the Arno Klein clinic transform their actualliving space into a refuge that 
they do not merely visit for occasional refreshment. 
As the conclusion of The Day Room illustrates, the psychodrama-inspired 
theatrics practiced in the institute tend to be as interminable as they are inconclusive. 
After the routine food fight that Baker outlines in Act One-"They watch daytime TV 
and throw food" (25)-the play folds back to its beginning. The Day Room ends with the 
maid and clerk resetting the open space as, lights dimming, the human TV changes 
channels on its own, and Klein, just arrived, steps into the washroom. The room goes 
black. The spectator then readjusts to a silent, leisurely lighted, semiprivate hospital-room 
for two, wherein a figure performs "slow, stylized, continuous" motions oftai chi (101). 
At the same time itself and not itself, at once a place of dread and hope, the reconfigured 
stage assures the audience that they were never lost. Rather, like the actors before them, 
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they were in a period of stimulating transition. 
Action 
DeLillo' s plays set in the Cold War trouble the restrictions of physical 
confinement and inactivity. Developing his theatrical project, his post-Cold War plays 
question liberty in American culture. Just as the feeling ofbeing lost compels ongoing re-
creation in DeLillo's early drama, the sensation ofbeing locked-in fosters enduring re-
positioning in his later drama. New understandings of spatiality and mass identity 
differentiate his later drama from his early drama. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
DeLillo's players are no longer ultimately represented in terms oftheir detention within 
cell-like spaces, whether manifested as a motel, a bunker, a holiday home, a board game, 
a hospital room, or a proxy stage. His post-Cold War formulations of captivity prove far 
more pervasive, and therefore more dangerous, than his earlier depictions of clear spatial 
limitations. Gone is his reference to security measures in the better parts of town. Gone is 
the blank TV screen that talks independently of human remote control as "Wyatt" regains 
the voice of his own agency. 
As devised in Valparaiso, and sustained in The Body Artist and Love-Lies-
Bleeding, detention extends beyond established perimeters. Throughout these works, 
restriction proves to be general rather than local, common rather than specifie. After the 
completion ofhis Cold-War epic Underworld, DeLillo's theatrically motivated fiction 
emphasizes an individuality that caUs for actual physical displacement. Escapes reassert 
identity in terms ofaloneness. As is the case with DeLillo's depiction of Lee Harvey 
Oswald in Libra, in addition to the delineation of aU his unique heroes, "sanity and 
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integrity appear to depend on each one's remaining outside the mainstream of a society 
that is clearly dangerous, even fatal, to the individual" (Arensburg 41). Increasingly since 
the publication of Underworld, protagonists in DeLillo break away from the social 
collective in order to frustrate what Jeremy Green de scribes as the "superficiality, 
passivity, and information overload that undermine the reflective capacities of the citizen-
subject" (8). 
As DeLillo's focus on inert figures intimates, however, these select departures 
become more and more difficult for "citizen-subjects" to accomplish in the global world. 
In Valparaiso, De Lillo shows that leaving does not merely concern relocation. Given the 
commonality of individuallimitation and agency destabilization in the millennial era-a 
consumer age bolstered by a corporatism that commemorates "the individual hooked up 
to various forms of technological devices, everything from phones, fax machines, 
televisions, and personal CD players, to computer monitors and the Internet" (Green 8)-
elusion entails an escape without any discernible escape hatch. Increasingly, leaving is 
just another version of hookup or lockup. Leaving therefore incorporates a Kafkaesque 
(perhaps Sisyphean or Ulyssean) effort to arrive at a half romanticized somewhere that 
seems to recede perpetually, despite its apparent attainability. And the "spectacle," as 
Debord poetically states, "is the epic poem ofthis strife" (43). As "technoculture," or the 
"fusion of culture and technology" (Green 8), evolves into spectacular techno-
internationalism, individuals find it less and less possible to challenge the limitations 
placed upon them. As a result, free agents have a gradually harder time asserting their 
daims to autonomy. 
Marking what he problematically postpones in The Day Room, DeLillo opens 
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Valparaiso with a series of representations that dispute notions of individuality and 
difference. Like The Day Room, Valparaiso integrates nine characters. Yet in multiple 
contrasts to its theatrical predecessor, the later play features a single roster of dramatis 
personae instead oftwo. Of the nine figures listed, only four have names: Michael 
Majeski, Livia Majeski, Delfina Treadwell, and Teddy Hodell. The five remaining 
players embrace little semblance of individual distinction. "Two actors, one male, one 
female," the overture to the two-act drama clarifies, "play all the Interviewers in Act 
One" (7). "The three members of the Camera Crew," the explaining note concludes, 
"double as Chorus" (7). Moving from character to space, replication and similitude 
furthermore demarcate the backdrop to Act One of Valparaiso. Employing his customary 
succinctness and satire, DeLillo maps out his stage setting: "Living room to the Majeski 
house. A large uncluttered space, bare-walled except for a large TV set in a wall unit 
upstage. The room is largely achromatic but not stylishly so. It is a representation of a 
living room, more or less anyone's" (11). Before moving to Scene One, DeLillo likewise 
collapses other forms of spatial disparity: "In several scenes a sector of this playing area 
functions as office space or as interview space in a broadcast studio" (11). This three-
dimensional play space accommodates all "representational" space. 
DeLillo's opening stage directions reinforce the performative depth and 
inclusiveness accentuated in his preliminary descriptions of character and place. To set 
Scene One into motion, DeLillo adds yet another dimension to the stage area. Presented 
with short-lived half-light, the audience barely witnesses a female figure ''pedaling 
steadily" on an exercise bike as she faces downstage (13). But attention swiftly shifts 
along with the lighting and the implementation of an "intense and electronic" digitalized 
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"roaring wind' (13). In a move that restages the curiously violent film in the prologue to 
Players, while at the same introducing the audience to another model of the inert or the 
stagnant, "a deep pulse image and sound' redeploys attention to the back wall whereupon 
a single videotape image is being projected. As the statically kinetic Livia industriously 
pedals in the tlickering video beam, spectators witness "a high-angle shot of a man in a 
tightly enclosed space" (13). "There is a plastic bag on his head," the directions outline, 
"fastened about the neck. He is seated, a forearm braced against the wall to either side of 
him. The plastic is thick and frosted, obscuring the man 's features" (13). After detailing 
the "digital display" that registers "the jleeting seconds and tenths of seconds" inset at a 
lower corner ofthe tape, the "crude and marked visual static" of the recording, and an 
unclear "interval of agitation," the wordless, twenty-five-second scene ends with a 
description of "the man" slowly raising "his head toward the camera" just before the 
image, shaking madly, abruptly stops (13). 
The man's final gesture towards the camera, an undeniably disturbing look cut 
short by a pronounced disturbance, introduces DeLillo' s audience to a number of 
disconcerting issues regarding the intertwined natures of performance and spectatorship. 
In contradistinction to the enforced compliance and identification highlighted in the 
opening of Players, the play audience of Valparaiso receives no indication about how to 
interpret the brief, opening film. DeLillo repudiates providing a narrative "we" or group 
identity for the purpose of alignment, uncomfortable or not. Rather, he offers onlookers 
various open considerations. Given that the veiled man gazes at the camera, he may in 
fact be aware of the camera. Therefore, he may be performing for the camera and the 
audience behind it. Since the scene centers on death, though, the unidentified man may be 
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attributing his demise to the presence of the camera. Maybe he blames the camera for 
invading his privacy. Perhaps the actor confines himselfto a cramped space under a 
camera in order to embellish his sense of spectacular violation. Above him, the recording 
device entraps him, positioning him as a public article of consumption. As a man without 
any sense of privacy, he may feel exposed. A public, indistinguishable everyman, he feels 
dead already. 
Equally troubling, the man may be unaware of the invasive camera. In other 
words, he may not be performing. He may simply be a man, any interchangeable man, 
enclosed in a tight space and captured on a candid camera, while he commits the violent 
act that ends aIl responsive acts. His self-murder, however, fails to be captured fully. Cut 
short, the brieffilm concludes before the man's life does. This interruption may prompt 
viewers to refocus on the camera itself. Favoring camera over man, we might wonder 
why the film stops, why the camera falls short of copying oncoming self-erasure. 
Moreover, as audience members we may individually marvel at the makeshift quality of 
the recording, a coarseness that compresses the intersection of unstable form and 
uncertain theme. Shaky and abrupt, pausing just before a life might end, the clip 
ultimately leaves us cogitating on the operator of the camera, on the machinations behind 
the camera, the machinations that include our own weird witnessing. 
Whether or not the spatially sequestered man intentionally performs for the 
almost-still camera, the statically dynamic Lydia, and the similarly unmoving play-
audience, the recording now exists for public consumption. An audience watches the 
tape. Scene One of Valparaiso places its viewership in the role ofliterary detective. Like 
the protagonist of Antonioni's 1966 film Blow Up, which is based on a short story by 
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Julio Cortazar, the individual audience member is invited to fabricate a narrative out of 
an unclear image. In Blow Up, Thomas suspects the true substance of his romantic shots 
of a couple in the park when the photographed woman demands that he relinquish his 
undeveloped film. After shrewdly swapping rolls in order to appease her; at least 
momentarily, he develops and enlarges the suddenly mysterious film. In due time, he 
discovers that his increasingly blurry blowups contain the evidence of a murder, 
putatively making him a deferred witness of the crime. In Valparaiso, as in Blow Up, 
unclear images compel the construction of narrative, a production that always implicates 
the viewer as an actor. As with a criminal action and its attendant courtroom deliberation, 
witnessing involves a form of complicity. Only the formulation of narrative allows the 
witness to extract herself from the prolonged deliberations of these legal proceedings. 
As Antonioni' s influence upon DeLillo exposes, the manifold complications 
associated with distorted forms of visual technology embellish the crudeness that DeLillo 
has long held to be a distinguishing aspect of mystery and narrative. In a 1988 interview 
with DeCurtis, DeLillo argues that the amateur video covering "the time [Kennedy's] 
plane landed in Dallas until the assassination itself [utilizes] extremely crude footage 
[that is] aIl the more powerful because of if' (61). DeLillo qualifies what he evaluates as 
the prized value of apparently flawed, footage in his assessment of the lone recording of 
the pennant-winning Bobby Thompson homerun at the Polo Grounds on 3 October 1951, 
the baseball game between the Giants and the Dodgers that he features as the prologue to 
his novel Underworld. In his talk with Firestone in 1988, DeLillo emphasizes the 
American imaginary. He expounds upon the contrast between availability and longevity, 
in addition to the close affinity between picture quality and productive uncertainty. 
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De Lillo states, "In the days of Thompson and Ralph Branca, there was no videotape. The 
home run could not be shown repeatedly, it could not be exhausted by midnight ofthe 
tirst day. 1 think that in part accounts for the longevity ofthat ball game, because it was 
not consumed so instantly and readily. The newsreel footage looks like something out of 
World War 1 and there's something precious about this fact" (153). A reconsideration of 
his article "The Power of History" spells out what DeLillo means by "precious." In this 
1997 piece, he writes, "Newsreel footage of Bobby Thompson's home run resembles 
something ofWorld War 1 vintage. But the shakier and fuzzier the picture, the more it 
lays a claim to permanence" (62). The baIl game, DeLillo proposes, maintains a special 
degree of stability in the American imagination because it must be left to imaginative 
reconstruction. 
As America's signature game, baseball, like nothing el se, represents America, 
especially in the middle ofthe American Century. Thompson hits his game-winning 
homerun in the bottom of the ninth when his team has aIl but sealed a season-ending loss; 
the game, therefore, in aIl of its excited rooting for an underdog, expresses the American 
Dream. Furthermore, given that the Soviets launch their second successful nuclear test on 
the same day as the unforgettable homerun (a test ensuring that they no longer need to 
test), the game takes place on the factual eve of the Cold War. In spite ofthese marvelous 
coincidences, which he explores in Underworld, DeLillo' s point is that the game and its 
climax never get played out by virtue of the multiple camera angles and the unfortunate 
replays that literally remove the mystery from recorded events. The bad quality of the 
recording further inflates a sense of inscrutability that caUs for creative imagination, not 
precise technology. Even with the interventions of modem digitalization, the game tape 
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still makes particular demands upon its viewers. Its mystery, its greatness, cannot be 
turned into a mathematical formula. Bat and ball contact cannot be clearly isolated, 
enlarged, and frame-advanced. The flight of the homerun baIl over the outfield wall 
cannot be undoubtedly captured, blown-up, and digitally advanced frame-by-frame, a 
technique that turns motion into a still, movement into a picture, and an irreproducible 
event into a series of minor, static ones. Because the game retains its precious 
indistinctness and doubt, it lives in the imagination. 
ln an interview following the publication of Valparaiso in 1999, DeLillo 
elaborates on his unremitting critique of the image age, the contemporary epoch wherein 
empty spectacle and effortless consumption outperform lasting mystery and lively 
engagement. Diffidently marking a disparity between his conceptions of the Cold War 
and the post-Cold War eras, he underlines the main themes of Valparaiso: "You know, 1 
never thought ofthis play in terms of Underworld. But, in a way, that's about Cold War 
America, and this play seems to be about the post-Cold War period in which we now find 
ourse Ives, a period ofpersonality, celebrity, fame, scandaI, enormous wealth, and empty 
spectacle. There seems to be no difference between substantial news and insubstantial 
news" (in Feeney 172). Perhaps blurring any distinction between his latest drama and 
contemporary culture, DeLillo then drafts a correlation between news-obsession and 
melodrama. Reviewing Valparaiso, he avers, "Nothing is allowed to remain unseen and 
nothing is allowed to remain unsaid. There' s a tendency of the characters to think of 
everything as potential footage. Things exist in order to be recorded in one manner or 
another" (172). 
DeLillo implies that as footage replaces privacy, sensationalism supplants 
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personality. Existing to be recorded and therefore unable to resist being recorded, an 
individual manufactures her image, a characterization that the media in turn 
remanufactures until the public figure gets played out and replaced by yet another 
embroidered leading story. This preplanned exhaustion of embellished character, 
DeLillo's chronology of empty spectacle suggests, usually establishes itself in 
documented dramas of mishaps or calamities. A manipulated "personality" leads to a 
maneuvered "celebrity," which leads to a stage-managed "fame," which, in turn, leads to 
a manufactured form of "scandaI," the inevitable scandaI that embodies the pitfall of 
public life, the inevitable scandaI that refocuses media attention onto a new personality, a 
new personality who is usually, but not necessarily, somehow affiliated with the original 
scandaI. 
A near copy of this sequence of events govems Michael Majeski' s story in 
Valparaiso. After the strange footage that opens the play, Act One progresses through 
seven more scenes, all of which feature media interviews of Michael, whom the audience 
eventually leams is the lone figure in "the world's most famous human-interest story" 
(Duvall 560). Reemphasizing the replication theme launched in the prologue, Michael' s 
fame results from his unpremeditated joumey to Valparaiso, Chile (via Santiago), a plane 
trip originally scheduled to bring Michael to either Valparaiso, Indiana (via Chicago), or 
Valparaiso, Florida (via Miami). DeLillo's third drama begins with media interest in 
Michael's unusualjoumey, a curiosity that inevitably, and quite quickly, shifts to the 
circumstances ofhis private life. Evoking Michael's ultimate lack of control over his 
media-manipulated image, as well as over his actuallife once the media establishment 
engineers it, the audience discovers that Michael had little command over getting 
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"Displaced or misplaced" (15) to the presumably incorrect Valparaiso. 
Demonstrably, because of a succession of interruptions related to the time 
constraints ofhis interviews, technical problems within interviews, and the inclination of 
interviewers to redirect Michael's account oftravel mishaps to one or another personal 
anecdote, DeLillo's audience never learns why Michael lands in Valparaiso, Chile, after 
his unusual "Miami mistake" (31). In Scene Two, for instance, an interviewer urges 
Michael to "Tell us everything," only to inform him in his very next line that "There isn't 
time" (17). When Michael consequently offers to "clarify or expand upon" the particulars 
ofhis joumey, details the interviewer limits to Michael's feeling of "strangeness" about a 
"succession of strange and random" "interlocking events," he abruptly gets cut short (17-
18). At once disregarding and reaffirming the ridiculousness of their discussion, the 
interviewer carelessly concludes the meeting: "I think that does it. When we air, l'H do a 
till-in. Sorne editing. Sorne ambient noise" (18). 
Correspondingly misdirected by other interrogators, outshone by technological 
instruments, and subsumed as a product of market culture, throughout Act One Michael 
dutifully "look[ s] at the camera" (21), "Use[ s] the present tense" (22), de scribes preflight, 
"predawn" sex with his wife Livia (22), "Frame[s]" his previous replies "exactly" (27), 
"Give[ s ] [information] faster" (31), promote[ s] Livia' s "dentifrice" (34), and "Wait[ s], 
wait[s], wait[s], wait[s]" (55) while being counseled to "Make sense" (57). These endless 
commands illustrate the imperatives of the media establishment. As the arbiter or 
controlling mechanism of culture and conformity, the news is fabricated, not discovered, 
as is the character of the so-called media star. Impugning "stardom" as a "pseudo-
stardom" defined by a rarefied form of "pseudo-power," in The Society of the Spectacle 
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Debord explains that "The individual who in the service of the spectacle is placed in 
stardom's spotlight is in fact the opposite of an individual, and [is] clearly the enemy of 
the individual in himself as of the individual in others" (39). Debord continues his 
assessment of the impotent media star as the victimized instrument of and perpetrating 
vehicle for ideological submission: "In entering the spectacle as a model to be identified 
with, [the star] renounces aU autonomy in order himselfto identify with the generallaw 
of obedience and to the [structured] course of things" (39). 
The audience members of DeLillo's drarna get drawn-in to trying to make sense 
of Michael's string ofincomplete, recorded discussions. Stressing the devices of 
representation, the locus of these interrupted meetings recurrently shifts between the TV 
screen, the living room, and other stage spaces. Punctuated by Livia's stationary pedaling 
and her customarily silent spectatorship, the media elaborates upon and circles around 
Michael's story without establishing its source. In Valparaiso, reporters avoid explicating 
and thereby resolving the comedies that make up what Livia caUs Michael's 
"breathtakingjourney" (30). Associating the elliptical nature of the interviewers with 
Livia's "static movement" on the exercise bike, Benesch elucidates that "the repetitious 
interviews partake in an endless loop of journalistic babble that stubbomly refuses to 
produce meaning" (141). This denial of transparent meaning, which Benesch describes as 
a "structural necessit[y] of the media," expresses itselfin interviews that are 
"monological rather than dialogical" (141). They have no reference points beyond their 
own "linguistic confines" (141). On the surface at least, the interviews are merely about 
interviews. Certainly, they tum upon themselves. They are, however, designed as devices 
of social control, a stage direction of Michael that is all the more perilous because it 
presents or parodies him as banal. Like Valparaiso, Michael is indistinct. Interviewers 
publicly yet falsely disallow and erase a claim to difference, to uniqueness. 
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Tactfully performing an injustice against Michael, the media resists narrativizing 
his daylong odyssey. Instead, they build and sanction a fashionable spectacular event. 
Already in the public eye, interviewers cling to Michael as the source of a new angle, a 
new lead on a subject that already sells-and controls. Stressing this drafting of the 
public, as manifested by the conscription of the play-audience into the paradoxically 
embelli shed and unexplained story, Michaellikewise buys into his appointment within 
the media. Shortly after doing a "hundred and fort Y interviews in four and a half days in 
three and a half cities" (36), he tells an interviewer that "There are just so many hours in 
the day," and he needs "sorne space for a change. Sorne time to unwind. Too many 
commitments. Too much nerve-racking travel" (41). When asked ifhe was therefore 
"tuming down aIl further requests for interviews," Michael seriously rejoins, "No. l'm 
quitting my job" (41). 
As laughable as this reply at first seems, it does not come as a revelation. Replete 
with the prerequisites ofvisual and print media, including voice recorders (14; 25), 
glowing microphones (21; 35; 58), a handheld camera (35), a laptop computer (41), and a 
control booth (54), Valparaiso collapses any sense of division between everyday life and 
mediated life. As a reporter explains early in Act One, Scene Four, Michael's 
interrogations require no "formaI" authorization: "This is on record. Everything is on the 
record. Everything is the interview" (25). Michael' s capitulation to the machines and the 
machinations of the media, a surrender that reanimates the horror of the restrained 
"Wyatt" as human television in The Day Room, likewise manifests itself in Scene Six, 
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wherein Michael, whose life equates to "footage waiting to be shot," gets filmed while 
he, obviously inert, sleeps (38). In the same scene, as Myles Weber details, "a 
documentary filmmaker suggests shooting a feature-Iength film of Michael sitting for 
interviews before competing camera crews" (130). This telling theatrical episode, Weber 
claims, fashions Valparaiso as "fully self-referential" (130). 
As in The Engineer of Moonlight and The Day Room, DeLillo includes a version 
of play-within-a-play in Valparaiso. For the first time, however, his hero appears to be 
both conscious of and candid about rus positioning within a "self-referential" space. This 
largely unprecedented openness about how the devices of fiction regulate the real might 
be said to emanate from DeLillo's own string of interviews foIlowing the great suc cess of 
Underworld. Although DeLillo ruminated on Valparaiso for many years, a period that 
began after the celebrity that foIlowed Libra, his second major run-in with the spectacular 
enabled him to dramatize the confinements of this dangerous contemporary process. 
Reinvestigating the problems he works out in his first two plays, in addition to his earliest 
novels, DeLillo finaIly conceives of drama as instantaneously self-referential. Not about 
subtly disclosed delays and deceptions that earmark the connections between 
performance and identity, as weIl as the ties coupling risk-taking to self-creation, 
Valparaiso represents the dangers of a global culture wherein passive agents fail to 
counteract increasing "hyper-banality" irrespective of their very awareness of this manic-
triviality (Weber 130). As an un-ironie journalist in Valparaiso refreshingly reveals, ''l've 
come into a stranger's home to do the most superficial sort of dimwit interview. This is 
the nature ofmy assignment" (50). In Valparaiso, the prevailing will of media culture 
actively cancels the will towards reestablishing individual senses offree agency. 
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The recording devices in Valparaiso caU to mind Beckett's Krapp 's Last Tape, a 
drama published in 1958. Yet in contrast to Beckett's compulsive hero, Michael has no 
control over his "tapes." Michael's final movement in Act One of Valparaiso establishes 
this distinction. Enacting a mere "half gesture," Michael stops in "mid-motion" as he 
reaches for the imaginary "bedside light" that the distant announcer of "Sunrise radio" 
advises him to grasp (58). Meanwhile, the minimal stage light emanates exclusively from 
the "glow" of a microphone resting next to Michael (58). Act One concludes with a 
troubled focus on inertia, compliance, and instrumentality, not personal agency. Unlike 
Krapp, Michael never personally fiddles with recording devices in Act One. Instead, as a 
substitution for a recording device, he responds to the maneuvering of others. In Krapp 's 
Last Tape, Krapp, on the one hand, maintains a divide between himself and his tapes, at 
least visuaIly. Notwithstanding the fact that he ultimately sits "motionless{ly] staring" 
upstage as his last "tape runs on in silence," the audience can perceive him (223). At the 
end of Act One, Scene Eight, in Valparaiso, on the other hand, the deviation between 
Michael and his engineered voice disintegrates. The play-audience only sees the still 
Michael because of the radiance on the table beside him, a glow he never attempts to 
resist or manipulate. Albeit Krapp's story terminates once he plays his last tape, he 
dominates his own story. He recorded it as he told it. As weIl, Krapp plays his story as he 
listens to it. Onstage, his movements and manipulations appear self-motivated. Playing 
himself, or the self he elects to present, he stage-manages himself. Michael, by contrast, 
never exercises these liberties in the first half of Valparaiso. In tum, he volunteers for 
this exhibition of submission. 
Act Two of Valparaiso, which is engineered as one long scene thrice disrupted by 
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a Chorus acting as commercial break or corporate subsidy, takes place at what Benesch 
would call the crux of "media-mad America" (134). Between Act One and Act Two, the 
mise-en-scène of the drama transfers from Michael's former office, the Majeski home, 
and other depersonalized spaces, to America's most public of spheres: the studio set of an 
Oprah-style TV show (Benesch 140; Duvall560). In Valparaiso, however, the 
confessional talk show hosted by Delfina and her sidekick Teddy c1early downplays the 
veiled ideological constraints (and their attendant perils to free agency) set forth on 
Oprah Winfrey's show-a dramatic understatement that Benesch and Duvall fail to 
notice. In DeLillo's dramatic adaptation of the talk show scene, gone are the/aux 
sincerity, fake expertise, and sham sympathy that characterize the Oprah mission. As the 
Pranzen debac1e made evident, Oprah steadfastly disallows the expression of views that 
run counter to her own, even if these dissenting outlooks are already revealed in a novel 
that she (unwittingly, ironically, worryingly) markets for the American public. 
On Delfina's show, which has no name, thus signifying that the program-like aIl 
talk shows-is about its host instead of its visitors, "the shining soul of daytime 
America" (64) freely elaborates on her wealth, her backing of market culture, her self-
absorption, and her treatment of guests as shoppers. Directly upon arising every moming, 
she telephones "Pinancial planners" (65). Observing her global renown, she loads her 
discourse with a surplus ofthe first-person singular: "l'm live, l'm taped, l'm run, l'm 
rerun. l'm on all the time somewhere in the world" (67). When she sees Livia, who is 
"clearly pregnant" (70), she concurs with Teddy's comment that they do not normaIly 
televise the unbom because "They're not consumers. They take up space but do not 
spend" (72). Given this bluntly satirical set up to Valparaiso's final act, which makes free 
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use of lines from its preeursor, it proves less than surprising that, as introdueed early in 
Act One, the dialogue "leads to the break-down of the real as a eategory ofhuman 
discourse altogether" (Beneseh 134). 
In a play abounding with ad res repetitions, Delfina, whose "private moments" 
manifest themselves as "endless[ly] replieate[d]" TV moments (93), resurreets an exact 
line from the original "superfieial sort of dimwit interview." With this reminder, Delfina 
betrays the mission of the media apparatus that she bolsters. After Livia and Michael, 
seemingly happy together, eomfortably begin to divulge their reaetions to the mistaken 
journey, the host cannot help but to redirect the talk to an altemate, less public, less 
tangible, less newsworthy, and less impromptu topie: 
DELFINA: Teddy. 
MICHAEL: It was hugely and vastly eomie. 
DELFINA: Tell them to shut up. 
TEDDY: Be nice. Ask them about their marriage. 
DELFINA: That's so unseduetive a subjeet. 
TEDDY: We have to peel away the outer layers. Don't you think? One 
byone. 
DELFINA: 1 hate these unraveling relationships. 
TEDDY: You hate that word. 
DELFINA: 1 hate ail the words in that sentence. 
TEDDY: Beeause you take them personally. You take everything personally. 
(My emphasis; 76-7) 
Delfina only "likes" to hear what she in fact orchestrates. Ineongruously adding layers to 
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the story, she and Teddy dominate the studio stage when the interview do es not conform 
to their staged scheme. 
This orchestrated monopoly of media space, as enforced through the reiteration of 
"1 hate all the words in that sentence," highlights the innuendo of the line. In Act One, the 
female joumalist acknowledges the phony nature ofher interview and prompts Michael 
to substitute roles with her. Aping his previous interviewers, he asks her a simple 
personal question: "Are you having a relationship?" (44). When the interviewer's phrase 
retums in answer to the utilization of the same word-relationship-in the live TV 
studio, Michael has nothing to do with the discussion. Here, Delfina and Teddy have 
already overtaken the universally televised "discussion." Interrupted, Michael and Livia 
are directed not to talk. Thus objectified, the couple gets drafted into a fictive story, a 
story that Delfina wishes to tell rather than to hear. On her show, obvious fabrication 
swallows the notion of the real. A kangaroo court or show trial wherein oppositional or 
nonconformist narratives are suppressed, Delfina' s TV show counteracts the devices of 
justice. Disregarding a legalistic discourse that integrates accusation, defense, and 
deliberation, in addition to the consequences of lawful decision, Delfina redirects the 
course of justice towards her own ends. Silenced, Michael cannot engage in an act of 
self-justification. As a result, he cannot expose himself to public judgment. Without 
narrative and its risks, he cannot rec1aim the free agency that the media has monopolized. 
Stories 
Myles Weber takes DeLillo to task for his enduring representation ofwhat might 
be deemed the collapse ofthe real within Valparaiso. Weber associates DeLillo's 
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repeated depictions of unrealistic dialogue with "a lack of dramatic vigor" (131). 
Concluding that since DeLillo does not observably parody "pretentious playwriting" à 
l'instar de Harold Pinter and Christopher Durang, he demonstrates an earnestness that 
reveals his "work" to be needlessly ostentatious (131). Weber, though, does not register 
how DeLillo integrates "vaguely inhumane dialogue" as a means of ideological critique, 
not as a "funny" caricature of amateurish theatre (131). In spite of their habituaI humor, 
DeLillo's masterful monologues and dialogues embellish the theatrical and inherently 
perilous nature of the media institution itself. 
When the media promotes a story, DeLillo intimates, any clear understanding of 
the distinction between the real and the unreal or the event and the mediated event falls to 
the wayside in support of a script designed to sway public interest. News exists for the 
news. The news does not unravel uncertain facts but, instead, proves pre-established 
ones. Strong-arming the evolution of culture, media manipulation privileges the 
inhumane-the empty dialogues, the nonsensical views, the penchant for repetition, the 
obsolescence ofmemory-over the distinct and the individuating. Michael's story, as 
DeLillo illustrates, inextricably intersects with Delfina's production ofhis story. 
Covering his story, she creates his story. Combining the roles of playwright, actor, and 
spectator, Delfina assumes the dictatorial role of puppeteer while Michael mutates into 
her handy marionette. To appropriate Franzen's estimation ofhis own personal 
exploitation at the hands ofOprah's television team, Michael thus becomes "a dumb but 
necessary object, a passive supplier of image" ("Meet Me in St. Louis" 288). 
Indistinguishable from Delfina's drama, the stage-managed Michael only proves 
serviceable until the end of Delfina's one-hour show, until the end ofher daily segment-
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unless, of course, she styles him into an intertextual figure, a figure she wishes to recycle. 
Stressing Michael and Livia's cooptation into a living drama that is at the same 
time not theirs and not not theirs, DeLillo likewise appoints the audience members of 
Valparaiso as the audience of Delfina's TV show. Act Two starts under dim light as 
Teddy emerges from the wings. Without further ado, he tells the assembled to avoid 
applauding, for "This is only the warmup" (63). Distorting the distinction between 
rehearsal and performance, Teddy's instant instructions recall the line that first positions 
Michael as an object of media management: "Everything is the interview" (25). Always 
captured, always a means and never an end, in Act One Michael exudes no power over 
his public image. He cannot compose himself for interviews; the media composes him 
both before and after interviews. As a human symbol of the personality permutations of 
media culture, Delfina's subordinate Teddy actively coaches his "live" play-cum-
television audience: "Not that the warmup isn't part of the show. The warmup is taped 
and studied. The warmup is completely crucial to the furtherance of our endeavor. Take 
my words to he art" (63). Following this simulated pep talk, he details how and when the 
audience ought to clap. Illustrating that Delfina's spectators are also complicit actors in 
her drama, Teddy also explains how and when the assembled crowd ought to engage with 
the "giant monitors" (64). Live spectatorship, Teddy cautions, involves stringent 
restrictions and responsibilities. As deputy actors, as surrogate props without unscripted 
reactions, the audience members offer themselves to public consumption. 
After Teddy's directives, the play audience is at once live and directed on how to 
be live. Akin to Michael and Livia, the audience is not what it is and not not what it is. 
Representation subsumes reality; the limits of representation direct the course and the 
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experience ofreality. In Valparaiso, as Duvall says, the "world of the television talk 
show is represented as Michel Foucault's panopticon writ large, revealing a carceral 
society (ironically experienced as fully liberated) where our ability to find instant 
gratification through image consumption demands only that we be not alienated" (561). 
Continuing with an exegesis of Delfina's character, Duvall affirms that "the true goddess 
of the postmodern in this contemporary Greek tragedy, must kill offalienation by 
representing it as Michael's personal pathology, just as Michael must reveal that he is 
alienated to reassure the viewers that they are not" (561). Duvall articulates that Delfina's 
live audience-the manipulated "teentsy-weentsy studio audience" standing-in for the 
indelibly jealous "Global millions watching at home" (Valparaiso 63-4)--also 
experiences estrangement and exploitation. Cast into Delfina's show, the gathered 
audience surrenders to the systems presently governing them. 
In Valparaiso, the Delphic motto conjured by Delfina's name alters from the 
personal "Know Thyself' to the public "Promote Thyself," an endorsement indistinct 
from "Let a Version of Thyselfbe Promoted," as Michael's mass-marketed story and the 
audience's requisite gestures on the massive monitor indicate. DeLillo's strange Chorus 
plays up the limiting impositions broadcast technology places upon the individual in this 
CUITent version of distorted self-discovery. Recalling the reason for Michael's celebrity, 
the three-member choral group wears "severe, faintly intimidating" and "not necessarily 
matching" "civilian" style ''flight-crew uniforms" (68). Quite predictably, this half 
motley, halfprofessional choir, which "exists in a space separatefrom the stage 
proceedings, in another dimension" (68), mimes and reiterates pre-takeoff safety 
instructions. The multi-language "Air Reliance" (69; 69; 84; 84) commercials, however, 
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often lapse into claptrap, panic, and poetry. DeLillo thus coalesces technology, travel, 
news, and capitalism. Reworking the depiction of space in The Day Room, he suggests 
that no matter where we are we are controlled by certain systems-and dependent upon 
them. Taking his iterations ofrestricted spatiality into account, the limited legroom of the 
airplane cabin is not merely conducive to good talk, as Wyatt and Budge originally deem 
it. Rather, this small space evokes the confining nature of the marketplace. Just as 
passengers automatically buckle into plane seats, citizen-subjects inevitably buy into the 
conditions of technoculture. 
Michael' s celebrated tragicomic joumey, to the "deep end of Latin America" (87), 
as well as the vital core of consumer culture (74; 83), begins as it purportedly ends: with 
an imposed "submi[ssion] to the systems" (86; 101). After several interruptions in Act 
One, the play-audience leams that Michael jettison[ ed] his Chicago "itinerary" in favor of 
a Miami "ticket" because the former was merely "typed" while the latter was "computer 
processed" (55). Nevertheless, he does not publicly admit to his helpless vulnerability to 
the "force" of "systems" until the midpoint of Act Two (86). Tellingly, once Michael 
confesses to this total intimidation, the same compliance to systems that later convinces 
him to board an aircraft for Santiago (86), Delfina instantly discredits his suppressed 
story. In a move that reminds the monitored audience and the at-home viewer ofher 
Orwellian adage, "Off-camera lives are unverifiable" (83), she breaks offhis story: "1 
don't believe you" (87). In spite of Michael's protestations and Livia's bewilderments, 
Teddy naturally seconds Delfina's judgment. 
At this juncture in the performance, Delfina's TV pro gram lapses into an evident 
charade of a televised talk show. She roundly rejects, and therefore publicly re-circulates, 
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the tabloid tedium conceming Livia's love affair with a documentary filmmaker (the 
liaison that leaves her pregnant), in addition to Michael's drunken car accident (the 
collision that disables the couple's son, who was not wearing his seatbelt). Unveiling the 
agendas ofher show, the host and her helper subsequently lead Michael through product 
placements-"Close Up" (94), "Wilkinson Sword" (98)--emulated introspection-
"Explain me to myself," "Is that what 1 want?" (95)-ineffectual blather-"Boo," "Ga ga 
ga ga ga" (97)-and indispensable artificial audience-alignment-"Don't fight the 
camera" (95), "Don't fight the camera" (98), "Use the present tense" (100). By these at 
once preposterous and convincing means, Delfina and Teddy persuade their malleable 
guest to disclose the true essence ofhis yet-unearthed epic story. Inadvertently 
handcuffed or straitjacketed by the artificiality of the show, far-fetched invention appears 
to be his only release from the confines of lunacy. 
Thus staged and prepped, Michael delivers a remarkable story. Refusing to 
disappoint his pushy hosts, live spectators, and TV audience, he personalizes the opening 
scene of Valparaiso. He explains that the shakyand abrupt end of the briefrecording in 
Act One, Scene One had its source in airplane turbulence, the instability and uproar that 
interrupted his attempted suicide. Because of "The pilot's talking on the intercom" and 
"the urgent flashing light," Michael declares under Teddy's tutelage, he "Retum[ed] to 
[his] seat" and resumed his role as "a docile traveler once again" (100-10 1). As he relates 
this confidential narrative of mishaps, he underlines versions of performance and 
conformity: "1 had to submit to the systems. They were designed to save my life. And 1 
complied gratefully. Retumed to my seat. Fastened my seatbelt" (101). In order "to know 
everything," Delfina and Teddy "need to showeverything" (90). For them, "everything's 
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accessible" because "everything's replayable" (90). Accentuating this form of spurious 
consumer-culturallogic, Micheal's overdramatic "story is verifiable" (101) on account of 
the fact that "There are video cameras in airline toilets" (101). 
Following Michael's theatricalized confession, Delfina succeeds where her 
featured guest failed. While Livia rests "motionless, staring straight ahead," like Krapp, 
and Teddy coolly "browses in a magazine," like a carefree consumer, Delfina strangles 
the submissive Michael with his own microphone cord (106). In Valparaiso, Michael's 
own elided motion and voice strangle him. DeLillo constructs a parallel dramatization in 
The Rapture o/the Athlete Assumed into Heaven. In the two-minute play, a young tennis 
player named Bobby, who has just captured his first title, is told by an interviewer, who 
invents every banal aspect of the new star's life without letting him intervene, that this is 
"the last day ofyour life" (12). A later adaptation of Bobby, Michael gets literally 
played-up and factually played-out by the manipulation ofhis image. Condensing the 
course and illustrating the dangers of spectacularism, mediated privacy erases actual 
privacy. Once consumed by the public, the individualloses her daim to individuality. 
Locked-in with little freedom to move, Michael, like Bobby, first gets entrapped, 
then strangled by the strictures of media representation. Again reminding the play 
audience of Valparaiso's opening, the drama ends with what can be seen as a series of 
epilogues. In the first of these, Delfina compares Michael to "An image aloft in the 
flashing air" (106). Waxing technological, she goes on to confuse forgetfulness, reality, 
representation, and replication as she reduces the dead man to a pattern of lightwaves. 
Before the lights go down, she condudes that Michael amounts to nothing more than "A 
set ofimage-forming units, sand-grain size, that shape a face on-screen" (106). When 
216 
light returns, the Chorus resumes its contrived repetitions of stock airline commands and 
gestures. The scheduled corporate recitation, however, meets with an interruption prior to 
naming its sponsor, a move that makes all of the Chorus' posturing and rhetoric as 
inconsequential as Delfina's own muddled metaphysics-in the terms of capitalism at 
least. Implying that the symbolic Delfina herself exists as but an amalgamation of 
lightwaves (she lives for the camera, she lives to "Melt into it" [95; 98]), the disturbance 
that suspends the choral routine, while likewise ending the actual play, is a rerun of the 
violent twenty-second projection that opens Valparaiso. Concluding in the same way as 
The Day Room, Valparaiso ultimately loops back into itself. The play stops where it 
starts: with Michael at center stage. According to the terms of Delfina's disquieting logic, 
Michael therefore appears to outlive the talk show host. In contrast to Delfina, who 
disappears by "melting into" the camera, an inconspicuous stage exit that plays on 
Marx's famous avowal "all that is solid melts into air," Michaelleaves a more lasting 
impression upon the spectators. Though she manipulates his narrative, his image 
overrides hers. 
A main problem with this final reading, however, rests in the fact that in the 
replay of "a man in confined space with [a] plastic bag on his head," the man's face 
remains unrecognizable (107). Audience members consequently have no verifiable 
reason to trust that the obscured face (13; 107) belongs to Michael. Even if the man 
proves to be Michael, the provenance of the tape is unknown. Perhaps Michael merely 
performs for a camera. Maybe a double substitutes for Michael in this piece of cinéma 
vérité. Because ofthe prompting and staging and copying that DeLillo highlights 
throughout Valparaiso, the veracity of the video recording seems dubious. Treated as a 
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representation and coached into a role, Michael may have had no viable alternative to 
corroborating with Delfina's embellished version ofhis story. An emblem of the media-
manipulated subject, Michael's complicity with Delfina's televised scheme may be his 
ironic alternative to committing perjury on a global witness stand. After being co-opted 
into a sustained media event that he knows must eventually terminate, perhaps he can 
only do justice to himselfby sanctioning the public version ofhis story. In so doing, he 
personally lends himself a weird air oflegitimacy. By disremembering the past, Michael 
takes an active stake in his own remaking. In playing his part, in actively reconciling his 
personal selfwith his public image, and more notably, in exaggerating or risking the 
limits of the part that Delfina directs him to play, he regains the claim to freedom that the 
interrelated "systems" originally seized from him. Whether or not he participates in the 
production ofthe video projection, only in acting, it seems, can Michael reassert himself 
with any degree of liberty-and self-justification. 
Nonetheless, Michael's fate at the hands of Delfina and the media executions that 
she emblematizes complicate the concatenation of performance with freedom. Because 
he dies, rus self-determination and attendant self-creation seem pretty short-lived. Since 
the media murders him, his liberty is conjectural. This discomfiting conclusion should 
remind DeLillo's audience of Michael's first unconditional capitulation to the 
machinations of the media. Rather than simply renounce the media circuit, he voluntarily 
enlists in this process. In Act One, Scene Seven, Michael quits his job in order to devote 
himself entirely to media treatment-an illogical contrivance only rendered logical by 
virtue of the demands of the media. His personal surrender to the public eye thereby 
heralds the altogether oppositional movements of DeLillo' s next protagonist: Lauren 
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Hartke. In The Body Artist, Lauren's unconcealed actions deliberately offset Michael's 
outwardly typical resignations. She steadfastly resists media representation. 
As the first and only woman starring in a lead role in the DeLillo canon, Lauren 
the stage-performer calls to mind a variety of unforgettable cinematic female characters. 
Theatricalizing the work of his earliest filmic influences, namely the directors whom he 
associates with the great era of European movies in one way or another, DeLillo crafts his 
female protagonist as a composite of several women playing distinct roles. A figure of 
personal upheaval, Lauren evokes the lone woman with a baby carriage who incites a 
mass revoIt against the attacking "Cossacks" in Odessa's outdoor "theatre" in Sergei 
Eisenstein's Battleship Potemkin (1925). Lauren's actions in The Body Artist likewise 
recall those of the first-time prostitute Nana, who will "parrot anything," in Jean Luc-
Goddard's My Life to Live (1962). She also reminds readers of the schizophrenic Carole, 
who locks herself in her "nuthouse" flat and refuses to answer the ever-ringing phone in 
Roman Polanski's Repulsion (1965). Perhaps most notably, Lauren also materializes as 
an avatar of the self-determining Karin, who, after "see[ing] [her] own confusion and 
understand[ing] it," makes a virtue ofher supposed craziness in order to escape the three 
men that trap her in a coastal home in Ingmar Bergman's filmic chamber play Through a 
Glass Darkly (1961). Lauren, a self-titled body artist, brings to mind a non-fictional 
figure as well, the performance artist Orlan. 
Most famous for her ten-part surgical performance indicatively titled 
Interventions, Orlan hails from France. In her unprecedented multipart piece, she stays 
awake as she undergoes a series of operations, spanning several years of the early 1990s, 
in time acquiring "the chin of Venus, the nose of Psyche, the eyes of Diana, the lips of 
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Europa and the brow of the Mona Lisa," among other features of Western femininity 
(Goodall 159). Stressing the spectacular nature ofviewing, the seventh ofher plastic 
surgeries was "relayed by live satellite" to a gallery in New York City, "where the packed 
audience was filmed watching it, and subsequently interviewed about it for CNN 
television" (GoodaIl159-60). Predictably and intentionally, her live performance was met 
with "contortionary" reactions ranging from "indignation" that her work gets dubbed art, 
"offense" at the misuse of science, and "confusion" about the exercise' s function (160). 
When interviewed by CNN, Orlan fuelled the frustration of the American public. 
Making reference to talk show star Cindy Jackson, renowned for her twenty-plus plastic 
surgeries, aIl in an attempt to look like Ken's Barbie, Orlan exclaimed, "1 don't want to 
be the Barbie Doll" (qtd. in GoodaIl160). Naturally, Orlan makes a virtue ofher refusaI 
to be "shaped and determined" by what Green describes as "the anonymous public 
imagery of the mass media" (168). The sway of the mass media proves so strong, in fact, 
that Orlan appears as more controversial than Cindy Jackson (if not Michael Jackson). 
Enacting non-conformity turns more divis ive heads than does the enactment of 
conventionality. As she says in another interview, Orlan effectively salutes dissension 
and confusion: "What's difficult about my work is that it's uncomfortable in every sense. 
So far as the operations are concerned, it is physically uncomfortable for me and for those 
who look at the images. But it is also uncomfortable to make sense ofit" (Ayers 180). 
Courting conflict, she transposes her discomfort onto her spectators; as such, she prompts 
them to question the so-called standards set forth and propped up by image culture. 
Rather than subscribe, like the Barbie Doll, to what Debord theorizes as "official 
similarity" (39), Orlan conceives of spectatorship as a recognition of difference. 
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Lauren, whose name echoes and contorts Orlan's, literally transforms her physical 
appearance in order to complicate any telling distinction between identity and its physical 
construction. She adds to the actions ofher filmic precursors. Refashioning would-be 
naturalistic paradigms, Lauren does more than assert her independence through acts of 
social rebellion. By way of rigorous and controlled body modification, she creates her 
self-identity through a process ofphysical or natural revolution. Revising Plato's 
substantialist conceptions ofpersonal identity, metaphysical notions that Franz Kafka 
explores in "The Metamorphosis," Lauren willfully corrects her physical makeup. 
Neither confined to a distinct corporal body nor defined by a particular emotional state, 
she realigns or morphs her physicality to match her evolving psychology. 
Aiso in opposition to the performance artist Orlan, not to mention her dramatic 
forerunner Michael, Lauren neither openly challenges the determinations of the mass 
media nor merely complies with them. Instead, she avoids the media's positionings and 
representations altogether. Recasting DeLillo's "exfoliation of the state we caU marri age" 
in the one-minute play The Mystery at the Middle of Ordinary Life, which is, as he notes, 
"really two acts in two minutes" (601), The Body Artist opens with a slowly paced, 
twenty-page breakfast-scene incorporating minimal dialogue between a man named Rey 
and an unnamed woman. It is not until the next scene, an obituary for the once-famous 
cinematographer Rey Robles (which the narrator slots between the first and second 
chapters), that readers discover the identity ofthe woman in the kitchen. Surviving Rey, 
who dies of "a self-inflicted gunshot wound" (27), is his third wife, "the body artist" 
Lauren Hartke (29). 
In the aftermath ofher husband's suicide, Lauren remains in their rented Big 
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Rouse by the sea and focuses mainly on "Meals, tasks, errands" (33). Customarily 
disregarding her ringing telephone, she sets aside time daily to watch a live webcam of an 
empty freeway in Kotka, Finland, reading the local time on the screen's digital display. 
As an analogue to "the days that moved so slow they ached" (32), she resumes the 
painfuIly measured "methodical contortion[s]" ofher bodywork (37). Playing up the 
oddly indistinct bug-eyed interloper she finds in her home, a madman or Martian 
(Gerlach 206) ofunfixed age who apes Rey's tape-recorded voice, she integrates echoing 
sounds and various stylized everyday gestures into her scrupulous body art regimen, such 
as compulsively checking her watch. She also replicates her invader's ghostliness by 
bleaching the color from her hair and exfoliating the pigment from her skin. Expunged, 
Lauren matches her body to what she terms the "clos[ed] off outlets of [her] self' (97). 
Erased, she inscribes her traumatic loss onto her blank body. 
Acting as a "counterpoint to the obituary" (Osteen 75), the narrator inserts an 
interview scene, titled "BODY ART IN EXTREMIS: SLOW, SPARE AND PAINFUL," between 
chapters six and seven of The Body Artist. In this reportorial interview, an interrogation 
from which Lauren, the interviewee, flees at the midway point, despite the fact that her 
coIlege classmate conducts the talk, readers leam that "although the brief run [of 
Lauren's performance] is over, she continues to look-weIl wasted" (103). The body 
artist, her old friend clarifies, "is not pale-skinned so much as colorless, bloodless and 
ageless. She is rawboned and slightly bug-eyed. Rer hair looks terroristic" (103). As in 
the early obituary, readers are here apprised ofbiographical information withheld from 
the main narrative, like Lauren's age, her coIlege major, and her father's occupation. 
As weIl, readers leam that Lauren's solo piece, which "sneaked into town for 
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three nights, unadvertised except by word of mouth," "begins with an ancient Japanese 
woman on a bare stage, gesturing" and "ends seventy-five minutes later with a naked 
man, emaciated and aphasic, trying desperately to tell us something" (105). As Lauren 
displays with her early departure from the meeting, however, her key point in Body Time 
is to make her spectators walk out of the performance (many ofwhom do), an exodus she 
accents when she says that her "slow," "repetitious," and "uneventful" show "ought to be 
sparer, even slower than it is, even longer than it is" (106). Perhaps alluding to Beckett's 
idea that "plays should ideally be played in front of empty theatres" (Moran 123), 
DeLillo's protagonist goes on to proclaim that Body Time ought to be "three fucking 
hours" (106). In her rigorous recital she pinpoints this alertness to time and emptiness by 
backgrounding her measured contortions with a video-stream from the lightly trafficked 
highway in Kotka, a projection equipped with a digital clock, a detail that might remind 
her impatient audience of the lone piece offurniture, a clock, in the cage of Katka's "A 
Hunger Artist." Notjust "A" artist, but "The" artist, Lauren Hartke finally caUs for and 
shows an expanded definition of performance and its indelible ties to personal identity 
and temporal experience, when she, acting or not, lapses into the voice of her naked man, 
"Not taped but live. Not lip-sync'd but real," before making a getaway to the lavatory 
(109). Leaving her friend to wait indefinitely, Lauren naturally never retums to the 
interview. 
Her iterated escapes from classicallimits of control and representation, whether in 
terms of the constraints of the body, the demands of the media, or the boundaries of 
theatricalityand identity, furthermore elicit a renewed reading of Michael Majeski's so-
called death at the end of Valparaiso. Maybe the orchestrations ofthe media world do not 
223 
kill Michael. A prototype for Lauren, who returns to her empty house by the sea in 
Chapter Seven, which is The Body Artist' s closing scene or stage, Michael may perform 
his death on Delfina's popular show in order to reclaim his personalliberty. By purposely 
staging his public death, Michael can manage to elude additional mass-market 
manipulation. Literally dead to the public, and figuratively dead to Delfina, who 
ironically lives by virtue of the public opinion she herself controls, Michael regains his 
privacy. By escaping the business and commerce of the spectacular, he relocates 
individuality in privacy. No longer an engineered or puppeteered symbol of 
undifferentiated stardom, he locates a unique personality in an act of escape. He walks off 
the public stage. 
Dead to the world as a celebrity, Michael reinstates the sense of aloneness that 
DeLillo constitutes as the essential feature of free, responsive agency. Like the later 
Lauren, he plays an active role in effecting his own sea change, which enables him to rest 
on the cusp of personal risk and change, as intimated by the biblical resonance of The 
Body Artist's seventh and last episode. Whether or not Michael falls from his present-day 
edition of Edenic retreat becomes his own choice. By acting out rus death, he exposes the 
necessary dangers of self-creation. 
De Lillo buttresses this refreshing analysis of Michael's final stake for freedom in 
his most recent drama. In Love-Lies-Bleeding, his first three-act play, DeLillo recasts the 
seascapes of both The Engineer of Moonlight and The Body Artist to a remote setting 
much like the empty spaces he includes at the end of his first novel, Americana. 
Refashioning the desolate atmospheres incorporated in Antonioni' s most popular films-
the distant barren isles in L 'avventura (1960), the bleak streets in Eclipse (1962), the 
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depressing waste in The Red Desert (1964), the massive sand dunes in Zabriskie Point 
(1970)-DeLillo situates Love-Lies-Bleeding in the spare old house of an artist in the 
middle of a desertscape, as the play's title, the common name of a desert flower, 
portends. In this slow yet moving piece, DeLillo reconfigures the themes, tensions, and 
cast ofhis tirst drama, The Engineer of Moonlight. He incorporates a man named Alex, 
who is seventy, like DeLillo at the time of publication; Toinette, Alex' second wife; Lia, 
his fourth wife; and Sean, the son from Alex' tirst marriage. 
The three younger members gather in the desert to discuss the fate of Alex, who, 
fully dependent in the wake of a second stroke, sits silently "in extremis," irredeemably 
"attached to a feeding tube" (1). Throughout the play, the trio determines the limits of 
Alex' life without legal or medical counsel. In Act One, Lia convinces herself, if not the 
two visitors, that her husband still experiences "awe" (14), that "He's not ready" to die 
(24; 41), that he should "die in his time" (27), and that "he's not gone. He's there. 1 can 
see him there" (30). Setting up a clear contrast to Alex' "persistently vegetative state" 
(27), Act Two features a tlashback to Toinette's visit to the remote house six years 
earlier, wherein the audience leams that Alex is an environmental artist modeled on Klara 
Sax in Underworld. In lieu of recycling thousands of decommissioned fighter planes into 
a popular installation somewhere in Nevada like Klara, Alex commences a nameless 
artistic venture. He aims to build "A room, a cube" in the middle of a mountain barely 
accessible by road (58). Knowing "It'll never be tinished" (61), he explains that after he 
and his three-man crew "cut a passage in," they will construct "A chamber, a cubical 
room. Fashioned out of solid rock. Precise dimensions. A large empty room. Six 
congruent surfaces" (59). Falling into Heideggerian phenomenology, Toinette likens the 
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reverse-archeology of this lofty and clinical dig to the sense of danger and release Alex 
craves. "1 know why you're here," she pronounces, "Risk everything. There's no safety 
here. It's all one thing. The art, the artist, the landscape, the sky" (63). 
Influenced by the long flashback in the same way as the play audience, Lia 
capitulates to the appeals of Toinette and Sean. With the inert, intubated Alex staring on, 
she consents to their case for applying euthanasia: "1 don't want to be here when this is 
happening. 1'11 go walking. 1 haven't done that in a while" (69). More compelling about 
this gesture than the biomedical ethics and the personal principles that come into play, at 
least for the purposes ofwhat 1 have called DeLillo's sustained dramatic project, is the 
fact that Lia quantifies her claim to liberty in terms of aloneness, the same aloneness that 
Alex privileges by moving to the lonely desert originally. No longer induced to tend 
Alex' "intravenous feeding setup" (3), she tums inward. Beyond the limits ofthe Big 
House, she exists individually. Offstage, she escapes her increased confinement to the 
house, an emergent sense of crowding signified by the arrivaI of Toinette and Sean. 
DeLillo's article "Counterpoint," published in Spring 2004, about one year before 
the first production of Love-Lies-Bleeding, confirms this reading. In the piece that he 
subtitles "Three Movies, A Book, and a Play" one of the films he considers is set in the 
barren tundra of the Canadian north, a land notorious for its far-flung remoteness and 
virtual emptiness. The theme to which DeLillo devotes the entirety of his attention in his 
assessment ofthis Canadian Inuit film, titled Atarnajuat: The Fast Runner, is the contrast 
between the confinement of the winter igloos and the endlessness of the snowy land, a 
landscape that mirrors the empty spaces that he al ways stages. 
In the most vivid and memorable scene ofthe movie, members of a rival clan 
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attack Atarnajuat and rus brother, both ofwhom are sleeping in a collapsible animal-skin 
tent under the warmer noonday sun. Woken by his brother' s death wail, Atamajuat, 
unclothed, runs for his life. Hunted by these men (much like the tracking of Selvy in 
Running Dog, Brademas in The Names, Mink in White Noise, Oswald in Libra, and 
Packer in Cosmopolis, to name but a few instances of chase and vigilantism in DeLillo), 
"the hero of Atarnajuat runs stark naked across miles and miles of broken pan ice" 
(Atwood 262). DeLillo's understanding ofthis fascinating, long scene extends primaI 
existence to something more than mere survival. He writes, "In The Fast Runner, 
Atarnajuat, racing, naked, is a man reacting to a primaI danger; there are other men who 
want to kill him. But he may also resemble an individual trying to reestablish his sense of 
isolation, his natural place in the landscape. Life in the winter dwelling built of snow 
blocks gets crowded and complicated, and even introspection becomes a group dynamic. 
The man is running, eyes wild, into the arctic sky" (46). 
Related to individuality, survival entails a committed stake in aloneness, for 
DeLillo. Again and again in his novels, plays, interviews, and nonfiction, in different 
ways he elaborates on the essential apartness of the novelist, the artist, the cultural critic, 
the terrorist, the actor, and the audience member. In his estimation, the individual who 
escapes confinement in order to engage in resourceful operations of introspection 
performs and thereby actualizes her uniqueness, her individuality. Identity requires the 
appreciation and active negotiation ofthese risky, unrepeatable, improvisational actions. 
These are the unscripted possibilities and responsive movements that instantiate the 
flexible connections betweenjustice and self-justification, culture and individuality, 
theatricality and freedom. 
The Odds of Justice in Smiley's Fiction 
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Chapter Five 
The End of Legal Process in The Greenlanders 
Jane Smiley writes about livestock and luck. Best known for her Pulitzer Prize-
winning novel A Thousand Acres, which adapts King Lear to the Midwestern farm-crisis 
in the 1980s, Smiley features the ownership ofproperty in virtually aIl ofher nine novels, 
two novellas, and several short stories. Her novelistic representations of chance and odds 
complicate these entitlements to territory. She tends to situate her realist fictions in the 
American heartland. In her two longest novels, however, she varies this inclination. She 
moves away from her primary setting-regional USA-in The Greenlanders (1988), 
located in Greenland in the fourteenth. and fifteenth centuries, and incorporates an 
international dimension in Horse Heaven (2000). Though Horse Heaven is centered in 
the US, it extends its frame of reference geographically to include England, France, 
Ireland, Lithuania, and Japan, among other places. Writing about farms and property in 
both novels, Smiley calculates the odds of survival for a medieval civilization in The 
Greenlanders and the odds of success at the racetrack in Horse Heaven. These two works 
likewise foreground problems of luck and fate to narrative, a move that is indicative of 
Smiley's proclivity to test the limits and devices ofrepresentation. As her repeated 
experiments with novelistic genres suggest, she prizes the investigation and manipulation 
of storytelling conventions. Duplicate Keys (1984), for instance, is a crime fiction, while, 
to categorize sorne of her other novels, A Thousand Acres (1991) is a contemporary 
tragedy; Moo (1995) a social comedy; Lidie Newton (1998) a bellum romance; and Good 
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Faith (2003) a Reagan-era satire. 
As a non-fictional coda to Horse Heaven, her recent book A Year at the Races 
(2004) reasserts her ongoing interest in stories while at the same time accenting her 
concem with gambling, odds, women, and luck. The last chapter of this book, titled after 
the racetrack adage "That's Horses," specifically points up her enduring preoccupation 
with luck and the many concessions luck can allow. Propelling narrative in unexpected 
ways, luck changes stories even as it provides them. As a structural device, luck draws 
out, shifts, and fragments stories. In terms of the narrative of gambling, luck opens up 
and often shakes up the odds. Luck c<pllengthen a sure shot in the same way that it can 
shorten a long shot. Combining skill and chance, a calculated gamble risks adeptness and 
expertise to the whims and impulses of Lady Luck. Gambling, in its many speculative 
varieties, is defined by this familiar apprehension of risk. From the law court to the 
steading (or farmstead) in The Greenlanders, and from the stable to the racetrack (or 
racecourse) in Horse Heaven, luck influences all forms of speculation. In other words, 
chance delimits Smiley's portrayal of the Nordic world in the same way that it typifies 
her representation of the track world. 
Smiley's two big novels, nevertheless, are not merely about risky play within the 
rubric of unruly chance. In these texts, the author elaborates multiple ways in which to 
approach and negotiate gambles and wagers in order to show that odds can run a parallel 
course to justice. Smiley' s female characters, for example, normally rely on intuition 
instead ofreason when they gamble. Unlike most of the men in Smiley's fiction, women, 
and sometimes children, are liable to possess particular qualities, including second sight, 
prognostication, wish granting, and animal communication, aIl of which alter the logic of 
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odds-making and -playing. Though odds can be interpreted and played in tenns of 
intuition, infonnation, or haphazard guessing, so Smiley illustrates, odds can furthennore 
be evaluated as good or just. Playing out garnes and legality in multiple ways, she links 
odds to justice-both of which can at once be pliable and exacting, changing and 
substantial. Odds, as Smiley configures them iri narrative paradigms, can offer an 
alternative and often an ironic twist to convictions about and implementations of justice. 
Interweaving narrative with various applications of garnbling and refreshed 
appreciations of justice, Smiley offers another version of the individuality and freedom 
that DeLillo develops all through his dramatic project. In The Greenlanders, she 
collapses the free agency that DeLillo atlributes to a self-detennined or -engineered sense 
of isolation. Working out spatiallimits of liberty and control in a way dissimilar to 
DeLillo's, Smiley's representation ofaloneness and remoteness ends not by enacting a 
self-awareness that privileges the actions of the individual over the passive nature of the 
crowd; alternatively, her depiction of sec1usion leads to the loss of collective stories, a 
loss that intimates the end of the Greenland colony. Without stories, without news from 
other places, without the group storytelling that go es on at their annual public tribunal, 
the Greenlanders lose not only their individual c1aims to distinct identity, but also their 
chance for survival. Asserting that laws and legality change first and foremost by way of 
public debate, in lieu ofthrough creative forms ofpersonal isolation and risky cultural 
comment and discourse, Smiley suggests in The Greenlanders that the inherent ironies of 
any legal system necessarily caU upon both measured and random actions. Without these 
risky public redirections of legality, these risky public maneuvers that are suppressed 
once the Greenlandic legal system is abandoned, these risky public interventions that tie 
personal and communal existence to the evolving devices of storytelling, legality, and 
justice, the colony cannot endure. As 1 will show in "The End of Legal Process in The 
Greenlanders," life ends along with transparent legality and shared narrative. 
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Smiley counteracts the breakdown of narrative as manifested in the literaI 
isolation that closes The Greenlanders with a focus on unrestricted movement and 
expansive stories in Horse Heaven. Neither constrained to particular spaces, nor limited 
to select storylines, a major portion of the growing cast of characters in Horse Heaven 
routine1y confronts and negotiates with tensions or even antitheses between stories and 
laws. The various interconnecting yet always inconclusive stories in this novel, 1 argue in 
"Big Stakes in Horse Heaven," position narrative beyond the law, in a realm where odds 
mIe. By incorporating characters that take advantage of odds, characters that actively 
respond to the risky repositioning that odds solicit, Smiley implies that justice may 
function at an individuallevel instead of a collective one. Freely migrating all over the 
global map, rather than ultimately trapped in a very specific place on a diminishing 
colony on a regional map, Smiley links movement and luck to justice and narrative. In 
this novel, individuals can take real stakes in fashioning their own identities by 
attentively incorporating themselves and their changing stories into the intersecting 
narratives around them. In Horse Heaven, narrative, identity, and personal forms of 
justice increase as characters position themselves in evolving storylines, storylines that 
they in turn contribute to and alter in the same way that they influence odds by playing 
either with them or against them. In other words, fate can function at individuallevels, 
individuallevels that can demarcate the necessary inconsistency-and unpredictability-
embedded into any speculative, legal, or representational system. 
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1 will start the development of this section of my dissertation with an examination 
of Smiley's depiction of the ill-fated Nordic colony. 1 begin with a chapter on The 
Greenlanders for two reasons. For one, the saga cornes first chronologically in Smiley's 
oeuvre. Secondly, her encyc10pedic novel Horse Heaven is her most complex, skillful, 
and far-reaching work of fiction. In contrast to the technique she implements in The 
Greenlanders, a method that finally shuts down the novel's single narrative, she 
integrates a strategy that expands the flow of multiple narratives in Horse Heaven. This 
later work, as my second chapter on Smiley shows, articulates sorne of the more subtle 
problems with justice, risk, luck, and representation initially introduced in her 
Greenlandic saga. 
Legality 
The Greenlanders, Jane Smiley's masterwork, illustrates the link between the law 
and survival in Greenland between 1345 and an indefinite period sometime after 1415. 
Smiley concedes that her saga wàs inspired by the singularity of the Greenlander' s 
dec1ine: "One ofthe first things that intrigued me about [the fate of the colony] was that it 
was the only attested case of an established European civilization or culture falling apart 
and vanishing" (N akadate 106). In this chronic1e of a people she earlier de scribes as 
"fall[en] through a hole in history and disappeared" (106), Smiley's narrative technique 
seems to be as merciless as the Greenlandic way of life is harsh, not to mention curiously 
unlucky. At a talk in 1996, eight years after the publication of The Greenlanders, she 
congratulated herself for the remorseless style of her novel-Iength version of the saga, 
while at the same time disc10sing her narrative influence: "After writing The 
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Greenlanders, 1 rather prided myself on my cruelty to my characters. 1 was pleased at 
how readily 1 could sacrifice them to principle. Sudden, accidentaI death, for example, is 
a prominent feature of the lcelandic saga" ("Shakespeare in Iceland" 171). 
Unpitying, she is also true to the stylistic conventions of Scandinavian sagas. As 
Nakadate points out, "the dominant mode ofthe sagas and chronicles was a direct and 
dispassionate 'plain style'" (104-5). For instance, Smiley uses parataxis (clauses linked 
by "and") in order to create a biblical feeling. The "plain style" that she employs for 
almost 600 pages-incredibly "the manuscript exceeded 1,100 pages" (Nakadate 110)-
refIects the Nordic lifestyle she represents: measured, repetitive, tiring, and bleak. This 
fiat, steadfast form, a form that includes reiterated indexes of time (paragraphs linked by 
"now"), also intimates what the Greenlanders see as their luckless decline. Almost from 
the beginning, their days seem numbered. Speaking at the "5 Voices, One Place" 
symposium held in Lincoln, Nebraska, in Spring 2001, Smiley construed what she saw as 
the Scandinavian condition. Stressing qualification while at the same lapsing into 
parataxis, she explained that 
what begins as, let's say, disconnection and depression ends up as a 
philosophy and aworld view. It's no coincidence that the Scandinavians 
were the only society that imagined that when the end came it would come 
in destruction. Everybody else in the world thought redemption was just 
around the corner and the Scandinavians thought that the evil guys were 
going to break their bonds and overwhelm everything and that the 
Valkyries and the warriors and the gods were going to come up short and 
that would be it and darkness would faH and that would be the end of the 
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world. ("It Ain't the Eiffel Tower" 338-9) 
Smiley goes on to wonder if "elevating a mood of, let's say, despair into a philosophy of 
universal destruction" is "the tirst step to the end" (339). In doing so, she conjectures on 
the self-fultilling propensities of a philosophy of despair. Expectations are commonly 
borne out in Greenland; consequently, a Greenlandic beliefin eventual doom overrides 
the hope of salvation. And this metaphysics, Smiley suggests, can compromise a life or 
the many lives of a select "society," no matter how secluded the settlements, districts, and 
steadings ofthis society happen to be from one another. A general sense of despondency, 
the author claims, negatively influences the odds of survival for the Greenlanders. 
The Greenland colony is comprised oftwo settlements. One ofthese, the Western 
Settlement, is inexplicably found "abandoned [with] all of the livestock dead or scattered 
to the wastelands" at the onset of Smiley's novel (The Greenlanders 6). In the Eastern 
Settlement, where the narrative takes place, the Greenlanders live on steadings in districts 
separated by fjords or long, narrow, and deep sea-inlets that divide high cliffs. Society in 
Greenland is made up of concentric circles, including the clerics in the priestly district of 
Gardar, the wealthy folk with one or more steadings, the poor folk with small steadings, 
and the servant folk who insinuate themselves onto steadings in every district by 
contributing livestock and handicrafts. Like many of the servants who seem at once to 
belong anywhere and nowhere, women complicate the relations of this social structure. 
Women do not merely have domestic skills in The Greenlanders. Their qualities include 
second sight and prescience. The men, however, often misinterpret the se female features 
and visions. Moreover, the men in Greenland generally ignore or outright suppress the 
interpretations, forewarnings, and admonitions of the women. 
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As a civilization, the Greenlanders also have strained relations with the skraelings 
or Inuit people, the Icelanders, the Norwegians, and the papacy in Rome and France. 
Most of the Greenlanders' relations--complex and simple, external and internaI-are 
determined by water. Fjords, for instance, separate their several districts. Skraelings show 
up in order to trade in canoes. Other visitors arrive on ships. Water likewise speaks to the 
fluidity of their social system. Due to a variety of factors, most of which the Greenlanders 
atlribute to luck, folk commonly change social ranks or classes in the colony. But the 
tendency in Smiley's saga, especially for her main characters, is downward. Their luck, 
as they understand it, is usually ill. 
What begins for Smiley as a re-creation of the undoing of Greenlandic civilization 
turns into what she cornes to understand as her social responsibility agenda. She ascribes 
a social value to tpe representation of conflict and increased lawlessness. She remarks, 
"The whole time [she] was writing [the saga], [she] felt very socially responsible" (in 
Nakadate 106). Continuing with this perception ofresponsibility, she links narrative 
manipulation to social control: "There's the sense that ifwe in our time knew how they in 
their time somehow managed to let go, somehow managed to lose control, then it would 
somehow keep us from losing control of our own situation" (106). History, she makes 
plain, mirrors and checks the present. And since conflict involves debate and fruitful 
exchange, Smiley credits the imaginative depiction of conflict in narrative as a translation 
of the confrontations of everyday conflict. Just as the past provides a check and balance 
for the present, representations of survival and justice provide a mode! for actual 
negotiations of survival and justice. In this sense, Smiley' s concerns reflect those of her 
Nordic characters. The Greenlanders value the representation of inconsistency and 
divergence, as it is brought to bear in the innumerable oral stories that they share. 
Conflict likewise defines their legal system, a complex system based in the always-
disputed operations of recoHection. 
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Neil Nakadate provides the only scholarship to date on The Greenlanders aside 
from book reviews. In his appraisal of Smiley's ambitious saga, he highlights dissolution: 
"The Greenlanders conveys the bewilderment of a slowly weakening, steadily fraying 
civilization in which meaningful conviction, civil obligation, and the skills of everyday 
life endure from year to year but decline over the decades" (112). Though Nakadate's 
emphasis on dwindling suret y, dut y, and adroitness is apt, his summary misses out on 
Smiley's principle strategy. Rather than single out decline-after aH, the Greenlanders 
are quite aware that they live through patterns ofhunger, sickness, respite, and bounty 
(The Greenlanders 473)-Smiley reflects on the relation between decline and the law. 
The Greenlanders lose lives as they lose laws. Smiley links legality to orality-to 
storytelling, to memory-and the sharing that their legal system entails. AH the same, 
Nakadate finds fault with the oral nature of Greenlandic civilization. Almost as though he 
rebukes the Greenlanders for idly discarding a written culture that they never had, he 
summarily condemns their reliance upon the conventions of orality. "The Greenlanders' 
orality-dependent, highly subjective, and fallible memory," Nakadate writes, "does more 
to sustain the debilitating enmities of clans than to nurture a sense of shared experience 
and a productive understanding of the world" (l32). 
Orality, so Nakadate determines it, is counterproductive for the Greenlanders. Yet 
Smiley illustrates the virtue and the justness ofthis "orality-dependent" colony. In The 
Greenlanders fairness requires communal engagement. Their justice system thereby 
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relies on contrasting memories and different versions or renderings of stories. For the 
colony, legality consists of productive discussion, which includes disagreement. The 
Greenlanders are therefore a variety ofwhat H. Patrick Glenn caUs a "chthonic" society. 
They depend on dialogue, on stories, and on debate. Marking the importance of the 
di alogie over what would invariably be a less public form of transcribed verbal culture, 
Glenn describes the essentiaUy egalitarian character of chthonic legal systems: "The law 
is vested in a repository in which aU, or most, share and in which aH, or most, participate. 
Transmission of the tradition is through the dynamic procession of oral education, in 
daily life, and the dialogical character of the tradition is a matter of daily practice, for aU 
ages of people" (59). 
The Greenlanders' type of chthonic legal system, caHed "the Thing," enforces 
deliberation, dispute, and aboveall communal participation. Though the men have all the 
say when it cornes to Thing "cases," the law is linked to publicness. Women and men 
look forward to and depend upon the Thing. Originally a seven-day annual affair, nearly 
every Greenlander attends the event in order to launch, resolve, jury, defend, or audit 
legal cases, as well as to organize communal hunts, brandish marriageable offspring, 
engage in team games, acquire news of other districts, and retell time-honored stories. 
The undefined title ofthis legal system speaks to its variation and adjustment. Because it 
is oral, because it is based on memory, and because it is essentially an open forum, the 
Thing is a process in constant transformation. Since it continually evolves, the 
Greenlanders do not know what to caU it. For this civilization, the Thing moves far 
beyond the province of cases and criminal sentences. Prompting change, the Thing 
influences aIl facets of daily life. A parochial version of the racetrack in Horse Heaven, 
the Thing provides a more-or-less equal forum for the acquisition of what sociologists 
calI "social capital." Robert D. Putnam clarifies that this concept of capital refers to 
valuable and productive "connections among individuals" (19). As he explains, social 
capital reinforces and extends "the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness" within a 
given community (19). 
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The Thing is not exclusively what Nakadate sums up as the "fundamental tool for 
articulating and distributing justice" (120). More importantly, Thing attendance also 
involves fruitful recreations. These diversions allow for a shared break from the 
difficulties of day-to-day life in Greenland. At the Thing, songs are sung and stories are 
shared. Legality, here, celebrates and generates stories. The Thing can also provide a 
place for regulated competition. It can sanction communal play, which has attendant 
social benefits. And because nearly everyone goes to the Thing, the legal system likewise 
widens the scope of play. As members from different districts engage in the play of tale 
telling, they can likewise participate in game-play. Not simply escapes from daily 
hardship, these two activities stimulate the Greenlanders in a number of ways. While 
storytelling encourages interpretation and the exchange of opinions, games allow for 
relatively safe instantiations of risk, both of which concentrate and reflect upon the 
strictures of a colony dependent on unending dialogue and defined by the constant threats 
to the daily lives of its inhabitants. As such, these two representative activities help 
develop individual senses of selfhood, senses of individuality that both stand apart from 
and prop up the continued progress of Greenlandic civilization. 
In The Greenlanders, Smiley illustrates that risky encounters or engagements help 
in the fashioning of identity. As a contemporary writer, she is not alone in this estimation 
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of individuality. When DeLillo's narrator argues that "running reveals the clue to being" 
at the beginning of Underworld (13), he also intimates that an absence ofrisk stifles the 
self. In Double Dawn, Frederick and Stephen Barthelme make a related point when they 
say that even when they lose at gambling, "It [still] satisfies the need for excitement, 
thrills" (109). Near the end of The Greenlanders, Gunnar, who is at once unlucky and 
long-living, a rarity in the colony, may be making a similar claim when he laments that 
even with "all the dangers of the hunt" the Greenlanders take "pleasure" in "fighting and 
killing each other" (509). Gunnar suggests that the jeopardy of the hunt is not enough to 
quell the Greenlanders' human need for peril. He thus points out the logical extension of 
a community that eventually suffers from a lack of regulated risk. Without the limits of 
play, the love ofhazard goes unchecked. Thrill and excitement also widen to play in its 
storytelling form: expressing opinions can be as risky and as rewarding as a deer hunt or 
a swimming contest. Opinions, at certain times and in certain places, need to be checked. 
The Thing, often less restrictive than the home, also tests, tempers, and develops the 
delivery of these personal convictions. Like hunting, skillful oration can be a life-saving 
talent. 
In her saga, Smiley represents the interrelations of the law and the social system. 
For the Greenlanders, the discussion and diversion that define the Thing are instrumental 
to survival. Despite cycles of great hardship, the Greenland colony survives through six 
centuries. The community that the Thing fosters makes this improbable survival possible. 
Community, so Smiley posits, does not simply alleviate the rigors ofNordic life; it 
functions to perpetuate this life. Without even consulting with one single woman, 
however, the men of Greenland end up abolishing their traditionallegal forum. The social 
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fabric that holds their civilization together soon follows suit. In the absence of a joint 
sense of community among the Greenlanders, internaI and external forces threaten 
continued existence. In Greenland, the law betokens a social system and a social system 
promises survival. Within the colony, in short, the law equals life. Without the legal 
system, revenge replaces legislated justice. 
Compellingly, the conclusion of The Greenlanders does not mirror its opening. 
Smiley does not depict the abandonment of the Eastern Settlement, and thus portray the 
termination of Greenlandic civilization. Rather, she leaves her Greenlanders in a state of 
lawlessness. Outlawry best represents this loss of legality. Thing law creates a zone for 
outlaws-the wilderness-to which laws do not extend. Outlawry is thus at once a place 
and a state. In Smiley's saga, the whole of Greenland tums into a lawless wilderness. 
General outlawry ultimately replaces the Greenlanders' fluid legal and vital social 
systems. Outlawry becomes their story. And outlawry ups the odds against the survival of 
the colony. 
In Nordic Greenland, legal justice is oral in nature. On an annual basis, cases are 
public1y presented at the Thing after the lawspeaker orally recites the laws. The law 
therefore passes through the generations only by voice. As Glenn relates, the "most 
evident feature of chthonic legal tradition has been its orality. The teaching ofthe past is 
preserved through the informaI, though sometimes highly disciplined, means of human 
speech and human memory" (58). Glenn goes on to emphasize the indispensability of 
memory: "The tradition only survives by constant decisions, based on previous decisions, 
and 'hence previous information" (73). This reliance on precedence, however, does not 
limit change. Instead, it allows for change in small II.1easures. Glenn clarifies that the 
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chthonic legal procedure is always "open to endless debate as to its interpretation and 
application; it can be rejected in its fundamental teaching and disappear" (73). As a 
chthonic-based common oral forum, the Greenlandic Thing makes essential demands on 
the civilization that it govems. At its best, the rigorous demands of public discussion and 
debate foster community and promote change. Characterized by voiced interchange, the 
law justly evolves because of communal interpretation and deliberation. 
Andrew Ross highlights the evolution necessary to legal systems. He makes the 
point that the law is "constantly in a state of redefinition" even as it is "already fully 
formed" (48). Both in definition and in practice, no system of law can remain stagnant. 
Since there is always a gap between the formation and the institution of the law, its 
strictures are always in a process of renegotiation. Laws always come from the past, so 
when they are reconsidered and adapted they are made pertinent to the particular 
demands uponjustice in the present. Remarking on the pluralism, cultural diversity, and 
historical settings that invariably influence systems of justice, Michael Walzer strongly 
implies that every implementation of legality is a unique appropriation of justice: "Justice 
is a human construction, and it is doubtful that it can be made in only one way" (5). Oral 
legal systems may make this process of human construction and reinterpretation all the 
more obvious. As the Greenlanders recite and then discuss the laws that they have 
committed to memory, they reconstruct their understandings ofthese laws. While 
engaged in this enduring observance of revision, they put previous laws and applications 
oflegality into practice in newly fashioned ways. Adding to these points, S. L. Hurley 
stresses that justice is not about regnant views, but in tum about impartial ones. "The 
mere fact that sorne normative views are prevalent," Hurley argues, "does not immunize 
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them ifthey compromise the demands of justice" (238). Though Greenland is basicaIly 
removed from the pluralism and diversity that Walzer and Hurley advocate and describe, 
the colony is comprised of distinct social classes from a variety of districts, aIl of which 
are invited to attend and participate in the Thing. With its open debate, chthonic law can 
ideally recognize and accommodate the competing and changing claims of what 
constitutes justice in particular oral civilizations. 
Nevertheless, for the mixed colony of Greenland, which integrates people of 
Scandinavian extraction with émigrés from other areas of Europe, the Thing is not a 
superlative or representative chthonic system. The arrivaI of Christianity distorts the 
openness and plainness of the legal method. In "The Greenlanders' Saga," which is 
purportedly reported by Thorfinn Karlsefni around 1010 and orally transmitted until 
preserved in manuscript form sometime in the thirteenth century, Eirik the Red tells his 
son Leif the Lucky that the first priest in Greenland is a "shyster" (145). Notwithstanding 
the fact that Eirik eventually converts to Christianity in this version of the saga, author of 
The Norse Atlantic Saga Gwyn Jones "prefer[s]" the divergent account that Eirik remains 
a "heathen" to the end (145). Whether or not this legendary figure adopted the teachings 
of the Catholic Church promoted by King Olaf of Norway at the turn of the first 
millennium, the effects of Christianity on Nordic law appear deleterious all the same. 
Speaking not ofWestem religion specifically, but rather of Occidental establishments 
generally, Glenn points out that "the massive character of European settlement has 
generally been debilitating for chthonic law" (78). Hearkening back to times predating 
substantial colonization, Glenn privileges the simplicity of the chthonic tradition: "A 
tradition which is oral in character do es not lend itself to complex institutions. So the 
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tradition faces less danger of pecuniary and institutional corruption, offering fewer 
positions of prestige and authority" (60). As he associates increased colonial settlement 
with growing complexity, Glenn intimates the threat to both the authority and the parity 
of traditional chthonic law. Chthonic legality values an open, shared understanding of a 
judicial process relying on stories, not written-down laws. As a prevailing component of 
increased religious institutionalization, the technology of writing alters the nature of 
legality for the Greenlanders. When an is said and done, as the mechanics of the oral 
process are complicated by the arrivaI of the Church in Greenland, the legal system risks 
the communal engagements that historically delineate it. 
In The Greenlanders, which begins three centuries after the arrivaI of the 
"shysters," Smiley accentuates the labyrinthine aspects of the legal system. Her narrator 
stresses the sway of the Church on legality while also observing the tangled interruptions 
and gaps that come with this influence: 
At this time the Greenlanders had three types of law, The Thing law, the 
bishop's law, and the king's law, ofwhich the last two were sometimes 
combined, depending on whether the bishop or the representative of the 
king was living in Greenland. Thing law and the law of the bishop were 
intended to concem the different matters of secular and Church law, but 
sometimes the Thing was less powerful, and sometimes the bishop was not 
in residence, so the men ofmost of the fjords settled disputes among 
themselves, and this was a habit the Greenlanders had gotten into since the 
death of the last bishop and the aging of the lawspeaker Gizur. (47) 
The system of law in Greenland loses authority as it loses clarity and organization. This 
244 
convergence of legal systems complicates jurisprudence. The self-govemance of the 
Greenlanders may even be evaluated as ajuster method with which to determine legality, 
given that oral exchange can remain unimpeded by the obscurity and contrivance typified 
by the seemingly ad hoc entanglement ofthree distinct approaches to the law. Their self-
settling likewise stresses the shared values of communallife. "Settling disputes among 
themselves" is socially condoned and therefore de facto transparent. That is to say, self-
legislature is open to the scrutiny of the community. 
Moreover, by doubting and bypassing the aged and incapable lawspeaker Gizur, 
the Greenlanders paradoxically infer the positive influence of lawspeakers. The control 
that a lawspeaker holds reproduces the sway that the law holds.Presiding over a thirteen-
judge panel, the lawspeaker stands for the values promoted by the Thing. When a 
lawspeaker is replaced, so too is the law revived. Just as a seasoned lawspeaker 
exemplifies an essential tie to traditional ideas oflegality, a new lawspeaker embodies the 
needed link to contemporary reconstructions of legality. In order for the law to be the 
law, it needs renewal and modification. Even in Greenland, where heritage and legacy 
reign, conceptions of justice inevitably evolve. Smiley suggests that the Greenlanders 
communally rally behind competent lawspeakers in the same way that they question 
incompetent ones. Promptly in the saga, her narrator remarks, "Osmund was known as a 
lucky man, who stepped forward and spoke up in all things. His mother's brother, Gizur 
Gizursson, was the lawspeaker, but it was well known that Osmund knew the laws better 
than any man in Brattahlid district" (9). Since Gizzurson is without an heir, the 
Greenlanders thereby elect the well-regarded and legally capable Osmund Thordarson as 
their new lawspeaker at the Thing that follows Gizursson's death (69). 
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Regardless of perceived competence, living lawspeakers tend not to be replaced in 
Greenland. Glenn's moderated explanation of the term gerontocracy is helpful in 
explaining why. Observing the diversity of chthonic peoples and the assorted applications 
of chthonic law, Glenn writes, "The most common feature appears to be a council of 
eIders, individual people who, by their assimilation of tradition over a longer period of 
time, often speak with greater authority. There is no guarantee ofthis, no process of 
screening out those faltering with age, but it appears to have been generally held to be 
true. This has been referred to as gerontocracy, but it may be preferable to see it as an 
expression of a link with past generations" (60). EIders are the living links to the legends 
and legalities of the past. Short of a great community destabilizing effrontery, the ruling 
lawspeaker or legal council deserves a valued place in the culture being govemed. In The 
Greenlanders, the lawspeaker, active or not, competent or not, is a reminder of 
precedents, if nothing else. He discourages any rapid tear from the past. If a lawspeaker' s 
memory of the laws noticeably Wanes, his judicial authority gets transferred either to the 
council of judges or to the community at large. Regardless of whether or not folk attend 
the Thing annuaIly, as long as the Thing is extant the community respects the 
conventions of legality that it bolsters. As the major plot event in The Greenlanders, 
Thing law manipulates the course of daily life, an everyday life the men of the colony 
drastically and irredeemably jeopardize not mainly because they disband the tribunal, but 
rather because they renounce refashioning it. AlI in aIl, Smiley insinuates that the 
community caUs upon itself to address questions of justice when a lawspeaker can no 
longer competently do so. The community as a whole can assume the role of an 
incompetent lawspeaker until a new figure assumes this leadership role. 
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The valuable opinion that supports, questions, replaces, and selects new 
lawspeakers likewise influences the Church in the colony. As Smiley illustrates quite 
early in the first ofthree main sections in The Greenlanders, the Bishop and the 
community appear to influence one another equally: "Bit by bit, the bishop had learned 
the ways of the Greenlanders, and often judged cases as the Greenlanders themselves 
would have judged them" (69). Local concerns naturally influence the terms under which 
justice is understood and invoked. Though rendered progressively more complex on 
account of Church intervention, legality in Greenland involves ongoing communal 
consensus. Glenn reveals that in chthonic societies "crime becomes the responsibility of 
civil society, in the form ofthe groups, clans or families which make it up. Injury to a 
member was the responsibility of the group" (64). The community, in no uncertain terms, 
is responsible for restoring the balance of justice. 
In The Greenlanders, "civil society" engages with both sides of the law: criminal 
acts and compensatory justice. According to Glenn, physical violence is the princip le 
social wound in chthonic societies. "There was to all intents and purposes no law of theft 
or burglary," he alleges, "no law of drugs, no organized crime; no money laundering; no 
white collar crime; no fraud. The list could go on. Crime was a serious social wound, 
usually involving physical violence" (64). Though murder is the gravest offence in 
Greenland, the Thing also commonly presides over other acts of injustice, including cases 
dealing with rape, fouI play, the abuse of servants, driftage rights, land disputes, and 
squatters' daims to abandoned steadings. The alternative kind of justice that Smiley 
offers for these crimes almost always appertains to property, in one form or another. Just 
as folk can lay lawful claim to abandoned steadings, they can be legally divested of 
247 
properties. Depending on the magnitude of a conviction, guilty parties customarily lose 
parts or the whole of their land and livestock as payment to the victims of their crimes. 
With the exception of a greater outlawry conviction (capital punishment), to judge a case 
is to consider the rightful ownership and allocation ofproperty. Even an arraignment of 
lesser outlawry (banishment to the wildemess at the fringes of the settlement and the law 
[The Greenlanders 88]) involves property. Charged with heinous acts but not judged as 
threats to the survival of the colony, Iesser outlaws lose their right to civilized territory. 
Smiley nonetheless problematizes what can be called the melodrama oflegality. 
Legaljudgments aim to demonstrate right and wrong. Hyperbolically, then, the law 
distinguishes the heroes from the villains. Yet The Greenlanders integrates unmatched 
cases with unfamiliar results. Therefore, sometimes the Greenlanders do not know how to 
judge a case or how to evaluate its consequences. As a result of being charged with 
witchcraft, for instance, Kollgrim Gunnarsson is bumt at the stake (506-7). Following 
this unprecedented crime and punishment, Kollgrim's father Gunnar Asgeirsson "knew 
not how to think of it, or to feel it, or, for that matter, to speak of it to [his wife] Birgitta" 
(509-10). Smiley's narrator never depicts this unparalleled yet eventual conversation. 
Even so, her narrator relates Birgitta Lavransdottir' s ensuing suicide attempt and 
successive "self-murder" (511). The folk of Greenland are undecided as to whether 
"shame" or "grief prompts Birgitta's "sin[ful]" final act (511). With these exceptional 
cases in point, Smiley suggests that every legal action is singular. Each and every lawful 
debate or above-board controversy ought to be heard, interpreted, and judged as 
unfamiliar. Additionally, Smiley implies that the law must always question its 
application, for every crime sets a causal sequence into motion, a series that precedents or 
cases stated can never envisage. On the who le, the job of the law is forever to redirect 
these sequences toward justice. 
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Highlighting this process of redirection, Greenlandic law requires the immediate 
announcement ofkillings (125). Distinct from murder, a killing can be a lawful 
compensatory act of justice. But for a killing to be perceived as just, ït must immediately 
be exposed to the evaluative process of the law. In this way, Smiley argues thatjustice 
does not stop with an act of remuneration. Just as lawspeakers are liable for their memory 
of the laws, judges are responsible for their application of the laws, and criminals are 
accountable for their unjust acts, remunerators are likewise answerable for their 
compensatory acts. Justice is never a matter of an open-and-shut case. Justice is never 
entirely comprehensive or utterly complete. Because crimes and judgments alike can 
have serious repercussions, justice demands ongoing renegotiation. Life on the colony 
persists because of the checks and balances ofunremitting liability. For the Greenlanders, 
court and civilization evolve as legal precedent is remembered, lawful function is 
debated, and above aH, official parity is privileged. The publicness and seeming 
impartiality of the Thing can be seen to illustrate Glenna L. Simons and William F. 
Stroup's contention that a court is always-already a part ofthe system that it tries to 
regulate (120). In Greenland, the Thing directs life in the colony as those living in the 
colony direct it. 
Outlawry 
Lawspeaker Bjorn Bollason, however, displaces the pattern oftransparency and 
slow shift that defines the Greenlandic legal system. After he replaces the dead Osmund, 
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he makes untold changes to the Thing. As the narrator clarifies, Bollason initially makes 
these incomparable alterations with the hope of preserving faimess in the face of 
slumping Thing attendance: 
Bjom Bollason established a new type of judge, to be known as an at-large 
judge, and to be appointed by the lawspeaker to sit in on cases when 
judges failed to come to the Thing, and these new judges were to be 
appointed from among the most prosperous farmers at the Thing who did 
not have cases pending, and they were to remainjudges-at-Iarge until they 
should have cases before the Thing, which would disqualify them for that 
year and two years after that. (328) 
Bollason's modifications suggest the prevalence or regularity of Thing cases. Legality, he 
implies, frequently intervenes in the lives of Greenlanders. His proviso likewise aims to 
secure continued equality for the Greenlanders. He makes the point that just as everyone 
is called to the Thing, everyone is alike at the Thing. These changes seem just, for they 
recall what Ross notes as the changing qualities of the justice system (48), while they also 
speak to what Walzer sees as the different implementations of justice (5). Still, Bollason 
breaks with longstanding tradition. Though it is true that "Unlike almost anything else, 
only the law can change itself," as Ross puts it (55), the Greenlanders depend on the 
delayed changes that result from open, communal disputation and consensus. In 
contradistinction to Greenlandic convention, Bollason changes the law in lieu of allowing 
the law to change itself by degrees. 
Bollason therefore devalues the effectiveness of the legal system by obscuring its 
legislative function, not to mention the merit ofhis privileged position. The knowledge of 
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the lawspeaker ensures that traditional customs are preserved as they are reformulated. 
But by undermining the laws that his position uniquely epitomizes, Bollason second-
guesses his own authority. His actions anticipate other changes to the legal system. 
Instead ofmerely cross-examining Bollason's competency by means of avoiding him and 
the Thing, which is the customary way ofredistributing a lawspeaker's authority to the 
community in general, Jon Andres Erlendsson, a respected man in the community, 
prepares a Thing case against lawspeaker Bollason. Elucidating the lasting demands that 
justice must make upon itself, Jon Andres accuses Bollason for an injustice that he 
committed as lawspeaker at a Thing years before. In a case without legal precedent, Jon 
Andres charges the lawspeaker himselfwith the murder of Kollgrim. Jon Andres 
contends that "mercy might have been shown" to his brother-in-law Kollgrim, in the form 
of the Greenlanders' being incapable of collecting enough wood to cremate him at the 
stake, but for the lawspeaker's clever notion to "Soak [the accused] in seal oil" (556). Jon 
Andres alleges that ingenuity, like strength, can kill (556). He then adds that murder is 
always murder, whether performed by a man or "a man in the guise of a lawspeaker," 
before he "demand[s] ajudgment of full outlawry and deprivation ofproperty against 
Bjom Bollason, [a verdict that entails] exile into the wastelands, loss of position as 
lawspeaker, and any other punishments as self-judgment might allow" (556). 
The lawspeaker' s response stands against the princip les of justice. Bollason 
reveals that his changes to the legal system were executed under "the shield of 
pragmatism [so as] to pack a truncated court with his ownjudges" (Nakadate 114-5). 
More valuable than the vested personal interests that Nakadate highlights, however, is the 
fact that Bollason's response outlines whatjustice is not: 
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l, Bjorn Bollason, have been lawspeaker of the Greenlanders for many 
summers, and before that my father Hoskuld had great knowledge of the 
law. Never in the memory of men has such a case been brought before the 
Thing, where a man who is a judge has been threatened with outlawry for 
carrying out the laws as they were decided upon. This action is absurd at 
the least and dangerous at the most, for in this way every decision of the 
judges can be challenged whenever and for as long as men wish to 
challenge it, and that is all 1 have to say in the matter. (557) 
Rather than disqualify himself from the position of lawspeaker "for that year and two 
years after that," as his amended laws prescribed (328), Bollason dismisses the 
lawfulness of the arraignment raised against him. 
ln so doing, Bollason rallies behind a priority that he revamped, namely 
precedence, in order to reject the challenge, argument, and consultation that any 
apparatus of justice ought to demand. With this representational move, Smiley hints at 
the uneasy and tenuous position of justice systems. Emblematic of any entrenched legal 
structure, the Thing can only sustain itself by reassessing and annulling the internaI 
inconsistencies that regularly surface and enforce ongoing debate as the apparatus for the 
allotment of justice evolves. As part of the limits and equities of the cultural milieu it 
regulates, justice marches forward on account of its inner incongruity. When Bollason 
disallows the confrontation that Jon Andres proposes and legality itself necessitates, he in 
effect cancels the justness of the justice structure. As the central plot event in The 
Greenlanders, this outright denial of the contradictions that demarcate the praxis of 
legality acts as a turning point for the colony. The implacable disappearance of the 
252 
Greenlanders, Smiley implies, arises from their failure to maintain the inconsistencies of 
their justice system. 
Bollason's chiefjudge likewise bucks the dissent that Jon Andres and his 
supporters at the Thing recommend. On the grounds that the lawspeaker "committed no 
crime, and indeed, would have committed a crime had he not endeavored to carry out the 
punishment that had been decided upon," he overrules the case against Bollason (557). 
Under Bollason's charge, the judge replaces a pro cess of debate with an ofthand 
dismissal. Barely disguising patent partisanship as certified precedence, Bollason refuses 
to defend his own case. In the same way, the judge neglects to subject the law to its own 
laws. The judge repudiates reconsidering the dispensation of the law; as a substitute, he 
simply reiterates its application. Both lawspeaker and judge supplant conscientiousness 
with a form of autocracy. Andrew Ross's remarks on the politics of legality apply to the 
masquerading of Bollason's court: "Subservience to precedents and prior decisions-
stare decisis-reinforces the perception that legal reasoning is subject to its own history 
ofrulings, and is in no way bound to political pressures of the moment" (51). Only thirty 
pages before the conclusion of the saga, "lawlessness," as Mr. Jenkins says of the 
influence of the southemers on the American President in Smiley's civil-war romance 
Lidie Newton, "runs right to the top" (97). 
A number ofthe Greenlanders, however, are prepared to fight tyranny with 
tyranny. Having anticipated and planned for the unlawfulness of "Bollason and his hand-
picked judges," John Andres and the backers he has solicited attack the lawspeaker and 
his allies (557). Because the attackers did not set aside their weapons upon arriving at the 
Thing, as the law prescribes, a one-sided battle ensues (557-9). By means oftheir 
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massacre, John Andres and his powerful group do more than simply disband the unjust 
partisanship ruling their legal system. The mapped-out assault, as devised over several 
years, suspends customary legal procedure, a deferment that exposes the immeasurable 
compass oflegality in Greenland. Directly foUowing Jon Andres' coup d'état, Smiley's 
narrator reveals the Greenlanders' regular dependency on Thing standards of due process: 
"The Thing was broken up without deciding any more cases, and the judges went home 
to their steadings, as if in flight. Indeed, everyone there went home as if in flight, for they 
knew not how to regain the normal ways that had been lost through this event" (559). 
Despite the fact that the specially selected judges are not executed when the Thing is 
disassembled, the catalogue of victims includes Bollason, his three sons, and a handfùl of 
other men and boys, sorne ofwhom are attackers, while others are defenders (559). The 
absence of a lawspeaker, and most importantly the destruction of the legal system that he 
directs, symbolized by the death of his sons, is utterly foreign to the Greenlanders. 
Though Thing attendance often wanes, "and such times come and go" (562), the Thing 
has always delineated the limits of "normal ways," of everyday life. For six centuries, the 
Greenlanders have had recourse to the Thing. Whether unfailingly attended or not, the 
forum for justice is invariably CUITent and dependable-that is, until BoUason's refusaI to 
uphold the principles of justice. 
The sense of loss or the feeling of getaway attending the dismantlement of the 
Thing recaUs the astute predictions of Ulfhild the widow, who loses a son in what cornes 
to be known as "the great battle ofthe Brattahlid [district] Thing" (562-3). Playing up the 
would-be naïveté of an individual in her social position in the colony, she once half-
covertly confronts Jon Andres in order to caU him to account for his clandestine designs: 
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"The powerful men of this district have been quiet enough for the last few years. 
Something is hatching, it seems to me" (540). At this private meeting, she also formulates 
an aphorism that functions as a version of legal counsel or liability caveat. "The great 
ones," Ulfhild forewams, "will bring us down in the end, and that is a fact" (540). Sooner 
than observe her admonition or acknowledge her insights that "It is a fact that men love 
to fight" and that "women can do little enough about it," however, John Andres avoids 
partaking in a transparent tête-à-tête with the widow. "No one cares to fight," the 
conspirer declares in order to deflect the issue (540-1). The fact is that at this time the 
men are readying themselves for a potential "fight"-love it or not, care for it or not-
against the injustice of Bollason' s trumped-up court. At this juncture of the narrative, 
Ulfhild sees the eventual truth, a certainty that neither the legal system nor the men that 
eradicate it seem to be able to embody. The law, here represented by the men of 
Greenland, cannot predict real or true outcomes. In tum, legal pro cess entails a working 
towards unprecedented and often unpredictable outcomes. Due process entails 
reconceptualizations of justice. 
Despite suddenly being left without their time-honored legal system, most folk on 
the colony endorse the recent attack on the head of the Thing. The narrator acknowledges 
that "it was generally agreed that [Jon Andres and his followers] had been strongly 
provoked in the case, and were not to be blamed too harshly for what had come about, for 
men must avenge the injuries done to them, ifthey are strong enough to do it" (559). 
Pointing up the cultural timbre of legality, the Greenlanders continue to discuss the law 
after they are vindicated from Bollason's partisan court. Looking back, they evaluate him 
as an inadequate lawspeaker: "Bjom Bollason could be said not to have leamed the laws 
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especially well himself, since the telling of them had shrunk in his time from a three-day 
cycle to less than a one-day cycle" (562). Not-so-distant Things, readers and 
Greenlanders alike remember, lasted seven days (562). Even so, notwithstanding their 
assessments and remembrances of the official forum, the Greenlanders do not renew the 
Thing after it is toppled. This lack of legal reinstatement, they together attest, is largely 
because Bollason "had not sought to teach the body ofthe law to anyone," except maybe 
to his son Sigurd, a victim of the battle (561). 
lronically, the aggressors in fact plan the murders of Bollason's sons for the 
purpose of suppressing their compensatory acts of justice. By restraining any possible 
acts ofredress, Jon Andres and his men likewise terminate the oral transmission of the 
laws through the generations. This chain of events exposes the impotence of a laissez-
faire attitude toward the meting out of justice. Literally stifling the law so as to ensure 
their own safety from acts ofretaliation, Jon Andres and his men kill offthose that would 
be commonly considered as "strong enough" to "avenge the injuries done to them" (559). 
When Jon Andres and his allies kill offthose who legally can retaliate, in other words, 
they eradicate legality. Justice thereby disappears along with the laws. And what cornes 
to pass as a result of this elimination of evenhandedness and inherent accountability 
insinuates the truth ofUlfhild's prognostication about the decline of the colony. Within a 
year of razing the court, the Greenlanders resign themselves to a non-Iegislated variety of 
reciprocity. The members of the colony halfheartedly appear to allow that, "Though no 
one knew aU the laws, did not everyone know, in a general way, what was to be expected 
of one another?" (562). 
Without a formallegal system, clashing can overtake conversing, unannounced 
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killings can supplant legal technique, and individual agenda can supersede social 
consensus. This state of affairs ironically reflects the approach that Jon Andres and his 
men utilize in order to overthrow the Thing. Because they judge a decision to be unjust, 
they present a case that questions the head of the legal system. When the less than 
solicitous court fails to consider the legitimacy of this case, the accusers summarily attack 
the lawspeaker, thus destroying the legal system. This act of retaliation creates nuances of 
irony and complexity of justice, especially wh en justice is understood to be nonpartisan 
or impartial. Yes, Jon Andres and his men question the legal process of the court. Yes, 
Jon Andres and his men eliminate what they determine to be an unjust court. And yes, 
they eliminate injustice in the name of justice. Nonetheless, they perform these 
maneuvers unjustly. 
In the name oflegality, they illegally overthrow Bollason's illegality. Jon Andres' 
revolutionary group strong-arms the law so that Bollason and his defenders no longer 
cano The attackers therefore replace a partiality with a competing partiality. Neither 
legislative body privileges the disinterestedness of the law. Neither assembly argues its 
case. Acting unjustly, each cluster of men dismisses dialogue and debate. Be that as it 
may, Jon Andres' injustice still highlights and puts an end to a perceived injustice. In 
Smiley's representation, unjust actions can redirect the unjust course oflegality toward 
the rigorous demands of justice; unjust actions can play up the ongoing renegotiations 
that implementations of justice require. Irony, Smiley insinuates, becomes the preserve of 
justice. Since irony is one way of creating escape-hatches in the law, justice integrates 
incongruity in order to serve and prote ct. Without a system of law to correct, however, 
there can be no escape-hatch. 
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When there is no legality, there are no illegal acts. When vigilantism or revenge 
or chaos reigns, taking the law into one's own hands-a legal fallacy--cannot amend the 
officiallack of rule. Legality and its concomitant orderliness, does not plainly spring 
from disorder. Though illegal acts can draw attention to the necessity oflegality, these 
acts need to be evaluated-ranked, judged-from the standpoint of order. Legality entails 
sanctioned exchanges within a dynamic lawful-unlawful dialectic. The only way to right 
a lack oflegality is to formulate a le gal system. Naturally, the Greenlanders are not 
starting ex nihilo. From their position, legality need not be inaugurated or instituted from 
nothing; on the other hand, The Thing only needs to be restored, as they collectively 
concur. Yet after "sorne talk" the men of the colony decide against "reinstituting" the 
Thing that was leveled a few years before: "but the Greenlanders would have to.make up 
a whole new set of laws for a new lawspeaker to learn, and this seemed both an 
impossible task and an unnecessary one, since almost everyone agreed on what actions 
were the proper ones and what were the improper ones" (570). The Greenlanders oust 
legal process in favor of a reliance on propriety. Dismissing the virtues of debate, they 
therefore replace a fluid legal method with an intractable moralistic system. 
Walzer makes the point that any goodness that masquerades as inevitability or 
propriety or something el se that a cultural group putatively takes for granted is by 
definition contentious. He attests that "No account of the meaning of the social good, or 
of the boundaries of the sphere within which it legitimately operates, will be 
uncontroversial" (21). Social goods, in brief, are not social givens. Altematively, they are 
arguable and changeable. This understanding, as it pertains to social justice, extends to 
the field of ethics. J. Hillis Miller remarks on the groundlessness that surrounds ethical 
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judgments: "An ethical judgment is always a baseless positing, always unjust and 
unjustified, therefore always liable to be displaced by another momentarily stronger or 
more persuasive but equally baseless positing of a different code of ethics" (55). The only 
stability for ethics, he insists, is the certainty of instability. Distinct from morality, which 
can be understood as a binary differentiation (good from bad, hero from villain, right 
from wrong) that never questions its foundation, ethics compels an ongoing reappraisal of 
its fundamental propositions. Like justice, ethics relies on openness, incertitude, and 
transformation. Never afait accompli, without this sustained incorporation ofpoint and 
counterpoint, ethics becomes moralistic. 
Addressing democratic systems, which the Thing typifies on account of its 
prescribed agonistic or polemical structure, Chantal Mouffe underlines the conditional 
nature of ethical and political accord. According to Mouffe, "every consensus exists as a 
temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a stabilization of power" (92). 
Democracy, she insists, "always entails sorne form of exclusion" (92). Endorsing 
controversy, democracy recognizes and legitimates diversity by making "room for the 
expression of conflicted interests and values" (92). In this way, ethical princip les define 
the democratic process. Developing change can be a corollary of dissent and discussion. 
The laws that govem the collective can evolve as individuals within the collective 
question and correct the limits ofthese laws. Under the rubric of democracy, order is 
pliable and temporary, not authoritarian and non-negotiable. 
When the Greenlanders avoid the reestablishment of their formallegal system, 
they also fail to revive the regulated provisionality of social and legal consensus. This 
flaw results in a comprehensive feeling or form of exclusion in the colony. Given that 
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there is no Thing and "no one kn[ ows] the laws," there is no way for lawbreaking 
Greenlanders to be "punished or outlawed" (The Greenlanders 575). Without a milieu for 
collective discussion, compensatory killings go unannounced (575). Without a Thing, 
legislated concurrence, answerability, and argument are steadily expunged from the 
severity of daily life. In the absence of Thing law, folk begin to take the remonstrations of 
Larus, a onetime cowherd now directing the Church mainly because of his nonstop 
prophesying and steadfast pushiness, to heart. After an inauspicious seal hunt, wherein 
"Two boats were lost, and three men, and few seals were taken, and men feU to blaming 
each other" (575), Larus decrees that this bad turn is a "Corrective" intervention on the 
part of the "Righteous Lord" (575). Larus proclaims that without legality, the Lord calls 
the shots. Silenced, the Greenlanders simply listen while righteousness appears to replace 
political and ethical conditionality. Lacking the legal system that encourages exchange 
and change, the Greenlanders begin to look upon interpersonal relations with trepidation. 
Waxing nostalgic, the narrator somberly explains that "many folk in many districts were 
afraid, and no longer spoke to one another as Greenlanders once had, in open jest about 
many things" (575). The folk no longer "gather" as they once took great pleasure in 
doing; there is no more commemorative "talk, andjesting, and tale-telling" (158). 
Story 
Previously characterized by their dedication to conflict, which includes banter, the 
folk come to fear disagreement and altercation. Without the redress and protection of 
liability, the Greenlanders start circumventing forms of dispute, an avoidance that 
ironically becomes indispensable to individual survival once the new codes of their so-
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called inevitable propriety prove impossible to interpret. Once legality no longer defends 
one from viable lawlessness, the narrator laments, it is clearly prudent to hide from this 
very lawlessness: "a man might do anything and be in the wrong. There was no way to 
tell. It was better to stay on the steading and mind the cows and be content with such days 
are left to one" (577). He means thatjustice requires communal consent. Sequestration on 
the steadings calls attention to the movement between farms and districts that the Thing 
formerly stipulated. Since Thing verdicts were influenced by the number of followers 
individual claimants rounded up, case presenters circulated from farm to farm (as Ulthild 
the widow detected of Jon Andres) for the purpose ofpetitioning for support by offering 
food and bribes, sometimes in the form of livestock and sometimes in the form of 
pledged allegiance. Due to the prior predominance of Thing cases, friendships, like 
foodstuffs, were simultaneously practical and essential investments. Drawing attention to 
the dialogic nature of public deliberation, the private pledges of support that of necessity 
preceded Thing cases tended to be reciprocated. To offer support often entailed receiving 
support. 
Just as Thing preparation engenders communal interaction, Thing attendance 
provokes general participation. This involvement extends beyond the legal benefits 
attending the public recital and reconsideration of the laws. The Thing itself has 
invaluable social implications. In the absence of the Thing, these communal payoffs are 
aIl the more perceptible. At the midway point of the saga, for example, certain folk recall 
the conviviality oftheir annual tribunal during a downswing in Thing attendance that 
clearly anticipates the fate that eventually befalls the Greenlanders: "now it seemed to 
sorne powerful men in the largest districts that certain benefits of the Thing assemblies 
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that had once gone unremarked upon, such as the opportunity to view prospective brides, 
or to trade goods, or to make plans for the seal hunts and the reindeer hunt, had come to 
be distinctly missed" (292). Through a variety of exchanges, the Thing props up the 
requisites of social capital in the remaining settlement of the co10ny. The Greenlanders 
can be seen to subsist because of what Putnam, clarifying this sociological conception of 
resource, describes as the efficiencies and conciliations of trust. Putnam makes it plain 
that "Honesty and trust lubricate the inevitable frictions of daily life" (135). Without the 
associate benefits of the Thing, essential hunts are diminished in the same way that 
necessary trades are underprivileged. The frictions or hardships of Greenlandic life 
therefore escalate in the absence of the legal system and the paraUel social network that 
helps restore the balance of justice. Without the Thing, the odds of survival on the colony 
drop. 
In the absence of laws, the folk can only live as outlaws. No longer a part of a 
colony, no longer mobile members of an interdependent group, the Greenlanders are 
bound by both place and quietus. As general outlawry replaces legality, death can follow 
from free movement. Gunnar's account of outlaw justice sets forth the gravit y of the 
Greenlanders' final predicament. As he considers forming a Thing case against Ofeig 
Thorkelsson near the beginning of the third book of the saga, he makes the point that "If 
[Ofeig] is made an outlaw, then he must live as an outlaw, for ifhe cornes into the 
districts of men, they may kill him with impunity" (400). Ofeig, readers leam, is the devil 
figure ofthe saga. As "The Devil," which is the tide of the second ofthree books in The 
Greenlanders, Ofeig symbolizes the ultimate fate of the Greenlanders. Remarking that 
"The Devil enters Greenland through the door of disorder" (115), critic Neil Nakadate 
appears to pick up on this synecdoche. Disorder can here be understood as the 
lawlessness or devilishness that compels the Greenlanders to isolation on their 
farmsteads. This self-seclusion, however, only compounds devilry. 
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That the Greenlanders sentence themselves to a form of self-detention on their 
steadings is a cruel twist of fate. Many of these folk naturally presume that solitude itself 
is devilish. Given this preconceived understanding of aloneness on the part of her Nordic 
characters, Smiley may perhaps be manipulating one ofPascal's ideas of devilry, as 
appropriated by William Gaddis in his first novel The Recognitions. "AlI the malheurs in 
this world," Gaddis' narrator says, "come from a man's inability to sit alone in a small 
room" (477). Malheur furthermore cornes from being forced to be alone or isolated. In 
Greenland, for example, the Devil seeks solitary figures: "it was said that devils sought 
out those who were alone and entered into them and possessed their souls" (The 
Greenlanders 185). This general beliefbrings to mind sorne of the psychological and 
sociological implications of enforced isolation. In "Control Units," an essay from How to 
Be Alone, Franzen critiques the empowerment politics behind the prison system and 
scrutinizes the disabling isolation inside the prison system. Embedded in the essay, 
Franzen's interview with political-prisoner Mutulu Shakur (a former Black Panther and 
the father of famed Tupac, the celebrated antiestablishment rapper and actor fatally shot 
in 1996 while in his mid-twenties) underscores the results of community disconnection. 
Shakur stresses that with penal isolation "The potential for mental damage is 
tremendous" (214). Whether in its most strict form (solitary confinement) or in its 
comparatively moderated form (general captivity), isolation can incapacitate mental 
faculties. lndividual well-being, Shakur implies, depends upon social interaction. These 
productive exchanges and struggles include, among other things, collective insights, 
chancy opinions, and corrected allegations. 
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For the Greenlanders, the fast-held doors of isolation illuminate the way for the 
Devil. Here, devilishness translates into the annulment of social interaction. This 
suspension certainly threatens the survival of individual Greenlanders and, by extension, 
the continued existence of their remaining settlement. Devilishness intimates the end of 
civilization and spells the replacement of order (legal justice) with disorder (outlaw 
justice). Isolation thus relocates "the waste districts, where the Devil ho Ids sway" (489), 
to the residual farmsteads in the colony. Gunnar's bear story articulates this conclusion 
by redefining the incursion of the wildemess into civilization as a form of self-
consumption. In this parable, Kari, a Greenlander, captures a bear cub while hunting. He 
and his wife Hjordis then name him Bjom and resolve to raise him alongside their true 
son, VIf. A decade later Kari releases his bear "son" to the wild (498). Shortly thereafter, 
VIf dies. Lonely, Kari beckons the now wild-eyed bear to retum to his steading. Bjom 
consents. Inevitably, he consumes Kari's food and livestock. FinaIly, in order to sate 
Bjom's hunger, Kari offers the bear his own arm knowing that "the bear would never be 
satisfied with only one arm, but must, in the end, eat him up" (501). Wildness literally 
swallows everything on the steading. 
The bear story also reflects the devil Ofeig's relations to wildemess and 
confinement. (Gunnar, in fact, relates the bear parable in the pages that fall in the 
mathematical middle ofOfeig's outlawry sentence [433] and his confirmed death [564]). 
As the Greenlanders prepare for the Thing at which Ofeig receives a capital punishment 
conviction, Jon Andres and Kollgrim discuss "hunt[ing]" and "kill[ing]" this "devil 
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among [men]" in the same way that they would a "bear" (432). Jon Andres twice calls 
attention to Ofeig's resemblance to a bear when he and his men are summoned to the 
widow Ulfhild's sheep byre, where she has latched the door behind Ofeig, effectively 
locking the brigand inside with her livestock. At the byre, Jon Andres shouts, "Folk say 
that bears have retumed to Greenland," before he threatens Ofeig's life: "Folk say that in 
former days, it took ten men to capture a bear, but only six to kill it, we have ten men 
here, and would hate to use only six of them, for all are ready to fight" (446). For all their 
might, however, the "bear" breaks down the barn door and flees (446). Bear-like, devil-
inspired, Ofeig overpowers and outruns the many men who later sequester him in Undir 
Hofdi church as well (448-50). 
Elucidating the association between confinement and the Devil, Ofeig routinely 
breaks into structures only to get locked inside them. With the exception of the events at 
Undir Hofdi church, these entrapments tend to occur on properties that are owned by 
women. Ofeig commits his first grave crimes, three assisted homicides, on the land of the 
widow Vigdis. The uncharitable Vigdis, who long dreads the loss ofher vast food stores, 
dubs Ofeig and his collaborators as diabolical when they awaken her by breaking into 
both her storehouse and her steading. Seeing his arrivaI as the confirmation of her fears, 
she shouts, "Now 1 see that Satan and his minions have come upon me at last" (358). 
Without any second thoughts, Ofeig and his hungry minions promptly attack Vigdis 
using 'Joints of beef and reindeer meat" as weapons before they finally murder her and 
two ofher "elderly servingmen" (358-9). Afterwards, the criminals faH into a "great 
eating frenzy" (359). In contradistinction to his minions, though, Ofeig neither gets sick 
from the feasting in the steading nor caught by the men who quickly gather outside the 
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steading. Peculiarly free of abdominal pain, with his "great mouth" Ofeig continues 
consuming food and mead even as his "hirdmen" suffer from the consequences of 
overeating after a prolonged dearth of food: cramps, vomiting, retching (360-1). In the 
end, the "staggering and shamefaced" accomplices topple outside the farmstead into the 
hands of the thirty or so men encircling the property (361). For his part, Ofeig, now solo, 
slips away from the policing band. When the monitors of the law enter the scene of the 
felonies in order to apprehend the at-large criminal, he is "nowhere to be found" (361). 
The site ofOfeig's last reported crime is particularly coded as female. Jon 
Andres, the owner ofthis property, is off soliciting support for his legal case against 
lawspeaker Bollason. Moreover, his two male servants are visiting a neighboring 
farmhouse for the night. Therefore, when Ofeig forcibly enters this steading-by 
crashing through the roof-he lands in a uniquely female space. Taking advantage of 
cunning and luck, these women, seven in number, including Jon Andres' young girl 
Gunnhild and his baby girl Unn, ultimately outmaneuver Ofeig. Using food as their main 
weapon against the invader, they patiently feed him and feed him and feed him. 
Unsurprisingly, he eats and eats and eats. Perhaps evoking a connection between female 
savoirjaire and good luck, just after Unn, who is hidden in a "bedcloset," randomly 
"whimpers," the startled Ofeig abruptly writhes, doubles over, and falls to the ground 
(547-8). The interloper, of course, overeats. Yet it is the baby's impromptu wail, an 
ostensibly unlucky exposure that tums out to be a fortunate intervention, which results in 
his indisposition. In sum, a haphazard cry combined with a calculated surfeit works to 
unsettle Ofeig's inordinately strong stomach. Once the assailant collapses in pain, Jon 
Andres' wife, her sister, and her servingmaids, one ofwhom is tellingly named Oddny, 
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proceed to hector him for his "gluttony" and other criminal acts as they beat him and beat 
him and beat him (548). Still, before they can lawfully kill the fugitive, he "scrabbles" to 
his feet and decamps into the empty "moonlight," a barrenness that brings to mind what 
the Greenlanders see as the palpable association between aloneness and devilry (548). 
Ofeig's overindulgence and successive beating at the hands ofa group ofwomen, 
so Smiley suggests, prompts the death of the outlaw. Notwithstanding the fact that he 
disappears, as he has a tendency to do after he routinely absconds, there are neither any 
more reports of his generallawlessness nor any more accounts of his entrapments. 
Rather, the repeat offender is found dead, "from starvation" by "all appearances" (565), 
not long after being tricked and trounced by the women on Jon Andre's farm. Since Ofeig 
overeats, it appears, he starves. Intriguingly, the narrator accentuates that Ofeig expires 
"sorne time" between the razing of the Thing and the decision not to reinstate this legal 
forum (565). The uncertain time ofthe delinquent's death-"the devil had been dead for 
sorne time" (565)-speaks to the correspondingly unique moment in the history of 
Greenland. In disbanding the Thing, the Greenlanders sentence themselves to the 
indecisiveness of legal deregulation. Ofeig, the last legally condemned outlaw in the 
colony, dies in the transitional period between the practice of legal justice and the 
inveterate espousal of outlaw justice. It can therefore be said that at this unprecedented 
time the Devil no longer needs Ofeig for a vehicle. Shortly after the aggressor's death, 
isolation lures the devilry that he personified into the distinct steadings of the Eastern 
settlement. The lawlessness that Ofeig represents speaks to the disorder that finally 
unsettles an enduring, if not a thriving, civilization. 
Still, Ofeig's story do es not merely foreshadow the encroachment upon or the 
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swallowing of civilization by the disorder that his death in the wilderness suggests. In 
lieu of exclusively epitomizing self-consumption, and thereby heralding the decline of the 
colony, Ofeig's movements between the wasteland and the settlement likewise lay 
emphasis upon the peripheries of Greenland civilization. These borders, Ofeig's illicit 
incursions show, extend to the marginal characters of Greenlandic society. His violent 
crimes lead to encounters with both the privileged members (leading men) and the 
underprivileged members (everyone else) of the colony. Tellingly, his lasting 
confrontations are with the latter group of people. Whereas he swiftly penetrates bands or 
circles of watchful men, he spends considerable amounts of time within the female 
properties that he invades. It is no great surprise that Ofeig's burial is administered by a 
woman rather than by a customary male priest. Despite the fact that this elderly 
maidservant is crack-voiced, "incontinent," and "blind and bent," that is to say, she is the 
marginal figure par excellence, only she knows how to exorcize or "lay the evil spirit" 
(566). In death as in outlawry, Ofeig's story concentrates not on the powerful men ofthe 
colony, but in turn on the qualities or as sets of the colony's fringe figures-women, 
servants, children. These peripheral characters are the central victims of his disreputable 
actions. 
This progress from margin to middle recalls the plot in Smiley's lone city novel, 
Duplicate Keys (1984). In this reconfiguration of the detective genre, protagonist Alice 
Ellis laments that because of the double-murder ofher two friends (the foster brothers 
Craig and Denny), she is unnervingly "thrust from the periphery" ofher social circle into 
its center (Duplicate Keys 174). Describing this unanticipated relocation, a positioning 
that refocuses her déménagement from the Midwest to New York City, she remarks, 
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"everyone twirled and turned alarmingly toward her" (174). As the plot ofthe crime 
novel advances, her unwonted position grows more and more alarming: her phone rings 
endlessly; less than memorable acquaintances drop by her flat; unfamiliar people acquire 
copies ofher apartment keys; she unwittingly solves the crime. What's more, she is 
nearly murdered. Detective Honey's cautionary words seem to summarize this sequence 
of incidents while it still progresses. Addressing Alice, he says, "Among other things, a 
violent crime is the beginning of a train of events, and a sign that whatever balance a 
given social network has achieved is strained. The crime is a change, and the change is 
always sudden and profound, affecting every member of the network in unforeseen ways 
and often violently" (221). Crime widens the parameters of storytelling and storymaking. 
The replication trope of the novel, specifically, the duplicate keys, the adopted brothers, 
the double-murder, and the nearly anagrammatic hero, plays up the dual roles of 
character. Alice Ellis is at once an outsider and an insider, a stranger and a friend, an 
intuitive detective and a possible victim. At one and the same time, she can be caught and 
she can catch. 
In The Greenlanders, Ofeig's relation to women and servants recasts the message 
or moral of Gunnar's bear parable. The parable, as Gunnar relates it, concludes with the 
bear's consumption ofhis foster father. The story, however, does not necessarily end 
where Gunnar stops relating it. Hjordis, the proxy mother of Bjom the bear, is still 
present. In other words, she is not de facto consumed like everything else on the steading. 
Like the earlier Alice from Duplicate Keys, Hjordis too has a story that evidently 
promotes complexity. Conspicuously left untold, her story can develop beyond the limits 
of Gunnar's narrative. As the chronicle ofOfeig elucidates,just as criminality involves 
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every member of the colony, every member of the colony can combat criminality. 
Women, servants, and children, for instance, impel the death ofOfeig and lay his spirit to 
rest. Female characters can eliminate lawlessness. For this reason, they can make 
invaluable contributions to the colony. These figures can up the odds of survival in 
Greenland. 
Though they may be evaluated as representationally marginal in Smiley's saga, 
women are not simply the "trinkets[ s] ... lying in the grass" that most Greenlandic men 
make them out to be (The Greenlanders 493). Instead, they play indispensable roles in 
the colony. The magnitude ofthese roles becomes aIl the more apparent once the entire 
colony cornes to embody the outlaw ethos. In a sense, the women of Greenland have 
always lived within and coped with parameters similar to those of outlawry. For one, they 
tend to be isolated upon certain steadings, as Ofeig's recidivist incursions exemplify. 
Women also tend to have little or no say in the exacting of justice, as Ulfhild the widow's 
confrontation with Jon Andres attests (540). Moreover, women likewise tend readily to 
accept the condition ofwhat the girl Sigrid Bjo~sdottir caUs "incomprehension" (532). 
To rearticulate Sigrid's application ofthis term, the women of Greenland are accustomed 
to encountering unknowns. As an alternative to calling the shots, women thus learn to 
adapt to the consequences of these shots. Given this attuned form of negotiation, 
adjustment and reconciliation can make women more lenient when it cornes to change on 
the colony. 
This manifested openness may be why women in particular manifest the 
peculiarities of second sight, prognostication, and intuition in Greenland. Contrary to the 
men, who generaUy rely upon the order or rule ofreason that they themselves determine, 
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the women do not constrain themselves to the ideallogic of these limits. In other. words, 
the women do not dismiss the unexplainable by reducing it to the explainable or the 
monitory. Because the women do not delimit what they see, it might be said that they 
allow themselves to see. In allowing themselves to envision freely, conventional 
boundaries and expectations appear not to circumscribe what they in fact can see. 
Birgitta Lavransdottir's first experience of second sight ends up being the most 
telling vision of the saga. Incorporating a scene that summons up the brief montage 
featuring a young woman with stumbling child in Ingmar Bergman's 1957 film The 
Seventh Seal, set in fourteenth century Sweden, in The Greenlanders' first book, 
optimistically titled "Riches," Birgitta, after having just moved to Gunnars Stead as a 
young bride, sees a woman in white "carr[ying] in her arms a child of about one winter's 
age, also cIothed in white" (64). Entranced, the newlywed watches as the "woman lift[s] 
the child to her face and kisse[s] it, then set[s] it among the flowers on the grass" (64). 
Happily, the child "laugh[s] ... stand[s] up carefully and stagger[s] forward with its arms 
in the air" (64). Called by a servant, Birgitta looks away. When she returns her gaze, the 
remarkable tableau is blank: the woman and child are gone. Birgitta, "who was later well 
known for having second sight" (64), relates this episode to Sira PaIl and Sira Jon. 
Without further ado, the two male priests judge that Birgitta has seen the Virgin and 
Child (65). For Sira PaIl and Sira Jon, who are considered model interpreters, the story is 
already written. According to them, there is nothing either to apprehend or to foresee. 
Birgitta, like three women before her, so Sira Jon explains (65), witnesses the apparition 
of the ideal woman and her perfect son. The meanings of this vision, the ministers of God 
make plain, are self-evident. Dispensing with foresight and prescience, these two men 
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look to the past, not the future. 
In the final book of The Greenlanders, called "Love," Margret Asgeirsdottir 
beholds an apparition that matches Birgitta's. Likewise on Gunnars Stead, the childhood 
dwelling to which she returns as an old woman, Margret sees a child in white "running 
and stumbling forward, its arms raised happily in the air" (527). Engaged in the scene 
before her, Margret watches as the "mother, also in white, sway[s] in attentive pursuit, 
now smiling, now laughing, at the child's antics" (527). Swaying, the child then 
"stumble[ s] into a circle of flowers and f[ alls] down," whereupon the "mother step[ s] 
forward and sweep[ s] it into her arms and cover[ s] its neck with kisses, just below the 
ear, so that the child laugh[s] out in glee" (527). Margret sees a near replay of Birgitta's 
first vision, a revelation Margret indubitably recollects, since she resided with Birgitta at 
the time of the sighting. In terms of the narrative, Margret is the first person Birgitta sees 
subsequent to her visualization of the so-called biblical pair (64). Margret's first-hand 
experience of this remembered second-sight, however, is not a moment of virginal 
visioning. What Margret sees is not the Virgin and Son that Birgitta finally appraises as a 
"false ... promise," largely due to male intervention and correction (391). Demonstrating 
that the men misinterpreted Birgitta's initial experience of second sight, the spectacle that 
Margret witnesses is not a vision at all, religious or otherwise. Altematively, she observes 
Birgitta's daughter Helga playing with her own daughter Unn. The "mother" whom 
Birgitta envisions tums out to be an actual woman of Greenland playing with her "chi Id," 
a child that is an actual Greenlandic daughter, rather than the holy Son. 
In lieu of affirming classical religious and moral paradigms, Birgitta's original 
vision anticipates a future event on the colony. As homage to the narrow hope for the 
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surviving generations of the Black Plague that Scandinavian director Bergman includes 
in The Seventh Seal, Birgitta's prognostication points to the individuals who can play an 
integral part in the preservation of Greenlandic civilization. Though it is naturally 
impossible to predict the instrumental and half-random way in which Helga and Vnn, 
among others, prompt the death of Ofeig, the vision focuses on a woman and her child. 
Without speaking, these characters stand and step and stumble and stand again. The 
revelation consequently urges the men to pay attention to the peripheral figures within the 
colony. It likewise encourages the men to listen to these marginal characters in the same 
way that they can listen to Birgitta's descriptions ofher envisioned characters. Just as 
women can see valuable things, they can say valuable things. Women, servants, and 
children do have voices, voices that ought to be taken into account by the men of 
Greenland. 
Smiley in fact peoples her saga with resilient, auto no mous women. These 
characters counterbalance or even override her focus on exacting, leading men. Born on 
the first page of The Greenlanders, Margret, who is Gunnar's older sister, is for all 
intents and purposes the heroine of the saga. Compellingly, her role in the work ironicaUy 
plays up the consensus that women are "eternal strangers" on the colony (116). After 
being tricked into marrying Olaf, whom she later names Odd and likens to a repugnant 
polar bear when she fictionalizes her long-suppressed story (428-430), Margret falls in 
love with Skuli Gudrnundsson, a Norwegian. In time, they "lay together as man and 
wife" (100). Lacking discretion, they are discovered. As a result, Gunnar and Olaf 
peremptorily kill Skuli for his part in the illicit liaison (125). The leading men of 
Greenland then banish Margret from her steading and district (126-7). Signaling the ever-
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increasing difficulty of her long exile, her child dies at a young age. Margret goes on to 
spend the fi ft y winters between Birgitta's vision and its actualization away from her 
beloved home, first on an abandoned farm that she appropriates, then as a servant who 
insinuates her way onto various farms in the colony by means of contributing livestock 
and needlework. 
Among other things, Margret' s movements all through the settlement accentuate 
the enigmatic qualities and distinctive features of the young women in Greenland. While 
she occupies her own property, called Steinstraumstead, Margret lives alongside Asta 
Thorbergsdottir, "a girl so strong that she liked to compete with boys and men in 
swimming contests" (132). Aiso vying with the men, Asta has a relationship with, and a 
son by, "a skraeling boy" (225). Accordingly, she is the first and only woman in the 
colony to consent to a relationship with a male Inuit, unlike the Greenlandic men who 
regularly pair with Inuit women. Furthermore, as a servant at Solar FeIl, the home of 
Bollason, Margret passes much ofher time with the lawspeaker's daughter Sigrid, a 
notorious figure on account ofher frequent "sham[ing] [of the boys] with the quickness 
ofher wit and the breadth ofher knowledge" (396). Despite her sagacity, Sigrid "h[olds] 
tightly to her incomprehension" when she and Kollgrim, the only boy she cannot 
embarrass, wordlessly sunder their marri age engagement (532). 
Kollgrim's concubine Elisabet Thorolfsdottir, the maidservant who leaves 
Gunnars Stead not long before Margret returns, embodies the same complexity and 
resolve as the other girls. Before Kollgrim's incineration, Elisabet stays on the farmstead 
irrespective of his insistence that she depart. Her reasons for staying on this property 
against his wishes remain unclear. Though the men assert that Elisabet lingers on the 
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steading so as to sever Kollgrim's engagement with Sigrid (502), Sigrid herself disputes 
this claim (532). Perhaps Elisabet resists departure for the purpose of upbraiding 
Kollgrim for his subsequent affair with Steinunn Hrafnsdottir, a married Icelander (496). 
Moving from reprimand to retribution, maybe she stays by his side in order to avenge 
Kollgrim for the dalliance he starts with her and brusquely terrninates (418). In yet 
another interpretation of Elisabet's deterrnination, she may remain within his reach 
because she loves him, as the title of The Greenlanders' last book suggests. One of the 
themes of "Love," evidently, is that Elisabet positions herself according to her own 
private motivations. Like many women in the Scandinavian colony, the self-driven and 
steadfast Elisabet manages to abide "through everything," notwithstanding the 
oppositional firrnness of a leading man (526). In Greenland, women can and do make 
meaningful personal choices, multifaceted choices that the men can leam from, 
indecipherable choices that can have a considerable impact upon the entire colony. 
The men of Greenland should not only take note of the stories of Greenlandic 
women, but also ask for these stories. The opinions, insights, and attributes of these 
characters-servants or proprietors, young or old-are of particular consequence once 
the survival of the colony is threatened by lawlessness. Women are accustomed to the 
outlaw environment that cornes to reconfigure existence in the colony. Outside oftheir 
steadings, the men typically silence the women. Because of this, the women have a lesser 
degree of legal input and right than the men. Given this diminished form of lawful 
involvement, women are demonstrably liable to the praxes and changes of a legal 
structure that they themselves have little opportunity of swaying. Although the law 
influences them, they cannot influence the law. Since they are disallowed a symbiotic or 
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democratic affiliation with the processes oflegality, women can be seen as etemal 
strangers in Greenland, etemal strangers who are forever compelled to anticipate, 
encounter, and adapt to versions of lawlessness and isolation. Distinct and tenacious, the 
women are therefore the experts of if. Only by efficiently maneuvering through a life by 
and large determined by provisos, can a woman manage to survive the harsh realities of 
Greenland. So to listen to a woman's story can be an exercise in the discovery ofhow 
unique individuals can wrestle against long odds and outlast continuing-or emergent-
uncertainty and unfamiliarity. 
The pirates from Bristol, England, who attack the colony approximately a decade 
after the Thing is dismantled, epitomize the state of outlawry that finally besieges the 
Greenland settlement. Pirates, of course, are prototypal medieval outlaws. The first 
person these invaders dispatch is a steward by the name ofOdd (578). Appropriately, 
after Odd's murder (and the several criminal acts that follow hard upon this 
representatively unlawful death) the odds of survival for the colony itself drop. When the 
freebooters restock their ship with what is left of the Greenlanders' limited goods, they 
expose the eroded social network of these Scandinavian people. As the opening 
paragraph of the saga's two-page "Epilogue" illustrates, general outlawry lies in the 
pirate's wake. The narrator opens his epilogue not only by expressing unprecedented 
dejection, but also by suggesting forthcoming devastation. Moving through the concentric 
circles that demarcate Greenlandic civilization, he moums the fact that the "news 
between the districts was slow," grieves that "every district tumed in upon itself," and 
finaUy bewails that "aU the families were in a turmoil of accusations and retaliations" 
(583). Without the legal system and its concomitant social web, the survival of the 
settlement becomes progressively more improbable. As the gaps between disparate 
families grow greater, as communication flags, districts segregate, and families fight, 
internecine conflict and indispensable isolation begin to typify daily life in Greenland. 
Once communal interaction dissolves, outlawry and lucklessness multiply and 
preponderate. 
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Perhaps this is why Gunnar, famous for his bad luck, as the reiterations ofhis 
unluckiness attest (55,224,329,413,417,436,509,577), turns out to be the narrator of 
the saga. Regardless of his characteristic misfortune, the last line of the epilogue makes 
plain that The Greenlanders is "his tale" (584). Even though up to this point in the 
narrative he kills "eight men," a tabulation that induces him "to weep and weep and 
weep" (581-2), Smiley, who revels in sacrificing her Nordic characters to principle, never 
forfeits Gunnar's life in favor of a prearranged code or law. Albeit forever ill-fated, 
Gunnar himself suggests that his survival is a consequence of his recognition of the traits 
and stories of the women, children, and servants in the colony. From the earliest stages of 
his life, these members of the Eastern settlèment make lasting impressions upon Gunnar. 
Like no one else in the narrative, he listens to the women and leams from them. 
Accordingly, Gunnar manifests a number offemale attributes. As a boy, he tells tales 
with the servingwomen (19). While growing up, he has "little bent for hunting" (34). As a 
young man, "he resorted to spinning wool, like a woman, in order to eam his place at the 
table" (44). Still young, he second-gues ses Sira PaIl by admiring what he himself sees as 
the "bold resolve" ofthe woman whom the priest chides in his les son (72). Indeed, 
Gunnar initially takes up scribbling on parchments in order to correct what he sees as 
Einar Bjomsson' s incomplete or unjust rendition of the Greenlanders' story (236-7). 
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Women play pivotaI parts within the only recognized European civilization to 
disappear. In Gunnar' s view, the neglected importance of their roles becomes all the 
more apparent when the colony is beset by outlawry. Finally confined to and isolated on 
their farmsteads, the Greenlanders are deprived of what Asgeir Gunnarson, father of 
Margret and Gunnar, a half-century before christened as "real wealth," namely, "news of 
other places" (8). Whether it be tidings from distant Rome or Germany, accounts from 
the nearer North Atlantic, or reports from a neighboring district, the Greenlanders "get 
the greatest pleasure out of a curious event" (281). Gunnar dilates upon the advantages of 
curiosityand novelty when, on the final page ofthe saga, he includes a paean to play. 
Consolidating that consciousness, existence, and play are indissociable for children, an 
observation that Joyce Carol Oates similarly makes in her essay "Transformations of 
Play" (254), after Gunnar deliberately looks over the chessboard, he soberly says, "folk 
may not contemplate their fates all the time, and must play as well as work" (584). 
Gunnar is neither merely recalling the feasts and songs of Kollbein Sigurdsson's 
swimming contest (144-9), nor simply recollecting the sliding and skating of Jon Andres' 
Yule feast (404-411). Surrounded by children, and in "the shadow" of "the great loom" 
that his sister, mother, and "many generations ofwives before them" spun upon (584), 
Gunnar recalls his introduction to play in the form of storytelling. Spinning his story 
belatedly, which positions narrative as antithetical to misconstrued legality, he concludes 
by fashioning a correlation between storytelling and justice by making The Greenlanders 
Margret's epitaph. As a testament to his sister, who feU victim to the pirates (582), he 
shows that justice, in order to be transformative and thereby just, must celebrate and 
circulate every story-especially the curious and rich stories of eternal strangers. 
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ChapterSix 
Big Stakes in Horse Heaven 
Chance 
In scope, style, setting, and subject, Horse Heaven is about starts of one kind or 
another. Whereas The Greenlanders focuses on decline and concludes by insinuating 
what Jane Smiley sums up as "the end of the Norse colony in Greenland" ("It Ain't the 
Eiffel Tower" 336), Smiley turns to beginnings in her horseracing novel. In the keynote 
address she delivered at the "5 Voices, One Place" conference held in April of 200 1 at 
the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Smiley pointed out that her racetrack novel was 
inspired by the mass of stories that surrounds the track: "Horse Heaven came from just a 
desire to investigate the language and stories of the racetrack, which abound, as many of 
you know" (338). Her attraction to a multitude and movement, as her recourse to the 
word "abound" suggests, stands in direct contrast to the motivating factor behind her 
saga: the singularity of the Greenlanders' min. Compelled by extremes ofnumber, 
Smiley emphasizes the limitations of narrative in her two longest works. In The 
Greenlanders, she shuts down narrative by restricting the sources for story so that her 
Nordic characters, now actively roaming and sharing, now passively sequestered and 
isolated, are left only to recollect. Countering the impression of constriction that ends The 
Greenlanders, she features an atmosphere of expansion throughout Horse Heaven. With 
her encyclopedic horseracing novel, Smiley perpetually amplifies the sources for 
narrative. 
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In her Nordic saga, Smiley closes doors as she moves closer and closer to the 
situation of solitude and stillness-and implied death-of narrator Gunnar and the 
civilization that his sister Margret emblematized. The condition that eventually governs 
the Greenlanders is therefore one of reevaluation. Like the remaining anonymous 
characters confined to their properties, and the readers constrained to following the 
demise of the Greenlanders, Gunnar is left looking and moving inward and backward. As 
the last living Greenlander who knows everybody, as the last rich voice, he reviews and 
retells the past. In the end, the destiny of the Greenlanders can be interpreted as autotelic. 
Once their legal and social networks dissolve, there is no more wealth, no more external, 
novel information. Restricted to their farmsteads, they finish in self-containment. In 
Horse Heaven, on the other hand, Smiley opens doors. This big novel subsumes a series 
of openings in order to show that the track is a use fui (and maybe even an ideal) model of 
the global world. Among other attributes, the world of the track incorporates a dynamic 
investment landscape, a plural social network, and a developing rule book or legal 
system. These interrelated aspects naturally hinge on economic venture or gambling. In 
most cases, the racetrack is synonymous with the pari-mutuel-the booth where horse 
bets are posted and the winners divvy up the losers' stakes. Notwithstanding this classic 
understanding of the racecourse, an evaluation that she logically integrates into Horse 
Heaven, Smiley likewise illustrates that wagering can translate into socially responsive 
actions. As put forth in her encyclopedic novel, the stakes of horse speculation transcend 
the turns and limits of the racetrack. 
Horse Heaven is in many ways unprecedented in contemporary female American 
writing, not to mention American women's writing in general. Though Smiley is 
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markedly more charitable to her readers than William Gaddis and Thomas Pynchon, and 
also more accessible than David Poster Wallace and Don DeLillo, Horse Heaven sits weIl 
in the company of post-WWII encyclopedic works like The Recognitions (1955), 
Gravity's Rainbow (1973), Infinite Jest (1996), and Underworld (1997)-a market so far 
cornered by male authors. As the "Cast of Characters" that sets the stage of Horse 
Heaven implies, Smiley peoples her longest work, a work her liability disclaimer 
describes as a "comic epic poem in prose" (x), with a Dickensian range of figures, 
including six principle horses and a dog (xv-xvi). She manipulates the fi ft y characters of 
her novel within a wide sweep of often-intersecting and always-incomplete episodes. Just 
as the "Prologue" to Horse Heaven, subtitled "Who They Are," ends by highlighting the 
"speculat[ion], myster[y], [and] potential" of Thoroughbred horses (7), the novel's 
"Epilogue" focuses on probability and conjecture as weIl. She features several short 
endings for Horse Heaven, aIl of which operate as possible starting points for narrative. 
Perhaps this is why Smiley' s epilogue is the only section or chapter (of seventy-
four) in her end-of-the-millennium narrative without a title. Since her conclusion is really 
an assortment of openings set to unfold, she do es not know what to calI it. Reminiscent of 
her Nordic saga, Horse Heaven is comprised of three books. The first book is titled 
"1997"; the second "1998"; the third "1999." She breaks up these respective books into 
months. Even so, this chronological construction does not depict three complete, ordered 
years. Alternatively, her layout concentrates on the timing of the Breeders' Cup Classic, a 
mecca of American horseracing. TextuaIly, Horse Heaven starts just after the Breeders' 
of '97 and ends an unclear number ofweeks after the Breeders' of '99. On account of the 
fact that this superlative racing event takes place in mid-autumn, each of the three books 
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in Horse Heaven spans a different length oftime. "1998" is the only twelve-month 
section in the novel. Complicating matters, however, none of her characters attends, and 
few even attend to, the Breeders' Cup ofthat "November" (353). 1998 is an incomplete 
year too. 
Following the cast of characters, the year marker, and the prologue, Horse 
Heaven opens on a distinct day: "On the second Sunday moming in November, the day 
after the Breeders' Cup ... " (9). The beginning of the epilogue recalls the November 
moming of sorne two years earlier: "The moming after the Breeders' Cup ... " (616). 
(There is, by comparison, no "moming after" in November '98). The decisive 
discrepancy here, however, is one of sequence and specificity. The date of the Sunday 
moming-the Breeders' is always held on a Saturday-that starts the final section of the 
fiction is indeterminate. In fact, her final month designation, unlike any of the twenty-
three before it, combines two months and seasons: "September-October" (569). In spite 
of the fact that the three chapters and the epilogue enclosed under this two-month heading 
contain several date references, it proves impossible to add up the exact date or even 
month in which the last fragmented stories of the novel occur. Smiley leaves her readers 
with six vignettes, all of which take place in the moming, as she demonstrates either by 
time or by mood references. These "momings" or commencements feature an undated 
selection from The Thoroughbred Times. As such, this selection calls to mind the 
numerous personalletters and joumalistic pieces amalgamated in Horse Heaven. 
Contradicting narrative convention, none of these is dated. The epistles and news items 
encapsulate the openended close of the novel. 
As in Joyce's Ulysses, time is finally incalculable in Horse Heaven. Smiley leaves 
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her characters in a gap somewhere between the end of October 1999 and the millennial 
tum in the same way in which the Irish Bloomsday book leaves Leopold and Molly 
somewhere between the tirst hours of 17 June 1904 and the sunrise ofthis new day. This 
intentional ambiguity or vagueness exemplifies Smiley's interest in what one ofher 
characters, referring to the track, expresses as "all these twists and turns in the plotline" 
(Horse Heaven 529). The author's equivocal denouement speaks volumes about the 
track. In lieu of tying up her multiple stories with the devices of fiction, she preserves the 
actual abundance of disconnected stories that first compels her to write about 
horseracing. This proliferation reveals the broad-spectrum strategy of encyclopedic 
representation: there is always a surplus of gaps, loopholes, conundrums, and episodes to 
account for and to narrativize. For this reason, no study or subject or field or department 
or even encyclopedia is comprehensive. According to Smiley, to talk about the track is to 
accumulate, catalogue, and speculate upon expanding information. In different ways, the 
track devotees within Horse Heaven participate in an enterprising process that likewise 
takes advantage of a desire to regulate or fulfill fate at individuallevels. Because these 
gamblers play the odds of the track, they also take active stakes in the making oftheir 
own improbable stories. 
Leo Harris, whom Smiley facetiously styles as a "racetrack aficionado [and] 
theorist of racetrack life" in her roster of players (xvi), revels in the proliferation and 
enigma of racetrack stories. Winding down yet another lecture on the lessons of the track 
to his son Jesse, who is nine years old, Leo oUtlines the multiple considerations that can 
be seen to mark out horse-playing from other forms of gambling and sports spectatorship: 
"Which horse has a hairline fracture, which horse sees something funny, which horse is 
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feeling especially good, whichjock pushes which other jock. It's a mystery that can't be 
plumbed by the form, by the theories, by any known science, and it happens every day, 
for me to look at. And, then, it's another story too. Every horse, every jock, every owner, 
every trainer, every bettor, every race. A football game is one story, one day a week. 
That's boring. A day at the races is a thousand stories" (165). As he commemorates 
horseracing for its wealth of narratives, he also draws attention to his own personal 
involvement in these ongoing, changing storylines. The track, Leo implies, is an 
invitation to engage in an active process that takes into account both the analysis of the 
known (the race form, the past, odds) and the estimation of the unknown (the racehorses, 
the future, impulses). 
Leo' s long list accentuates that odds can be based in knowledge. His j udgment of 
track ins-and-outs recalls a comparable inventory in De Lillo 's Great Jones Street (1973). 
In this novel about a rock star who ironically increases his fame by way of self-exile, 
DeLillo stresses the dedication that racetrack wagering demands when his hero' s 
downstairs neighbor deplores her husband's former ignorance and indolence. Playing up 
the incalculable consequences of the indefinite or the unexplained, the widow 
Micklewhite censures her dead namesake for his amateurish approach to the racetrack: 
"He was a horse pervert. He went to the track rain or shine. Him and the chink from the 
Bronx, they went to the track in blizzards with their hats down over their ears. He lost 
thirty, fort Y simoleans on the average every time they went. The chink had winners left 
and right. The chink knew the scratch sheet, he knew the smart money, he knew the track, 
he knew the weather, he knew the animaIs. My husband, he didn't know shit from 
Shinola" (135). Her unremitting yet instructive complaint registers sorne of the variables 
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(or stories) that astute gamblers and horse-handicappers (or odds-makers) diligently 
interpret in order to increase their chances of success at the races. These considerations 
include, odds, rail placement, the racing form, and the track surface, not to mention the 
horses themselves. Horses are far from surefire vehicles to victory. Predictable only in 
terms oftheir unpredictability, horses can tire, slip, strain, scare, and sicken. They can 
also come to life and triumph. 
There is no single way for a bettor to compute this evolving myriad of 
information. As a result, to visit the track and its pari-mutuel windows is always, in a 
sense, to begin anew. Every day, each race caUs on a reassessment of old variables and a 
negotiation ofnew ones. Once-fast horses weaken,just as slower ones improve. 
Celebrated jockeys fumble, just as unproved ones thrive. Soggy turf dries, just as sandy 
bases harden-maybe. A horseplayer must always be prepared to refashion her 
understandings of and projections for this irregular process. To revise or not to revise is 
not the goveming ethic oftrack culture. Instead, informed pari-mutuel wagering entails a 
coupling of "When to revise?" and "How to revise?" As an embodiment of this racetrack 
feature, "maybe" is the most repeated term or condition in Horse Heaven. Any random 
reading of Horse Heaven yields the adverb maybe, and perhaps two or more maybes, 
before very many, if any, pages are tumed. 
These maybes underline the probability and prospect that typify life at the track. 
Smiley reemphasizes this focus on contingency and chance in her nonfiction A Year al 
the Races. Presenting a series ofmaybes on the penultimate page ofthis book, she 
conjectures on her racehorse, her horse-trainer, herself, and other racing particulars: 
Pedigree-wise, Corey would be bucking the odds. But her individual 
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personality--dominant, self-confident, energetic, friendly-says maybe. 
Her physique-long legs, long stride, strong, sound-adds to the maybe. 
Her temperament-relaxation that revs into aggression rather than fear-
adds again to the maybe. Into the mix we add luck, training technique, 
care, attention, timing, money, the world political situation, the state of 
horse racing in California, Alexis's health and luck, my health, luck and 
impulsiveness, the march oftime and fate. Maybe. (282) 
Maybes, so Smiley half-jokily daims, evoke the multiple internaI and external influences 
that can alter the odds of track success. By extension, she points out that no approach to 
betting is foolproof. Notwithstanding the fact that Smiley seems to fashion an arithmetic 
out of maybes, she "adds to the maybe," playing the odds involves the impracticable 
addition of volé).tile factors. This is not to allege, however, that odds cannot be ca1culated 
to advantage. 
Though odds can be influenced by haphazard circumstances, like injuries, bad 
starts, and other intangibles, unlucky and not, horse-handicappers tend to be accurate. In 
A Year at the Races, Smiley indicates that, "as with the stock market, handicappers are 
often right-the favorite wins about 30 percent of the time" (119). Comparing racetrack 
and stock market wagering, Smiley implies that both activities incorporate serious 
versions of play. In Horse Heaven, "futurologist" Plato Theodorakis draws attention to a 
similar point (xvi). After the characteristically pompous Plato volunteers that he "went to 
the race meets every weekend" while studying at Cambridge, he baptizes gambling in 
Britain as an unadulterated version of the marketplace economy. "Betting in England," 
Plato contends, "is the purest form of market speculation there is" (254). These 
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investment activities, he stresses, consolidate the assets of attentive or learned 
speculators. Such is the case with Plato's girlfriend, the "animal communicator" 
Elizabeth Zada (xvi). According to Elizabeth, who somehow channels the 
consciousnesses ofhorses in order to place well-informed bets, her stakes earnings are 
"in the black for the year ... Way in the black" (348). By contrast, purported track 
theorist Leo arbitrates his bets on the basis of superstitions rather than in relation to the 
changing information-the many stories-that Plato and Elizabeth access in different 
ways. In spite of the lessons he orates to his son Jesse, when he heads to the track, Leo 
routinely wears "lucky socks" (152; 329), believes "preferred parking" to be lucky (153), 
deems pooling his money with Jesse's propitious (153), and considers that "looking at a 
nun was the worst thing you could do" (153). Mapping out luckiness as best he can, Leo 
esteems the habits and rituals that he himself consistently performs. 
Prefigured patterns furthermore determine how Leo actually sees individual races. 
For instance, while he and Jesse wait on the official result of a "Photo-Finish," Leo 
assures his son that their two picks, one and six, have placed first and second, 
respectively, on account of the numbers they brandish: "They did it! 1 knew it! Perfect 
pick! One and six. That's always been a great pick for me, because 1 dated this girl when 
1 was sixteen, her name was Peggy Sue! It really was, and that song was such a great hit 
that my statistical average with one and six over the years has been way out of the normal 
range" (155). Unfortunately for Leo, the so-called time-honored poignancy of Peggy 
Sue's timing merits doubt. Since the number seven horse wins "by a head," Leo's 
numerical average with his memorable integers drops doser to normal (156). Overall, 
Leo can be said to approach betting dogmatically rather than dynamically. Relying on 
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superstition, which is a secular form of piety, cryptic configurations and a reliance on 
narrated coincidences delimit his stake making. Given this approach to wagering, Leo 
supplants the circumspection and study of racetrack speculation with a form of less than 
foolproof ceremony. 
Jesse, on the other hand, takes a more active approach to what he conceives as 
"good investing" at the track (161). Against the advice and example of Leo, who "always 
stay[s] inside the track" in order to avoid "betting hunches" (156), Jesse adds the physical 
evaluation of horses and their jockeys to his consideration of the odds. After paying 
attention to the horses in the saddling enclosure and during their preliminaries, Jesse 
makes several bets, one ofwhich, again counter to his father's counsel, ventures on a 
niaiden two-year-old filly named Residual to place in the top three (158). For his part, 
Leo never wagers on maiden two-year-old fillies. He plainly dismisses laying down 
anything on these rookie female horses that have yet to win a race. "That's like playing 
the lottery," he cautions (157). AlI the same, Leo, who traffics in luck, overlooks the 
study ofhorses. Playing the same numbers, and reading what he calls "signs" (328; 330), 
he bases his bets on perceived design. Repetition, rather than revision, defines his betting 
style. 
After the maiden filIy, against the odds, places a neck-and-neck, photo flash 
second (160), Jesse discems what his father fails to recognize about the dynamics ,of the 
track. Thinking to himself, Jesse realizes that "What the track taught you was very 
detailed and there was a lot to remember, and his dad knew aH about it. But his dad 
hadn't seen how the fiHy floated" (161). Win or not, place or not, Jesse appreciates both 
the set-up to the race and the action of the race. With this emphasis on engagement and 
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action, Smiley illustrates that the payoffs of serious play, or what Jesse caUs good 
investing, are not merely pecuniary. As Residual's name suggests, the benefits of stake-
making stretch beyond the acquisition of money. 
Not just about stakes, starts, and purses, horse racing concems the physics of 
movement. Pari-mutuel wagering, which naturally inc1udes an appraisal of how horses 
actually perform at the track, is a fluid process in itself. Horses therefore literally and 
figuratively represent the flowing pro cesses-the changing odds and chancy tums-of 
the racetrack. Calling on enterprise and initiative, horseplayers take active stakes in the 
outcome ofuncertain future events. Juggling known probabilities, they invest in the not-
yet-known. Consequently, their form of serious play necessarily involves the acceptance 
of discomfiting results. Given that the accuracy rate of expert horse handicappers tends 
not to exceed thirty-percent, track speculators recurrently lose-and make appropriate 
adjustments to endure these hardships. Smiley speaks to the adaptability of bettors when 
she justifies the safe milieu of the racetrack in A Year at the Races. "Racing fans are 
exceptionally nonviolent," she remarks, "because they have to keep reading the Racing 
Form and getting their bets together for the next race, and also because they are inured to 
disappointment" (166). Racetrack wagering, in other words, can accustom its devotees to 
the vicissitudes of loss. After losing, gamblers typically retum to their study and their 
stake making. Starting over, players resume their interpretive practices. 
The habituation to difficulty and scrupulous deliberation that Smiley delineates 
may indeed be the key merits of gambling in its serious form. Since astute gamblers 
manifest the convictions to take chances, they possess the abilities to overcome 
mischance. Present-day gambling, however, as sorne scholars moum, suffers from a lack 
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of studious conviction and risk-taking. This state of gambling-world affairs is as recent as 
the field of gambling studies itself. In many ways inaugurating and legitimating gambling 
as a bona fide field of interdisciplinary study, William R. Eadington solicited academics 
and researchers to the First Annual Conference on Gambling, held in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
in the summer of 1974. In Gambling and Society, the book comprised of articles 
originaIly presented at this conference, Eadington's preface immediately speculates on 
the longstanding prevalence of betting: "The oldest profession known to civilized society 
may very weIl be prostitution, but probably just as old as a leisure activity or as a more 
serious endeavor is the phenomenon of gambling" (xi). Gamblers, he conjectures, have 
wagered stakes for as long as prostitutes have turned tricks. Each primaI, risky activity 
appears to be a cultural given. 
Nevertheless, the illicit twain seems to have parted ways. Still replete with risk, 
unlawful and forever serious, the prostitution trade, 1 think 1 can safely wager, continues 
quite like always. Yet the phenomenon of gambling, at least as a serious venture, suffers 
from a marked decline in participation over the last three or four decades. According to a 
number of scholars in the field of gambling studies, fewer and fewer contemporary 
gamblers seriously gamble. When it cornes to gambling, these theorists appear to posit a 
symmetrical relation between play and initiation. Often backing their conclusions with 
statistical analyses, they by-and-Iarge determine that how we bet mirrors how we 
approach betting. As a result of the fact that betting is now largely lawful, and for that 
reason less markedly suspicious, gambling lacks its original craftiness, ingenuity, and 
stealth. 
Emphasizing gambling within the context of American state lotteries, first 
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ushered into the US in New Hampshire in the 1960s, James F. Smith remarks on the 
relatively recent acceptance and even celebration of gambling. Playing the diplomat, 
Smith criticizes the ideology that legalized gambling apparently bolsters: "gambling 
today can be seen as harmless, recreational, charitable and even patriotic" (102). 
Eadington, who is Australian, widens Smith's allegations to the international stage, or at 
least the Western one. Marking the progressively more politicized subtext of gambling 
since the 1990s in North America, Europe, and Australasia, he maintains that "gambling 
ha[ s] transformed itself over the previous thirty years from an inappropriate, 'sinful' 
endeavour to a mainstream participatory activity" ("Ethical and Policy Considerations" 
243). Smith, for his part, targets the pluses oftraditional, "inappropriate" gambling. He 
indicates that when gambling was considered "a sin, a vice, a crime, and an unproductive 
waste oftime," successful gamblers, whether card sharps, pool sharks, or horseplayers, 
were interpreted as antiheroes ("When it's Bad it's Better" 102). These individual bettors, 
legendary and real, courted risk. In wagering stakes, they worked against and defied a 
variety of odds. 
Though dealing beyond the boundaries of the law, these luminary figures, as 
Smith elucidates, "mirrored the risk-taking characteristic[ s] of an evolving nation, 
culture, and economy" (l02). This assertion recalls drama and cultural theorist Erving 
Goffman's positive take on gambling, as clarified by Jan McMillen. Goffman's analysis 
of gambling, McMillen argues, "contains an implicit recognition that gambling 
contributes to the moral and political regulation of society by reaffirming conventional 
values" ("Understanding Gambling" 16). Serious gamblers play up the merits of poise 
and counterpoise, of direction and redirection, of change and interchange. Since play in 
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the form of assiduous risk-taking at once underscores personal and collective 
advancement, Smith makes a case for the value of conventional, outlawed gambling. "In 
many ways," he contends, "gambling was 'better' when it was seen as 'bad'" (102). 
Earmarking the main reason for his case against an increasingly state-sponsored 
gambling infrastructure, Smith points to the incongruous fact that gamblers today tend 
not to play: "The irony here is that there is little or no real play in the new world of 
gambling, while play (or action) is the raison d'être for traditional gambling" (110). 
In his appraisal of legalized gambling, Smith charges that the scratch card, the 
state lotto, the slot machine, and the roulette-wheel alike disallow their disciples the true 
opportunity to engage in a process of play, intelligent or otherwise. In tum, these "new 
diversions," so Smith brands them (112), calI for a single, repetitive, mechanical act-if 
any act at all. As mere automatic amusements, these approaches to gambling take the 
action out of play and the skill out of staking. Appropriately, these games rely on luck 
exclusively. Instead of being the one erratic factor of a multitude of more-or-less 
calculable risks, luck seems to be the only factor in the patriotic cash nexuses of the lotto 
and the casino. In lieu of sitting on the sidelines and whimsically hindering or helping 
individual gamblers according to her customary leisure, Lady Luck now seems to govem 
popular forms of gambling. In other words, CUITent submissions to chance override 
established convictions to take chances. Lamenting the effortless quick-fixes 
accommodated and created by "the new gambling culture," Smith concludes that "the 
real value of gam[bling] is lost" (112). As gambling mislays its original outcomes, such 
as the validation of self-possession and pliancy, it likewise mislays its primary 
motivation, or what Freud, paraphrasing Dostoevsky, called "le jeu pour le jeu" (456). 
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Choices 
As a big, social, encyc10pedic text set over the last three years of the millennium, 
Horse Heaven ironically integrates the manifold public and private implications of 
playing for the sake ofplaying in a number of ways. In Smiley's seminal novel, Leo is 
the only compulsive gambIer. Accordingly, his addiction reflects his style of "play." A 
representative member of the new gambling culture, he depends on weird rite and fickle 
luck as he stakes identical numbers or sequences of numbers. Without changing his 
tactic, he indulges in a perfunctory act. In so doing, he alters the end of gambling. Devoid 
of its active, changing, and fluid processes, gambling certainly is no longer an end in 
itself. Play, of course, cannot be its own reward once it becomes an habituaI repetition. 
Winning is the sole reward. 
Given the long odds against winning at the racecourse, Leo's enthusiasm 
predictably tends to transform into frustration between his arrivaI and his departure from 
the track. En route to the track with his dad, the precocious Jesse wonders why Leo fails 
"to remember that chances were he would be disappointed" by the end of their day at the 
races: "But how could he not know? Jesse was only eleven, and he knew. His mom never 
went to the track, and she knew. Jesse was used to thinking ofhis father as smart. No one 
talked like his father, no one impressed upon him all those differences in class and talent 
and pedigree the way his father did, and yet here was a simple thing, the simplest thing in 
the world, that his father didn't know" (330). In the same way that Leo overlooked how 
the maiden filly Residual moved around the track (161), he neglects to notice how he 
himself refuses to budge from his gambling routine, like dwelling on superstition and 
playing similar numerals. On the one hand, Leo stays the same while he rel ives 
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unchanging motions and emotions year after year. Jesse, on the other hand, changes as 
time passes. He insinuates this progression, a development that counters the inflexibility 
ofhis father's betting system, by pinpointing his own limited age. In downplaying the 
import ofhis own perceptions on account ofhis narrow life experience, his evolving 
opinions ofhis father furthermore intimate that Leo's visible obtuseness is a consequence 
of his static approach to gambling. 
The young Jesse realizes that Leo's non-transformative betting style runs a 
parallel course to his overalliifestyle. Notwithstanding Leo's uninformed or amateur 
approach to stake making, he sees everything as betting. "It's all betting" is his mantra 
(328). Leo encourages his son to rehearse and live according to the same truism. Once 
again, however, Jesse goes on to observe something that his father fails fully to 
apprehend. With his characteristic penchant for the performative, only this time with a 
pistol for a prop, one night Leo prepares to leave the house for a dramatic run-in with his 
Korean bookie. Should Park Min Jong try to swindle him out ofhis fair take, Leo testifies 
before his cliffhanging departure, "there's going to be a payoff, let me tell you!" (431). 
Jesse, for his part, seems primed for this theatrically coded moment. Following his 
father's extravagant stage-exit, Jesse notes that Leo's been reminding him "over and over 
for years" that he "was a believer injustice rather than mercy" (433). Paired with his 
focus on reiteration, Jesse's unbothered demeanor after this climactic leave-taking 
suggests that he understands how justice rises above the repetition and staginess that 
typify Leo. Leo's macho act, Jesse's calmness appears to convey, will come to a 
conclusion once he faces the bookie. Whether enacted in front of a district attorney, a 
jury ofone's peers, a television audience, or a so-called enemy, justice al ways makes 
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particular demands on accusers, defenders, and witnesses alike. These demands can work 
against ready scripts and preplanned actions. 
Subsequent to his putative confrontation with the Korean bookie, Leo enters 
Jesse's bedroom quoting Thoreau and lecturing on what he professes is the message of 
Marxism. He makes clear that since his own father "let the bookies walk aU over him," he 
"lived a life of quiet desperation" (435). In opposition to the father he 'judges" as 
"wanting" (436), Leo sees himself as markedly successful. He credits his achievements to 
his modem-day Marxist principles. Predictably, he alleges that he gets what he wants 
because he knows that "power always cornes from the barrel of a gun" (436). Then, 
presumably backing up his words with hard evidence, Leo draws a lump of money out of 
his pocket. The timing of his stylized, self-important gesture indubitably indicates that 
Leo stood up to the Korean, thus leaving him with little choice but to hand over Leo's 
accrued piece of the ante. Leo advocates this verdict with his finallist in the novel: "the 
Koreans will respect you ifyou stand up to them. The Chinese won't, and you never want 
to stand up to a Russian, you know, just stay away from a Russian bookie, no matter 
what. The Jews are still the best, taken aU in all, and 1 don't say that because we're 
Jewish, you know. It's just alliessons. Life is a set of lessons, and if you pay attention 
everyday, you'llleam them" (437). 
Though Jesse pays careful attention to his father, or perhaps because he takes such 
close notice ofhis father, he remains less than impressed with the man's less than subtle 
theatrics. Conceivably identifying with the young version of his own father, he intemally 
attributes the "biggish" size ofLeo's roll to "the smaU bills" it likely contains (437). A 
little later, Jesse also imagines Jong's perspective ofthe would-be mêlée: "in the middle 
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of the night, it was as ifhe saw Leo through the bookie's eyes, small-time. AH the talk. 
The whole system. The racetrack itself. Everything about it was very smaH-time. AH the 
theory in the world, and even aIl the money in the world, couldn't change that" (437-8). 
The smaIl-time, as Jesse discems, pertains to Leo's seemingly persistent refusai to accept 
even a measure of change. Whether he wins big or wins nothing at aH, as a man, a father, 
and a character, Leo never develops or grows. AH too predictable, Leo is one-
dimensional. In spite of the fact that he revels in the many stories of the track and 
fashions many theories about the track, he reduces the track to a set of inflexible patterns 
and mottoes. Leo plays up intricacy and inteIlectualism while he reduces these studied 
processes into sorne weird, personal paradigm. Supposing he thinks big and sees the big 
picture, he acts small. His actions in the everyday world reproduce his actions in the 
racetrack world. Moving within limited parameters, Leo cannot even do justice to 
himself, for justice, personal identity, social relation, and unpredictable circumstance are 
inextricably intertwined. 
In contradistinction to Jesse, and most ofthe other characters in Horse Heaven, 
Led only ever sees through his own eyes. The narrow lens ofLeo's world picture, as 
Jesse tinaIly understands it, ironicaHy recaHs Leo's tirst inventory in the novel. In the 
chapter titled "A Day at the Races," Leo accentuates the wide sociallayout of the track. 
Playing the cultural analyst in a move that recalls the social capital of the Greenlanders' 
Thing, he asserts, "There' s no place like the racetrack, son. Everyone of every sort is 
there. No one is excluded at the racetrack. Blacks, Jews, Hispanics, Chinese. Koreans 
love the racetrack. Kids play there. People picnic there. Families break bread together 
there at the racetrack. Rich, poor, and everything in between. It doesn't matter what you 
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do in your life, son, the richest man you will ever see will be someone you saw at the 
track, holding his tickets just like you. And probably the poorest you ever see will be at 
the track, too" (164). For aIl his pontificating, however, Leo assumes no active role 
within this inclusive social dynamic. He takes no stake in these many stories. Whereas 
nearly aIl the characters in Horse Heaven interact at sorne juncture, or have remote 
connections to each other as bettors, owners, trainers, or jockeys, Leo has no engagement 
with any other track-world figures. In the same way that he dismisses hunches or 
intuitions from his playing of the odds, he seems to disallow coincidence and interaction 
from intervening into his own story. As a result ofmaintaining an imposed distance from 
the other characters in the novel, his story remains self-contained. His story never 
intersects with any of the other stories. Because he essentially eliminates the odds of any 
social interconnection, Leo thereby resists the numerous potentials for character. A 
variant to other featured stories in Horse Heaven, his personal narrative ne ver moves 
forward. 
Leo's demonstrably limited movement or range reflects upon sorne ofSmiley's 
equally conspicuous personages in her 1995 novel Moo, which is a precursor to Horse 
Heaven. Like its sequel, Moo incorporates a considerable cast of characters (over thirty) 
and a substantial number of chapters (seventy). Moo is a social comedy about campus life 
in the 1989-1990 academic year at Moo University, the center of a small, unidentified 
town located somewhere in the Midwest. In the four-hundred-plus-page novel, Marly 
Hellmich is one of only a few characters not involved in intellectual pursuit, academic 
administration, or grant application. She works in Moo U' s cafeteria. Perhaps anticipating 
Leo's initiallist oftrack types in Horse Heaven, Marly's story begins with her mental 
297 
register of the half-freakish, half-inane patchwork of "types" that pass through her food 
line: 
There were all physical types, from the blackest Africans to the palest 
northern Europeans ... from the tallest-maybe seven feet-to the 
shortest, maybe three. They rolled through in wheelchairs, hobbled 
through on crutches, lifted their trays with hooks (farm accidents, most of 
those), carried white canes, followed guide dogs, watched her lips, wore 
hearing aids. They twitched and hunched and limped, or they seemed to 
dance. Breathtaking beauties ofboth sexes passed through the line. People 
who were quite the opposite ofthat did, too. There were girls who had 
shaved their heads and boys who had hair down to their waists, and vice 
versa. A few had tattoos on their faces, more had them on their arms. 
People in thousand-dollar suits stood next to people in tom sweats and T-
shirts, but everyone had on shoes and shirts. That was a health rule and the 
only sort ofuniformity. (Mao 26) 
This long list underscores the physical properties ofidentity. Marly moves from the body 
types, through the props, to the trends that distinguish character. In her estimation, the 
only regularity in this lineup follows from the single banal rule everyone attends to in 
order to be served. Uniforms, in the deregulated combination of shoes and shirts, uphold 
a measure ofhomogeneity. 
Marly's rernarks on the rnany external properties of character, sorne selected and 
sorne not, inevitably carry over into the internaI qualities of character. As a person 
chooses her cane, clothes, or haircut, she fashions her identity. Yet these fabricated or 
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embelli shed physical traits do not always accurately reveal the multidimensional angles 
of identity. As expected, everyone has secrets and longings, and everyone suppresses 
these in one way or another. Smiley foregrounds this discrepancy between outwardness 
and inwardness or between projected identity and protected identity with the setting of 
her novel. Though Moo takes place in a college envirorunent, the most compelling figures 
in the narrative are Marly, Loren Stroop, Earl Butz, and Joy Pfisterer, all ofwhom are 
non-academics. By the end of the novel, which, like a play, has five parts, each ofthese 
complex and misunderstood personalities literally opens a door to a new identity. Distinct 
from the later Leo, these apparently peripheral characters willfully vary their individual 
stories. 
At the age ofthirty-five, Marly lives with her father. She attends church twice a 
week. Her boyfriend, Travis, is a long-distance truck driver. When stationary, he stays 
with his wife and children in Pennsylvania. Notwithstanding her unhappiness, Marly 
keeps their affair a secret. Her lot in life changes, however, when Nils Harstad, Moo U's 
fifty-five year-old dean of extension who sees her as a virginal, late-twenty-something, 
plain, trusting, frugal woman (59-61), proposes marriage to her. No fool, Marly takes into 
account the lackluster job that she could quit and the SUffiS of money that she could 
spend. She accepts his offer. Regrettably, before long she cornes to find her fiancé 
insufferable. Moreover, her unanticipated engagement to a relatively wealthy 
administrator, what could be called her putative lucking out, quickly alienates her from 
her friends. "As Nils Harstad's wife-to-be," she finally admits, "she had long ago become 
a degree untrustworthy" (361). As a result ofher revisiting melancholy, she decides to 
take an active stake in changing the parameters ofher story. In the final scene that 
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includes Marly, she spontaneously climbs through the open door of Travis' tractor-trailer. 
Without warning, and without caring about her eventual destination, she leaves town, the 
first time that she has gone off on her own. 
Loren Stroop's last action in the novel hinges on an open door as weU. Despite his 
advanced age, the farmer and inventor spends the better part of his time rebuilding and 
refining a machine that will revolutionize American agriculture. Yet, ever suspicious of 
what he labels "the FBI, the CIA, and the big ag businesses" or "companies" (85,85-6, 
87, 165, 167,289,291,358), he wears a buUet-proofvest, hides his blueprints, and tests 
his contraption only in the dark. He aims to donate his invention to Moo University. 
Before he gets the opportunity to exhibit his creation, he suffers a stroke. Months later, he 
returns home from unproductive rehabilitation half-paralyzed and unable to speak. He 
limps and shuffles. He coos and moos. Bored, and alone in the midst of a late-winter 
snowstorm that delays his caretaker, he decides to check up on the assailable invention 
stashed in his barn. Once he laboriously dresses himself, he manages to press his front 
door ajar just enough so that the "wind took it and slammed it against the house" (358). 
He laments his inability to close the wide-open door: "Y ou didn't want to leave it like 
that, letting aU the heat out, but he didn't have much choice" (358). Weak and weary, he 
soon slips in the snow. Unable to get up, he dies. As it tums out, Loren's invention do es 
indeed mysteriously disappear from his property. His original drawings, nevertheless, are 
found. These designs, willed to the university, end up being Moo U's "Deus ex 
Machina," as Smiley's chapter heading makes clear (388). By patenting the machine, the 
university, which is undergoing severe cutbacks, "could earn millions" (389). Due to his 
death, which is timely insofar as it saves the university positions and programs that are 
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about to be curtailed, Loren is remembered not only as an eccentric, paranoid farmer, but 
also as an ingenious, charitable man. Though he has no choice but to leave his front door 
open, he makes the choice first to open it. With this deliberate, last act, he adds to his 
story by extending it into the future. 
In acts four and five of Mao, Joy Pfisterer actively reorients the direction ofher 
story, while Earl Butz, a hog, culminates his story. In fact, Earl's movements reveal that 
he has a personality and a stake in his own story, not to mention a story at aIl. In "It Ain't 
the Eiffel Tower," Smiley can be seen to reemphasize his story when she describes Earl 
as "the totally innocent porcine hero of [her] novel" (337). His story opens Mao. Earl, a 
Landrace boar, is unofficially penned in Old Meats, a rundown, unused building in the 
center of campus. As the object ofhog expert Dr. Bo Jones' covert research, Earl's 
business is "eating, only eating, and forever eating" (Mao 4). Bo's simple project is to see 
how big a pig, when "allowed to eat at will for the natural course ofhis lifespan," can 
possibly grow (6). Even so, Bo disregards his line of investigation when, following the 
fall of European Communism, he plans and pursues a hog-hunting expedition in newly 
opened Central Asia. The hidden Landrace boar likewise loses interest in the fattening 
experiment. Once he somehow recollects the gambols in the green grass with his siblings 
that predate his near two-year confinement, Earllearns to prefer daydreaming and 
thinking over eating and eating (270). While his owner chases down hogs in their natural 
environment, Earl longs for his former freedom and movement. In early spring, he gets 
his chance to escape confinement. When a crane bites down on Old Meats, which was 
slated for demolition due to budget cuts, Earl rushes from his collapsing pen. "[A]s big as 
a Volkswagen Beetle but much faster," he rockets around the open, but "not empty," 
301 
campus (371). Unaccustomed to exertion, in little time he slows, stops, and falls to his 
side on the white-not green--earth. Pains then shoot in his left foreleg, as his body 
trembles, and he dies of a heart attack. By way of his gutsy getaway, Earl himself proves 
the long-contradicted rumors about "the secret hog at the center of the university" (371). 
While he confirms his clandestine story, he validates his own memory of space and play. 
Much like Marly, Joy redirects her personal story. Not a holder of an advanced 
degree, Joy works as Equine Manager at Moo U, runs a riding club, and lives with Dr. 
Dean Jellinek, from Animal Science. First "obsessed with cloning" (54), then obsessed 
with artificiallactation, Dean customarily secures funding for his projects, since he is a 
"great grant proposaI writer" (55). Dean's synthetic quests naturally depress Joy, who 
loves animaIs. She also cornes to doubt his moral character. In response to her rising 
skepticism and clinical depression, a condition Dean effortlessly dismisses by saying that 
Joy is "in a bad mood aIl the time" (95), he, like the Earl of old, eats and eats and eats 
(218,222-3,297). Downcast on many levels, and no longer able to abide Dean's nonstop 
discourse on hormone manipulation, a monologue that only his eating interrupts, Joy runs 
from the house one cold night without her coat. When she retums, Dean noticesthat "the 
frontdoor [is] wide open" (300). Rebuking her, he begins holding forth on a major 
expenditure of the midwestem economy ("Heat is expensive!") until he recognizes that 
she is suffering from hypothermia (300). Still, unlike the comparable fates of Loren and 
Earl, Joy survives the first winter of the new decade. When Moo ends, Dean and Joy are 
in therapy. He, understanding, now listens. She, conscientious, now stifles her sighs. 
Nevertheless, Joy's story does not conclude in suppression or self-restraint. As the 
only intertextual figure in Smiley's fiction, seven years and three seasons after the cold 
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spring that concludes Moo, she returns as Joy Gorham, mare manager of Tompkins 
Ranch, Califomia, in Horse Heaven. Despite her recurrent signs of depression, symptoms 
that her mother attributes to her "life choices," Joy is "content" no, longer to be "smiling 
and nodding" as her "old boyfriend Dean" frustratingly lectures "on and on about sorne 
lOO-percent unnatural animal-breeding project" CHorse Heaven 26-7). Although less 
straightforward or immediate than the actions of Marly, Loren, and Earl, Joy chooses to 
modify her story as weil. The self-directed maneuvering of these four characters, and 
Joy's jockeying in particular, set up and lead into the exponential aspects of character and 
narrative that Smiley explores in Horse Heaven. 
Stories 
Smiley uses the racetrack to speculate on the unpredictable course, coincidences, 
and odds of stories working out. These multiple conjectures account for the episodic 
structure of Horse Heaven, as weIl as its encyclopedic storylines. Although she separates 
her many characters at the macro level by means of her prefatory playlist, many of her 
manifold stories overlap. Her players are not circumscribed by the initial settings that 
distinguish them. With a motif emblematized by Sir Michael Ordway, who is presented 
as a "horse agent [and] peer of the realm" under the heading "Everywhere" (xvi), most of 
the characters in Horse Heaven travel or relocate. Circulation govems the track and the 
unique fates of people and horses. As sure as horses run around a track, they similarly 
aspire to run around many tracks. Owners, trainers, assistant trainers, jockeys, exercise 
riders, grooms, and masseurs, among a host of less essential associates, follow the horses 
that they are affiliated with on these national, and sometimes transoceanic, racing tours. 
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The structure of Smiley's "Cast of Characters" insinuates the international scope 
of the racetrack. Moving from the local to the global, and the particular to the general, 
she commences with headings that feature American racetracks, cities, and states, as she 
progresses to the world-stage. Indicatively, her final four headings are "Texas," 
"France," "Everywhere," and "Horses" (xvi). The move that she orchestrates from 
"Everywhere" to "Horses" implies that horses are somehow more than everywhere, just 
as everywhere is more than France, and France is more than Texas. Horses, the author 
intimates, bring something more than globalism to the track. These equine characters in 
someway surpass the logic of conventional demarcation, spatial or otherwise. By 
extension, the human companions of these horses can also take advantage of this 
indeterminate transcendence: horse heaven. 
Under "Horses," Smiley lists the names of six racehorses. Whereas she briefly 
describes her human characters by virtue of where they live and what they do, she 
portrays this final handful of fictional figures in terms of their body markings and their 
places of breeding. These highly abbreviated reports poeticalIy downplay the lengthy list 
of forebears traditionalIy used to ascertain the value and estimate the potential of 
individual Thoroughbreds. Because purebreds are defined by their pedigree, as the first 
sentence of Smiley's prologue acknowledges, "AlI the Jockey Club knows about them is 
parentage, color, markings" (3). Documentation ofhorse lineage is comprehensive and 
exact. 
InA Year at the Races, Smiley clarifies that the detailed record ofthese 
bloodlines goes back to the eighteenth century. Integrating a somewhat stealthy reference 
to human genealogy, she states, "Records have been kept about the racing and breeding 
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of Thoroughbred horses for almost three-hundred years, especially in England, where the 
General Studbook is not unlike Burke 's Peerage. Every horse at every Thoroughbred 
track in the world is a statistical unit. His parentage for at least sixty-two generations 
(since the publication of the first volume of the General Studbook in 1791) is known. His 
performance in every race, and even in every training work, is recorded somewhere" (7). 
In keeping with racecourse standards, Smiley unsurprisingly incorporates a number of 
horse ancestries, fictional and non-fictional, into Horse Heaven. Every racehorse has her 
family tree. Every racehorse has predecessors looking down at her from horse heaven. In 
contrast to biblical and narrative conventions, Smiley's human characters do not come 
with these family lines in Horse Heaven. These characters are not encumbered or typed 
because of their names, as the Greenlanders often are by virtue of their patrilineal naming 
system. Human histories, titles, and names, unlike equine ones, do not automatically 
matter at the track and its pari-mutuel booths. 
In his novel Bob the GambIer, Frederick Barthelme suggests that gambling, 
perhaps like nothing else, offers its individual practitioners the opportunity to play in 
what he would call the big time. Barthelme's protagonist, a blackjack devotee, tells his 
wife that "[gambling]'s the only thing we can play out of our league. Where ifs like, real. 
The pro tour, whatever. Real as it gets" (150). When his wife doubtfully replies, "That's 
something we want?," he responds with an appeal to the justice of gambling: "Always. 
Everybody. Maybe the only thing we want" (150). Racetrack enthusiasts also participate 
in this "real" version of play-from the horse owners to the stable boys, the academics to 
the autodidacts, the octogenarians to the ingénues, the African-Americans to the 
Cantonese, and the wealthy to the poor. The plural nature of this cultural setting sanctions 
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a measure of equality that the everyday world cannot always furnish. At the racecourse, 
where everyone has the equal opportunity to play and influence her own odds of success, 
people and classes can always mix. Nepotism and name recognition have no impact on 
race results. 
The track also offers a justness that professional sports cannot accommodate, 
whether the Pro Tour of golf, the World Series of baseball, or the World Cup of soccer. 
There are far fewer naturals in the gambling world. For human "stumblebums and stars" 
alike (Agee 333), victorious racetrack wagering ordinarily depends on something other 
than natural size, strength, reflex, or gift. The fact that cheating at the track is next to 
impossible for a betlor adds to this parity. A horse cannot be bribed like a boxer or a 
baseball team. Yet a horse can be doped. Corrupt owners, trainers, and jockeys can 
engage in this lawlessness to influence the outcome of races. While horses absorb the true 
costs of cheating, wins translate into fame and money for treacherous swindlers. The 
blood-doping and over-training of a horse in the service of winning can turn out to be 
fatal to a victimized racer. 
A goveming trope in A Year at the Races is the fragility of horses. As Smiley 
shows in this book, horses, which require tremendous investments ofmoney, time, 
energy, and love, pass away from heart atlacks (50), infections (67), lung aneurisms (77), 
racing accidents (84), and colic or intestinal twisting (261), among other natural frailties 
and unnatural events. One of the handful of "heavens" in Horse Heaven is the fact that 
none of her principal horses dies. Smiley do es not sacrifice any of these characters to 
principle as she does the majority ofher characters in The Greenlanders. Because of 
trainer Buddy Crawford's practices, however, the filly Residual cornes very close to 
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being killed at the races. Though Buddy recognizes that at the track "the only sure thing 
is that a sure thing is never a sure thing" (565), he attempts to replace manifest 
uncertainty with marked certainty. As an alternative to caring for and training Residual, 
Buddy drugs her and overworks her with the help of crooked equine-practitioner Curtis 
Doheny. Effectively limiting the distinctive and celebrated maybes of the racetrack, the 
notorious pair takes illegal risks in order to shorten the long odds against winning. 
Buddy is the solitary dishonest trainer in Horse Heaven. He also happens to be the 
single religious character in the novel. At times, he applies a spurious, superstitious 
version of Christianity to himself. While in these fugues, he stops mistreating horses in an 
effort to increase his own odds ofhaving a good life. For Buddy, horses are alwaysa 
meanS to something else. TeUingly, Buddy is also the only character in the novel to spend 
time in "heU." He uses this noun to describe the torment he undergoes once he gets to the 
Breeders' Cup Classic, the American racing destination that eludes him for the duration 
ofhis thirty-year career. With a representationaUy ironic move, Buddy's descent from 
horseracing heaven to personal "heU" occurs just as his filly Residual wins her race 
(614). When she crosses the finish line to capture the eminent Breeders' Cup Distafftitle, 
Buddy is "spin[ning]," "coughing," and completely confused (613-4). "Looking right at it 
but not seeing it," he fails to experience the filly's highly improbable win (614). Given 
the pertinent timing of his unprecedented breakdown, his "terr[ or]" matches Residual' s 
post-race fright (614). Once Buddy, "who didn't even know that he had won!," arrives in 
the winner's circle with the help ofhis team, and he carefully observes Residual, he 
remarks to himself that "She was beyond exhausted, beyond afraid. She was done for" 
(614). For the first time, Buddy empathizes with a horse. 
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The condition that Buddy and Residual share in the penultimate chapter of the 
novel (the last episode before the multileveled epilogue) recalls a memorable statement 
made by Buddy near the beginning of Horse Heaven. Masking callousness as common 
sense, Buddy declares that horses are dispensable so long as they win before they expire: 
"If the fucking horse falls over two steps after the finish line, he's done his job that he 
was bom into this world to do" (17). Both clearly fortunate, neither character dies after 
winning the race. As Smiley illustrates in the epilogue, Residual retires to a farm while 
Buddy retums to training (619-20). The implication, however, is that Buddy cannot 
retreat from horse training until he duplicates his outside chances of retuming to the big 
time level. Although he makes it to the Breeders' and retums with his trainer's stake of 
Residual' s prize, not to mention the cachet and soon-to-be increased remuneration 
befitting such a distinction, he never experiences what is most likely the culmination or 
defining moment of his vocation. 
Smiley puts the experience ofwinning into words in A Year at the Races: 
"Gamblers everywhere will always feel that Heaven reached down and touched them 
personally if they win" (245). It is not hard to imagine that Smiley is obliquely 
referencing the halfpious, halfpitiless Buddy. Despite the fact that he is not a 
horseplayer per se, he devotes a considerable amount ofhis time and energy to the track. 
In so doing, his diligent investment in horses, just or not, runs a parallei course to that of 
pari-mutuel gamblers. Because he refuses to play according to the rules of the racecourse, 
though, he fails to experience the real reward of gambling. Notwithstanding the fact that 
he finally wins the Breeders', that he finally beats the longest of alliong odds, heaven 
still evades Buddy, on earth at least. 
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Residual narrowly endures the "raging case ofpleuropneurnonia" that Buddy's 
training tactics instigate (614). Her survival therefore speaks to the manipulation of 
animal destinies featured throughout Horse Heaven. Though all of Smiley' s six principal 
horses escape death, each of these "characters" has a sporadic and unpredictable fate. Mr 
T., for instance, a twenty-year-old gelding that won over $300,000 in stakes under the 
registered name Terza Rima, is found starving in the grassless fields of a small farm in 
Texas at the start of the novel. Due to the pleas in a letter from eleven year-old Audrey 
Schmidt who lives nearby (23-4), Mr. T is rescued from these inhurnane circurnstances. 
Not long after Mr. Tompkins' secretary forwards Audrey's typed letter to mare manager 
Joy Gorham, a truck carries Mr. T to the Tompkins Ranch in Califomia, where he 
previously trained. Mr. T starts to mentor the young filly Froney's Sis. Yet despite the 
fact that Froney's Sis wins a stakes race, she does not have a runner's natural desire or 
form. When the filly, no longer a maiden, retires from the racetrack, Joy moves Mr. T to 
another area of the same ranch, where he unpredictably reunites with his former trainer 
Farley Jones. Mr. T then guides or ponies for Farley's colt Limitless. As a result, Mr. T 
occupies a position on the team that escorts Limitless to Longchamp, Paris, for "The 
Grand Prix de l'Arc de Triomphe" (572), the French equivalent to the Breeders' Cup. Mr. 
T, who was bred in Germany and won stakes in France, as Audrey's letter detailed (23-
4), relishes his retum to these heavenly, wet, green pastures. He communicates these 
feelings to Elizabeth the horse-whisperer, along with everyone else around him. 
Revitalized, he canters like a youthful colt (579). As he does so, he channels his desire to 
retire in France. Given his request, and the consideration of Limitless' team, Mr. T do es 
not retum to the USA. 
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For his part, Limitless wins the race at Longchamp, a first for an American-bred 
horse. He do es not race again however. Farley and his owners, Rosalind and Alexander P. 
Maybrick, decide to sell Limitless for seven million dollars to Matsuo Oku Stud, a 
stallion farm on a small island in Japan where, as legend has it, "horses live forever" 
(618). The spokesperson for this farm is a "Mr. Nakadate" (618), which is likely Smiley's 
nod to Neil Nakadate, her most enthusiastic critic. An adaptation of the retirements of 
Residual, Mr. T, and Limitless, Froney's Sis experiences a similar withdrawal from the 
racetrack. In the aftermath ofher short-lived career, she finds herself at Ellen's hunter-
jumper stable and riding school in Maryland. Since "racing did not suit her" (597), Kyle 
Tompkins agrees to give Froney's Sis to Audrey, who works part-time for Ellen. Now 
fourteen, Audrey renames Froney's Sis Chantilly (621). Suitably, this change ofname 
reflects on another recent addition to Ellen's conspicuously unnamed stable. 
Around three months earlier, Ellen receives a big black horse that has just been 
gelded. She do es not know his name. In view of the fact that he always bucks and forever 
runs through her fields, she cannot read his identification tattoo. All she knows is that he 
was ruled off the racetrack for "savaging someone," and gelded because "he was still 
bananas" even without "the stress of racing" (518-9). He caIrns after a month, the usual 
testosterone tapering-offtime. A naturaljumper, he begins vaulting fences ofhis own 
volition. Because her new horse uses his instinct, Ellen names him Sudden Intuition, or, 
strangely, Toots (547). Later, while training him, she reiterates his odd double name: 
"Sudden Intuition, or Toots" (599). Confident in his newfound impulses, she never 
bothers to check his tattoo. She consequently never leams that his real name is Epie 
Steam, that he was "a three-million-dollar two-year-old" (143), and that he was convicted 
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of savagery for stomping an assistant starter in the gate (487-8). With his transition from 
the racecourse to Ellen's, his past does not matter. His innovative names calI attention to 
the possibilities of identity. With the starting gate behind him, he moves and jumps 
forward. History, gates, and fences, aIl of which can be seen as constraints on rus animal 
destiny, no longer demarcate his unique boundaries. 
Playing up the migrations of aIl the feature horses in Horse Heaven, Sudden 
Intuition or Toots starts over on account ofhis own salient actions and movements. In 
like fashion to Ellen herself, whose family name is never revealed, the altemating 
destinations, attributes, and names of Smiley's horses address the open, evolving nature 
ofhuman character. Names and titles neither delimit equine nor human identity. As 
illustrated in Moo, a single person can adopt multiple parts in a narrative. Reinforcing the 
correlation between Moo and Horse Heaven, Smiley peoples the margins of the sequel 
with a number of academics. Contributing to a sense of justice that consolidates 
expertise, luck, representation, and fate, these academics symbolically remain on the 
sidelines of the many narratives in Horse Heaven. 
Initiating what cornes to be a prolonged peripheral focus on the connections 
between scholarly conjecture and the lively sociallayout of the racetrack, horse-trainer 
Farley is likened to a "visiting physics prof essor" near the beginning of the novel (58). 
Later on, Smiley's free indirect narrator reminds readers that the likeable Farley 
resembles a "teacher or scientist" (468). Stressing what might be called the plurality and 
democracy ofboth scholastic and pari-mutuel approaches to revis ion and interpretation, 
Smiley integrates several other disparate references that associate versions of schoolwork 
to versions of track work. Louisa, who is the wife of horse-trainer Dick Winterson, for 
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example, "teaches vocal technique at a College in New York" (86). Characteristically 
lamenting what he dismisses as the unjust ratio of effort to reward at the track, at one 
point Buddy mentions his "Really fat" cousin who is a lazy "prof essor at a college or 
something" (130). In the same tangential vein, Ho Ho Ice Chill, a rap artist and racehorse 
owner, sleeps next to the doctoral dissertation of the woman he loves, a comparative 
literature prof essor at the college where he spent one year (145). Roberto Acevedo 
likewise postpones his formaI education. He defers his secondary schooling to be a 
jockey while still undersized. He disappears from the novel after he rides Limitless to an 
unprecedented American win at the Arc and moves in with Mlle. Lalande-Ferrier, who 
"has a position at the Sorbonne" (594). Furthermore representing a relation between 
international travel, education, and horseracing, Plato, an assistant prof essor at Berkeley 
who studied in England, gives up his academic post in order to be Kyle Tompkins' 
"house intellectual" in the "very new field" of "future management" (352). Throughout 
Horse Heaven, the majority of these characters emerge in secondary roles or as extras. 
Relegated for the most part to the background of intersecting plotlines, these figures have 
a tendency to be forgotten, faraway, or former academics. 
As runaway students, former prof essors, or would-be instructors, these characters 
draw attention to what Smiley sees as another category of scholar. Unsurprisingly, given 
Horse Heaven' s sideline emphasis on academics, in A Year at the Races she compares 
the track world to the academic world. She alleges that "The available public information 
on all the horses running in any race gives the advantage to retention and interpretation of 
detail, and around every racetrack there are dedicated interpreters of detail who have 
devoted as much time and energy to contemplation of their subject as any prof essor at 
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any university in the country. And no doubt the two categories of scholars have been 
remunerated to the same degree" (245). Smiley herself seems to be a member of both of 
these groups: she professes and she gambles. Neither purely an academic scholar nor 
merely a racecourse scholar, her identity is indistinct, like the developing identities ofher 
self-motivated characters. A dynamic personality, she goes on to saywhy she privileges 
racetrack wagering over other forms of legalized gambling. Lapsing into parataxis as she 
excitedly dilates upon horseplayers, she asserts that "It is always available to them to go 
out and watch the animaIs and their jockeys on the track eight or ten times a day, five or 
six days a week, aU year round. It is always available to them to recognize that, in 
addition to money, there are horses; in addition to greed, there is beauty and talent and 
effort and joy and heartbreak" (245). 
Smiley's evident enthusiasm for the multiple facets ofhorseracing, an interest that 
in due course highlights emotional attachment over dedicated interpretation, appears to 
elucidate why Justa Bob is the most compeHing equine character in her racetrack novel. 
His story is neither about money nor greed. Moreover, repetition and a series of "ands" 
typify the adapted Wanderlust form ofhis narrative. In distinction to the other hors es in 
Horse Heaven, Justa Bob inevitably journeys aH over the US because he is not a stakes 
horse. That is to say, he is not a big money, big race, big time horse. As a "claimer," he 
belongs to a different class of racehorses. Smiley clarifies this racetrack "staple" in a 
footnote in the first chapter of A Year At the Races. "Claiming races," she explicates, "are 
a staple oftracks aU over the world. A horse in a c1aiming race (a 'selling race' in 
England) may be bought by any owner for a set price, in cash, which the claiming party 
deposits in the racing secretary's office before the race. The price is set in the published 
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conditions of the race. As soon as the claimed horse goes into the starting gate, he 
belongs to the new owner no matter what happens in the race. Any winnings go to the 
previous owner" (19). Early in Horse Heaven, Roberto Acevedo translates the different 
types of racehorses into social classes after Justa Bob is claimed for the first time. Visibly 
saddened, Roberto notes that "Allowance races ... were like the middle-class-a realm 
ofhardworking stability that stakes horses rose out of on their way to wealth and 
greatness and claimers fell out of on their way to oblivion" (56). Standing in the winner's 
circle, the jockey laments the red claim-tag on Justa Bob's nose while trainer Farley puts 
the random fate of claimers into plain words: "You've got to run them in races they might 
win or you've got to retire them. But 1 hate to see [Justa Bob] go. He could end up 
anywhere. You know, horses start out in France and end up in North Dakota or Hong 
Kong" (56). 
His movements mapping America as they catalogue various racetrack characters, 
Justa Bob travels between many owners in Horse Heaven. Since his races are always 
dramatic, he promptly develops loyal fan followings wherever he competes. On account 
ofhis status as a claimer, he likewise lives on luck, both good and bad. Following his last 
win with Farley, he runs for Buddy, who is also in southem Califomia. After three more 
races with Roberto as his sole jock, Justa Bob then goes north to Golden Gate Fields, in 
San Francisco, where he runs a race with an unparalleled finale. He finishes first even as 
his jockey soars through the air after a competing horse lifts him off Justa Bob only 
seconds from the finish line. An inquiry follows as Justa Bob, unperturbed, dozes. 
Because the "book said one thing-that a horse must have a rider in order to win the 
race-but the heart said another," the post-race inquiry seemingly lasts "forever" (168). 
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In the end, racetrack officiaIs close their extended deliberation "by the book, placing the 
aggressor last and Justa Bob second to last" (168). Fred Linklater, Justa Bob's newest 
trainer, sees this turn of events as "the best loss he had ever sustained" (168). The reward, 
for trainer, spectator, adjudicator, and horse alike is the race itself. Albeit, the implication 
is thatjust as Justa Bob can customarily change homes, legislators can modify or amend 
the laws and regulations that govem and define their game. In lieu of directly dismissing 
Justa Bob's clearly proscribed finish, administrators reevaluate the justice of a particular 
track policy. By doing so, these judges affirm the dynamic nature of le gal systems. If a 
particular case can be evaluated as falling beyond or between lawful precedents, legality 
must make adjustments or corrections. Typified by Justa Bob's unpredictable migrations, 
justice must always be open to claims that extend, alter, or rectify its configuration and 
implementation. Also emblematic ofSmiley's encYclopedic project, the provinces of 
legality are never comprehensive: new instances, novel intersections, and unprecedented 
stories refine the structures of the law. 
Subsequent to his short yet thrilling tenure under the tutelage of Fred Linklater, 
trainer Lin Jay "The Pisser" Hwang, who is also in San Francisco, appropriates Justa 
Bob. Unfortunately for the aging horse and his latest trainer, Justa Bob sustains a quarter-
crack. The Round Pebble, a silent, eighty-year-old Cantonese woman who ordinarily does 
not like her son The Pisser's claimers, assumes the responsibility ofminding this 
unpredictable or "odds-defy[ing]" leg injury (217). Following his brief stint as The 
Round Pebble-'s "Iron Plum," which is what The Pisser's mother christens the sociable 
Justa Bob (217), he works with two new trainers in Denver, Colorado, namely, the young 
Lily Dodd and the Icelander Hakon Borgulfsson, before he continues east to Chicago, 
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Illinois. After a long road trip, Justa Bob arrives at William Vance's small farm suffering 
from dehydration. As is common in such precarious cases, the distressed and weakened 
horse develops colic, a painful, life-threatening obstruction of the intestines. Unable to 
choose "death" for an animal, even an aging six-year-old claimer that he has hitherto 
neither raced nor trained (304), William pays "sixty-eight hundred dollars" for Justa 
Bob's emergency surgical procedure (389). After three and a halfmonths ofrecuperation, 
Justa Bob retums to the track with William in New Orleans, Louisiana, where he 
startlingly wins and wins and wins-and always by the small margin of a "nostril" (389). 
Emphasizing these persistently narrow victories, the owner-trainer points out that "You 
can't run this horse ifyou got a weak heart. Or he'll kill you" (389). Though William 
makes over sixt Y thousand dollars from Justa Bob's inconceivable eight-consecutive 
wins, he "really likes" the fact that "Bettors around New Orleans love it. They love to bet 
on Justa Bob and they love to bet against him" (389). As "a sure thing who doesn't look 
like a sure thing" (389), the injury-prone claimer attains racetrack stardom because he 
relentlessly rallies to beat the odds against him. Illustrating that improbable stories can 
work out, Justa Bob is a model underdog. 
After his eighth-consecutive win, his photo-finish no se is tagged once again. Still 
seemingly delimited by Midwest locales, Justa Bob arrives somewhere in Texas. His 
latest owner, the suspicious RT Favor, "née Robert Biddle" (491), soon leaves him 
underfed and ignored. Without. waming, RT then disappears. As a result, the down-and-
out Justa Bob does not race. Given the claim-horse's faH into "oblivion," a disappearance 
his former jockey Roberto disappointingly envisaged (56), William, who is back in 
Chicago, tries to track down the horse. Unable to get any news of Justa Bob, William 
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places ads in two racing magazines offering cash reward for "Justa Bob, by Bob's Dusty, 
out of Justa Gal, by Rough Justice" (491). Giving up the search after six months, William 
endeavors to forget the memorable horse (550). Meanwhile, Angel Smith, a very slow, 
very old man, watches over RT's two largely neglected horses. They in turn care for their 
substitute caretaker by "stamping" and "whinnying and whinnying" until his wife cornes 
running after Angel collapses from a heart attack (590-1). No longer physically capable 
oftending his two rescuers, Angel sends RT's abandoned horses to an auction with his 
friend Horacio Delagarza. In spite ofhis "Fifty-four starts, twenty wins, [and] seventeen 
seconds or thirds" comprising a "lifetime winnings of $172,000," the "slaughter guy" 
buys the skeletal yet composed Justa Bob, now known simply as Amigo, for thirty 
measly dollars (603). 
In a remarkable twist offate, Horacio saves the life of the amicable "Amigo." 
Suddenly approaching the driver of the slaughterer's "double-bottomed cattle-truck, now 
crammed with [disposable] horses," Horacio negotiates the repurchase of the unusually 
familiar and self-possessed horse for less than two hundred dollars (604). Presumably 
aware that a cattle trailer "was just not his type of conveyance at aIl, at aIl," once the 
driver opens the door of the overcrowded truck, Justa Bob straightforwardly saunters 
down the ramp and gives "Horacio justa bump in the chest" (604). Without any 
prompting or coaxing whatsoever, the presumably doomed horse understands that sorne 
sort of oversight requires correction. As a supplementary materialization of Justa Bob's 
auspicious combination of fate, luck, and coïncidence, aIl of which seem to be 
emanations ofhis distinctively impressionable character, shortly after salvaging Justa 
Bob, first-time horse-owner Horacio contacts William through the Jockey Club. 
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Incomparably thrilled, and with "plenty of feed," William heads south for Texas in order 
to recover Justa Bob in the epilogue of Horse Heaven (617). Although just a claimer, 
Justa Bob manages to influence the irregular or coarse destiny that his lineage foretells. 
An out-of-the-ordinary emblem of the "Rough Justice" ofhorseracing, a caveat 
fundamental to the racetrack dictum "That's Rorses," Justa Bob somehow manages to 
beat the long odds against his racetrack success, not to mention his actual survival. The 
adventures of this claim-horse suggest that, irrespective of social class, fate and justice 
can be regulated and fulfiUed at individuallevels. Even unjustly underprivileged 
characters can contribute to the restructuring oftheir ill-fated personal destinies. 
In Horse Heaven, the statistical and genealogical units that typify Thoroughbred 
taxonomy do not determine Smiley's horses. In opposition to the stable identities put 
forth in the General Studbook, the physical and psychological identities of her horses 
tend to modify as they change locations; owners, and names. Smiley's horses are not 
merely variables and vessels. They work. They tire. They travel. They rest. As 
"individuals," they independently transform as they distinctively mature. Like people, 
they can take active stakes in shaping the evolution of their own stories. In opposition to 
the collective narrative the Greenlanders advocate, an endorsement that dismisses the 
chronic1es of many women in the colony, the ironic equine narratives of self-control in 
Horse Heaven, and Justa Bob's in particular, caU attention to the chances and accidents 
that human figures can consider so as to refashion the courses of their own stories. 
Perhaps taking a page from Aristotle, who conjectured that "coincidences are most 
striking when they have an air of design" ("Poetics" 55), Smiley's encyclopedic novel 
assimilates a ruling strategy wherein the movements and preferences of racehorses play 
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up the coincidences that cross and connect the stories of different people. Unlike the 
cruel, quarrelsome Buddy and the crazy, melodramatic Leo, both ofwhom are governed 
and controlled by the betting model "you win sorne and you lose sorne," attentive 
speculators can take advantage of any wager regardless of its upshot. As a reflection of 
this adaptability, these same conscientious gamblers can profit from haphazard 
encounters and improbable circumstances. 
Because they are neither resigned to the concessions of Lady Luck, nor 
discouraged by the results of particular races, composed horseplayers can contribute to 
the construction of their own unpredictable yet intersecting storylines, at the track and 
beyond it. As evidenced by the professional work of the animal-communicator Elizabeth 
(who writes books about human relationships [554-5]), human characters can make 
significant decisions in spite of the fate that oversees their everyday lives. Smiley 
insinuates her preoccupation with the twists and tums that connect, disconnect, and 
reconnect the narratives of her individual characters by integrating the motif of 
inattentiveness into Horse Heaven (122, 172, 176, 247, 394). This trope barely extends 
past the halfway point of the novel. Not to listen, the author shows, is at once to interact 
and not to interact. It is to be present and absent at one and the same time. Tellingly, 
Smiley phases this pattern out of her most complex work as she incorporates more and 
more international destinations into the fabric of her text. Travel, especially in an 
international context, integrates novelty, strangeness, culture shock, and a greater sense 
of self-awareness, all ofwhich encourage the individual agent to pay careful attention to 
the people that she encounters and the places that she visits. These global experiences 
translate into greater awareness-attention, integrity--<>n the home front. 
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Indicating an interconnection between movement, freedom, and justice, when 
people, especially married couples, physically separate, they begin to communicate in 
Horse Heaven. Such is the case with protagonist RosaIind Maybrick and her estranged 
husband Alexander P. Maybrick. A contemporary adaptation of Birgitta from The 
Greenlanders, Rozzy, who is also remarkably calm, has special "powers" (37). One of 
. . 
these unusual skills unwittingly enables her to make people cheerful. Exposing the link 
between her equanimity and the happiness that she instills in others, she identifies her 
inimitable quality of "self-possession" (31), before she fully comprehends how she 
involuntarily "cast[s] her speIl[s]" (36). In correspondence to Justa Bob, who inducesjoy 
in fans and some of his owners, Rozzy illustrates her self-assurance by ensuring that "she 
never has to be in a rush" (31). While in the public eye, neither of these two leading 
characters ever exudes a sense of dishevelment or discomfort. Never rushing, Justa Bob 
just wins. Forever calm, Rozzy radiates poise. As an additional analogue between these 
protagonists, in the same way that Justa Bob saves his new custodian Angel from a heart 
attack, Rozzy comforts the stranger Farley after his undefined public collapse (274). 
Given their discemibly attentive demeanors, and the lasting senses of fulfillment 
and achievement they not only evince but also evoke, each of these figures can be 
interpreted as a mapper of sorts. Inscribing his gripping story in the minds of local 
spectators and caretakers aIl through the US, and finally the Midwest, Justa Bob maps 
America. Recontextualizing Justa Bob's orientations globally, Rozzy, who was bom and 
schooled in Appleton, Wisconsin, "map[ s] the world" (401). Her story starting where 
Justa Bob's concludes (which is most likely in semiretirement as a mentor for William's 
upcoming racehorses in Chicago and New Orleans), as a socialite, art connoisseur, horse 
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owner, and "prophetess" (180) ex-Midwesterner Rozzy travels to Singapore, Ireland, 
Istanbul, Nice, and Edinburgh, among many stateside locations (371; 390; 415; 502; 
530). Compellingly, when she purchases art for her galleries, she immediately loses 
interest in the objects themselves. Thinking to herself, the cosmopolitan character reasons 
why: "What others thought was the product, beautiful rooms, was only the by-product. 
The product was the flow itself' (394). With this internai observation, which takes place 
on the same page whereupon Smiley discontinues her inattentiveness theme, Rozzy 
underscores the leitmotif of Horse Heaven. For her, as for Justa Bob, the "flow" or 
process matters more than the result, as when Justa Bob wins a race, then loses it because 
he has no rider. Because they privilege means over ends, Justa Bob and Rozzy do justice 
to themselves and to those around them. As judicious and attentive figures, figures Kant 
might read as mindful of the "categorical imperative" in aH of its unconditional a priori 
practical principles (33-77), they pay attention to themselves and to others in equal 
measure. As Kant emphasizes, the "one end" of the categorical imperative (43), which 
"declares an action to be objectively necessary without reference to any purpose, i.e., 
without any other end" (42), is indeed the "natural necessity" of "happiness" (43): 
Elucidating that happiness, though a necessity, is not always a reality, Al, who is 
at odds with his wife Rozzy, likewise decides to travel widely. An entrepreneur, he 
manages industrial projects in Moscow, Lithuania, Japan, Rio de Janeiro, and Helsinki, 
among other destinations (366; 449; 530; 530; 569). Yet after being alienated from one 
another for more than a year (save for brieftelephone caUs beset by static), the couple 
reconciles at the Pré Catalan (a restaurant they visited on their honeymoon in Paris over a 
decade before) to celebrate the improbable win of their horse Limitless at the Arc de 
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Triomphe (588-9). By way ofher long-shot success, Limitless reintroduces and rejoins 
the couple. This outwardly random turn of events recalls how Mr. T introduced and 
united horse-trainer Farley and mare-manager Joy. Neither knowing the other's name, 
they first fall in love from a distance at a race (232-3). Both single and secretly more-or-
less obsessing over a solitary glimpse of an elusive stranger, they finally meet again-
simultaneously thinking "lucky me" (307)-when Joy leads Mr. T to Farley's barn nearly 
three months later. In order for each of these impromptu rapports to rekindle, these 
individual characters needed an amalgamation of space, time, privacy, luck, and 
confidence so as to reestablish their senses of selthood. Unique fulfillment insists on this 
vetted stake in the self, a risky pledge that permits the individual to begin to act justly-
an endless beginning indicating that narratives are never just. Rather, stories are always 
capable of moving towards justice. 
Conclusion 
Risks and Starts 
At once fashioned as prudent synopses and persuasive finales, closing arguments 
attempt to convince adjudicators of the justness of a particular story. Naturally, the legal 
processes that precede a counsel's final statement influence the formulation ofthis 
argument. No matter how diligently and with how much conviction an attorney designs 
and delivers her case, her last remarks, like the ones she makes during a trial, reveal the 
shared deliberations that jurisprudence demands-not just the narrative that she 
preplanned. A counsel's position evolves in conjunction with the interchanges that 
constitute juridical procedure. If a triallawyer disregards the unpredictable developments 
that define the legal process, she does a disservice to her client and to jurisprudence. In 
the same way as fictional dispositions to justice incorporate narratological interventions, 
as weIl as analytic adjustments and textual corrections, the law must implicate itself in 
constant reconceptualization. As the vehicle for the allocation of the ideal of justice, 
judicial reflection must be as arguable as the conception of justice itself. Even on the 
home front, justice cannot be served in one way only. 
As configured in the work of Jonathan Franzen, Don DeLillo, and Jane Smiley, 
local administrations of justice are informed through prolonged deliberations mediated 
through global experiences. In The Corrections, Valparaiso, and Horse Heaven, for 
example, principal characters travel to international spaces in order to escape the 
contrivances of American forms oflegality. In leaving the USA, and in eventually fleeing 
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war-tom Lithuania, Chip Lambert of The Corrections identifies a connection between 
self-justification and self-correction. His revelatory auto-correction begins after he gets 
caught in a political coup and a life-threatening armed robbery in an outlaw zone. While 
in the empty, lawless space between two Baltic states, the unlikely hero of The 
Corrections realizes that no one has a monopoly on victimhood. As a victim, Chip 
recognizes that revenge cannot cancel out the injustices perpetrated upon him. Instead, he 
justifies his allegedly unjust actions by articulating the narratives of others. By traveling 
and by telling the stories of his family members, he legitimates the personal actions that 
the campus tribunal at D- College adjudicates as unjust. Justice, Chip shows, is not 
about one single event or narrative. Because they leave the continental US as well, Chip's 
cosmopolitan sister Denise and his suburban mother Enid likewise associate validation 
with the ability to appreciate the countless stories of the people around them. Justice 
inevitably concems more than one pers on and therefore presumes the dimensions of 
narrative, if not novels. In distinguishing the countless stories around them, Enid and 
Denise recognize the participatory inevitability of justice. Justice obtains in social 
environments, where people have to tutor themselves in cooperation and getting along. 
ln Valparaiso, Michael Majeski ultimately avoids a similar notion oflegal 
restraint by unexpectedly embarking upon an aircraft bound for the tip of the Americas. 
Without regular travel tickets or plans, he lands in Valparaiso, Chile, a continent away 
from his scheduled destination of Valparaiso, Indiana. lronically tuming around the 
submission to systems that ostensibly saves him from suicide in the turbulent air 
somewhere above South America, Michael rec1aims his sense of individuality by acting 
out his death on a televised talk show. This public performance enables him to escape the 
circumscription that the machinations of the media represent, as emblematized by his 
wife Livia's silent and endless pedaling on her stationary bike. In openly "dying," 
Michael regains his right to privacy. In sanctioning his official death, he reclaims the 
movement and isolation that individuals require, in Don DeLillo's estimation at least. 
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Like Chip, who performs a series of escapes to and from global spaces, Michael 
leaves the US because he finds himself alienated, then departs from the US where he 
finds himself victimized by the circumlocutions of the media. His sense of justice results 
not from an understanding of the stories of others per se, but from a newfound 
appreciation ofhis own, changeable story. He realizes that he can modify the limits ofhis 
narrative according to his will-a will that first requires an experience akin to the 
aloneness that Chip encounters on his solo, predawn walk to the Polish border. Chip and 
Michael both experience versions of the isolation that compromises justice. Though 
justice mediates interpersonal relations, it aIso works at the individuallevel. These 
scenarios suggest that justice can take in tiny or grand spaces, but the ultimate test of 
justice is about the disposition of the characters to assume ajust attitude even while 
alone. Justice begins with an understanding of the selfprior to one's entry into social 
systems. 
In another adaptation of independence and justice as arbitrated through global 
experiences, private and public spaces, and responsive actions, Rosalind Maybrick of 
Horse Heaven mns from and returns to the US. As she travels, she integrates herself into 
the staries of strangers. She extends the margins of her own narrative at the same time. A 
wish granter, Rozzy's advantageous intuitions mn counter to the laborious calculations 
that tend to determine legal apparatuses, as exemplified in the precincts of the pari-
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mutuel and the racetrack. For Rozzy, as for her Horse Heaven co-hero, the popular claim-
horse Justa Bob, success and survival are the consequences of unpredictable movements 
and intersections. In opposition to Leo the pitiable gambling fanatic, who is dissatisfied 
with his life because he fails to distinguish the differences between routine and instinct, 
not to mention between betting and living, Rozzy and Justa Bob exert free agency by 
insinuating themselves into random narratives. Like Diana in DeLillo's The Engineer of 
Moonlight, these two characters justify their dealings, and those of the people around 
them, by not only abiding but also welcoming the risky opportunities that force them to 
adapt to new environments. According to Smiley, justice is instituted through the 
commemoration of multiple stories. Every one of these stories, in tum, leads to another 
constellation of unprecedented and interminable narratives. 
In depicting altemate emanations of spatial escape and personal adaptation, 
Smiley, DeLillo, and Franzen recall and invert the circumstances under which 
McTeague's narrative concludes. In the last lines of Frank Norris' naturalistic novel 
McTeague, the title character finally finds himself left for dead in an empty space 
handcuffed to the man whom he has just murdered. The rapid death ofhis ally-tumed-
adversary satirically augurs McTeague's own slow demise. McTeague is left in a 
theatrical space suddenly rendered untheatrical. His story ends along with the novel. 
Without an audience or an antagonist, he cannot persist. Like a Greenlander locked in rus 
farmstead, McTeague expires when he can no longer share his story. Even the hero ofthe 
Inuit film Atarnajuat, who reclaims his sense of individuality by successfully fleeing bis 
persecutors in the vast arctic, survives because others integrate him into their communal 
story. In contrast to McTeague, Atamajuat shares his story after he locates his 
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personhood in isolation. He lives to share his story not because he escapes the would-be 
killers of a neighboring clan, but because strangers nurse his naked body-which is a text 
ofbattle-scars and frostbite lesions-back to health. Neither murder, nor escape, nor 
isolation guarantees survival. Rather, novelistic narratives do. 
In contemporary American fiction, protagonists endure variable versions of 
victirnhood because they widen the scope oftheir personal experiences. Not alone, 
silenced, or imprisoned within domestic spheres, lead characters in DeLillo, Smiley, and 
Franzen reconstitute the limits of their own lives by participating in impromptu 
international activities. As they illustrate the prevalence of justice within the everyday 
lives of Americans, aIl three authors elaborate on how global experiences inform local 
enactments of jurisprudence. Deliberated and delivered in campus tribunal s, suburban 
homes, airplane cabins, television studios, theatres, casinos, and racecourses, spectacles 
of justice abound in conternporary American culture. Consequently, US citizens 
constantly participate in acts of justice. They do so as judges, plaintiffs, defendants, or 
witnesses. Spectacular or not, evolving implementations of legality occupy a vital place 
in the individuallives~r stories~f the mass collective. 
In law and literature, the idea of "representation" is central. Chip, as narrator, 
bears witness to his own misguided behavior. Michael Majeski acknowledges a mishap 
and near suicide. Gunnar, the survivor in Smiley's The Greenlanders, inscribes the story 
of a disappearing Nordic civilization into his writing and weaving as a representation of 
what has happened. The free indirect narrator of Horse Heaven openly concludes her 
representation of the racetrack with a focus on proliferating and uncontainable narratives. 
The reason that legality offers a crucial place in the lives of people is that it, too, implies 
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a convergence ofrepresentation with lived reality. Like representative fictional 
characters, people have ideas about what is just and they represent these ideas to 
themselves as truth. But the law will reprove and correct its subjects when those ideas 
diverge too far from the law. Fictional narratives articulate these same discrepancies and 
departures. In the courtroom, a lawyer represents one or sometimes one represents 
oneself. In the end, that representation may not be the truth either; it is just how 
individuals persevere in relation to reality. For this reason, justice requires multiple 
stories. F ocused on parity, strengthened by conditionality, relying on refutation, juridical 
practice continues its onward march because it requires correction--or more stories-as 
weIl. Legality develops not because of precedents but because of transitions. 
Jurisprudence is only fair when it risks its claims to justness. Never conclusive, justice 
eulogizes the trajectories that contemporary American fiction makes a virtue of 
witnessing-and representing. 
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